The year when the world came to know of the wonderful potential of nuclear
energy, Homi Jehangir Bhabha, prime architect of India's atomic energy
programme, prophesied that we would apply it to produce electricity in just
two decades.
Five decades have passed. Bhabha's dream is still unfulfilled.
We have spent millions of rupees in setting up 12 nuclear power reactors
across the country. But what these have achieved is less than 3 per cent of
the envisaged capacity.
Worse, these power plants are disasters in the making. For, we continue
with outmoded reactors.
What throttled our ambitious energy programme?
In a five-part series, Senior Associate Editor George Iype investigates why
the sector is ailing. And how it is a threat to public safety.
PART 1: 'A failure on all
fronts!'
PART 2:
Disasters-in-the-make
PART 3:
The Russian connection
PART 4:
Not power, bombs!
PART 5:
Experts speak!
FREE AGENTS
This spring the U.S. State Department reported that South Asia has replaced
the Middle East as the leading locus of terrorism in the world. Although
much has been written about religious militants in the Middle East and
Afghanistan, little is known in the West about those in Pakistan-perhaps
because they operate mainly in Kashmir and, for now at least, do not
threaten security outside South Asia. General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's
military ruler, calls them "freedom fighters" and admonishes the West not
to confuse jihad with terrorism. Musharraf is right about the
distinction-the jihad doctrine delineates acceptable war behavior and
explicitly outlaws terrorism-but he is wrong about the militant groups'
activities. Both sides of the war in Kashmir-the Indian army and the
Pakistani "mujahideen"-are targeting and killing thousands of civilians,
violating both the Islamic "just war" tradition and international law.
Pakistan has two reasons to support the so-called mujahideen. First, the
Pakistani military is determined to pay India back for allegedly fomenting
separatism in what was once East Pakistan and in 1971 became Bangladesh.
Second, India dwarfs Pakistan in population, economic strength, and
military might. In 1998 India spent about two percent of its $469 billion
GDP on defense, including an active armed force of more than 1.1 million
personnel. In the same year, Pakistan spent about five percent of its $61
billion GDP on defense, yielding an active armed force only half the size
of India's. The U.S. government estimates that India has 400,000 troops in
Indian-held Kashmir-a force more than two-thirds as large as Pakistan's
entire active army. The Pakistani government thus supports the irregulars
as a relatively cheap way to keep Indian forces tied down.
What does such support entail? It includes, at a minimum, assisting the
militants' passage into Indian-held Kashmir. This much Pakistani officials
will admit, at least privately. The U.S. government believes that Pakistan
also funds, trains, and equips the irregulars. Meanwhile, the Indian
government claims that Pakistan uses them as an unofficial guerrilla force
to carry out "dirty tricks," murders, and terrorism in India. Pakistan, in
turn, accuses India's intelligence service of committing terrorism and
killing hundreds of civilians in Pakistan.
Pakistan now faces a typical principal-agent problem: the interests of
Pakistan (the principal) and those of the militant groups (the agent) are
not fully aligned. Although the irregulars may serve Pakistan's interests
in Kashmir when they target the Indian army, they also kill civilians and
perform terrorism in violation of international norms and law. These crimes
damage Pakistan's already fragile international reputation. Finally, and
most important for Pakistanis, the militant groups that Pakistan supports
and the Sunni sectarian killers that Pakistan claims it wants to wipe out
overlap significantly. By facilitating the activities of the irregulars in
Kashmir, the Pakistani government is inadvertently promoting internal
sectarianism, supporting international terrorists, weakening the prospect
for peace in Kashmir, damaging Pakistan's international image, spreading a
narrow and violent version of Islam throughout the region, and increasing
tensions with India-all against the interests of Pakistan as a whole.
PAKISTAN, TALIBAN-STYLE?
The war between India and Pakistan over the fate of Kashmir is as old as
both states. When Pakistan was formally created in 1947, the rulers of
Muslim-majority states that had existed within British India were given the
option of joining India or Pakistan. The Hindu monarch of the predominantly
Muslim state of Jammu and Kashmir chose India, prompted partly by a tribal
rebellion in the state. Pakistan responded by sending in troops. The
resultant fighting ended with a 1949 cease-fire, but the Pakistani
government continued covertly to support volunteer guerrilla fighters in
Kashmir. Islamabad argued then, as it does now, that it could not control
the volunteers, who as individuals were not bound by the cease-fire
agreement. (On the other hand, Maulana Abul A'la Maududi, the late founder
of the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami, argued that as individuals, these
"mujahideen" could not legitimately declare jihad, either.)
Pakistani officials admit to having tried repeatedly to foment separatism
in Kashmir in the decades following the 1948 cease-fire. These attempts
were largely unsuccessful; when separatist violence broke out in the late
1980s, the movement was largely indigenous. For their part, Indian
officials admit their own culpability in creating an intolerable situation
in the region. They ignored Kashmir's significant economic troubles,
rampant corruption, and rigged elections, and they intervened in Kashmiri
politics in ways that contradicted India's own constitution. As American
scholar Sumit Ganguly explains, the rigged 1987 state-assembly elections
were the final straw in a series of insults, igniting, by 1989, widespread
violent opposition. By 1992, Pakistani nationals and other graduates of the
Afghan war were joining the fight in Kashmir.
What began as an indigenous, secular movement for independence has become
an increasingly Islamist crusade to bring all of Kashmir under Pakistani
control. Pakistan-based Islamist groups (along with Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, a
Kashmir-based group created by Jamaat-e-Islami and partly funded by
Pakistan) are now significantly more important than the secular
Kashmir-based ones. The Indian government estimates that about 40 percent
of the militants in Kashmir today are Pakistani or Afghan, and some 80
percent are teenagers. Although the exact size of the movement is unknown,
the Indian government estimates that 3,000 to 4,000 "mujahideen" are in
Kashmir at any given time.
Whatever their exact numbers, these Pakistani militant groups-among them,
Lashkar-i-Taiba and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen- pose a long-term danger to
international security, regional stability, and especially Pakistan itself.
Although their current agenda is limited to "liberating" Kashmir, which
they believe was annexed by India illegally, their next objective is to
turn Pakistan into a truly Islamic state. Islamabad supports these
volunteers as a cheap way to keep India off balance. In the process,
however, it is creating a monster that threatens to devour Pakistani
society.
SCHOOLS OF HATE
In Pakistan, as in many developing countries, education is not mandatory.
The World Bank estimates that only 40 percent of Pakistanis are literate,
and many rural areas lack public schools. Islamic religious
schools-madrasahs-on the other hand, are located all over the country and
provide not only free education, but also free food, housing, and clothing.
In the poor areas of southern Punjab, madrasahs funded by the Sunni
sectarian political party Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) reportedly even pay
parents for sending them their children.
In the 1980s, Pakistani dictator General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq promoted the
madrasahs as a way to garner the religious parties' support for his rule
and to recruit troops for the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. At the time,
many madrasahs were financed by the zakat (the Islamic tithe collected by
the state), giving the government at least a modicum of control. But now,
more and more religious schools are funded privately-by wealthy Pakistani
industrialists at home or abroad, by private and government-funded
nongovernmental organizations in the Persian Gulf states and Saudi Arabia,
and by Iran. Without state supervision, these madrasahs are free to preach
a narrow and violent version of Islam.
Most madrasahs offer only religious instruction, ignoring math, science,
and other secular subjects important for functioning in modern society. As
Maududi warned in his 1960 book, First Principles of the Islamic State,
"those who choose the theological branch of learning generally keep
themselves utterly ignorant of [secular subjects, thereby remaining]
incapable of giving any lead to the people regarding modern political
problems."
Even worse, some extremist madrasahs preach jihad without understanding the
concept: They equate jihad-which most Islamic scholars interpret as the
striving for justice (and principally an inner striving to purify the
self)-with guerrilla warfare. These schools encourage their graduates, who
often cannot find work because of their lack of practical education, to
fulfill their "spiritual obligations" by fighting against Hindus in Kashmir
or against Muslims of other sects in Pakistan. Pakistani officials estimate
that 10 to 15 percent of the country's tens of thousands of madrasahs
espouse such extremist ideologies.
Pakistan's interior minister Moinuddin Haider, for one, recognizes these
problems. "The brand of Islam they are teaching is not good for Pakistan,"
he says. "Some, in the garb of religious training, are busy fanning
sectarian violence, poisoning people's minds." In June, Haider announced a
reform plan that would require all madrasahs to register with the
government, expand their curricula, disclose their financial resources,
seek permission for admitting foreign students, and stop sending students
to militant training camps.
This is not the first time the Pakistani government has announced such
plans. And Haider's reforms so far seem to have failed, whether because of
the regime's negligence or the madrasahs' refusal to be regulated, or both.
