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Sena could soon go public in support of deal

NEW DELHI I AUGUST 25: Peeved at being taken for granted by the BJP, the Shiv Sena is planning to break ranks from the NDA on the Indo-US nuclear deal issue. And unless there is a quick rapprochement between the saffron parties, the Sena is set to take a public position backing the deal. “Please wait for a while and we would make our stand clear,” Sena sources told The Sunday Express. “We are in the process of formulating our response, but as it is, we are all for the agreement,” they said on Saturday. When asked why had Sena leadership refrained from coming into the open in support of the deal so far, they said, “We were seeking expert opinion”. Now that the leadership “has received all inputs, we would spell out our reading of the matter”. They pointed out that even Atomic Energy Commission chairman Anil Kakodkar, who had initially opposed the agreement, later expressed his satisfaction. Pending a formal positioning by the Sena on the deal, party mouthpiece Saamna has even showered praise on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for standing up to the Left. Two editorials in it, on August 20 and 22, have hailed Singh for behaving like a “Sikh warrior and displaying his manhood”. Mocking the Left’s talk of national interest, the newspaper says it is “like a prostitute inaugurating a seminar on family planning”. The editorials say the Left only wants that India should not get powerful. “What would happen to China if India becomes a superpower in Asia” after the nuclear deal? This must have been worrying the brokers of China,” the Sena daily says. The deal, however, is just an immediate excuse for the Sena to take a swipe at the BJP. It, in fact, wants wants to avenge “insults” hurled at it by BJP General Secretary Gopinath Munde and Maharashtra BJP chief Nitin Gadkari who have publicly aired their desire to sever ties with it. The shift in Sena stance vis-à-vis the BJP has been evident of late. In the latest instance, even when UPA constituents like the DMK, RJD and NCP joined the Opposition to press for action against Indian Ambassador to the US Ronen Sen, its members did not join the NDA walkout in the Lok Sabha on August 22. The Saamna comments are likely to find echo in New Delhi. Enough cause for worry in the BJP because it shows NDA as a vulnerable coalition amidst speculation over a snap poll. However, the Sena support would be counter-productive for the Congress, which is already worried over a supposed Muslim alienation due to the Government’s perceived proximity to the US .

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Left posturing over nuke deal justified: RSS

New Delhi: : The RSS has supported the Left opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal saying its “posturing” over the 123 agreement is justified. “Whatever be the explanation for the Congress party’s new-found arrogance, the Left is justified in its posturing (over the nuclear deal),” an editorial in the Sangh mouthpiece Organiser said. The party has been critical of the deal and has been accusing the Congress-led Government of compromising Indian interests. The editorial said: “There is no mention in the deal in the common minimum programme under which this bizarre government was formed. There was no need for the UPA to take forward the deal compromising national interest.” It also accused the UPA of using tricks to avoid early elections and said PM Manmohan Singh could have avoided confrontation with the Left over the deal. “The Left is understandably hurt that the PM chose to take to the street a matter that could have been sorted out at the dining table,” the editorial said.

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Grave crisis over India-US nuclear deal

The confrontation between the United Progressive Alliance and the Left over the India-United States nuclear deal has ballooned into a major crisis, which could potentially dislodge the government. The roots of the crisis lie in the way the "123 agreement" was negotiated, without political leaders being taken into confidence about its context or content, or involved in resolving differences over its text.
Opposition to the deal, whether genuine, procedural or contrived, is widespread. But it's only when the Left presented its critique on August 7 that matters came to a head. This was the first well-informed and -reasoned critical analysis of the deal it after the "123" text was made public.
Even so, an ugly confrontation might have been avoided but for two events. First, Singh gave an interview to the Kolkata-based Telegraph (Aug 11), challenging the Left to withdraw support to the UPA. Second, US State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack was reported to have said that under "123", "all nuclear cooperation [would be] terminated" if India conducts nuclear test. This was one day after Singh said that testing is India's "sovereign decision", and won't cause sudden termination.
If the second event created confusion, the first provoked the Left. Singh taunted it for not having "thought" things "through", and said: "It is an honourable deal Šif [the Left parties] want to withdraw support, so be itŠ" Singh's self-styled advisers calculated that this would help him play the CPM's so-called "moderate modernisers" in West Bengal off against its "hardliners" to trump their opposition. This betrayed a serious misunderstanding of how the Left parties make policy decisions. It also underrated the unanimity among them on foreign policy and security issues.
The Left's reaction was ballistic. Within three days, Singh was begging CPM general secretary Prakash Karat for a reconciliation meeting. Thus began the worst-ever crisis in UPA-Left relations. The CPM, joined by the other three Left parties, demanded that that the government suspend further talks with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group to complete the deal.
Or there would be "serious consequences". Without the Left's support, the UPA would fall short of a parliamentary majority by 30 to 50 seats. Instead of sincerely exploring a via media, the UPA deviously resorted to accusing the Left of acting at China's and Pakistan's behest. This tendentious charge was articulated through Right-wing pro-US China-Pakistan-baiters masquerading as "experts". In reality, there is no live contact between the Indian Left and the Chinese Communist Party, over some of whose policies the Left has serious misgivings.
India is now witnessing the most vicious attack on the Left since the 1962 China War. Every Tom, Dick and Harry in the media--from semi-literate television anchors, to former intelligence spooks, to pitiable third-edit writers--is unleashing vitriolic anti-Communist assaults. This new McCarthyism betrays malignant intolerance. Such intolerance can only have dangerous consequences for public debate. If every dissenting opinion is attributed to the "foreign hand" by suppressing its rational content, and if every difference on principle is reduced to an "ego clash" between personalities, there can be no rational discourse on policy issues. That does not bode well for Indian democracy.
It's simply undeniable that the Indian Left represents the most important current driven by ideology and principle in politics, which perhaps concentrates more brainpower per capita than any other party. Despite the Left's conduct in Singur and Nandigram--of which this writer has been strongly critical--, its objection to the deal on strategic grounds cannot be dismissed. As this column argued two weeks ago, the nuclear deal is inseparable from the larger US game-plan to recruit India into a junior strategic partnership, not least to counter China, and more broadly, to create an anchor for a Washington-dominated security architecture in Asia. The deal cannot be divorced from the Defence Framework agreement of June 2005, nor from India's two votes against Iran at the IAEA, nor from the 27 recent high-level military exercises with the US.
The Left's critique of the deal is foundational. It's centred on the US's deeply destabilising world role, and its attempt to ignite a second Cold War by encircling Russia with NATO and targeting China and Iran through "Son of Star Wars" Ballistic Missile Defence. The US remains the globe's most belligerent power, which has made the world more insecure through its Global War on Terror and its Empire project.
True, the Left did not consistently emphasise the deal's strategic dimensions in the past two years, and often concentrated on its text rather than context. Since December, it has been more concerned to point to differences between the Hyde Act and Singh's assurances to parliament. It didn't really agitate the issue in public. Any genuine, principled opposition to the deal should logically have focused on its harmful global and regional consequences for nuclear disarmament, and its promotion of an inappropriate, costly, hazardous and environmentally unsound energy trajectory through nuclear power development--besides its consequences for the loss of India's strategic and foreign policy autonomy via a strategic embrace of the US. These are significant errors of omission.
However, the government's errors of commission are graver. Singh acted like a typical bureaucrat, and left the deal's negotiation to bureaucrats alone, without bringing political leaders on board. He consistently underplayed its strategic consequences, and fomented the illusion that the deal would offer a magic bullet for India's energy problems. He capitulated to US pressures. Former US assistant secretary of state Stephen Rademaker says India's votes on Iran were obtained through "coercion".
Singh continues to pay lip-service to disarmament, while knowing fully well that the deal will enable India to stockpile 1,600 kg of plutonium every year--enough for more than 300 bombs, in addition to the existing estimated inventory of 100-150 warheads. This is a recipe for a nuclear arms race with Pakistan, and worse, China, which can only reduce the security of all three.
Now, the UPA faces a crisis of survival. It would be foolish for it to brazen this out. It can still rescue the situation by doing four things. The first is to distance itself strategically from Washington demonstrably--by cancelling the huge military exercises with the US, Japan, Australia and Singapore planned for September. Second, it should initiate what might be called a "domestic Hyde Act" to prevent the transfer of any imported nuclear material/equipment out of India which would jeopardise the continuous operation of Indian reactors.
Third, the UPA must update the Rajiv Gandhi plan of 1988 for global nuclear disarmament and place it before the United Nations. That's the only concrete way of fulfilling the National Common Minimum Programme's promise that India would seize "leadership" in fighting for a nuclear weapons-free world. Finally, the UPA must launch a national debate on nuclear power, reviewing India's (unhappy) experience with it, analysing its international performance, and focusing on its hazards, costs and unsustainability.
The UPA must suspend negotiations on the deal while these processes are under way. Similarly, the Left must clarify that it won't vote against the government or contribute to its fall, thus helping the BJP. That could promote an honourable solution.

