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On the 62nd anniversary of the atomic devastation of Nagasaki, Praful Bidwai looks at the military and energy implications of the India-US nuclear agreement.
August 9 was the 62nd anniversary of the atomic devastation of Nagasaki. It is an appropriate, if sad, occasion to look at the military as well as energy implications of the India-US nuclear agreement.
The nuclear deal is as much about weapons as civilian power. Not only does it recognise India as a "responsible" state "with advanced nuclear technology"; it specifically distinguishes between India's civilian and military nuclear facilities while placing the former under international inspections (safeguards). Its Article 2.4 affirms that its purpose is "not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either party" or to "hinder or otherwise interfere" with any other activities involving "material and technology" acquired or developed "independent of this agreement for their own purposes".
Put simply, India can produce and stockpile as much weapons-grade material as it likes in its unsafeguarded and military-nuclear facilities, including dedicated weapons-grade plutonium producers like Dhruva, the uranium enrichment plant near Mysore, the Prototype Fast-Breeder Reactor (PFBR) under construction, and the eight power reactors (of a total of 22 operating or planned ones) exempted from the agreed separation plan.
According to an International Panel on Fissile Materials report, the eight reactors alone will yield 1,250 kg of weapons-grade plutonium a year, enough to build 250 Nagasaki-type bombs. In addition, the PFBR and Dhruva will respectively produce 130 and 20-25 kg of plutonium annually. India can use imported uranium for its safeguarded reactors and dedicate scarce domestic uranium exclusively to military uses, generating up to 200 kg of plutonium after reprocessing.
This will each year allow India to more than triple its existing estimated plutonium inventory of 500 kg, itself enough for 100 warheads. The deal leaves India free to build even more weapons-dedicated facilities. Surely, this puts India's potential nuclear arsenal way beyond the realm of a "minimum deterrent". This should put paid to the argument that the deal will cap India's nuclear-military capability. If anything, the deal panders to India's vaulting nuclear ambitions.
Washington made unique exceptions in the global non-proliferation order for India primarily to recruit it as a close, if subordinate, strategic ally for reasons elaborated since 2000 by Condoleezza Rice, Ashley Tellis and Philip Zelikow, among others. A strong rationale was to create a counterfoil to China, and an anchor within a US-dominated Asian security architecture, on a par with Japan and Israel.
There's a price to pay for this. This isn't merely acquiescence in US strategic-political plans, or accommodation to Washington's pressures in respect of Iran. It also, critically, lies in potentially triggering a regional nuclear-arms race and abandoning the fight for global nuclear disarmament. It is sordid that India, long an apostle of nuclear disarmament, should end up apologising for mass-annihilation weapons.
Will the deal help India achieve energy security? Nuclear power is a hazardous and accident-prone energy source. Its radiation is an invisible but deadly poison; it leaves extremely toxic wastes which remain active for thousands of years. No solution to the waste-storage, leave alone disposal, problem is on the horizon.
Nuclear power is costly. A Massachusetts Institute of Technology study estimates US unit costs of 6.7 cents for nuclear, 4.2 cents for coal, and 3.8-5.6 cents for gas. In India, power from nuclear plants under construction will cost Rs 3-plus. But the winning bid for the coal-based Sasan project is only Rs 1.20.
Nuclear power has a bleak future worldwide - despite global warming, which the nuclear industry claims it can mitigate. Nuclear power can only make an insignificant contribution to greenhouse gas reduction. A just-published Oxford Research Group study says that for nuclear industry's contribution to be significant, the global industry would have to construct about one reactor a week for 60 years - an absurdity.
Nuclear power in India is less than 3 per cent of its total electricity capacity. Even if its utopian mid-century targets materialise, nuclear power will only contribute 6-7 per cent to power generation. What price are we paying for it?
Kashmir leadership is a 'divided lot' is not just
a cliché popular with scribes, columnists and
journalists for putting a story. It is a new
found phrase to justify procrastination - that
has taken a toll of Kashmir problem for past
sixty years. It is a baton that is now very
easily used to beat into silence many
enthusiastic Kashmir leaders seeking solution of
the Kashmir problem through internationally
recognized covenants for resolution of such
problems. Echoing of this cliché in some quarters
of New Delhi is no surprise but it was amazing
when it resounded in the Rayburn Hall of the
Capitol Hill, Washington. True, it were some
scholars from New Delhi who made all out
endeavors to add this dimension to the
deliberations in the two day Seventh
International Peace Conference on Kashmir but
what was surprising that some American Scholars
also subscribed to the idea. They too believed
that Kashmir leadership was divided. And it was
this division that was coming in the way of
finding a solution of the problem in accordance
norms of international justice.