Only about 4,350 of the estimated 40,000 to 50,000 madrasahs in Pakistan
have registered with the government. Some are still sending students to
training camps despite parents' instructions not to do so. Moreover, some
chancellors are unwilling to expand their curricula, arguing that madrasahs
are older than Pakistan itself-having been "designed 1,200 years ago in
Iraq," according to the chancellor of the Khudamudeen madrasah. The
chancellor of Darul Uloom Haqqania objects to what he calls the
government's attempt to "destroy the spirit of the madrasahs under the
cover of broadening their curriculum."
Mujibur Rehman Inqalabi, the SSP's second in command, told me that Haider's
reform plan is "against Islam" and complains that where states have taken
control of madrasahs, such as in Jordan and Egypt, "the engine of jihad is
extinguished." America is right, he said: "Madrasahs are the supply line
for jihad."
JIHAD INTERNATIONAL, INC.
If madrasahs supply the labor for "jihad," then wealthy Pakistanis and
Arabs around the world supply the capital. On Eid-ul-Azha, the second most
important Muslim holiday of the year, anyone who can afford to sacrifices
an animal and gives the hide to charity. Pakistani militant groups solicit
such hide donations, which they describe as a significant source of funding
for their activities in Kashmir.
Most of the militant groups' funding, however, comes in the form of
anonymous donations sent directly to their bank accounts. Lashkar-i-Taiba
("Army of the Pure"), a rapidly growing Ahle Hadith (Wahhabi) group, raises
funds on the Internet. Lashkar and its parent organization, Markaz ad-Da'wa
Wal Irshad (Center for Islamic Invitation and Guidance), have raised so
much money, mostly from sympathetic Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia, that they are
reportedly planning to open their own bank.
Individual "mujahideen" also benefit financially from this generous
funding. They are in this for the loot, explains Ahmed Rashid, a prominent
Pakistani journalist. One mid-level manager of Lashkar told me he earns
15,000 rupees a month-more than seven times what the average Pakistani
makes, according to the World Bank. Top leaders of militant groups earn
much more; one leader took me to see his mansion, which was staffed by
servants and filled with expensive furniture. Operatives receive smaller
salaries but win bonuses for successful missions. Such earnings are
particularly attractive in a country with a 40 percent official poverty
rate, according to Pakistani government statistics.
The United States and Saudi Arabia funneled some $3.5 billion into
Afghanistan and Pakistan during the Afghan war, according to Milt Bearden,
CIA station chief in Pakistan from 1986 to 1989. "Jihad," along with guns
and drugs, became the most important business in the region. The business
of "jihad"-what the late scholar Eqbal Ahmad dubbed "Jihad International,
Inc."-continues to attract foreign investors, mostly wealthy Arabs in the
Persian Gulf region and members of the Pakistani diaspora. (As World Bank
economist Paul Collier observes, diaspora populations often prolong ethnic
and religious conflicts by contributing not only capital but also extremist
rhetoric, since the fervor of the locals is undoubtedly held in check by
the prospect of losing their own sons.)
As the so-called jihad movement continues to acquire its own financial
momentum, it will become increasingly difficult for Pakistan to shut down,
if and when it tries. As long as "Jihad International, Inc." is profitable,
those with financial interests in the war will work to prolong it. And the
longer the war in Kashmir lasts, the more entrenched these interests will
become.
ADDICTED TO JIHAD
As some irregulars are financially dependent on what they consider jihad,
others are spiritually and psychologically so. Many irregulars who fought
in Afghanistan are now fighting in Kashmir and are likely to continue
looking for new "jihads" to fight -even against Pakistan itself. Khalil,
who has been a "mujahid" for 19 years and can no longer imagine another
life, told me, "A person addicted to heroin can get off it if he really
tries, but a mujahid cannot leave the jihad. I am spiritually addicted to
jihad." Another Harkat operative told me,
"We won't stop-even if India gave us Kashmir". We'll [also] bring jihad
here. There is already a movement here to make Pakistan a pure Islamic
state. Many preach Islam, but most of them don't know what it means. We
want to see a Taliban-style regime here.
Aspirations like these are common among the irregulars I have interviewed
over the last couple of years.
The "jihad" movement is also developing a spiritual momentum linked to its
financial one. Madrasahs often teach their students that jihad-or, in the
extremist schools, terrorism under the guise of jihad-is a spiritual duty.
Whereas wealthy Pakistanis would rather donate their money than their sons
to the cause, families in poor, rural areas are likely to send their sons
to "jihad" under the belief that doing so is the only way to fulfill this
spiritual duty. One mother whose son recently died fighting in Kashmir told
me she would be happy if her six remaining sons were martyred. "They will
help me in the next life, which is the real life," she said.
When a boy becomes a martyr, thousands of people attend his funeral. Poor
families become celebrities. Everyone treats them with more respect after
they lose a son, a martyr's father said. "And when there is a martyr in the
village, it encourages more children to join the jihad. It raises the
spirit of the entire village," he continued. In poor families with large
numbers of children, a mother can assume that some of her children will die
of disease if not in war. This apparently makes it easier to donate a son
to what she feels is a just and holy cause.
Many of these families receive financial assistance from the militant
groups. The Shuhda-e-Islam Foundation, founded in 1995 by Jamaat-e-Islami,
claims to have dispensed 13 million rupees to the families of martyrs. It
also claims to provide financial support to some 364 families by paying off
loans, setting them up in businesses, or helping them with housing.
Moreover, the foundation provides emotional and spiritual support by
constantly reminding the families that they did the right thing by donating
their children to assist their Muslim brethren in Kashmir. Both
Lashkar-i-Taiba and Harkat have also established charitable organizations
that reward the families of martyrs-a practice common to gangs in
inner-city Los Angeles and terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and Hamas.
Although these foundations provide a service to families in need, they also
perpetuate a culture of violence.
BAD BOYS
The comparison to gangs and terrorist groups is particularly apt because
the irregulars often hire criminals to do their dirty work-and sometimes
turn to petty or organized crime themselves. Criminals are typically hired
to "drop" weapons and explosives or to carry out extreme acts of violence
that a typical irregular is reluctant or unable to perform. For example,
members of the Dubai-based crime ring that bombed the Bombay stock exchange
in March 1993 later confessed that they had been in Islamabad the previous
month, where Pakistani irregulars had allegedly trained them to throw hand
grenades and fire Kalashnikov assault rifles. Law-enforcement authorities
noted that the operatives' passports contained no Pakistani stamps,
suggesting the complicity of the Pakistani government.
Criminals joining supposed jihad movements tend to be less committed to the
group's purported goals and more committed to violence for its own sake-or
for the money. When criminals join private armies, therefore, the political
and moral constraints that often inhibit mass-casualty, random attacks are
likely to break down. Criminal involvement in the movement also worsens the
principal-agent problem for Pakistan: pure mercenaries are even harder to
control than individuals whose goals are at least partly aligned with those
of the state.
EXPORTING HOLY WAR
Exacerbating the principal-agent problem, Pakistani militant groups are now
exporting their version of jihad all over the world. The Khudamudeen
madrasah, according to its chancellor, is training students from Burma,
Nepal, Chechnya, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Yemen, Mongolia, and Kuwait. Out
of the 700 students at the madrasah, 127 are foreigners. Nearly half the
student body at Darul Uloom Haqqania, the madrasah that created the
Taliban, is from Afghanistan. It also trains students from Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, Russia, and Turkey, and is currently expanding its capacity to
house foreign students from 100 to 500, its chancellor said. A Chechen
student at the school told me his goal when he returned home was to fight
Russians. And according to the U.S. State Department, Pakistani groups and
individuals also help finance and train the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,
a terrorist organization that aims to overthrow secular governments in
Central Asia.
Many of the militant groups associated with radical madrasahs regularly
proclaim their plans to bring "jihad" to India proper as well as to the
West, which they believe is run by Jews. Lashkar-i-Taiba has announced its
plans to "plant Islamic flags in Delhi, Tel Aviv, and Washington." One of
Lashkar's Web sites includes a list of purported Jews working for the
Clinton administration, including director of presidential personnel Robert
Nash (an African American from Arkansas) and CIA director George Tenet (a
Greek American). The group also accuses Israel of assisting India in
Kashmir. Asked for a list of his favorite books, a leader of Harkat
recommended the history of Hitler, who he said understood that "Jews and
peace are incompatible." Several militant groups boast pictures of burning
American flags on their calendars and posters.
INTERNAL JIHAD
The "jihad" against the West may be rhetorical (at least for now), but the
ten-year-old sectarian war between Pakistan's Shi'a and Sunni is real and
deadly. The Tehrik-e-Jafariya-e-Pakistan (TJP) was formed to protect the
interests of Pakistan's Shi'a Muslims, who felt discriminated against by
Zia's implementation of Sunni laws governing the inheritance and collection
of zakat. Iran helped fund the TJP, probably in hopes of using it as a
vehicle for an Iranian-style revolution in Pakistan. Five years later, Haq
Nawaz Jhangvi, a Jamaat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) cleric, established the SSP
to offset the TJP and to promote the interests of Sunni Muslims. The SSP
was funded by both Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Since then, violent gangs have
formed on both sides.
After Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a Sunni sectarian gang, attempted to assassinate
then Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif in early 1999, Sharif proposed to
expand the special military courts that try terrorist crimes from Karachi
to the rest of the country. Pakistan's Supreme Court later deemed the
special courts unconstitutional. Musharraf has continued Sharif's attempt
to rein in the terrorist groups by implementing, among other things, a
"deweaponization" plan to reduce the availability of guns to sectarian
gangs and criminals.
The problem for Musharraf is that it is difficult to promote the "jihad" in
Kashmir and the Taliban in Afghanistan without inadvertently promoting
sectarianism in Pakistan. The movements share madrasahs, camps,
bureaucracies, and operatives. The JUI, the SSP's founding party, also
helped create both the Taliban and Harkat. Deobandi madrasahs issue
anti-Shi'a fatwas (edicts), and boys trained to fight in Kashmir are also
trained to call Shi'a kafirs (infidels). Jaesh-e-Mohammad, an offshoot of
Harkat and the newest Pakistani militant group in Kashmir, reportedly used
SSP personnel during a fundraising drive in early 2000. And the SSP's
Inqalabi, who was recently released after four years in jail for his
alleged involvement in sectarian killings, told me that whenever "one of
our youngsters wants to do jihad," they join up with the Taliban, Harkat,
or Jaesh-e-Mohammad-all Deobandi groups that he claims are "close" to the
SSP.
Sectarian clashes have killed or injured thousands of Pakistanis since
1990. As the American scholar Vali Nasr explains, the largely theological
differences between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims have been transformed into
full-fledged political conflict, with broad ramifications for law and
order, social cohesion, and government authority. The impotent Pakistani
government has essentially allowed Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi'a Iran to
fight a proxy war on Pakistani soil, with devastating consequences for the
Pakistani people.
WHITHER PAKISTAN?
Pakistan is a weak state, and government policies are making it weaker
still. Its disastrous economy, exacerbated by a series of corrupt leaders,
is at the root of many of its problems. Yet despite its poverty, Pakistan
is spending hundreds of millions of dollars on weapons instead of schools
and public health. Ironically, the government's "cost-saving" measures are
even more troubling. In trying to save money in the short run by using
irregulars in Kashmir and relying on madrasahs to educate its youth,
Pakistan is pursuing a path that is likely to be disastrous in the long
run, allowing a culture of violence to take root.
The United States has asked Pakistan to crack down on the militant groups
and to close certain madrasahs, but America must do more than just scold.
After all, the United States, along with Saudi Arabia, helped create the
first international "jihad" to fight the Soviet Union during the Afghan
war. "Does America expect us to send in the troops and shut the madrasahs
down?" one official asks. "Jihad is a mindset. It developed over many years
during the Afghan war. You can't change a mindset in 24 hours."
The most important contribution the United States can make, then, is to
help strengthen Pakistan's secular education system. Because so much
international aid to Pakistan has been diverted through corruption, both
public and private assistance should come in the form of relatively
nonfungible goods and services: books, buildings, teachers, and training,
rather than money. Urdu-speaking teachers from around the world should be
sent to Pakistan to help. And educational exchanges among students,
scholars, journalists, and military officials should be encouraged and
facilitated. Helping Pakistan educate its youth will not only cut off the
culture of violence by reducing ignorance and poverty, it will also promote
long-term economic development.
Moreover, assisting Pakistan will make the world a safer place. As
observers frequently note, conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir
is one of the most likely routes to nuclear war in the world today. The
Pakistani militants' continued incursions into Indian-held Kashmir escalate
the conflict, greatly increasing the risk of nuclear war between the two
countries.
Although the United States can help, Pakistan must make its own changes. It
must stamp out corruption, strengthen democratic institutions, and make
education a much higher priority. But none of this can happen if Pakistan
continues to devote an estimated 30 percent of its national budget to
defense.
Most important, Pakistan must recognize the militant groups for what they
are: dangerous gangs whose resources and reach continue to grow,
threatening to destabilize the entire region. Pakistan's continued support
of religious militant groups suggests that it does not recognize its own
susceptibility to the culture of violence it has helped create. It should
think again.
Jessica Stern is a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University's
Kennedy School of Government and Adjunct Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations.
Islamic fundamentalists have carved out a new
strategy to "catch them young", says RAHUL BEDI
New Delhi, November 30
The "Talibanisation" of children in northern India's
Muslim-majority state of Kashmir is underway. An extremist Islamic group
has established over the past year free schools in the rural areas of the
state to indoctrinate schoolchildren into jihad (holy Islamic war).
Official sources in Srinagar say that the Din-e- Mohammad Taliban, which is
sponsored by the Pakistan-based Taliban militia group that rules
Afghanistan, has opened a series of schools in the north Kashmir
districts of Pulwama, Anantnag, Kupwara and Baramulla. They are staffed by
Islamic scholars with good oratory skills that are utilised to "educate"
Kashmiri children "free of cost".
In reality, however, the sources say, the schools have a mandate to
prepare their wards to become warriors of Islam. The districts where
these schools have sprung up are amongst the worst-troubled by Kashmir's
11-year long insurgency for an Islamic homeland, a secessionist quarrel
that has claimed over 35,000 lives. These are villages where formal
education is virtually nonexistent.
Reports from Pak say that in the absence of state-run schools, some 1.75
million youngsters are undergoing religious and basic military training in
about 7,000 madrassas. They will ultimately be sent to Kashmir and other
parts of the world to wage jihad District officials say that students
are flocking to the Din-e-Mohammad Taliban-run schools propelled by their
parents, who are delighted at the thought of their children being educated
gratis. Being illiterate, many parents are unconcerned about the hardline
sectarian content of the schools' curriculum.
"This (setting up of schools) is Pakistan's long-term design to create
future recruits who will not falter in their commitment to fightfor an
independent Islamic homeland," a security official says. It is a repetition
of what Pakistan did in the mid-1990s, when it sculpted the Taliban in
thousands of madrassas (Islamic seminaries) across the country.
Recent media reports from Pakistan reveal that in the absence of state-run
schools, some 1.75 million Pakistani youngsters are undergoing religious
and basic military training in approximately 7,000 madrassas. They will
ultimately be despatched to Kashmir and other parts of the world to wage
jihad against the "infidels".
Mohammad Ajmal Qadri, leader of the fundamentalist Jamait Ulema Islam
party, told The Washington Times that 2,000 of about 13,000 seminary
graduates have already been sent to Kashmir. Qardi said that the focus of
the training in the madrassas was the deployment of its students in
Kashmir and Chechnya, but that it is the US that is the ultimate target.
India accuses Pakistan, which occupies a third of Kashmir and lays claim to
the rest, of "sponsoring" the insurgency in Kashmir, which erupted in 1989.
Pakistan denies the allegation, saying that Kashmiri militancy is an
indigenous movement to which it provides only diplomatic and political
support.
Militancy and counter-insurgency related stress has led
to a massive escalation in mental disorders amongst both civilians and
soldiers, says RAHUL BEDI
New Delhi, November 30
The rate of suicides across the state of Jammu and Kashmir is escalating
alarmingly. There have been 107 suicides reported over the past three
months, and psychologists blame the rash of self-destruction on incessant
and increasing stress and violence.
Doctors say that some of their young patients are survivors of torture by
the security forces; they were interrogated brutally, with electricity
current passed through their genitals. "Often the victim is rendered
impotent, not by the electric shock but by the psychological fallout of the
torture," a doctor says.
"Depression and anxiety are so common in Kashmir today that already
overburdened doctors are unable to cope with the rising number of
patients with psychological disorders," says Dr Nazir Mushtaq of
Srinagar's SMHS hospital. With mental and emotional help severely limited,
the number of patients self-destructing is increasing at an unprecedented
rate, he says.
Specialists say that the daily-and seemingly inevitable-death toll across
the state, the sudden crackdowns by security forces, seemingly arbitrary
militant encounters and arrests, compounded by an absence of normal social
activity and recreation, have had a "devastating" effect on locals.
The stress has taken other forms, too. It has rendered many young
Kashmiri men sexually dysfunctional, forcing them to turn to Viagra, the
male potency wonder drug, which today has a thriving underground market
in the state.
"Depressive disorders are common here," said Dr Mushtaq Margroob, a
leading Srinagar psychiatrist, who estimated that more than 75 per cent of
men seeking medical help in the city suffer from some form of depression.
"It affects their sleep, appetite, sexual activity and desire," he added.
Scores of Srinagar chemists admit to selling Viagra clandestinely for
more than Rs 500 a blue pill. A chemist at Dal Gate, in the heart of
Srinagar, claims to have charged Rs 10,000 for one Viagra tablet from a
desperate youngster last year, when the drug was relatively new in the
market.
"Many youngsters feel humiliated asking for Viagra in public and come when
we are about to close for the day, or wait till there is no other customer
in the shop," says a chemist. He said the number of Viagra customers from
rural areas is also growing steadily as militancy has spread to virtually
every village in the Kashmir Valley.