The writer, a former newspaper editor, is a researcher and peace and human-rights activist based in Delhi

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Aruna Roy, Medha question deal

MUMBAI: The National Alliance of People’s Movements and Sangharsh, another coalition of mass organisations, have said the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) should be stopped from going ahead with the India-United States Nuclear Deal unless there is a public debate. In a statement released on Thursday, they said there was a need for all citizens to question and speak out against a deal that was against national security and sovereignty. Medha Patkar, leader of the Narmada Bachao Andolan , Aruna Roy and Sandeep Pandey in a statement said: “Today when the deal is seen as an issue of conflict between the UPA and its Left front allies, we as representatives of people’s movements must reiterate our stand, which is that the deal is not just anti-democratic but against peace, and against environmentally sustainable energy generation and self-reliant economic development.” They also demanded that the Constitution be amended to make public debate and referendums mandatory and pre-conditional for signing such treaties. The electorate should approve such treaties before they were signed. The statement said the Left front was questioning the fact that such an international deal with significant implications was imposed on the people and Parliament, with no public debate and consultation in India. While the U.S. Congress took a year-and-a-half to discuss the proposed change in the U.S. laws, permitting nuclear commerce with India, the process in India had been totally undemocratic. Ms. Patkar and the others feared that the U.S. would enter the Indian subcontinent, to manage intra-regional and inter-country relations. This whole process was likely to escalate the arms race between Pakistan and India, sabotaging the India-Pakistan peace process, they said. Their basic objections to this deal stemmed from their opposition to the production and use of both nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. The irreversible dangers of radioactivity and its ongoing impact on health, water, and the environment were factors that were being summarily dismissed in an irresponsible manner, the statement said. They also said that the enormous potential of renewable sources of energy needed to be fully tapped. Appropriate technology, research and development for production of cheaper equipment and tools, needed to be combined with just distribution. However, there was no political will for this in the ruling establishment. The nuclear energy option should be opened for widespread public debate.

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N-deal a total sellout to US: Maoists

Hyderabad: After the Left, it is the turn of the ultra leftists to come out against the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. The outlawed CPI Maoists have warned that the agreement would push India into "perpetual dependence on US" as it was a total sell out of India's interests to that country. In a statement, the spokesperson of the central committee of CPI Maoist Azad has asked the Left parties, mainly the CPI and CPI(M) to withdraw their support to the UPA Government as it was trying to push through the agreement. The statement said that if the Government did not scrap the deal immediately, the Left parties should withdraw their support. "The Left parties are crying hoarse against 123 Agreement but continuing their support to the UPA Government", the statement signed by Azad said. The CPI Maoists held those MNCs responsible for pushing the deal who will garner huge profits from energy contracts. It named companies like GE and Westinghouse in this regard. The organisation, which has been waging armed struggle in as many as 16 States on the issue of land, warned that the deal would widen the gulf between India and Pakistan and trigger an arms race in south Asia. "This agreement is anti-national and anti-people," the statement said. The agreement was signed on July 22 but till August 3 its details were kept under wraps.

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N-deal: CPM Central Committee meets; CPI, DMK hold talks

NEW DELHI, AUGUST 22: While the Left parties are hoping for a last minute favourable word from the Government on the IAEA safeguard talks, the CPI(M) Central Committee met on Wednesday to begin discussion on the possible scenarios emerging out of the stand-off. Japan PM begins visit, N-energy on agendaCong politely says sorry to Left’s latest: go to Vienna but don’t talk We want to carry the Left with us, I don’t know if I will succeed: Firefighter Pranab Why the nuclear deal is in dangerDMK won’t change path, will support n-deal: KarunanidhiThe committee discussed the various likely outcomes of the deadlock, including the withdrawal of support and the situation arising out of it. The Central Committee is expected to endorse the stand of the Politburo in a shriller tone. At the beginning of the two-day meet, party General Secretary Prakash Karat presented a report, detailing the Politburo resolution and the meeting between UPA Chairperson Sonia Gandhi, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Politburo member and MP Sitaram Yechury and him. Though the general mood is against a mid-term election and towards ending the impasse, the Central Committee is exploring answers to all political scenarios. The party will, however, wait for a final word from the Government before concretising its plans. Both Jyoti Basu and West Bengal unit's secretary Biman Bose have ruled out early general elections. “Since it’s an ideological question, the party can’t go back on its stand. But still there is scope for reconciliation depending on the UPA's proposal to us,” said a senior party leader. Meanwhile, the efforts of the Left are at an advanced stage to reach out to the UPA allies. Following CPI(M) Politburo member K Varadarajan meeting Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi to apprise him of the developments and explain the Left’s “principled position” on the nuclear deal, CPI leader D Raja also held talks with the DMK chief. The Left leaders have also spoken to RJD chief Lalu Prasad Yadav and LJP’s Ramvilas Paswan. It is learnt that Karunanidhi has said that, if required, he would come to Delhi. He has also conveyed to the Left that they should wait before taking any hasty decision. “We need to make our stand clear to the allies too. We are giving support to the UPA allies and not the Congress alone,” All India Forward Bloc Secretary G Devarajan said.

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Show us safeguards first, Japan tells India

New Delhi: At a time when the India-US civilian nuclear deal is negotiating a turbulent sea on the domestic front, Japan on Wednesday made it more than apparent that its own future plans to enter into nuclear cooperation with India would be predicated on how India winds its way through the US deal at the IAEA. "We have to examine the India-US deal thoroughly and carefully. It may take us time to come to a decision," said Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mitsuo Sakaba. Even as the Left kept the heat on against India-specific negotiations at the IAEA, Sakaba clearly said, "Negotiations between the IAEA and India for safeguards would be the key for us," adding, Japan would "want to see what those safeguards look like." A joint statement issued at the end of the delegation-level talks between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Japanese counterpart did underline in principle that Japan would like to do civil nuclear business with India. Acknowledging that "nuclear energy can play an important role as a safe, sustainable and non-polluting source of energy in meeting the rising global demand for energy," the two decided to move ahead with "constructive deliberations at the relevant international fora with respect to the international civil nuclear cooperation framework under appropriate IAEA safeguards with India." For Japan, the main hurdle in a US-like deal with India is the fact that India, despite being a nuclear power, is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Given Japan's collective national memory of nuclear weapons, the Japanese political and diplomatic class is divided on the issue of nuclear powers entering into civilian nuclear cooperation. As an official put it, "We do not have doubts about the concrete aspects of the (India-US) deal. This is an issue on which Japanese people have deep sentiments. At least from the perspective of Japanese national sentiment any possible cooperation between the two countries which have tested nuclear weapons would be a definite no." However, a more pragmatic arm of Japanese policy-makers believes India-specific safeguards at the IAEA could end India's untouchability for good. For Japan, as part of its Cold Earth 50 initiative, pushing for safe, sustainable, non-polluting energy is a priority and civilian nuclear energy cooperation the natural byword. What makes India a "unique problem" for Japan is the fact that the former is a non-NPT signatory nuclear power. Japanese officials say, "On this issue we want a debate within Japan taking into account all factors, including India's growing energy requirements, Indo-Japanese ties, and future environment challenges." Sakaba said Japan's position is currently "neutral," in that it has not yet come to a decision on how to credibly engage with India in civilian nuclear cooperation. "Japan is trying to gauge the implications of this (India-US) deal taking into account the issues of non-proliferation and disarmament. We look forward to the deliberations at the NSG within international guidelines and the IAEA safeguards for India," Sakaba said. Although Japan does have cooperation with nuclear powers like Russia, India's non-membership of the NPT regime poses a "unique problem," he said. India, on its part, while conveying to Japan that it understands the latter's position has also underlined its "good track record" on proliferation despite not being covered by the NPT regime. Sakaba said Japan has "taken note of this explanation" but must still wait for the IAEA outcome. To this end, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh expressed the hope that Japan would support India's case at the NSG.