It will be too puerile to construe that because
of New Delhi's effective lobbying some American
scholars and academics have believing that it has
been division in the ranks of Kashmir leaders
that has been delaying resolution of the Kashmir
problem as the Gospel truth.
There can be no denying Indian intellectual's
presence in Kashmir American Council as compared
to Pakistan was far higher. There was hardly a
Pakistan academician or intellectual of standing
present in the conference- the reason for their
absence was perhaps rough political weather in
their own country. All shades of Indian
intellectuals; right, left and independent were
present in the conference. Some were highly
pragmatic and objective and some held official
briefs- but silver lining in their discourses was
that all pleaded for finding an amicable solution
of the Kashmir problem. Is Kashmir leadership
really a 'divided lot'? Is there division on the
ideological basis? Or the division is because of
clash of egos?
Or it was more because of the vested interest
than politics? Much before trying to address
these questions- it needs to be remembered that
like any other state in United India two streams
of politics flowed in Kashmir much before the
birth of India and Pakistan as independent
nations- one subscribed to Congress politics and
other to the Muslim League politics. It was only
Jammu and Kashmir that for the wavering mind of
its leader failed to decide about the future of
the state which ultimately brought the issue of
accession of the state to either of the two
dominions to the United Nation's- where India and
Pakistan entered into an international agreement
for resolving the problem through a referendum.
It has been since this day that Kashmir leaders
have been divided- one believing in the finality
of accession with India and another believing
that the International Agreement between India
and Pakistan was yet to be executed. But it is
not this traditional division in Kashmir
politicians that a section in New Delhi has been
talking about coming in the way of finding an
amicable solution of Kashmir problem or that was
echoed by scholars like Prof. Rodeny Jones in the
Kashmir Conference Washington.
It is not this schism but the division amongst
Kashmir leaders espousing right to
self-determination and demanding implementation
of international agreements signed by the two
contesting countries that is being talked about
in various fora. If one analysis objectively,
Kashmir leaders are not divided on fundamentals
or basic principles that have been providing
grist to the movement they have been leading in
the state for past sixty years. The variance lies
in their approaches towards the resolution of
this problem. In 1993, the All Parties Hurriyat
Conference- conglomerate of more than thirty
parties was born. It took a departure from its
predecessor parties who demanded holding of
plebiscite in the state under the auspices of the
United Nations and instead it pleaded for a
negotiated settlement, leaving ample scope for
identifying approach roads to the resolution and
bringing flexibility in the traditional political
stand. The variability in approaches became
distinct after one faction decided to hold direct
with New Delhi without making its agenda for
discussion public and other faction made it
public that the guiding principle for all talks
should be the 'inalienable right to
self-determination' as has accrued to the people
of the state through various resolutions of the
United Nations and agreements. It also demanded
that talks should be trilateral and not
bilateral. Seen in right perspective this
variance in approach was not unbridgeable but for
the parties debating this issues in democratic
environs pursued the policy of estrangement that
widened the gulf between various factions.
My hopes brightened that a consensus amongst
leaders not only of Kashmir but India, Pakistan
and Kashmir could emerge, after a group of varied
ideologies and backgrounds hammered out a
document on the second day of Kashmir Conference
in the Capitol hill. The Conference appointed a
drafting committee for framing a declaration that
could be adopted at the end of the conference. It
consisted of Indians, Pakistanis, Kashmiris from
both the sides of the Ceasefire Line. It
consisted of people of different faiths and
varied backgrounds and outlooks. The drafting
committee comprised, Dr. Angana Chatteerji,
(Indian), Dr. Attiya Inaytullah, (Pakistani),
Raja Muzzafar Ahmed Khan (Pakistan Controlled
Kashmir), Prof. Nazir Ahmed Shawl (Kashmiri), Ved
Bhasin (Jammu), Jatinder Bakshi (Kashmiri Pandit)
and Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai (Kashmir Diaspora).
To understand that how people with varied
political ideologies can reach a consensus on
very intricate and complex and sensitive subjects
it would be appropriate to reproduce all the nine
point prepared by the draft committee in their
totality:
1. The process of reconciliation and peace
building between India and Pakistan be expedited,
and the people of Jammu and Kashmir be
acknowledged as integral partners of the process
and acknowledged as its primary stake holders.
The parties should determine the parameters of
the process and define a time frame for its
implementation.