Young Kashmiri men are not the only ones suffering mental stress in this
violence-riven state. Security officials say that the mental condition of
soldiers deployed on counter-insurgency operations (COIN) in Kashmir is a
standing "concern". " They are tired of living under constant tension in
hostile territory, not knowing who is a friend or foe," an officer says.
This is taking a severe toll on their mental health, he says.
Union Defence Minister George Fernandes told Parliament recently that
combat stress in Kashmir has led to more than 20 incidents since 1997 of
army personnel killing their own colleagues. Deployed on a constant state
of alertness, an increasing number of army and paramilitary personnel are
cracking up under pressure, and instances of "fragging", where soldiers
shoot their colleagues dead before suiciding, are steadily multiplying.
Senior army officers in Kashmir privately admit to many more cases of
"fragging" than are made public out of respect for the dead soldiers'
families and for reasons of insurance payments.
"Our troops are working under tremendous stress and strain," says K
Vijay Kumar, former chief of the 40,000-strong Border Security Force (BSF)
in Kashmir. BSF doctors say that hypertension and depression are common
amongst enlisted men, and that officers are also beginning to show the
strain, with complaints of acute headaches, palpitation and excessive
sweating.
November 27: THE INDIAN Air Force has suggested the formation of a nuclear
air command even as it seeks two-front capability and enhanced force levels
in the years to come.
Government sources said the IAF in a presentation entitled 'Vision 2020'
last month, had recommended that India move to a position of deterrence
against Pakistan and China not only in the nuclear arena but also on the
conventional front. This future defence strategy is a step ahead from the
present stance of deterrence for Pakistan and dissuasion for China.
The presentation made before the Arun Singh Task Force on Higher Defence
Management, was path-breaking since it advocated that the country's
strategic resources be placed under the nuclear air command because only
the IAF had the required delivery platforms (strategic reach aircraft).
According to the IAF, the Army did not need and in fact might not need a
nuclear role because of the incongruity of tactical nuclear weapons in
India's draft nuclear doctrine. The third leg of the triad _ nuclear
submarine _ was still beyond the Indian Navy's reach.
The IAF recommended that as soon as the Agni intermediate range ballistic
missile became operational, it should be given to the nuclear air command
as the range of the Prithvi missile was too short to qualify as a nuclear
weapon delivery platform. The paper urged the Government to have its
nuclear systems in place, given New Delhi's no-first-use policy. It said
that the armed forces should go beyond the creation of the strategic
element "under a three-star officer".
The nuclear air command, according to the Air Force, should have even the
strategic surveillance resources _ both in space and elsewhere _ under its
control so that they provide intelligence inputs on a continuous basis.In
the presentation, the IAF saw itself grow from the present authorised
strength of 39-and-a-half combat squadrons to 55 combat squadrons in the
coming two decades. This will be in addition to the urgently needed force
multipliers such as airborne early warning systems (AWACS) aircraft,
air-to-air refuelling aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles.
The vision document argued that the Government should think in terms of
giving more teeth to the IAF as the land forces are locked in a "status
quo" on the northern and western fronts and sea forces expected to protect
the coastline and commercial sea-lanes. It said the true exploitation of
air power is that enemy air and surface forces are stopped from coming
anywhere close to Indian forces.
The paper discussed future war scena.
THE three-day "Pen for Peace" conference held in Karachi has made a powerful
appeal for peace in South Asia. This is not the first time that intellectuals on
both sides of the border have called for an end to conflict. Concurrently, a
"Give Peace a Chance" conference was held in New Delhi which demanded Prime
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's peace initiative to be turned into a "peace
offensive". These appeals carry a note of desperation and urgency in them.
Significantly, the Hurriyat Conference leader from the Kashmir Valley, Abdul
Ghani Lone, has emerged simultaneously as an emissary of peace between India and
Pakistan during his visit here.
This new move for peace initiated by civil society and intellectuals in South
Asia - another peace conference is to be held in Kathmandu next week - has come
at a time when a political and economic crisis grips Pakistan and the
nuclearization of the subcontinent has exposed the region to the dangers of a
nuclear war. It is understandable that in this dismal situation when no
solutions are visible to the problems which confront the masses of South Asia
with certain death and devastation, the sane-thinking people are urging the
leaders of India and Pakistan to shed their militancy and hardline stance on
Kashmir and national security which they have traditionally adopted.
A beginning has to be made. Let it be made now. India has taken the initiative
by announcing and implementing a Ramazan ceasefire in occupied Kashmir. The
Mujahideen and the Pakistan government have rejected it terming the move a ploy.
This response is quite incompatible with the position adopted by the Hurriyat
Conference and other leaders from the Valley who are the ones directly affected
by the happenings in the occupied territory. The Hurriyat has opted for a
cautious acceptance of the truce and its leader Umar Farooq has expressed his
willingness to talk to New Delhi. He is also trying to persuade the
freedom-fighters to lay down arms.
Regrettably, India has remained rigid in its stance vis-a-vis negotiations with
Pakistan. To overcome this hurdle the Hurriyat has proposed that it should be
allowed to talk separately to New Delhi and Islamabad to pave the way for a
three-way dialogue on Kashmir. This is a sensible approach since in the present
circumstances of an Indo-Pakistan deadlock and insurgency in the Valley, talks
by the Kashmiri political leadership might open the door for a political
process. It is obvious that no negotiations can take place between parties which
are locked in an armed conflict. India has already shown a measure of
flexibility by allowing two Kashmiri leaders to participate in the OIC summit in
Doha and another to visit Pakistan for a family wedding. It should now
facilitate the peace process by inviting the APHC leaders for talks and allowing
their delegation to visit Islamabad.
Should Pakistan reciprocate? It depends on whether the government recognizes
that the level of militarization it has opted for and its failure to be flexible
on immediate foreign policy issues for making long-term gains has left the
country impoverished and isolated, the masses deprived of a decent quality of
life, society brutalized by violence unleashed by obscurantist forces and, worst
of all, a pervasive sense of gloom and uncertainty among the people. If this
realization has dawned on it, the Musharraf regime should now submit to the will
of the Kashmiris and let them determine the conflict resolution mechanism and
the ultimate solution.
There are two reasons why we believe a responsible and peace-oriented response
is warranted from our end. First, Pakistan has always stood for the right to
self-determination of the Kashmiris. Let them now decide how they want this
imbroglio to be resolved. If they want proximity talks, why should we be opposed
to these? Did we not accept this format at Geneva when the Afghan issue was
being negotiated with GenNajibullah? Secondly, more than 35 years ago Islamabad
agreed to let Shaikh Abdullah act as an intermediary between India and Pakistan.
In fact, the Shaikh even came to Pakistan but had to cut short his visit
prematurely when Jawaharlal Nehru died suddenly. Unfortunately, the process
could not be resumed then or ever thereafter. Why can't it be done now?
KARACHI, Nov 26: Peace is essential within the country and on the borders for
improving the health of the ailing economy as well as for the welfare of the
people.
Search for security results in a search for weapons which leads to arms race and
frittering away the scant resources of the country, as is shown by a weakening
economy and the ever harsher conditionalities of the IMF and other international
lending organizations.
These were the views expressed by speakers at the fourth session on "Sectorial
perspective" of the "Pen for Peace" conference here on Sunday. The session was
jointly presided over by Dr Inayatullah and Prof S. M. Naseer. Nazir Mahmood was
the moderator.
In the concluding remarks, Dr Inayatullah called upon enlightened sections of
people, committed to peace, not to address their opponents with terms of
contempt like Jehadi organizations but with a degree of respect and hold talks
with them.
"Those who are working for an Islamic revival, as they understand it, should not
be called fundamentalists."
He said only those can contribute to any movement who are guided by the spirit
of fighting against human sufferings.
Joint Chairman of the fourth session, Prof S. M. Naseer, said people have been
groping in the dark and there is confusion everywhere. India does not need not
to drop nuclear bomb as we are capable of destroying ourselves.
"Both India and Pakistan want to make Kashmir their colony, but the solution is
to give them independence," he said.
Speaking on "Foreign relations," diplomat and former foreign secretary Iqbal
Akhund pointed out that our foreign policy has been obsessed with India and the
Kashmir issue.
He said the objective of partition of the subcontinent, which was mainly to
provide an opportunity to Hindus and Muslims to live peaceably in their
countries and have friendly relations, could not be achieved.
Referring to the Kashmir issue, he said it was the direct outcome of the
decision of the Muslim League leadership, who at the time of partition, had
conceded the right to the rulers of princely states to decide on accession of
their states with Pakistan or India, not to the people of the states.
However, he said, Kashmir had remained more of a problem for India than for
Pakistan where the former has deployed nearly a million of its troops and had
been spending billions of rupees.
He said it was important that there was a realization among the rulers that
there was no military solution to the Kashmir issue.
"We don't have the military power to overrun India as was the case with India
which used its military might to create Bangladesh," he said.
Mr Akhund said Pakistan favours third party mediation, and this too was tried
but failed, as India could not implement the UN resolution calling for
plebiscite.