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N-deal crisis: Next 15-20 days crucial

New Delhi, Aug. 22: The standoff between the Congress and the Left parties on the India-US nuclear deal appears to be heading for a mid-term Lok Sabha poll. While UPA strategists feel the next fortnight could be decisive politically, the ruling allies feel the Left could formally withdraw support by the end of next month. "The next 15 to 20 days will be crucial politically," well placed sources in the Congress said, indicating that the government cannot back out of the 123 agreement. The Left parties are unlikely to take a decision on the future of their relationship with the government till September 18, when Atomic Energy Commission chief Anil Kakodkar travels to Vienna to attend the IAEA meeting. Under the nuclear deal, India is required to negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. If Dr Kakodkar discusses the Indo-US nuclear deal with the IAEA, the Left parties will decide on the future of the relationship. "We have two options — either to run a langdi sarkar (lame-duck minority government) or take a mandate from the people," a Congress leader said. Asked when the elections could be held, whether in April or May, the leader said the picture would be clear much before the presentation of the Union Budget next year. Party insiders concede privately that a strong pro-US stand could weaken its support base among minorities and they are unsure whether the upper middle class would vote for the UPA. According to UPA insiders, the Congress would ask for votes on the basis of the Manmohan Singh government’s performance. But would it project him as Prime Minister? "We don’t think so," they said and added that even Mrs Sonia Gandhi’s "sacrifice" card may not appeal a second time. The Congress would go to the polls under the UPA banner. This was indicated by party MPs and senior leaders. While it is unsure whether the PMK would continue to the part of the UPA, the Congress is opposing inducting the Janata Dal (S) into the UPA. A CWC member predicted the Congress would win about 200 seats. Meanwhile, RJD chief and railway minister Lalu Prasad Yadav on Wednesday said there is no threat to the UPA government and it will complete its full term. "There is no fear about the government’s stability.

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Pakistan under siege

Pakistan is 60 years old. For over 40 years of its life, it has been ruled directly or indirectly by its army. Each cycle of military rule has left the country in desperate crisis.
The rule of General Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in 1999, has been no different. Beset on all sides, he now seeks, with American help, to ride out the storm and stay in power.
Down this path lies even greater disaster.

Origins of Failure

Pakistan's leaders have failed it from the beginning. At independence, its founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, adopted the British colonial title and powers of governor-general. He died within a year, leaving no clear vision of the country's identity or future, no broad-based, cohesive, national political party or movement to guide it, no tradition of democracy. Pakistan fell into the hands of a civil service and army that knew only colonial habits.
There were four governor-generals and seven prime ministers in the first 10 years, rising and falling through palace intrigues, but all powerless in the end. Pakistan could not even create a constitution. Then, in 1958, came the first military coup. General Ayub Khan told the country the army had no choice. There was, he said, "total administrative, economic, political and moral chaos" brought about "by self-seekers, who in the garb of political leaders, have ravaged the country."
General Ayub Khan ruled for a decade. His two goals were strengthening the army and modernizing of the society and economy. The General negotiated a close military alliance with the United States, which was looking for Cold War clients around the world. American dollars, weapons, advisors, and ideas poured into Pakistan. The result was the 1965 war with India, wrenching social change, and grievous inequality. By the end of his rule, it was said that 22 families controlled two-thirds of Pakistani industry and an even larger share of its banking and insurance sector.
Eventually, the people rose in revolt. The demands for representation were greatest in East Pakistan, home to the majority of Pakistan's people. Elections were held and a nationalist party from the East emerged victorious, but the army and its political allies were mostly from West Pakistan and would have none of it. The army went to war against its own people. There were appalling massacres. In 1971, with help from India, East Pakistan broke free and became Bangladesh.

Lost Generation

The army relinquished power in the West. But the new civilian leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, lacked a democratic temperament, and treated opposition as threat. He nationalized large sectors of the economy, further strengthening already unaccountable bureaucrats, doled out government jobs to his followers, established Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, and refined the practice of buying public support by appeasing the mullahs.
In 1977, the army took back control, and executed Bhutto. The new ruler, General Zia ul Haq, sought to Islamize Pakistan. He introduced religious laws, courts, and taxes, supported radical Islamist madrassas (seminaries) and political parties, and altered school textbooks to promote a conservative Islamic nationalism. Work on the bomb proceeded apace.
The United States turned a blind eye to both the dictatorship and the bomb. It poured billions of dollars into Pakistan to buy support for a war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The Pakistan army trained and armed Islamic militants from around the world, with American money, and sent them across the border to fight godless communism. The jihad was born.
General Zia died in a mysterious plane crash in 1988, and the Soviet Union admitted defeat and left Afghanistan. Elections were held, only to have the army become the power behind the throne. America re-discovered that Pakistan was building the bomb, and imposed sanctions. It was too late.
The new crop of leaders, including Bhutto's daughter, Benazir, descended into corruption and intrigue, each seeking the army's help to take office. There were nine prime ministers in 10 years. Some actively courted the mullahs, none tried to undo the Islamic order created by General Zia. A generation was abandoned to intolerance, violence, and radical Islam.
The army demanded the lion's share of national resources. The politicians paid up, even though the economy crumbled and one-third of Pakistanis fell below the poverty line. The army continued to dominate foreign policy. It helped create, train, arm, and lead the Taliban to power in Afghanistan. The goal was to create a client regime and secure Pakistan's western borders. The people of Afghanistan paid a terrible price.
A similar strategy was tried in Kashmir. Pakistan organized and armed Islamist fighters and sent them to battle. Kashmiris, who have struggled for decades for the right to decide their own future free from Indian rule, found themselves trapped between the violence unleashed by Indian armed forces and Pakistan-backed militants.
Amid the chaos, in 1998, India and then Pakistan tested nuclear weapons and a year later went to war. Both sides hurled nuclear threats. Pakistan's elected politicians went along, claiming credit at every opportunity.

The Musharraf Era

There were few protests when the army, led by General Pervez Musharraf, seized power in 1999. "The armed forces have no intention to stay in charge longer than is absolutely necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish," he promised. Instead, he rigged elections and made a deal with Islamist political parties willing to support him as president.
After the September 11 attacks, the United States dropped its opposition to General Musharraf. It needed Pakistan's support for another American war. Money poured in (over $10 billion so far), and demands for a return to democracy disappeared.
After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, many Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters fled across the border to Pakistan's tribal areas where they have reconstituted themselves. Under U.S. pressure, the Pakistan army has tried to go into the tribal border areas to show they are tackling the Taliban and al-Qaeda there. They have met resistance. Also, there are many in the army who do not want to fight what they see as an American war. The army has resorted to missile attacks from aircraft, helicopter gun ships, and artillery. As civilian casualties have grown, local people have turned against the army, and some have joined the militants.
The al-Qaeda and Taliban influence has started to spread from the remote border areas to larger towns and even major cities in the two border provinces. These militants have made common cause with local Islamist groups, who find recruits in Pakistan's countless madrassas and its many Islamic political parties. Militants have attacked soldiers, policemen, local officials, ordinary people, and national leaders, including Musharraf. Suicide bombings have claimed hundreds of lives across the country.
Islamist fighters have taken over whole villages. Emulating the Taliban, they repress women, close girls' schools, attack DVD and music shops, destroy TVs, and demand men grow beards and go to the mosque. The movement has spread even to the capital. For six months, Islamist students and fighters occupied a mosque in Islamabad and set up their own court. The government sat by until forced to act by national and international pressure. The bloody storming of the mosque served only to fuel the militancy and enrage public opinion.
Sectarian violence has accompanied the rise of the militant Islamists. Armed Sunni groups, some linked to major political parties, have attacked Shias and religious minorities with abandon. Hundreds have died. Even though the groups are banned, they operate with impunity, their leaders appearing in public.
The Islamists are not the only armed resistance to the state. There is an insurgency in Pakistan's largest province, Baluchistan, fuelled by demands for greater autonomy and control over their natural resources. It is a longstanding grievance. The Pakistani army crushed the latest in a series of four insurgencies. Baluch groups have obstructed and attacked gas facilities, gas and oil pipelines, electricity transmission towers, and train tracks. They have also targeted foreign companies seeking to explore new gas fields in the province and working on other development projects there. They have also called protests and strikes.