2. Free movement across Jammu and Kashmir be
reinstated, all traditional routes across the
ceasefire line may be reopened and made
operational.
3. The fundamental rights and freedoms of
the people of Jammu and Kashmir be ensured and
the various draconian laws be withdrawn. The
expeditious release of all detainees and
prisoners be ensured and cases against them and
those already released be withdrawn. Information
may be made available about the conditions and
fate of approximately ten thousand disappeared
persons.
4. The return, rehabilitation, and
resettlement of all internally and externally
displaced persons, including Kashmiri Pandits and
those from the border areas and ceasefire line,
be facilitated with dignity and honour.
5. For comprehensive and lasting peace in
South Asia, and a politically secure and
democratic future, the inalienable right to
self-determination of the people of Jammu and
Kashmir be recognized
and respected.
6. All cycles of violence in Jammu and
Kashmir should end and a space be created for the
conclusive settlement of the dispute in
accordance with the wishes and aspirations of all
the people.
7. Demilitarization is a necessary step for ensuring peace in the region.
8. India and Pakistan should negotiate a
treaty to create a nuclear weapons-free zone in
all of Jammu and Kashmir.
9. Trade and Tourism across the Ceasefire
Line be prompted and inflow of tourists from
India and Pakistan to both sides of Jammu and
Kashmir be allowed and encouraged.
This resolution which was called as Washington
Declaration drafted by a varied team was
unanimously adopted by participants from India,
Pakistan, and the two sides of Kashmir serves as
lodestar for Kashmir leaders. The declaration
talks about 'inalienable right to
self-determination', it talks about India and
Pakistan dialogue, it talks about reinstating
traffic along the Loc as was before restrictions
was imposed on it in fifties and many other
important. If people professing different
political outlooks could reach a consensus there
should be no difficulty for Kashmir leaders to
arrive at a broader consensus that would propel
the Kashmir politics in the right direction and
snatch the baton 'divided lot' from their
adversaries.
When it was discovered that the train had bought
a full load of corpses, a heavy brooding silence
descended on the village...
'Train to Pakistan', 1956 by Khushwant Singh
Partition, the largest peace-time migration in
history, which involved an estimated 14 million
people and saw another million killed, has been
something of a meta-narrative for the
subcontinent. Its grievous injuries, never fully
forgotten, have endured in the collective memory
despite the emergence of three post-Partition
generations. Cynical politicians have
periodically gained great dividends from it, not
just in terms of the occasional episodes of riots
and carnage, or indeed in the carefully
constructed hostility between India and Pakistan,
but in the suspicions and bad faith between
Hindus and Muslims that continue to mark
ordinary, everyday life, 60 years on.
Those grainy, black-and-white images of trauma,
horror and pain from a lost era could have served
as a 'never-again' lesson, rather than remaining
a perennial source of animosity. Only one group
of men and women, whom we somewhat erroneously
term our "founding fathers", having been witness
to that turbulence at first hand, drew the right
conclusions. The Constitution they drafted, in
many ways, testifies to this. Several, including
Gandhi and Nehru of course, spoke eloquently on
the issue, but let me cite S. Radhakrishnan's
speech on the floor of the Constituent Assembly
on August 14-15, 1947, before the clock struck
12: "Were we not victims, ready victims, so to
say, of the separatist tendencies foisted on us?
Should we not now correct our national faults of
characters, our domestic despotism, our
intolerance which has assumed the different forms
of obscurantism... Now that India is divided, it
is our duty not to indulge in words of anger.
They lead us nowhere..."
Some among the crowds realised this in their own
distinct ways. On August 15, 1947, the late
journalist, Nikhil Chakravarty, was able to
capture as a cub reporter an eloquent scene in
the slums of a Calcutta still reeling from the
worst Hindu-Muslim riots in its history: "The
first spontaneous initiative came from the Muslim
bustees and was immediately responded to by Hindu
bustees. It was Calcutta's poor, especially
Muslims, who opened the floodgates... Muslim boys
clambered up at Chowringhee and shouted,
'Hindu-Muslim ek
ho'..." This found immediate echo in the Hindu
bustees. "Then all of a sudden in the very storm
centres of the most gruesome rioting of the past
year, Muslims and Hindus ran across the frontiers
and hugged each other in wild joy."