Now, he said, for Pakistan third party mediation means that the US should use
its power to force India to hold plebiscite. But we forget that Kashmir is not
Kosovo and there has been a major shift in US policy since the adoption of the
UN resolutions in 1949-50 and gradually the US has come more closer to India.
Now the US favours, to an extent, some kind of autonomy for Kashmir.
He favoured giving moral support to Kashmiris but did not agree with those who
favour sending Jehadi groups to Kashmir as it could lead to communal riots
within the country itself.
He said Pakistan's strategy should be based on the assumption that there was no
real danger of a full-fledged war with India.
He said if Pakistan by signing the CTBT could get a good deal from Japan as
reported, we must sign it.
Referring to Afghanistan, he stressed the need to use the good offices of Saudi
Arabia to pressure the Taliban to respect human rights and to stop its
endeavours to "export Jehad." Iran too could play a role in bringing about peace
in Afghanistan, he added.
He said the present mess in the country was not due to foreign policy but
resulted from non-payment of taxes by people.
Historian Dr Mubarak Ali traced Hindu-Muslim relations in the subcontinent from
the beginning up to the separate homeland movement for Muslims led by the Muslim
League and the creation of Pakistan.
He said feelings of separation had been growing by the day. M. B. Naqvi, senior
journalist, highlighting the prevailing political situation and its causes, said
the present rulers had no solution of the problems which Pakistan faced.
"On the one hand, the country stands internationally isolated and the economy
has been sinking on the other. There is a threat of nuclear war from India and
there is political apathy among the people. These are some of the issues fraught
with serious consequences," he said.
Then there was threat of Talibanization of the country from Jehadi
organizations, which could not succeed due to inherent differences among
themselves. They, however, could cause some ugly situation, he feared.
"Besides, the Western countries are demanding to help check Afghanistan from
exporting its system, to stop Jehad in occupied Kashmir and to rein in Jehadi
organizations in the country. They are putting forth these conditions to save
the country from debt payment default," he said.
He said as feudal lords of West Pakistan did not want to concede the rights to
the people of East Pakistan, where democratic spirit was strong, so the
machinations of the feudals led to the dismemberment of the country, he added.
Dr Mehnaz Fatima, an economist, said the problems of the country could not be
solved nor the economy could be improved without a change of mind-set. Even if
defence expenditures were curtailed the funds would be pocketed by those who had
made a mess of aid and foreign loans.
She gave figures how Pakistan, over the years, had been spending its GDP on
defence. Before the 1965 war, the percentage was 2 which rose to 5.6 after the
war. In 1971 it was 4.3 per cent which after 1975 went up to 7.5. She said now
it was 5.7pc as against the world standard of 2.5pc. India spent 2.8pc of its
GDP on defence. Dr Asad Saeed said without cutting defence expenditure the
economy could not be strengthened and social services could not be improved.
"Since defence contracts are non-transparent, kickbacks from contracts are high.
The real amount of kickbacks could not be known because of the non- transparent
nature of such contracts," he said.
He pointed out that in one year the amount of pension of military personnel was
Rs26 billion, but the pension amount of the employees of the civil
administration was slightly above Rs one billion though they numbered 2.2
million as against the army's 650,000. Wahid Bashir, trade unionist and
journalist, said the people could take interest in peace only if it ensures
justice and equity.
Businessmen A. Majid said peace is essential for promoting industry and
business. He said globalization of trade was tantamount to colonizing the
economies of developing countries.
AN event of hopefully great significance for India and all of South Asia
took place in
New Delhi earlier this month. After three days of deliberations,
grassroots workers,
former members of the armed forces, trade unionists, students,
scientists, doctors and
artistes from around the country decided to constitute the Coalition for
Nuclear
Disarmament and Peace, the first country-wide network against weapons of mass
destruction. Sadly, the happening was barely noticed by the media, which
is very
attentive when it comes to reporting bellicose statements and offering
considerable
space to analysis that is only one step away from a call to arms.
A peace movement is not totally new to India. Over the years, a number of
small
groups in India and Pakistan have tried to build bridges over the flames
fanned by the
governments of the two countries. On a parallel track, a handful of
organisations like
the Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament and the Physicians for
Peace, have
worked to highlight the dangers of South Asia going nuclear. The Pokhran
tests of
May 1998 changed all that. While political parties across the mainstream
spectrum
initially either vied with each other to express their support for a
nuclear India or chose
to congratulate scientists who had demonstrated their prowess at the
50-year-old
technology of nuclear tests, it was left to citizens' groups to oppose
the dangerous path
that the Government had taken. New groups like the Indian Scientists
against Nuclear
Weapons sprouted to work alongside grassroots organisations in the
campaign against
nuclearisation. Small these groups were, but they were numerous and
widespread
enough to deny the establishment's claims of "a national consensus" in
support of
nuclear weapons.
While the campaign against the horrors of nuclearisation has continued,
the actions
have been local and independent of each other. To build up co-ordinated
action and
give the campaign a new momentum, a few groups took the first initiative
to hold a
"National Convention for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace" in New Delhi between
November 11 and 13. More than 100 citizens' groups around the country
interacted
over six months in preparation for the meeting. The results were there to
see. Over
600 delegates, double the expected number, participated in the convention
which was
financed solely by citizens' groups and individuals and was an entirely
voluntary
exercise. This was not a "Delhi" show, as events in the capital
frequently turn out to
be. More than 450 of the 600-odd delegates were from outside New Delhi. There
were residents of rural Rajasthan, Kashmir and Bihar rubbing shoulders
with trade
unionists from Mumbai. Grassroots workers from Bengal and Tamil Nadu joined
hands with retired personnel from the armed forces. Artistes, students
and teachers
from New Delhi were together with scientists from Bangalore. The
organisation by
volunteers was remarkable. There were two days of intense discussions in
more than
20 working groups that dealt with nuclear doctrines, militarisation,
nuclear power,
networking, advocacy and campaign strategies. While discussions went on
late into
the evening, the sessions were interspersed with folk music, street
theatre, slide shows
and films. (The documentary "Buddha Weeps at Jaduguda" which gave a
frightening
picture of what is going on in Jharkhand where the uranium for India's
nuclear power
and weapons programme is mined will convince even the most sceptical
citizen about
how casual India's atomic energy/weapons establishment can be about
safety and how
callous it can be towards those living around nuclear facilities.)
In what gave the convention a truly global character, the Indian
delegates were joined
by 50 representatives from Pakistan and peace activists from the small
countries
(Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka) in the nuclear shadow of South Asia.
Also present
to share their experiences were representatives of well-known peace and
disarmament
movements in West Europe, North America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand
like
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Abolition 2000 and the Japan Congress
against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.
On the third day of the convention, the delegates decided to form the
"National
Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (NCNDP)". As the name
suggests, the
NCNDP is not going to be a centralised organisation but a co-ordinating
coalition for
groups opposed to nuclear weapons. The brief interim charter of the NCNDP
demands first of all that India stop assembly of nuclear weapons, halt
development of
delivery systems (i.e. missiles) that can deliver these weapons and end
production of
weapons- grade fissile material (i.e. plutonium). It also demands complete
transparency in this area and calls for proper compensation to all people
harmed by
government activities in the nuclear fuel cycle - from uranium mining to
reactor
operation to waste disposal. The charter calls for a similar roll-back in
Pakistan and
demands that the five nuclear weapons states immediately de- alert their
weapon
systems, commit themselves to a No First Use strategy and stop all
research into
advanced weapons. (A 50- member national co-ordinating committee was also
constituted to prepare a more detailed charter for the first country-wide
peace
coalition.)
The NCNDP also drew up a detailed action plan for the next year. Some of the
components are:
* To establish a "clearing house" of information to generate public
awareness about
nuclear weapons and a lack of transparency in the nuclear power sector.
* To build up a dialogue with all political parties, mass organisations,
religious bodies
and professional associations.
* To support organisations fighting the cause of nuclear radiation.
* To help set up a national federation of radiation victims.
* To work with the Pakistan Peace Coalition (PPC) to identify 10 schools
and 10
colleges in India and Pakistan which will be "sister" institutions that
will discuss
disarmament and peace.
* To liase with the PPC and prepare for a joint Indo-Pakistan civil
society initiative
that would highlight the dangers of nuclearisation of South Asia.
It was not as if there was unanimity at the convention on all issues.
Many delegates
had strong and differing views on India's nuclear power programme and the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The discussions on power, in
particular,
were quite heated. While grassroots organisations working in Bihar,
Rajasthan and
Tamil Nadu - areas where the environment and health fall-outs of government
activities in different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle have led to
considerable local
protests - could not see how the nuclear power programme could be
separated from
weapons production, there were some who were against a clubbing of the
two. If yet
these differences did not come in the way of the formation of the NCNDP and
formulation of a plan of action, then credit must go to the six months of
preparatory
work during which many of these differences were aired and compromises worked
out.