The Democratic Challenge

The army's effort to confront Islamists and Baluch insurgents has created its own crisis. Over the past few years, the government has taken into custody hundreds of people and, after they "disappeared," denied ever having arrested them. Their families found an ally in the chief justice of Pakistan's Supreme Court. He has demanded that the government produce the missing people in court. General Musharraf responded by firing the chief justice. Musharraf's greater fear is that an activist court would block his effort to continue in power as president.
There was a national movement for the reinstatement of the chief justice. Judges resigned, lawyers went on strike, and police attacked demonstrations by lawyers outside the Supreme Court. Across the country, large crowds gathered to hear and support the chief justice. The Supreme Court declared that the chief justice must be reinstated. Musharraf had to concede defeat.
The Court is now hearing the cases of the missing people. The government has produced some and dragged its feet on others. The chief justice has threatened to jail a senior law enforcement official and summon the chiefs of Pakistan's armed forces if the government will not produce the people in court. As elections loom, and Musharraf seeks to retain power, the Court has already begun to hear appeals on voter registration.
Some hope that restoring a semblance of democracy could turn the tide against the Islamists and reduce the nuclear danger. Musharraf, with U.S. help, is trying to cobble together a deal to stay in power. He is considering dumping his Islamist allies in exchange for support from Benazir Bhutto, who would be cleared of the corruption charges that she fled and allowed to return from exile. It will not be enough.
In the Musharraf years, the army has consolidated its power in new ways. Generals rule provinces, run government ministries, administer universities, and manage national companies. The army's business interests now span banking and insurance, cement and fertilizer, electricity and sugar, corn and corn flakes. They will not give this up without a fight.
For the army, the outside world appears threatening too. As India's economy grows and it increases military spending in leaps and bounds, Pakistan's army looks for ways to keep up. With the United States cultivating a new strategic relationship with India, the army fears losing its oldest ally. It worries how it will sustain its nuclear, missile and conventional weapons arms race with India. The army must extract yet more from Pakistan's economy. A civilian government rule will not be allowed to challenge these priorities.
Military rule and puppet politicians have brought Pakistan to its present dreadful state. Rather than keeping Musharraf in power, the world must demand that Pakistan's army yield control over government and economy once and for all. Only a freely elected and representative government that can actually make decisions can pursue economic development as if people mattered, confront the Islamists, and make peace with India.

Zia Mian is a physicist with the Program on Science and Global Security at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University and a columnist for Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org). An earlier version of this piece appeared in The Philadelphia Inquirer.

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India - US Nuclear Deal:

Statement by Medha Patkar, Aruna Roy and Sandeep Pandey on the Indo-US Nuclear Deal

The India - US Nuclear Deal: Need for all citizens to question and speak out against a deal that is against national security and sovereignty, and takes us further down the path of environmentally disastrous nuclear energy.

Stop the UPA from proceeding before a public debate.

Much has been said and written about the India-US Nuclear Deal; beginning with the statement issued by many eminent nuclear scientists soon after the talks on the deal began between India and US governments. Public fora and People's organisations such as Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace called it anti-Sovereignty. Today when it is seen as an issue of conflict between the UPA and its Left front allies, we as representatives of people's movements must re-iterate our stand, which is that the deal is not just anti-democratic but against peace, and against environmentally sustainable energy generation and self-reliant economic development.

The Left front is questioning the fact that such an international deal with significant implications is imposed on the Indian people and Parliament, with no public debate and consultation in India. While US Congress took a year and a half to discuss the proposed change in the US laws, permitting nuclear commerce with India, the process in India has been totally undemocratic.

The deal is part of a successful attempt by the United States to build a strategic relationship with India, in confronting the rising capitalist challenge from China where India will be used as its client in the region. Directly or indirectly, the US will also enter the Indian sub-continent, to manage intra-regional, inter-country relations. This whole process is likely to escalate the arms race between Pakistan and India, sabotaging the India-Pakistan peace process. How can we ignore that fact the US sells arms to both India and Pakistan?

The agreement also facilitates a full-fledged international exchange of nuclear fuel and technology with insufficient caution and control. There will no doubt be a corporate rush to extract, export and misuse nuclear fuel and technology, and it will be very difficult to prevent misuse even for the arms trade. Highly superficial clauses don't instill any confidence against such a possibility.
However, our basic objections to this deal stem from our opposition to the production and use of both nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. The irreversible dangers of radioactivity and its ongoing impact on health, water, and the environment are factors that are being summarily dismissed in an irresponsible manner. The whole cycle of nuclear production beginning with uranium mining, is fraught with catastrophic dangers, and as a nation we cannot use the decisions of another country as justification for our own. Places like Jaduguda in Jharkhand, Kota and Pokhran in Rajasthan, have already demonstrated the ongoing dangers of nuclear use to the common citizen.

We, in India, have inherited rich renewable sources of energy, which are environmentally benign and abundantly available. The solar, wind, and ocean waves along with human power need to be fully tapped and put to use with people's control. Appropriate technology, research and development for production of cheaper equipment and tools, need to be combined with just distribution, for the right priorities. There is no political will for this in the ruling establishment. Estimates show that India can generate far more energy through alternative, environmentally sound sources. The nuclear energy option should be put up for widespread public debate giving citizens a full opportunity to make an informed choice.

This deal however raises questions beyond nuclear energy opening up large spaces for US government and corporate control in India. This, no doubt, is a symbol of imperialism already demonstrated through the Iraq war and the obvious links of US policy with corporate control over resources. With unbound exchange of information, data and material, knowledge and technology the dominant global power is all set to encroach upon Indian reserves and impinge upon our sovereignty. The deal ensures supply of sufficient nuclear material to nuclear reactors in India for the next 40 years, but the precautionary agreements to negotiations and consultations are only promises for the future. All this is subject to approvals and conditions to be monitored by the US Congress, while sidelining the Indian parliament.
The UPA government is proving to be increasingly submissive to the exploitation of our resources, knowledge and cheap labour by commercial interests and corporate interests. The BJP and its allies are also in the power game, using capitalist forces for support. The Left has raised an important issue using their bargaining power. Non-party people's formations may not have the power in parliament, but we have an important set of issues that need to be considered. The Indian Constitution which allows deal such as this, as well as international treaties and agreements to be reached without democratic consultation, needs an amendment to make public debate and referendums mandatory and pre-conditional. We need an approval from the Indian electorate before we agree to sign the agreement.