That visionary gleam took awhile to dispel. The
fifties were relatively peaceful, but by the
sixties communal riots were once again very much
a part of the Indian political scene. The decade
began with the Jabalpur riots of 1961, triggered
reportedly by a Hindu girl eloping with a Muslim
boy, and ended with a major conflagration in
Ahmedabad, in 1969, which bore all the familiar
characteristics of the major riots that followed
- including the political assertion of the
RSS/Jan Sangh. The Justice P. Jaganmohan Reddy
Commission appointed to inquire into them made
the now familiar recommendation that the Gujarat
police needed to be reorganised in order to be
less biased, a theme that figured hugely in the
Srikrishna Commission report two decades later.
Sociologist Paul Brass has argued that this
"production of Hindu-Muslim communal violence",
often occurring in waves, was linked to the
political construction of 'Hindu' and 'Muslim'
identities in post-Independence India.
But Partition did more than coalesce communal
identities. Its fearsome repercussions branded
the lives of the women of the subcontinent.
Inherently vulnerable, they were attacked in
innumerable and horrific ways - outlined
graphically in work done by feminists like Ritu
Menon, Kamala Bhasin, Urvashi Butalia, Shahnaz
Rouse, Gargi Chakravartty and many others -
because they came to define the identities of the
warring groups and represent community honour. As
Menon and Bhasin put it, the women "became their
respective countries". This legacy carried on,
well into the post-Independence years. In
Pakistan, Rouze points out, 'Muslim' dress came
to be defined as the shalwar kameez, with the
sari being denounced as 'Hindu'. Clearly, if
communal attitudes today drew sustenance from
memories of Partition so too did dispositions
towards women.
Which brings us to the question whether the
subcontinent can ever, will ever, decisively
transcend Partition's negative legacies. Some
years ago I put this very question to artists and
writers of the Partition generation. Their
responses gave no great cause for optimism. The
late Manohar Shyam Joshi, whose Buniyaad
flickered brilliantly and briefly on our
television screens, believed that one of great
problems was that "we are a nation devoted to
forgetting than remembering". He added that this
may have something to do with the Hindu timeframe
based on yugantars: "We either exist in the
present reality or in infinity. In our shhradhs,
we remember our ancestors only up to three
generations." He believed that this was probably
one reason why we don't have a great novel of the
Partition, "not even a great partisan novel - a
Hindu Mahasabha version of those events in
fiction."
Theatre doyen, Habib Tanvir, who forced his
immediate family to remain in India when the
larger family left for Pakistan because "I was
convinced that the place you belong to is your
place", believed that it is important that
creative people must work towards undoing
Partition's inheritance of hate. One of his
powerful plays, Jisne Lahore Nahin Dekhiya, was
based on a story by Asghar Wajahat that drew from
real life. When a Hindu woman who chose to live
in Pakistan died after 30 years, a local maulvi
maintained that her body should be cremated. The
cremation caused riots. "If that play conveyed
the message of the senselessness of riots and
that communalism is not the preserve of any one
community, I believe I have succeeded."
Ram Kumar, the noted painter, who had even
attempted a novel on the theme, Ghar Bane, Ghar
Toote, argued that the baleful effects of
Partition can only be exorcised through art -
"yet the interregnum has yet to produce a great
work of art or fiction, say of the quality of
Tolstoy's War and Peace." But Kumar also
recognised that in today's subcontinent, "a
third-rate politician has more power to influence
people than a first-rate artist".
Each of these comments underlines the
deficiencies of a post-Independence society that
power politics shaped in its own image. Partition
brought freedom in one way, but fettered minds in
innumerable other ways. The question is, can we
remember it in order to forget it?
The text of the supplemental agreement to the India-US nuclear deal has been released and it is becoming clear that the agreement is a hot potato that will have major strategic-political consequences.
SINCE this clumn discussed the India-United States "123 agreement" two weeks ago, its text has been released. What was earlier reported as a major "breakthrough" is suddenly becoming a hot potato.
The agreement, meant to translate the India-US nuclear deal of July 2005 into reality, has more critics than supporters in the Indian political class. India's Left parties now oppose the agreement. As do the Bharatiya Janata Party, its allies, and most regional parties. Virtually everyone barring the United Progressive Alliance seems to be against it.
The Left's rationale, stated in a five-page document, has to with the deal's links to a close "strategic partnership" with the US, as well as some differences between "123" and the Hyde Act passed by the US Congress. The Left opposes a strategic embrace of the US for internally consistent reasons. It also says the Hyde Act can be used arbitrarily to terminate nuclear cooperation.