In any case, a rainbow of views in anti-nuclear weapons movements are not
uncommon around the world. Coalitions everywhere contain differences on
specific
issues while they remain focussed on the larger goals. Mr. Dave Knight,
head of the
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the United Kingdom, who was a delegate to
the convention, observed that "Where it took us years to agree on a broad
agenda, it
is a remarkable achievement of the Indian activists to have come to the
same position
so quickly".
Forming a platform and drawing up a plan of action is one thing. Building
up a mass
campaign and lobbying with the political establishment is the more
difficult and longer
term task. It will be a long haul. But a beginning was made in New Delhi
on the road
to a safer, more secure and nuclear-free South Asia, which is quite the
opposite of
what the nuclear scientists, the strategic thinkers and political elites
have created
for us.
KARACHI, Nov 25: Speakers at the first session on the second day of the
"Pen for Peace" conference on Saturday urged the government to set up an
independent regulatory body to monitor the activities of the government
bodies which are authorized to make nuclear weapons.
The conference, which began an hour late with renowned columnist Prof
Khawaja Masood in the chair, was attended by only three of the six speakers.
The first speaker, Dr Inayatullah, a social scientist, said the possibility
of the outbreak of nuclear war between India and Pakistan could not be
ruled out. He said it was mistakenly believed that since the presence of an
atomic arsenal in the West had not brought about war, there would no
nuclear war between India and Pakistan.
He cited four reasons which could lead to nuclear war in the subcontinent.
There had been no territorial dispute between the US and the former USSR.
There had been no long history of hostility between them. A nuclear arsenal
in the US and the former Soviet Union had been built up to establish
supremacy. Both had avoided brinkmanship.
He said all these reasons showed that nuclear war could break out between
India and Pakistan. He cited five reasons which might lead to war between
the two countries. There was no trust between India and Pakistan. People
with jingoistic mentality were powerful on both sides. Either side could
initiate war intentionally. They might drift into war - as they almost had
during the Kargil crisis. Both sides might declare war owing to a
miscalculation. "Pakistan should declare unilaterally that it will not have
nuclear weapons," he demanded.
The title of Dr Inayatullah's paper was "Is Pakistan-India nuclear war a
real possibility and is nuclear arming a real deterrent?"
The second speaker, Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy, a professor at Quaid-i-Azam
University in Islamabad, said before May 1998, certain intellectuals and
retired army officers had maintained that if Pakistan detonated its nuclear
device it would be better off - both financially and politically. He added
that events after May 1998 had proved the proponents of this theory wrong.
He said people of Pakistan, including the chief executive, the finance
minister, the foreign minister, and the governor of the State Bank, wanted
to sign the CTBT. But, he added, "we know where decisions in Pakistan are
actually taken. They are taken in Mansoora and Akora Khattak. It is a very
dangerous situation."
He said one way of minimizing the danger of war was to disseminate
information about nuclear war. He maintained that signing the CTBT would
not suffice. He pointed out that the CTBT banned testing of nuclear
devices. It did not forbid governments to acquire nuclear arsenal. The
title of Dr Hoodbhoy's paper was "Implications of nuclear arms."
The third speaker, Dr A. H. Nayyar, another professor at Quaid-i-Azam
University, spoke on the subject of "Dangers of nuclear arsenal and plants
and the importance of de-nuclearization in the subcontinent." He said the
mining of uranium and plutonium took place in DG Khan. He said it was
learnt that the level of radiation in atmosphere in DG Khan was higher than
what it should be. He added that miners normally did not wear gloves
because DG Khan was a hot place. This, he said, exposed them to danger of
radioactivity even further.
He said he had asked the chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
to allow him and Dr Hoodbhoy to visit the site and check the level of
radiation. The chairman, he said, did not allow them to visit the site.
Dr Saeed Hassan Khan, an intellectual, spoke on anti-nuclear movements.
Answering a question, Dr Hoodbhoy said scientists were trying to make a
nuclear reactor that employed the nuclear fusion process rather than the
nuclear fission process because it was more environment-friendly.
At the end of the conference, Prof Khawaja Masood called for starting a
signature campaign against nuclearization. Rehana Iftikhar was the moderator.
The new idiom of security that has come into existence after Pokhran-II
compels a coalescence of forces around the ideas of nuclear disarmament and
peace.
A THREE-DAY convention in New Delhi held between November 11 and 13 laid
the groundwork for the formation of a Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and
Peace, bringing together on one platform the diverse range of protest
groups that emerged following the I ndian nuclear tests of May 1998. Though
the new body will focus its endeavours primarily within India, a degree of
coordination with peace movements in the neighbourhood and elsewhere is
indicated by the participation of no fewer than 50 delegates from P
akistan, 15 from other parts of South Asia and 20 from the global
anti-nuclear movement.
The nuclear domain is one where diverse shades of opinion can often
coexist. India witnessed that phenomenon in 1996, when ardent champions of
disarmament, nuclear strategists and national security hawks made common
cause in rejecting the Comprehensive T est Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a decidedly
dubious pact, which would contribute little to the goal of a nuclear-free
world.
That tenuous coexistence of opposites fell apart after the Pokhran nuclear
tests of May 1998 and the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government's decision
to deploy what it euphemistically titled a "minimum credible deterrent".
The new realities compelled a c oalescence of forces around the ideas of
nuclear disarmament and peace. After some years when peripheral differences
tended to enjoy undue prominence, the new idiom of national security
succeeded once again in focussing minds on the fundamentals.
The charter adopted at the convention provides the essential elements of
the Coalition's programme for the years ahead. Nuclear weapons, the
Coalition believes, should be resolutely opposed whether it is in India,
South Asia or globally. Apart from drain ing scarce resources, nuclear
weapons were inherently genocidal and only promoted a generalised sense of
insecurity. India's attempt to blast its way into the nuclear club in 1998
was a betrayal of its own ethical positions in the past. The damage could
be partly undone only by an unequivocal commitment to reverse the
preparations under way to assemble and induct nuclear weapons into the
Indian arsenal.
A number of other agreements are structured around this basic compact. For
instance, the Convention witnessed a range of opinions on the utility and
legitimacy of the nuclear energy programme worldwide. But the final
consensus was to avoid any specific f indings on the links between nuclear
energy and weapons. There was little dissent, though, over the assertion
that civilian nuclear programmes in India needed to institutionalise a
greater degree of transparency and accountability through all stages of t
he fuel cycle - from uranium mining to spent fuel management and waste
disposal.
The ethics and practical utility of various nuclear restraint measures came
in for minute scrutiny. Here again, a range of views was witnessed. A
section within the Convention argued that initiatives such as the CTBT had
an inherent value as part of a global disarmament movement. The optimal
strategy for the peace movement would be to take each measure as part of a
connected whole, as steps towards an ultimate goal of a nuclear-free world.
Another viewpoint emphasised that the Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) were
responsible for fostering a climate of impunity in which there were no
rewards for the principled renunciation of weapons of mass destruction.
Rather, the prevalent climate seemed to provide overt incentives for
clandestine weapons proliferation. To retrieve their fast diminishing
credibility, the NWSs needed, at the minimum, to provide iron-clad
"negative security assurances" to the non-nuclear states.
In the current context, the greatest hazard facing the nuclear disarmament
campaign is the imminent U.S. decision on the deployment of a National
Missile Defence. Recognising this, the Convention adopted a resolution
"condemning" the NMD proposal and urg ing the Indian government to shed its
equivocation on this issue.
The Convention also adopted an action plan that places emphasis on the
formation of linkages among various movements that have so far been
proceeding in a rather uncoordinated fashion. It includes the formation of
a "clearing house" of ideas, literature and campaign material on
disarmament and the illegitimacy of nuclear deterrence as a strategic
doctrine.
A 40-member coordination committee was set up by the convention to
formulate the next steps in the Coalition's practical agenda. The apex body
includes figures such as Admiral L. Ramdas, former Chief of the Naval
Staff, and Achin Vanaik, writer and peace activist. Distinguished
scientists and researchers from the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore,
the Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Chennai, and the National Institute
of Immunology, Delhi, are also involved with the committee.
Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh stated that India will
not block enforcement of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but views
nuclear testing as an "inherent right." Singh also reiterated statements
that CTBT enforcement will not be possible with the existence of nuclear
weapons all over the world.
KARACHI, Nov 24: Participants at a "Pen for Peace Conference" have stressed
the need to create awareness among the peoples of India and Pakistan of the
horrors of nuclear war and to prevail on their rulers to end the arms race,
sign the CTBT and to bring a durable peace in the region.
The speakers, who were writers, intellectuals, poets, artists and academics,
called upon the rulers of both the countries to start dialogue to resolve
outstanding issues, including Kashmir, cut their defence expenditures and
use their scant resources for the welfare of their peoples. Citing the
example of the former Soviet Union, they said it could not sustain itself in
spite of having a big stockpile of nuclear weapons. The overspending on
building up military might resulted in economic collapse. As a result, the
country disintegrated.
The three-day conference, which opened at Karachi Press Club on Friday, has
been sponsored by over a dozen organizations of writers, journalists,
literary bodies and political and social forums. The opening session was
presided over by renowned journalists Zamir Niazi and M. H. Askari. Hasan
Abidi presented the address of welcome.