Sandeep Pandey
Aruna Roy
Medha Patkar

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Dr. Heckle & Mr. Hyde

The Hyde Act was enacted by the US Congress in December explicitly to promote 'nuclear cooperation' between India and the US and enable them to sign an agreement under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1954. It is highly significant that the Agreement does not mention the Hyde Act at all. This is all the more so because it mentions other documents such as the Indo-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, repeatedly; the IAEA's statute, its document on 'The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities' and the convention on the 'Physical protection of Nuclear Material'. These are international instruments accepted by both sides. References to them constitute, in legal parlance, incorporation into the agreement by reference. In contrast, India is not bound by the Hyde Act, which is why the agreement does not refer to it even once. The omission is deliberate and of legal consequence.
Prakash Karat, whom I respect, is wrong in holding that "to say that the Hyde Act is not binding to (sic) India is irrelevant. The point is that it is binding on the US." The real point is that it is binding on the US alone. "The text states that 'national laws' will prevail." This is a serious factual error. It states no such thing anywhere. 'National laws' are mentioned thrice. Article 2.1 says, "Each party shall implement this Agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations, and licence requirement concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." The words are used ejusdem generis (of the same kind). Generically grouped, each category acquires colour from the rest and from the context. They relate to implementation of precise undertakings recorded in the accord. Article 2.1 cannot be used to nullify them, bringing Mr Hyde by the back door. Indeed, under Article 5.6 (a) the US "is committed to seeking agreement from the US Congress to amend its domestic laws" in order to ensure for India "assured and full access to fuel for its reactors".
The omission of any reference to the Hyde Act is striking because in one particular respect, the accord explicitly invokes 'national laws' as a bar to "the transfer of any information regarding matters outside the scope of this Agreement", which their own laws bar them from transferring.
Article 16.4 clinches the matter. "This Agreement shall be implemented in good faith and in accordance with the principles of international law". Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties only restates a settled principle of the law. "A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty." More, Article 14.3 says that no breach of the accord would be considered "material" unless it meets the test of the Vienna Convention.
Article 2.4 affirms that agreement will not "affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either party" or interfere with "military nuclear facilities" built "independent of this Agreement for their own purposes".
The US Congress Acts read like political manifestoes - the Cuban Democracy Act, 1992, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 1996, and the Iraq Liberation Act, 1998.
The Hyde Act, true to form, sets out in Section 102 'the sense of Congress' in 13 propositions. Section 103 has 16 "Statements of Policy". The Almighty was content with ten. Iran figures in them. So do China and Pakistan along with India for securing "a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purpose". This has not caused any panic in Beijing. If we are to get hysterical over such non-legislative inanities, we might as well stop dealings with the US.
Presidential excesses - passing off treaties as executive agreements to avoid ratification by the Senate - led to congressional overreach. In 1967, Congress asserted that "the executive and legislative benches of the United States government have joint responsibility and authority to formulate the foreign policy of the United States."
In 1830, Andrew Jackson made the first statement while signing his assent to a Bill to indicate how he would implement it. The first 42 Presidents used it fewer than 600 times.
George W Bush made more than 800 signing statements in the first six years of his Presidency. The Supreme Court's reliance on them has been "sporadic and unpredictable". A Bill in Congress on "Presidential Signing Statements" (2006) bars courts from relying on them, yet asserts its right to inform them of its intentions underlying the Act.
Must we get involved in this crazy situation? President Bush's signing statement on the Hyde Act, on December 18, 2006, is beyond reproach. It is pro-India. He said he was not bound by the 'statements of policy' in Section 103, nor by a provision that barred transfer to India of an item contrary to a guideline of the Nuclear Suppliers Group; and he would construe sections which require him to furnish information about India in a manner consistent with his "authority to control and protect information that could impair foreign relations, national security", etc. This constitutes the President's commitment to India as well.
Understandably, while we assert that we are not concerned with the Hyde Act, US spokesmen affirm a duty to abide by it. Both are right. Besides the Act, the agreement is silent on testing. We have agreed to differ. Consider the realities. Even if there was no agreement or the Act, nuclear tests would have entailed consequences - as in 1974 and 1998. The BJP regime came close to signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) then. We do not intend presently to conduct tests. Nor have we given up the right to do so. The US knows that and is prepared to go along while it can. When we conduct the tests, we will also have the clout to terminate the Agreement under Article 14. Even then the parties "agree to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination cessation resulted from a party's serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security". This applies to both sides, if India conducts any tests.
The US Under-Secretary of State, Nicholas Burns, said on July 27, "the fact is also that we hope and trust that it won't be necessary for India to test in the future". The US's right to return of supplied material "is preserved for the worst case hypothetical event in the future".
On the same day, National Security Advisor MK Narayanan said that both sides understood "the limits of flexibility and how far we can go" while Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon said, "It is for them to understand whether this agreement meets their laws or not. It is not for us to interpret their law," and vice versa.
The concerns concerning the creeping Indo-US military relationship are legitimate. Neither ground justifies withdrawal of the Left's support to the UPA, which, however, should allay the disquiet on both grounds. A mechanism comprising leaders on both sides, with the aid of professionals, should be set up, so that as Prakash Karat puts it, "the doubts are clarified and the implications of the Hyde Act evaluated".
At the end, a White Paper should follow. The IAEA and NSG talks can proceed. The net result will speak for itself. Maar se pehle tauba is wasteful.

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The nuclear deal: Key issues and political circumstances

While several readers agree that the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation deal should be put on hold under the present politically murky and changing circumstances, some readers have raised questions about what they perceive to be changes and even a ‘contradiction’ in The Hindu’s editorial position on the deal. One reader has specifically asked: “What has changed” between August 6, when the newspaper published the le ader “A sound and honourable 123,” and August 20, when it published the leader “Put the nuclear deal on hold”? We welcome this kind of serious public debate, which we believe will help clarify the key issues and their implications in a changing political context. Here is our response:

1. The Hindu has endorsed, and continues to endorse, the 123 deal as “a sound and honourable agreement,” which reflects the fact that “the assurances provided to Parliament by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2006 have been fulfilled virtually in their entirety.” The newspaper’s editorial assessment of the key provisions of the 123 agreement is that they do provide adequate protection for both fuel supply to the nuclear power reactors and for the strategic programme. However, some uncertainties and challenges lie ahead, especially in relation to how the Nuclear Suppliers Group will respond when it is asked to change its guidelines to accommodate India to India’s satisfaction.

2. The editorial of August 6 took realistic note of a couple of limitations of the 123. They related to the United States ruling out supply of reprocessing and enrichment equipment and also “some uncertainty over the nature of the arrangements and procedures to be agreed upon before India can reprocess spent fuel.” Our assessment was that these problems could be managed given the safeguards built into the 123. The major caveat made in the August 6 leader was this: considering that the United Progressive Alliance government was continuing the same policy as the predecessor National Democratic Alliance government of “compromising foreign policy independence and aligning the country with the U.S. in the name of a ‘strategic partnership,’” the country should not allow the 123 to become “new leverage to pull India deeper into the U.S. strategic embrace.” The editorial concluded on the note that “while the Manmohan Singh government deserves full credit for negotiating a 123 agreement that is indisputably to the advantage of India’s nuclear programme and energy sector, it needs to be reminded that its breakthrough will count for little if it turns out that the hidden cost is a further erosion of external independence.”

3. While this remains our considered editorial assessment of the 123, the leader of August 20 addresses the murky and complex political situation that will determine the fate of the nuclear deal. The reality is that the UPA government finds itself in a hopeless minority on this issue. The main opposition party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, and its NDA allies have aggressively attacked the deal as a sell-out of national interests and of the strategic nuclear programme, and look forward to making this a major election issue. All the constituents of the ‘third force’ bloc, the United National Progressive Alliance, are strongly opposed. The biggest supporting bloc, the Left parties with 61 MPs in the Lok Sabha, has demanded that the government should not go forward even with the next step (going to the IAEA) to operationalise the deal. The simple point is that a regime that finds itself in a hopeless minority in Parliament on a highly sensitive issue cannot act like a majority government! Economic and technical arguments do not necessarily score in politics, especially when they ride on the back of non-independence in foreign policy and non-transparency for much of the time the nuclear deal was in process. In the present political circumstances, the only way to resolve the crisis facing the Manmohan Singh government is to put the nuclear deal on hold and to meet all the objections and doubts democratically. Business leaders and economists might not be able to understand or appreciate this political necessity. “A Country is Not a Company” argument was brought in precisely to make this point.

4. Because that section of the Congress which is determined to go ahead with operationalising the nuclear deal is on a high horse, with blinkers, it does not appear to have grasped what is self-evident: “The guaranteed way of sinking the civilian nuclear deal, which this newspaper has editorially endorsed with some caveats, is for the government to go down, taking the 123 with it … given the deep political polarisation there is little chance of any other Prime Minister or government making a go of this deal in the conceivable future.” In other words, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s current posture of ‘I-must-have-the-nuclear-deal-or-I-go,’ if not reversed, will inevitably lead to the nuclear deal self-destructing, aside from other serious political consequences. This is the reality check our August 20 leader offers.

5. These reasoned propositions are the basis of our editorial recommendation that the nuclear deal should be put on hold and that the government could “pursue the deal by scheduling an earnest round of all-party discussions” to take in “objections, apprehensions, reservations, and questions relating to the nuclear deal that have come in from all serious quarters.” There is nothing sacrosanct about the timeline the Indian and U.S. governments have in mind. The outcome of the all-party discussions might seem uncertain. There is of course a risk of the nuclear deal falling by the wayside. But if the Congress party realises that the risk is to be weighed against the virtual certainty of the deal being buried if the UPA government goes down, it will make the right political choice. This is our editorial assessment and it can be seen that there is no contradiction between the leaders of August 6 and 20.

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Pakistan needs real democratic government

Rather than prop up Musharraf, the world must demand that Pakistan's army give up control of the government and vast sectors of the economy.