The BJP, by contrast, has no principled objection to an intimate India-US alliance-indeed, it advocates it-, but opposes "123" to embarrass the UPA with crude national-chauvinist rhetoric. Most Centre-Right critics of the deal define sovereignty not in terms of independence in policy-making, but strictly in relation to the possession of mass-destruction weapons.
To its credit, the Left is worried at the likely impact of "123" on India's traditional advocacy of universal nuclear disarmament. It says that by getting "accommodated in a US-led unequal nuclear order", India's role in championing disarmament is "being given the go-by". The Right is altogether silent on this.
Many opponents of the deal make a fine-toothcomb comparison between the "123" text and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's past assurances of strict adherence to the original 2005 deal. They focus solely on a procedural issue: Singh must not deviate from what he told parliament.
But it's more relevant to recall another parliament speech by Singh, on May 28, 1998. Singh, then an MP, pilloried the Vajpayee government for Pokharan-II, and passionately pleaded for disarmament. He accused the government of violating India's three-pillared nuclear "consensus". The first pillar is that "nuclear weapons [are] weapons of mass destruction and their use [is] a crime against humanity".
So, said Singh, India should "work for a non-discriminatory, multilateral arrangement to have these weapons outlawed... [T]his consensus [is] sought to be disrupted".
Singh accused the government of reducing security to its "military dimension" alone, and launching an arms race with an "uncontrollable increase in expenditure on mass-destruction weapons". He warned of threats to "social cohesion" and insecurities arising from "ill-health, illiteracy, ignorance and disease. If we do not attend to these threats, you will have WMDs like the Soviet Union, ... but the Soviet Union still withered away. Therefore, ... think before you weaponise ..." Ironically, "123" formalises weaponisation and its acceptance by the US. Clearly, Singh has travelled a long way. What's the main content of "123"?.
The "123" agreement's Article 2.4 says its purpose is "not to affect ...or hinder ...unsafeguarded nuclear activities...". So "123" will help India expand its nuclear arsenal. India will only subject 14 of 22 operating/planned power reactors to inspections. The remaining eight can annually yield 1,250 kg of plutonium-enough for 250 bombs.
India can also stockpile as much weapons-grade material as it likes in its military-nuclear facilities, including the "Dhruva" reactor, and other unsafeguarded plants, including the under-construction Prototype Fast-Breeder Reactor.
All told, India can annually add 1,600 kg of plutonium to its existing 500-kg stockpile, itself enough for 100 bombs. This is way beyond the professed "minimum deterrent".
"123" gives "prior consent" to India's right to reprocess. Article 6(iii) is unambiguous on this. The right will come into effect when India builds a dedicated reprocessing facility.
Continuous fuel supply guarantees are also written into Articles 2.2(e), 4.1, 5.6, 14.5, etc. "123" recognises "the importance of uninterrupted operation of nuclear reactors" and of "corrective measurers" in case of disruption. The US also will help India develop a "strategic reserve" of fuel for the reactors' lifetime. If India tests, the US will terminate cooperation. But India has secured some cushions. Article 14.2 says the US will "take into account whether the circumstances [leading to the test] resulted from [India's] serious concern about "a changed security environment..." [e.g. a test by another country].
The US can then demand the return of exported equipment/material, but must give notice. Article 14.5 recognises that "exercising the right of return would have profound implications for their relations". "123" mandates obligatory multi-layered consultations, subject to continuity of supply guaranteed under Article 5.6.
Nuclear power is costly. A Massachusetts Institute of Technology study says its unit costs in the US are 40-60 per cent higher than for coal- or gas-based power. Power from new Indian nuclear plants will cost Rs3-plus. But the coal-based Sasan project will deliver power for only Re1.20. India would court serious trouble by developing nuclear power.
The deal will have major strategic-political consequences. India will abandon the fight for global nuclear disarmament. You don't get admitted to the Nuclear Club-and then demand its dissolution! India will also become more vulnerable to pressure to join U.S.-led security arrangements, and to dilute its policy independence. This will detract from a principled commitment to an equitable world free of the scourge of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, India's Parliamentary debate is unlikely to advance principles. Rather, it's likely to be drowned in jingoistic sloganeering, which confuses sovereignty with the ability to cause mass destruction.
The National Alliance of People's Movements, a
network of over two hundred people's movements in
India working for social and economic justice,
believes that the India-US nuclear deal has grave
consequences for India’s national security and
sovereignty, for India's relations with its
neighbours, for India's economy, for the health
of its people and for the state of its
environment. It will directly impact the rights
and well-being of the people of India for
generations to come. On the anniversary of Quit
India call given in 1942 and the atomic bombing
of Nagasaki, we demand that the Government of
India withdraw from the India-US nuclear deal and
reject strategic partnership with the United
States.