Zamir Niazi, in his paper, highlighted the importance of peace between the
two countries, which was now more important than ever before, considering
the fact that India and Pakistan had become nuclear powers.
He referred to the nuclear holocaust after nuclear bombs were dropped on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and said following the advancement of technology the
use of nuclear weapons would inflict unheard-of destruction on mankind.
"If nuclear bombs are dropped on Bombay and Karachi, these big cities would
turn into a rubble, and even if nuclear weapons are not used, their presence
would pose a danger to human beings if leakages from nuclear reactors
occur," Mr Niazi said.
He said Pakistan by signing the CTBT could get a moral victory over India
and show to the world that Pakistan is prepared to end the arms race in
South Asia. Later, this would compel India to sign the CTBT.
M. H. Askari, in his presidential remarks, pointed out that the most
powerful country of the world had dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, but Pakistan and India, occupying a low place even among the
developing countries, would inflict extreme destruction on each other if a
nuclear war broke out between them.
However, he expressed optimism that on both sides of the border there were
sensible people who were not only against nuclear weapons but against all
kinds of weapons.
Comrade Sobho Gyan Chandani recalled that fascist elements in the two
countries had been creating hatred against each other. He said the peoples
of India and Pakistan shared a lot in common, therefore they could very well
live in harmony. He stressed the need for declaring Kashmir a demilitarized
zone and said Kashmiris should be allowed to have their own system.
Dr Jamil Jalibi warned that if there was a nuclear war between India and
Pakistan, there would be such a great holocaust that for centuries the
region would be repenting the consequences of this insanity. So writers owed
a major responsibility to play their role in creating awareness among the
people.
Intellectual Hamza Alvi said after turning into nuclear powers, the two
countries were sitting on a pile of nuclear bombs which could go any moment.
Therefore, he said, it had become all the more necessary for writers,
intellectuals and for all to play their parts in influencing public opinion
that could lead to elimination of the fear of a nuclear holocaust.
Ghulam Kibria said we should not pride on being nuclear powers, as it is
achievements and excellence in philosophy, science, economy, and morality
that bring pride and honour to nations. He said the Kashmir issue can be
resolved through dialogue.
Dr Anwar Sadeed said security of the country is important, but nuclear
weapons could not provide security but rather take the nations towards
destruction.
Poet Fehmida Riaz said except for the lunatic fringe, the majority of the
people in both Pakistan and India want to live with each other in peace.
Some how there voices are not powerful, so they are an invisible entity.
Tahir Mohammed Khan, human rights activist, stressed the need for peace not
only between the two countries but between nations, provinces, societies and
in South Asia.
He said it augurs well that the peace mission has been initiated from
Karachi which should not be only the city of lights but also a cradle of
peace. Peoples in entire South Asia, in the whole world, need peace, he said.
Abid Hasan Manto, lawyer and political leader, said there was contradiction
in the thinking of rulers and peoples of India and Pakistan. "The people
want peace, but the rulers' attitude is aggressive," he added.
He said during the past 50 years conspiracies had been hatched against peace
not only at the official level but at every levels. The rulers should change
their attitudes, he said.
Mehmoud Qazi from Gujranwala said there was a need to tell the truth about
the destructive potential of nuclear weapons which were being propagated as
weapons necessary for deterrent.
Prominent Artist Ali Imam recalled the role of painters in creating
awakening against war. In this connection, he referred to Picasso's
"Anti-war paintings" and "Dove of peace." He said in Pakistan Sadequain did
paintings on "War and peace." Salima Hashmi and Prof A. R Nagi also did such
paintings.
He said there was not only the need for peace with the neighbouring country
but between individuals, families, neighbours, and various groups.
Mubarak Machuka said some outlet can be found for peace through the power of
pen and brush.
Intellectual Hamid Akhtar said writers and journalists have a special
responsibility to forewarn the people of the consequences of nuclear war.
Prof Khwaja Masood said eternal neighbours cannot be eternal enemies. We can
solve our problems in the spirit of peaceful co-existence.
Fateh Mohammed Malik said Sindh is a land of peace and it has the honour of
hosting the "Pen for Peace Conference."
Prof Ghani Parwaz said we have to wage a concerted effort against the forces
promoting obscurantism.
Prof Shamim Akhtar was the moderator.
Pakistan's famous ex-civil servant columnist Inayatullah, whose wife Attiya
Inayatullah is a member of General Musharraf's cabinet, in his article National
Debate on Kashmir ( The News 3 October 2000) has expressed the worry that
Pakistan may have lost the international leverage to get the Kashmir dispute
resolved in its favour: 'Should one consider that the deeply felt views of
Nawa-e-Waqt, [Lashkar-e-Tayba chief] Hafiz Saeed and [ex-ISI chief] General
Hameed Gul on Kashmir are outdated? And if Occupied Kashmir is to be accepted
advisedly as Indian territory, will the economy of Pakistan remain unharmed
with India left free to use and divert the waters flowing from Kashmir, as it
wishes, to our detriment? Already works are in hand on the Chenab river, of
which little notice has been taken by Pakistan. Let us not forget that
Pakistan's agriculture and economy overwhelmingly depend on these rivers.'
Pakistan and India agreed to sign a treaty about river waters in 1960 which
other regions of the world refer to as examples of success. The Indus Basin
Waters Treaty bifurcated the river system as far as possible to preclude water
disputes between the upper riparian (India) and the lower riparian (Pakistan).
The rights of the lower riparian are safeguarded in customary international law
but enforcement is possible to some extent if it is confirmed by a bilateral
treaty holding both to a binding arbitration. Pakistan and India had such an
agreement. After the Wullar Barrage dispute arose over Jhelum the two were not
able to conclusively resolve it, but Pakistan did not go for arbitration.
Nonetheless much hostile ink was spilt on both sides about the perfidy of the
other and there was a time when Pakistan seriously considered going for
arbitration over it.
Water as next cause of war: Scarcity of water in the coming decades of growing
population and degrading environment is going to cause disputes to erupt
between nations. This would reverse the present trend of 'producing' water
disputes out of an already soured relationship. The Wullar Barrage and Sir Creek
disputes are an example of the latter trend. But quarrels over selfish use of
river water can erupt in the future as countries exhaust their finite water
resources in relation to an infinite growth of populations. Almost 45 percent
of Pakistan's water is 'imported', India's ratio is 14 percent, Bangladesh's 80
percent, the last ratio applying to most o countries of Southeast Asia.
Pakistan's major source, the Indus River, rises in China but passes through
that part of Kashmir that is now in Indian control. In relative terms, Pakistan
is less at risk as a lower riparian state than most Asian states. India's
Ganges also comes from China but about 40 percent of it is replenished by Nepal. If Pakistan is to secure its river waters, it must prevent
hostile diversions in China and India. If India is to prevent such a hostile
diversion it must avoid conflict with China and Nepal.
Regions are being discovered to be interconnected through waterways in the 21st
century because of scarcity of water and the growing possibility of war over
its use. China is sitting on top of the water resources of Pakistan, India,
Bangladesh, Burma, Kazakhstan, and the whole of the Mekong Delta in Southeast
Asia. China, not dependent on 'import' of water, suffers from scarcity of water
and is thinking of diverting its eastern rivers by building dams over them. The
question that looms over the future of Asia is: should river water be seen as
an issue to be solved between amicably cooperative states or as a cause of war
between already hostile states? Pakistan and India fall in the last category.
Both have a tendency to see the world through the prism of the bilateral
equation, both are hostile to each other and apply strategies of threat
perception to each other. India has begun to see China as a source of threat
since 1998 and may look at China as a power determined to take over its river sources. This might lead to invading and occupying
Nepal as a first step since it supplies nearly half the water of Ganges. Since
China controls the South Asian rivers in Tibet, the Sino-Indian border can be
made to include a challenge to China's title to Tibet.
Indo-Pak rivalry and the rivers: After the Indian occupation of Kashmir the
most important Pakistani rivers have continued to flow from the Occupied
Territory. For nearly fifty years India has thus 'controlled' Pakistan's
rivers. This should apply especially to those rivers that fell to Pakistan's
share under the Indus Basin Waters Treaty. By and large, one can say that the
two countries have behaved in consonance with the stipulations of the Treaty,
and Pakistan has not suffered to any considerable degree because of India's
hostile management of the rivers that pass through Occupied Kashmir. The only
exception has been India's construction of Wullar Barrage over Jhelum which
became highlighted more because of the hostile bilateral relationship than any
objective conditions. It must be remembered that under the Indus Basin Treaty,
Pakistan permitted India to use Jhelum, Chenab and Indus for non-consumption
purposes, that is, for purposes other than irrigation and electricity production. In the case of Wullar Barrage, called Tulbul Navigation
Project by India (because the Indus Treaty allows navigation projects on
Indian-controlled Jhelum) it was mutual hostility which motivated India not to
make Pakistan privy to the Barrage/Project when it was planned. The case of
Chenab referred to by Inayatullah may turn out to be a similar case, but can be
exacerbated by mutual distrust and hostility. It appears that the bilateral
treaty has been more effective in regulating river water use than the customary
international law, which safeguards the rights of the lower riparian state. On
the other hand, Pakistan and India have been less successful in handling
internal disputes arising out of river-water sharing. In Pakistan, Sindh, the
NWFP and Balochistan are opposed to Punjab's use of the Indus waters and thwart
the construction of Kalabagh Dam deemed crucial to the survival of the country.