On the 60th anniversary of independence, Pakistan is under siege. Its leaders lack legitimacy, politics is held hostage by its army, and radical Islamists stalk the land. The future looks bleak. There is talk of civil war.
There is only one way out: End the cycle of military dictatorship and allow truly free, representative government to take root.
Pakistan's leaders have failed it from the beginning. Its founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, claimed the Muslims of British India needed a separate country if they were to be free from domination by its more numerous Hindus. He cast a wide net, offering orthodox Muslims a vision of an Islamic society and more secular Muslims a dream of a country where religion was no business of government. This ambiguous legacy and the terrible religious violence that accompanied the partition of British India have haunted Pakistan ever since.
Jinnah died within a year of independence. Politics became a personal power grab, with seven prime ministers in the first 10 years and then, in 1958, a military coup. The decade of army rule brought a close military alliance with the United States, further strengthening the army, and the forced modernization of a poor rural society. The costs were war with India, wrenching social change, and grievous inequality. Eventually, the people rose in revolt. In 1971, East Pakistan broke free and became Bangladesh.
The army relinquished power. But the new civilian leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, lacked a democratic temper and treated opposition as threat. He established Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and a practice of buying public support by appeasing the mullahs.
In 1977, the army took back control and executed Bhutto. In his decade in power, Gen. Zia ul-Haq sought to Islamize Pakistan. He introduced religious laws, courts, and taxes, supported radical Islamist madrassas (seminaries) and political parties, and altered school textbooks to promote a conservative Islamic nationalism. Work on the bomb proceeded apace.
The United States turned a blind eye to the dictatorship and the bomb. It poured billions of dollars into Pakistan to buy support for a war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Islamic militants from around the world were trained and armed by the Pakistan army, with American money, and sent across the border to fight godless communism. The jihad was born.
Zia was killed in a mysterious plane crash in 1988, and the Soviet Union admitted defeat and left Afghanistan. Elections were held, only to have the army become the power behind the throne. The new crop of leaders, including Bhutto's daughter, Benazir, descended into corruption and intrigue, each seeking the army's help to take office. There were nine prime ministers in 10 years. Some actively courted the mullahs; none tried to undo the Islamic order created by Zia. As one third of Pakistanis fell below the poverty line, Pakistan tested nuclear weapons and missiles and went to war with India. Both sides hurled nuclear threats.
There were few protests when the army, led by Gen. Pervez Musharraf, seized power again in 1999. He promised that "the armed forces have no intention to stay in charge longer than is absolutely necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish." Instead, he rigged elections and made a deal with Islamist political parties willing to support him as president.
After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the United States gave Musharraf no choice but to join another American war. Money poured in (more than $10 billion so far), and U.S. demands for a return to democracy fell silent. Musharraf consolidated military rule. Generals rule provinces, run government ministries, administer universities, and manage national companies. The army's business interests now span banking and insurance, cement and fertilizer, electricity and sugar, corn and corn flakes. Inequality has grown.
But Pakistan is being torn apart by an Islamic militancy that rejects Musharraf's alliance with America. Militants have attacked soldiers, policemen, local officials, ordinary people, and national leaders, including Musharraf himself. Suicide bombings have claimed hundreds of lives across the country. The army has struggled to respond. Many soldiers resent fighting their own people in what they see as an American war against Islam.
Islamist fighters have taken over whole villages. Emulating the Taliban, they repress women, close girls' schools, attack DVD and music shops, destroy TVs, and demand that men grow beards and go to the mosque. The movement is spreading. For six months, Islamist students and fighters occupied a mosque in Islamabad and set up their own court. The government sat idly until forced to act by national and international pressure. The bloody storming of the "Red Mosque" in July served only to fuel the militancy and enrage public opinion.
The outside world appears threatening, too. The United States warns of al-Qaeda and Taliban havens in Pakistan; some politicians talk openly about the possibility of a U.S.-led attack on Pakistani soil. The United States fears Pakistan's nuclear weapons may fall into the hands of Islamists. America is cultivating a new strategic relationship with India, causing fears among Pakistan's army leaders of losing ground in its nuclear and missile arms race with India.
Some hope that restoring a semblance of democracy could turn the tide against the Islamists and reduce the nuclear danger. Musharraf, with U.S. help, is trying to cobble together a deal to stay in power, dumping his Islamist allies for support from Benazir Bhutto, who would be allowed to return from exile, cleared of the corruption charges she fled. These steps will not be enough.
Pakistan needs to break its cycle of military rule and puppet politicians for democracy to take root and flourish. Rather than keeping Musharraf in power, the world must demand that Pakistan's army yield control over government and economy once and for all. Only a freely elected and representative government that can make decisions can pursue economic development as if people mattered, confront the Islamists, and make peace with India.

[* Zia Mian directs the Project on Peace and Security in South Asia at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs]

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At democracy's crossroads?

All South Asians who value freedom must feel relieved that President Pervez Musharraf dropped the disastrous idea of imposing a state of emergency on Pakistan, which would have allowed him to postpone the legislative and presidential elections due soon. Musharraf seems to be undertaking some sobering introspection to the point of admitting that his popularity ratings have declined and accepting part of the blame for dismissing Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry -- a deplorable move on which he had to eat crow.
Yet, it would be wrong to attribute Musharraf's decision to some new-found respect for democracy. He blinked because there was tremendous pressure from the United States, exercised through threats and hints, capped by a 17 minutes-long 2 a.m. telephone call by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Secondly, Musharraf probably calculated it'd be far too risky to further inflame adverse popular opinion against the army. Another eruption of public protest--probably worse than the agitation against Chaudhry's sacking--would rob his regime of whatever's left of its legitimacy. A just-released Indian Express-CNN-IBN-CSDS-Dawn-News survey says 55.4 percent of Pakistanis want him to quit as army chief before the presidential elections; only 29.6 percent accept his continuation.
However, Musharraf hasn't fully reconciled himself to holding free and fair national assembly elections, which former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif can contest. On August 11, he again opposed their return from exile because it might create a situation not "conducive" to elections. Nor has Musharraf given up the idea of contesting the presidential election in uniform, or as a bizarre alternative, nominating civilian loyalists--Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz or Chaudhary Shujat Hussain--for the contest if the Supreme Court rules against his candidature. That would be a weird case of illegitimate substitution and a travesty of democracy.
The more one learns about Musharraf's secret deal with Bhutto, the worse it sounds. Under it, she would return to Pakistan and contest elections provided she accepts that Musharraf would stay on as army chief till November 16. Bhutto has confirmed the existence of this "confidential understanding". She claims she would like certain "confidence-building measures", such as withdrawal of corruption cases against her and amending the constitution to enable her to become Prime Minister for a third time. Her spokesperson has said that the General's uniform is not an "obstacle". This suggests that the Pakistan People's Party might not oppose the President's re-election, due earlier.
Bhutto would then consider allying with Musharraf. Bhutto's logic is that forcing him out of power through a street agitation might lead to another spell of military rule or risk an extremist takeover of Pakistan. The logic is dubious. It makes a false opposition between two extremes and rules out the possibility that Musharraf might be forced by the court not to seek re-election from the sitting assemblies whose terms will expire shortly. It also underestimates the strength of public opinion.
It's unclear whether Musharraf maintains a strong enough hold over the army to persuade it to impose another term of martial law. In recent months, the army's standing has greatly eroded because of its long years in power, increasing intrusion into civilian authority, and its handling of the Lal Masjid crisis.
Eight years ago, many Pakistanis accepted Musharraf's coup out of disgust with the corrupt governance of civilian leaders. Some civil society groups even supported military rule.But the military regime betrayed its many promises: to cleanse governance, make the rich pay taxes, oppose the forces of extremism, and adhere to transparency while implementing "free-market" policies. For instance, the Accountability Commission became a farce. Musharraf struck a deal with the MMA. And there were scandals in the privatisation of public enterprises. Today, there's widespread disillusionment with the military.
A recent opinion poll by the US-based pro-Republican International Republican Institute found that Musharraf's approval ratings had dipped to just 34 percent from 60 percent in June 2006. As many as 58 percent of the 4,000 adults polled gave the army-dominated government poor or very poor marks; 56 percent said they felt less safe than a year ago. 62 percent said they wanted Musharraf to step down as army chief if he wants to contest the presidential election.
By entering into a shady deal with Musharraf which allows him to get re-elected as president before fresh assembly elections, Bhutto would violate the Charter of Democracy she signed with Sharif in May, which states: "We shall not join the military regime or any military- sponsored government. No party shall solicit the support of the military to come into power or dislodge a democratic government".
This will make it doubly difficult for Sharif to return home. Musharraf bears a special animus against him. Whatever Sharif's faults--and there are many--, his continued exile will be a setback for democratisation. And it would be tragic if the PPP, Pakistan's largest party, were to reach such a compromise with the military regime. There's a distinct risk that the PPP could split or some of its leaders like Aitjaz Ahsan might leave it. That apart, such a deal would help the army entrench itself in a prominent role in public life just as it's losing its credibility. This would undermine some major gains that the momentum towards democratisation has registered.
Regrettably, despite Musharraf's ambivalent record in fighting the Taliban, and the questionable role his secret agencies are playing in Afghanistan, external factors too seemingly favour him. The three major nations that matter the most to Pakistan, the US, China and India, seem inclined to support a large role for the Pakistan army. This is of course understandable in the case of the US which, true to type, follows a myopic policy guided primarily by its Global War on Terror (GWoT). It believes that Musharraf remains its best or sole bet as regards GWoT. China is probably deeply sceptical, if not suspicious, of the prospect of Pakistan's democratisation.
However, India's pro-Musharraf position is less understandable, much less justifiable. India has a long-term stake in a democratic, stable Pakistan which can rein in the military and its secret services, which nurture a strong anti-India prejudice -- probably the obverse, if a more extreme one, of the anti-Pakistan attitude of their counterparts across the border. That certainly conforms to the dominant view held within the Indian security establishment, which has for long years argued that the "state-within-the-state" autonomy which agencies like the ISI enjoy have allowed them to sustain anti-India activities.
Yet, India's National Security Adviser M K Narayanan declared (July 29) that "the worst is over" for Musharraf; there's been no "major dent" in his influence because he accepted the Chief Justice's reinstatement "with grace". Besides echoing the dominant US view of Musharraf's indispensability, this expresses cynicism towards the aspirations of the Pakistani public.
A survey of democratisation in South Asia by India's Centre for the Study of Developing Societies suggests that the democratic aspirations of ordinary Pakistanis are no weaker than those of Indians or Nepalis. One can only wish the people success in making Pakistan a full-fledged democracy, with a properly functioning party system which can respond to the people's wishes on the basis of accountability, and not benevolent paternalism.