Democracy
In July 2005, President George Bush and Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a deal to
exempt India from US laws and international rules
that for almost three decades have sought to
prevent states from using commercial imports of
nuclear technology and fuel to aid their nuclear
weapons ambitions. These rules were created
because India secretly used nuclear materials and
technology that it acquired for peaceful purposes
to make a nuclear weapon. The deal is of profound
importance since it allows for India to import
nuclear fuel, reactors and other technologies,
and will enable India to expand both its nuclear
weapons and nuclear energy programme.
The US Congress took a year and half to discuss
and approve the new US policy and change existing
US laws to enable nuclear commerce with India. In
India, the government simply told parliament that
it had made a deal with the United States.
Subsequently, the US and have negotiated a '123
agreement'’ a treaty that will cover nuclear
cooperation between the two countries. But while
this agreement will have to be approved by the US
Congress, India’s parliament will not be allowed
a vote on it.
NAPM believes that the people of India have been
denied the right to debate the nuclear deal and
the larger changes in foreign policy and other
issues that it involves, and to express their
opinion through their elected representatives.
The nuclear agreement should not be accepted
under these circumstances.
Foreign policy
The United States sees the nuclear deal with
India as part of a process of building a
strategic relationship between the two countries.
The US seeks to use India as a client state in
its new confrontation with a rising China and to
achieve other strategic goals, for example
putting pressure on Iran.
NAPM believes that India should not compromise
its national sovereignty or its long standing
tradition of an independent non-aligned foreign
policy. The India-US strategic partnership and
the nuclear deal in particular will escalate the
nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India, and
upset the India-Pakistan peace process. It will
also create serious tensions between India and
China, instead of helping improve relations. The
deal with the US also threatens India’s relations
with Iran, which the US considers to be a rogue
state. The US in particular is opposed to an
Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline that could
improve political and economic relations among
these three countries and provide relatively
cheap, clean energy to India.
Economy
The US - India nuclear deal was first announced
as part of a larger package of agreements that
included a commitment to "deepen the bilateral
economic relationship” between the US and India,
and create in India an enhanced “investment
climate" so that "opportunities for investment
will increase." The US sees India as an
increasingly important source of cheap labour and
high profits for its corporations.
NAPM believes that privileging business interests
means pursuing neo-liberal economic policies
which favour the interests of Indian and US
corporations. These policies include the creation
of Special Economic Zones and other such measures
that come at the cost of the poor. These policies
have been followed for almost twenty years and
have failed. In 2006, India was ranked at number
126 among 177 nations according to the United
Nations Human Development Index. NAPM believes
India should follow policies that will promote a
just and equitable social and economic
development aimed at meeting the needs of India’s
poor and disadvantaged.
Energy
The nuclear deal assumes that nuclear energy is
an economic and safe way for producing
electricity for India. Nuclear energy has failed
in India and offers no solution for the future.
After 60 years of public funding Department of
Atomic Energy (DAE) produces less than 3% of
India’s electricity. For comparison, in less than
a decade and without state support, wind energy
now accounts for about 5% of India’s electricity
capacity.
To escape its failures, the DAE plans to import
large nuclear power plants and fuel. The US,
France, Russia and Japan hope to profit from
this. This pursuit of nuclear energy comes
despite that fact that the cost of producing
nuclear electricity in India is higher than
non-nuclear alternatives and each reactor adds to
the risk of a serious nuclear accident and
worsens the problem of radioactive nuclear waste.
The DAE’s budget is ten times more than the
budget for development of renewable energy
technologies. India must reverse its priorities
and invest more in wind, solar, biomass and micro
hydel energy resources.
NAPM believes that the real energy challenge
facing India is to meet the needs of the majority
of Indians who still live in its villages. India
needs an energy policy that works with the rural
poor to develop and provide the small-scale,
local, sustainable and affordable energy systems
that they need. Renewable energy resources are
better suited to fulfill this need.
Major General (Retd.) Sudhir Vombatkere, D.
Gabriele, Aruna Roy, Medha Patkar, Sr. Celia,
Suniti S.R., Ulka Mahajan, Mukta Srivastava,
Thomas Kocherry, N.D. Koli, Sanjay M.G, Anand
Mazgoankar, Geetha Ramakrishnan, P.