In India, a similar dispute over Kaveri between Tamilnadu and Karnataka has defied central authority. There is more trust, it
appears, between India and Pakistan than between Islamabad and Sindh over the
use of river waters.
The worry about the rivers has arisen in Inyatullah's article because Kashmir
is a disputed territory to which Pakistan lays claim and challenges India's
occupation of Kashmir on the basis of the Security Council resolutions. He
thinks that if the Kashmir dispute is resolved in a manner other than the
plebiscite ordained by the UN resolutions, Pakistan may forever give its rivers
in hostage to India. This is a scenario of defeat: that Pakistan will be
forcibly deprived of its right on Kashmir and, in the time following this, the
two states will remain mutually hostile; in which case India will use the
rivers to punish Pakistan. If Pakistan were to lose Kashmir to India in the
course of a conflict-resolving process, then there will have to be another
treaty of normalisation of relations between the two of which the Indus Basin
Treaty is sure to form a continuing cornerstone. Why should India punish
Pakistan if it 'wins' by gaining Kashmir and by normalising with Pakistan? The time to do mischief with the rivers is now, but India is not seen as
doing that. The dispute over Farraka Barrage could not be resolved because of
bad relations, but India was able to settle the issue with Bangladesh to mutual
satisfaction, barring certain politically partisan voices on both sides.
The real issue: What is at issue is Pakistan's security from within. Its
economy has declined over the last decade (the decade of Kashmir jehad) and
nosed-dived since 1998 when it imitated India in testing its nuclear device.
Over the last one year of 'inflexibility', the rupee has gone down against the
dollar by 12 percent. This scenario has perhaps prompted Inayatullah to sound
the tocsin of alarm. The article is encrypted in the idiom of a shaken orthodox
who wants to only 'hint' at change of policy without being rebuked. The two
personages he has referred to as custodians of our Kashmir policy are not the
most rational of exponents of Pakistan's image: General Hameed Gul has been
predicting the break-up of India when India was in the process of breaking out
of its low growth rate and becoming economically strong and politically united;
Hafiz Saeed, dreaded equally in India and Pakistan, has consistently opposed
democracy in Pakistan and prescribed a system that is sure to lead to the country's final collapse as a state.
Kunwar Idrees, writing in Dawn ( A retreat from liberalism, 15 October 2000)
speaks of Hafiz Saeed as follows: 'Hafiz Saeed does not approve of banking. His
organisation, he says, spends the money as it comes and depends on Allah for
more to come and spend. On assuming power he would introduce gold and silver
coins to replace the currency notes. Pakistan, Hafiz Saeed advises, should now
explode the hydrogen bomb to bring America to its knees'. While Inayatullah
hangs on to the likes of Gul and Saeed, the people of Held Kashmir are in the
process of changing their minds. In a survey conducted by the Indian weekly
Outlook, 72 percent of the Muslims of the Valley wanted 'independence' while
only 2 percent wanted to consider Pakistan as an option. The figure of 2
percent is down from 19 in 1995. Of course, no one wants to join India while 16
percent may accept autonomy, up from only 3 percent in 1995.
The argument about the rivers is clearly a lingering excuse to hang on to the
status quo in Pakistan. The rivers have not been diverted to any damaging
extent since 1960 when the treaty on river waters was signed between India and
Pakistan. Advancing the rivers argument is also in violation of Pakistan's
official stance because it is the right of self-determination in Kashmir that
Pakistan upholds, not a war to get the rivers freed from India's control. The
change in policy will depend finally on the way Pakistan looks at the last ten
years of jehad and the country's capacity to prosecute it in the face of
growing internal disorder. That the governments in Pakistan are not able to
develop the suppleness of response needed in these circumstances foreshadows a
bigger dislocation than a diversion of rivers could bring.
NEW YORK -- India's weekend decision to unilaterally cease military
operations against Mujahedeen groups in the disputed Himalayan enclave
of Kashmir during Ramadan, Islam's holy month, is a welcome gesture.
Islamic militants should now rejoin in search of an earnest peace.
With 347 civilians murdered, 712 militants killed and over 2,100 men,
women and children injured in skirmishes since an August cease-fire fell
apart, few rational alternatives exist to ending the bleeding ground war
that is consuming Kashmir.
In an effort to stop the carnage, earlier this year I proposed a
framework for dialogue to General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military
leader, and Atal Behari Vajpayee, India's prime minister, that
envisioned empowering ordinary Kashmiris -- civilian and militant alike
-- as the central partners for peace. The initiative had backing from
President Bill Clinton as an effective means for preventing the internal
implosion of Pakistan at the hands of its Islamic zealots.
Most importantly, it was supported by Sayed Salahuddin, leader of Hizbul
Mujahedeen, Kashmir's largest indigenous group of "freedom fighters"
Then Pakistan's Islamic fundamentalists got wind of the proposal. The
mere thought of slowing down or stopping their well-financed "jihad"
was heresy.
In September, after learning that I had delivered a letter from Mr.
Salahuddin to Mr. Clinton in which he sought verification of the
president's direct backing of our peace initiative, religious extremists
threatened to replace the Hizbul leader and issued "fatwas" (death
warrants) against me.
When I met General Musharraf in late May of this year, I counseled him
that Pakistan was in danger of losing the moral authority it once held
in Kashmir by allowing, indeed encouraging, increasingly indiscriminate
violent behavior by Islamic radicals fighting there. During our almost
three hours of meetings, I told him that every civilian I met in Kashmir
earlier that month had tired as much of the incessant violence imparted
by Pakistan's militia forces as they had from that of India's security
forces over the past decade.
I implored him to do what no one expected of him "to persuade the
Mujahedeen under his control to opt for non-violent means as a platform
for ending the conflict", to basically put the onus for peace back in
New Delhi's court. I could only do this knowing how India would react
"with an immediate and unconditional acceptance" of an offer to cease
hostilities and negotiate a permanent Kashmiri solution.
But as with many things General Musharraf has done since assuming power,
he got cold feet when the July cease-fire he initiated with Mr.
Salahuddin was portrayed in Pakistan's fundamentalist circles as a
"sell out"? Mr. Vajpayee also fell prey to fundamentalist Hindus and
pulled out of the cease-fire at that time.
Not to be undone by extremists, we resurrected in August our framework
to resume the peace with Mr. Salahuddin's blessing. We proposed
centering it around his call to widen the cease-fire net so it would
include all militant groups operating in the Kashmir Valley. We would
trade Indian intransigence on structural issues that derailed the late
July cease-fire to essentially give all parties to the conflict a role
in making peace.
Pakistan would be brought to the negotiating table at the outset of
political discussions after the cease-fire had taken hold, first
bilaterally and then at the Kashmiris' request, trilaterally. India's
adamancy to not talk to Pakistan unless cross-border "terrorism"
stopped would disappear in the Valley-wide cease-fire call from Mr.
Salahuddin. He would receive critical support from General Musharraf to
bring unruly Islamists on board and General Musharraf would in turn get
a wink from Washington along with some much needed International
Monetary Fund aid.
India would agree to a significant, verifiable and permanent reduction
of its forces in the Valley in exchange for a verifiable withdrawal of
Pakistani militants. In the process, the Mujahedeen voice would be
strengthened and unified and Pakistan could take credit for having
tangibly supported peace through its military advocacy of the Kashmiri
cause.
This framework to resurrect meaningful dialogue aimed at stable and
permanent peace was agreed to by the Indians and, conditioned on
Pakistani intelligence accepting it, by Mr. Salahuddin in late August.
With virtually all of Islamabad's demands met and a historic opportunity
to find a permanent solution, why has Pakistan not yet embraced it?
The world has a right to know what was possible to prevent the now
almost inevitable escalation of hostilities in Kashmir. Until General
Musharraf finds the courage to stare down his religious extremists as
the real enemies of Pakistani and Kashmiri welfare, violence and
bloodshed will continue.
Islamabad's "bleed India" policy is a recipe for disaster that dooms
every ordinary Pakistani to permanent poverty. New Delhi's "we can
bleed forever" retort exposes India's economic renewal to the perpetual
threat of religious extremism. General Musharraf, Mr. Vajpayee and the
Islamic extremists fueling Kashmir's bloodshed need to muster the
courage for employing a reasoned framework that provides each party with
a face saving exit and brings finality to one of history's most
dangerous conflicts.
The writer is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and chairman
of Crescent Investment Management in New York. He contributed this
comment to the International Herald Tribune.
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