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Political Fallout of Indo-US N-Deal Turns Severe

The United States-India nuclear cooperation agreement has precipitated the worst-ever political crisis for the India's United Progressive Alliance (UPS) government by losing the support of the communist parties on this defining foreign and security policy issue. Praful Bidwai reports.

NEW DELHI, Aug 17 (IPS) - The United States-India nuclear cooperation agreement, tabled in India’s Parliament on Monday, has precipitated the worst-ever political crisis for the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s United Progressive Alliance (UPS) government since it was formed a little over three years ago.
Although the existence of the ‘left-of-centre’ UPA government is not immediately threatened, it has clearly lost the support of the communist parties on this defining foreign and security policy issue.
Support from the 59 members of parliament of the Left parties, led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), has been critically necessary for the survival of the UPA, which lacks a majority of its own in the 543-strong Lower House of Parliament.
This means the UPA will remain isolated on a major issue pertaining to India’s external relations and her strategic posture, with a strong bearing on her energy options. The alliance will become politically vulnerable and might find itself in an impasse in the coming months.
Singh, who has staked a lot on the nuclear deal, faces an unpleasant choice. A majority of India’s legislators oppose it for a variety of reasons. If he tries to bring them on board by addressing their concerns, he will have to go slow on the deal’s implementation.
Here, he risks losing a narrow window of opportunity for the agreement’s ratification by the U.S. Congress by the end of 2007, before it goes into election mode.
Alternatively, he can quickly ready the deal for U.S. ratification after getting it approved by the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) and by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But that will deprive it of domestic legitimacy and broad-based support.
Ironically, Singh brought this crisis upon himself. On Aug. 11, two days before the text of the "123 agreement" (so called because it will amend Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, 1954 to lift prohibitions on nuclear cooperation with India) was laid in Parliament, the Kolkata-based "Telegraph" newspaper carried an interview with him.
In the interview, Singh staunchly defended the deal, attacked its critics, and dared the Left to withdraw support to the UPA. He said: "I told them that it is not possible to renegotiate the deal. It is an honourable deal, the Cabinet has approved it…if they want to withdraw support, so be it..."
He also said: "They are our colleagues and we have to work with them. But they also have to learn to work with us." He chided the Left for not having "thought" things "through" on the nuclear agreement and the welcome accorded to it by nuclear scientists and experts.
This brought a sharp rebuff from CPM general secretary Prakash Karat, who said the UPA was running the government with the Left’s support; it should decide whether "it wants to run this government". Karat also sarcastically remarked that Singh is "very sensitive about his government’s relations with the U.S., but this (the deal) is a matter of serious national import."
"After Singh so openly challenged the Left, and made disparaging remarks against it, Karat had no choice but to join issue with him," says Anuradha Chenoy, a social scientist with Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi, and a keen observer of Left politics.
Chenoy added that it could not have been ‘’an accident that Singh chose to grant the interview to a Kolkata-based paper, rather than a national daily published from New Delhi’’. Kolkata is the capital of CPM-ruled West Bengal state which has gained a reputation for being extremely market friendly.
Singh, said Chenoy, wanted to reach out to the West Bengal leadership of the CPM, which is considered more "pragmatic" than the central leadership. ‘’Singh has a good equation with Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhatttacharjee, whose ‘free-market’ policies he often praises."
However, it is unlikely that Singh’s stratagem of playing off differences within the CPM will produce a major shift in the party’s stand on the deal. India’s communist parties tend to close ranks when attacked. Bhattacharjee might be sympathetic to right-wing economic policies, but has a different stand on foreign policy issues. He has recently made strong statements criticising the nuclear deal for its pro-U.S. strategic dimension.
On Monday, the Left parties reiterated their opposition to the deal by walking out when Singh finished reading his statement on it in the Lower House of Parliament amidst relentless slogan-shouting by regional party and right-wing MPs.
When it became clear that the Left would not cow down and dilute its opposition, the Prime Minister sought a breakfast meeting with Karat on Tuesday, to which Karat agreed after much persuasion. Singh also talked to Bhatttacharjee, whom he is likely to meet on Friday.
"Going by past experience, the Left parties are unlikely to change their stand against the deal," argues Achin Vanaik, a political scientist at Delhi University. "They usually act in unison. And it is known that the Left parties other than the CPM are even more critical of the UPA’s policies and would like the Left to reconsider supporting it unconditionally. The Communist Party of India (CPI), for instance, advocates issue-based support."
Vanaik explained that more will be known after political bureaux of the CPM and CPI meetthis weekend. ''We’ll soon know whether they dilute or maintain/harden their stand. Their biggest constraint is that they cannot risk toppling the UPA government because that would help the Hindu-chauvinist and jingoistic Bharatiya Janata Party. But they can continue to oppose the nuclear deal without formally voting against the government and thus risking the possible return of the BJP.''
At stake here is the Left’s distinct ideological-political identity. In the three states (including Kerala and Tripura) in which it rules, but especially in West Bengal, its economic policies are not markedly different from the UPA’s. This has produced some discontent among Left cadres.
If the Left parties lose their image as staunch opponents of U.S. "imperialism", they risk serious erosion of core support and loyalty. Both the CPs are scheduled to hold party congresses early next year, where their leaders will face the scrutiny of the rank-and-file."
Unlike the Right and centrist parties, which focus primarily on asymmetries in the "123 agreement" in the rights and obligations of India and the United States, and some of whom (not the BJP) oppose close relations with Washington, the Left concentrates its criticism on the deal as part of a U.S.-India "strategic partnership" or India’s strategic embrace of the U.S.
The Left too speaks of asymmetries at some length and is worried that the U.S. can terminate the agreement arbitrarily, while India must accept safeguards (inspections) on some of its nuclear facilities in perpetuity.
The Left at least refers to the impact of "123" on India’s advocacy of universal nuclear disarmament, which the UPA promised to return to in 2004. The Left also mildly questions the relevance of nuclear power, which the deal promotes, to India’s long-term energy security.
"These are strong suits which the Left would do well to develop," says Vanaik. "This will help it demarcate itself sharply from others. In particular, it should emphasise that the nuclear deal will increase India’s capacity to make nuclear weapons; and this cannot give us more security. On the contrary, it will fuel a nuclear arms race not just with Pakistan but also with China."
The International Panel on Fissile Materials, a group of independent scientists, estimates that the nuclear deal will allow India to produce and stockpile enough plutonium for more than 300 Nagasaki-type bombs every year. This can be done through reprocessing fuel in unsafeguarded power reactors, diverting domestic uranium from civilian to military uses, and continuing/expanding fissile material production in unsafeguarded civilian and military facilities.
Meanwhile, the political fate of the nuclear deal remains unclear. How the UPA handles the issue will determine its longevity.