Chennaiah, Arundhati Dhuru, Hussain P.T., Uma
Shankari, Sandeep Pandey
The US is having a difficult time trying to
justify the US-India nuclear deal as part of
which the 123 agreement has just been concluded,
guaranteeing India full civil nuclear
cooperation. As the text of the agreement has
been released 3 days prior to Hiroshima Day,
there is consternation among people believing in
a world free of nuclear weapons.
After imposing sanctions on India, after its
nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998, the US is
ultimately according it the status of a nuclear
weapons state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty without formally saying so.
The US is willing to do business with India in
nuclear technology and materials, as it is with
any other nuclear weapons or non-nuclear weapons
state, which is a party to the NPT. As a
non-signatory state, India is not supposed to
derive this privilege.
However, under the deal, India is being given the
benefits which have been made available to some
very close allies of the US, like Japan or
EURATOM, making other NPT members wonder about
the utility of their acceding to the Treaty.
The US seems to be more worried about the
business interests of its corporations than about
the more worthy cause of disarmament, and it has
once again proved that to maintain its global
hegemony it does not mind throwing all national
and international norms and laws to the wind.
With Nicholas Burns, the chief diplomat-architect
of the 123 agreement, hinting at subsequent
non-nuclear military cooperation with what he
describes as a "soon to be the largest country in
the world," we are going to see more of a
unipolar world, posing a threat to the smaller
countries around the world, especially the
unfortunate ones out of favour with the US
Government.
It is quite clear that US wants to court India as
a strategic ally, with the objective of
developing joint military capabilities and
perhaps even establishing military bases on
Indian territory, and it is willing to play along
with Indian nuclear ambitions.
The recent stop-over of the US nuclear powered
aircraft carrier Nimitz, recently deployed in the
Persian Gulf as a warning to Iran and possibly
carrying nuclear weapons, at the port of Chennai,
in violation of India's stated policy of not
allowing transit of foreign nuclear weapons
through its territorial waters, is a sign of
things to come.
At the preparatory committee meeting for the 2010
NPT review conference held in May-June, in
Vienna, the New Agenda Coalition countries,
Ireland, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand,
South Africa, Sweden and Japan have urged India,
besides Pakistan and Israel, to accede to the NPT
as non-nuclear weapons states in order to
accomplish universality of the Treaty.
Under the Treaty a nuclear weapons state has been
defined as one, which has manufactured and
exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive devices prior to January 1, 1967.
It would really be a misnomer to call India --
and Pakistan and Israel -- as non-nuclear weapons
states. So, the US is doing the next best thing.
It says that by signing the deal with India it is
bringing India into the non-proliferation regime,
as more of its nuclear facilities will now be
subjected to IAEA safeguards.
As part of the negotiations, India has agreed to
bifurcate its nuclear activity into clearly
identified civilian and military categories, with
the provision of the former being open to IAEA
inspections.
The US has agreed upon this India specific deal
as an exception, in spite of resistance from
within and without, because it thinks that India
has not contributed to proliferation.
It is a different matter, though, that by
conducting nuclear explosions twice India has
violated the global non-proliferation regime,
instigating Pakistan to do the same. North Korea
was also emboldened to come out of NPT because of
India's brazen transgression.
India has consistently refused to sign the NPT,
CTBT or FMCT. It is amazing how India has come
this far with the US, outraging the modesty of
the international community, and extracted
significant concessions in the deal.
Against the spirit of the Henry Hyde Act, if
India decides to conduct another nuclear test or
violates IAEA safeguards agreement, the US will
not immediately exercise its right of return of
materials and technology but, giving due
considerations to the circumstances which
prompted India's action, will ensure the
continuity of India's nuclear fuel supply from
other sources around the world.
The text of the 123 agreement has even gone as
far as identifying France, Russia and the UK as
potential suppliers in the eventuality of the US
terminating its supply. And even if the US
exercises right of return, India will be suitably
compensated. Moreover, the US would support India
in building up a strategic nuclear fuel reserve,
ensuring that India will not be stranded like it
was when fuel for the Tarapur plant was stopped
after India's first testing.
The issue which clinched the 123 agreement was
India's offer to subject a new reprocessing
facility, which will be built exclusively for
this purpose, to IAEA safeguards in return for
the consent to reprocess the spent fuel, even
though the US president is on record as saying
that enrichment and reprocessing are not
necessary for a country to move forward with
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. India will
be free to maintain and develop its nuclear
arsenal.
The deal will not have any impact on this. In
fact, with external resources available for its
nuclear energy programme, it will be able to
divert its internal resources for strengthening
its strategic programme. 8 nuclear reactors out
of 22, and an upcoming Prototype Fast Breeder
Reactor, will remain dedicated for military
purposes, outside the purview of IAEA.