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US-India Nuclear Energy Agreement: A Bad Deal for Global Security and for Energy Security

Indian Doctors for Peace and Development (IDPD) and Physicians for Social Responsibility - USA (PSR) — the Indian and US affiliates, respectively, of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) — have grave concerns about the negotiated accord between US President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, which, in return for India's agreement to put its civilian reactors under international inspections, effectively removes the ban on the sale of fuel and civilian nuclear technology to India enacted by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and erodes the bulwark against the further spread of nuclear weapons established in the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Under the agreement, India will retain its nuclear arms program and keep a third of its reactors under military control without international inspection, including two so-called fast-breeder reactors that could produce fuel for weapons. The accord would also allow India to build future breeder reactors and keep them outside international inspections. Whereas the use, testing, production, transportation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons constitute a grave danger to human life and health;
Whereas the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a grave danger to global security;
Whereas our groups support the prevention of nuclear war and the elimination of nuclear weapons;
Whereas the "Section 123" agreement between the United States and India would further erode the imperfect but prevailing international legal standards for peaceful cooperation and control and security of nuclear materials and nuclear technology;
Whereas the US-Indian Nuclear Agreement would weaken the global norm against nuclear weapons proliferation. The unique exception for India, as is provided under the deal, would further aggravate the discriminatory nature of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and prevent progress toward fulfillment of US obligations to negotiate in good faith toward nuclear disarmament contained in Article VI of the NPT. By further undermining the currently unstable non-proliferation order, this Agreement would encourage additional states to acquire nuclear weapons and gravely damage the prospects of global nuclear disarmament. It would also further worsen the ongoing nuclear arms race in South Asia by significantly increasing India's capabilities for fissile material production;
Whereas the radically boosted nuclear power program in India, following as a consequence from this Agreement, would throttle investments for developing environmentally benign renewable sources of energy including wind, solar, and others, having grave impacts on the prospects of long-term energy security. As bodies of professional doctors working for peace and disarmament we feel it is our duty to warn about the use of nuclear energy for power generation. This is neither safe nor economical and is fraught with enormous dangers to the health of people. These dangers were once again made clear several weeks ago when damage from an earthquake forced the closing of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station in Japan. Furthermore, a study published in July in the European Journal of Cancer Care (2007, 16, 355-363), concluded that there is up to 24% rise in leukemia in children around nuclear facilities in Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Spain, and the US.

Therefore, Indian Doctors for Peace and Development (IDPD), Physicians for Social Responsibility - USA (PSR), and the entire IPPNW federation of national medical associations committed to the abolition of nuclear weapons:

1) Call upon the Parliament of India and the United States Congress to reject this agreement as dangerous to international peace and security;
2) Call upon the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to reject this agreement as contrary to their objectives; and
3) Call upon the United Nations Security Council to undertake to support NSG guidelines and the improvement of international legal rules for the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the promotion of nuclear disarmament.

Gunnar Westberg, Co-President, IPPNW
Ime John, Co-President, IPPNW
Catherine Thomasson, President, PSR
L. S. Chawla, President, IDPD

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Pakistan: Just justice

Yes, that's Pakistan's only anniversary wish. There cannot be a sustainable fight against extremists who pretend to fight for justice if those called to join the battle are not offered justice themselves.

As a tense and wary Pakistan celebrated 60 years of independence on 14 August, there was no doubt that a profound movement of change has swept the country affecting many global issues - the struggle against Islamic extremism, the movement for democracy in the Muslim world and the danger of nuclear weapons. At the heart of the mass movement in Pakistan is a profound undercurrent that both the West and Muslims need to support - the demand for justice.
For four months, from March to July, millions of Pakistanis led by lawyers and other middle-class professionals marched in the streets to protest the arbitrary manner in which President Pervez Musharraf had suspended Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, the chief justice of the Supreme Court. Ordinary people demanded justice, the rule of law, democracy and an independent judiciary free of control from the military. The lawyer protestors were reminiscent of those who had marched in 1945 in Indian cities before the creation of Pakistan.
When Chaudhry was reinstated by a Supreme Court bench on 20 July, the verdict stunned Musharraf and was celebrated by the nation. For the first time in Pakistan, reinvigorated judges released unprecedented judicial activism. The Supreme Court swiftly issued pro bono, for the public good, verdicts on previously untouchable issues, such as examining the disappearance of political prisoners by the intelligence services and making the Election Commission independent of the military.
Before the verdict Musharraf had presumed he would easily win another term of five years as president and also be allowed to remain army chief by a supine parliament that has done the army's bidding since it was elected in a blatantly rigged election in 2002. Musharraf's election by the national and four provincial assemblies would be followed by another rigged general election.
Since the verdict Musharraf has thrashed around in a virtual state of panic as he tried to re-impose the army's presence on the political scene - now toying with the idea of an emergency rule, now martial law, while at the same time trying to be conciliatory towards the opposition by meeting in secret with exiled leader Benazir Bhutto and unleashing a charm offensive on state-controlled television. The biggest threat to his plans is the Supreme Court, which has pledged to follow the rule of law. Any one of several cases now awaiting adjudication by the Court could bring Musharraf's house crashing down.
For a country that has been ruled for half its life by the military, the present mass movement against continued military rule is more profound than expected. Underlying it and emphasized by the new lawyer-turned-politicians is the demand for social and political justice. The failure over decades to receive day-to-day justice at the hands of the army, the courts and the political elite now drives public activism. The demand for justice is a natural corollary of the demand for democracy, but it is also a root cause for unrest and upheaval in the Muslim world today.
What Pakistan has been witnessing in the past few months is emblematic of a fundamental cause behind the instability and turmoil in many of the world's Islamic countries. The lack of justice permeates every aspect of autocratic Muslim societies around the world and is an essential argument used by Islamic extremists from Osama bin Laden to Taliban's Mullah Omar. They can do so because justice is not just a democratic demand, but also the fundamental promise of the Koran. The Koran is permeated with demands for justice for the oppressed - be they Muslims or non-Muslim minorities or women.The most quoted Hadith, or sayings of the Prophet, also recount his dispensation of justice and his demand that all rulers do the same.
The lack of justice is a principal driver of the Talibanization now taking place in Afghanistan and in the Pashtun tribal areas of Pakistan. Where no social or political institutions exist or they have been totally corrupted and subverted, the first thing the Taliban offer is justice. When Islamic radicals occupy an area, they set up a sharia, or Islamic court of law - not because people necessarily demand sharia, but because such courts dispense quick, cheap justice.
The fortunate aspect of the movement in Pakistan is that it is led by educated middle-class professionals, determined to introduce justice through democracy not religion. This could have a long-lasting effect in helping win the wider struggle against extremism in the Muslim world.
However, the US administration retains tunnel vision in supporting Musharraf and army rule. The Bush administration failed to plan for a post-Musharraf era and now ignores the justice-through-democracy movement. Influential presidential Democratic candidates point out what Pakistanis have long known - that the US dependency on Musharraf and the US $10 billion aid money to the military since 2001 - has led to Musharraf and the army confidently double dealing the US on stopping Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In the face of failure within the desperate Bush administration, there is now open and dangerous talk of invading Al Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan.
With Musharraf hell-bent on persevering power, the risks multiply. Al Qaeda spreads its tentacles through several Pakistani proxies across the country, and a wave of suicide bombings target the army and police. In Balochistan a separatist insurgency by secular rebels, possibly backed by India and Iran, picks off Chinese workers - thereby creating a crisis with Pakistan's closest ally.
After 100 militants were killed in the army's July crackdown on the Red Mosque in Islamabad, where Islamic militants had holed out for six month, the Islamists promised revenge. Intelligence agencies report that more than 600 students who escaped the mosque siege have become suicide bombers. Then there is the elephant in the room: Pakistan's 40-odd nuclear weapons. Washington is considering how to deal with loose nukes if anarchy spreads and radical army officers take control of some nuclear weapons. In the past Musharraf rejected US offers of technical assistance in securing the weapons, out of concern about losing sovereign control. In the current heightened anger against the US, amid talk of unilateral intervention in Pakistan, cooperation on the nuclear front may be even more difficult.
Since 2001, the Bush administration has refused to accept that political stability in Pakistan is a prerequisite for fighting terrorism and the army acting alone could not guarantee that stability. Washington presumed that because Musharraf represented the army's big stick there was no need to look further.
A more reasonable policy for the US to pursue and one that would help win back Pakistani hearts and minds would be to support the immediate return of exiled politicians, early general elections monitored by international observers followed by a free and fair election for the presidency. Washington needs to help bring about a just political transition in Islamabad before it again insists that the army battle Al Qaeda. The US can then help ensure that the new elected political leadership works closely with the army to combat extremism.There cannot be a sustainable fight against extremists who pretend to fight for justice if those called to join the battle are not offered justice themselves.
The danger is that, if the present democratic movement for justice is deprived of international support and is left to wither, then it will be taken over by the forces of Islamic extremism. That would be a disaster not just for Pakistan but the entire Muslim world.

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Landelijke India Werkgroep - 29 augustus 2007