Hence, in essence, India will enjoy all the
powers of a nuclear weapons state under the NPT,
especially if the Nuclear Suppliers Group of 45
countries also yields to the US-like concessions
to India.
The US is going to campaign with the NSG to
engage in nuclear trade with India after it has
helped India sign an agreement with IAEA on
safeguards, because it has to seek another
approval of the Congress before the deal can be
considered final.
It is intriguing how Australia, Canada, South
Africa, and others, are only too willing to go
along with the US desire so that they can do
business with India, giving up their long
standing commitment to non-proliferation.
23 US lawmakers wrote a letter to the US
president on July 25, expressing concern over
India's growing ties with Iran, including the
domain of defence partnership. It must be
remembered that India is considering a very
important deal with Iran on the
Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.
Considering that the energy information
administration of the US has, in its
International Energy Outlook 2007, predicted that
the largest proportion of the new capacity
addition for electricity generation until 2030
will be in the form of gas fired technologies,
which are also better from the point of view of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, it is more
likely that India will give equal if not more
importance to its relationship with Iran. The
deal with Iran is also one of the rare instances
where Indian and Pakistani interests converge.
Hence, it should not surprise anybody if the gas
pipeline deal with Iran dominates the nuclear
deal with US in the Indian and regional context,
at least for a couple of decades to come.
India claims that with this deal the global order
has been changed. And it is right. It has upset
the non-proliferation regime. Globally and
regionally, it is going to lead to
reconfiguration of forces, possibly leading to a
renewed arms race.
The National Command Authority of Pakistan, which
oversees the nuclear programme there, chaired by
President Musharraf, has already expressed its
displeasure at the deal and pledged to maintain
(read upgrade) its credible minimum deterrence.
Pakistan views this deal as disturbing the
regional strategic stability, and has asserted
that it cannot remain oblivious to its security
requirements.
An International Panel on Fissile Materials
report predicts at least four to five times
increase in India's weapons grade plutonium
production rate. The present Indian stock is
estimated to be sufficient for about 100 nuclear
warheads. This is obviously alarming for Pakistan.
What India and Pakistan need, in the interest of
the people of the sub-continent, is a mutually
reassuring deal to suspend the nuclear arms race
rather than something which will fuel the nuclear
fire. The peace process undertaken by Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh and President Pervez
Musharraf is in danger of being eclipsed by the
US-India nuclear deal.
Sandeep Pandey recieved Ramon Magsaysay Award for emergent leadership in 2002.
NEW DELHI: The civil nuclear deal with the United States does not hinder India’s strategic programme and leaves enough room for conducting an atomic test in a changed geo-political situation, some former diplomats have said. They said that India and the U.S. should put on fast track the negotiations with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and pave the way for signing the pact. “We are free to test ... the agreement is for import of technology. There is no mention of treaties like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT] and Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty which prohibit atomic tests,” the former Foreign Secretary, Muchkund Dubey, told PTI. He also sought to dismiss the Bharatiya Janata Party’s rejection of the draft 123 agreement, terming it “political posturing.” “I am surprised by the BJP’s statements. Its opposition is based on political and electoral compulsions and not on scientific reasoning,” Mr. Dubey said. Asked about the apprehensions of the scientific community on the option to carry out nuclear tests, the former Foreign Secretary, Shashank, said the decision to conduct a test rested with the Government of the day. “Nuclear testing is not a decision to be taken by scientists. It is a political decision,” he pointed out. Mr. Shashank said both the U.S. and India had made concessions but since it was a negotiated agreement, it should be looked at in its entirety and not by putting it in a negative light. “Now, the agreement needs to be wrapped up quickly before the Bush administration moves into election mode,” he said. Naresh Chandra, former envoy to the U.S., said future governments would have to be alert and vigilant as “American politicians do not have a universal view about India.” He said this when asked whether the deal could be a cause of concern for future generations. India would require a “lot of support” at the NSG and guard against lobbying by Pakistan, he said. “China could also make attempts to thwart it and try to get a similar deal for Pakistan.” Mr. Dubey dismissed apprehensions about Indian nuclear facilities being subjected to American inspections if the IAEA expressed its inability to ensure safeguards. “Why would the IAEA safeguards fail? They fail in nations where governments cheat. We have been transparent in our dealings and will continue to be,” he said. Moreover, Mr. Dubey said, any decision on the failure of safeguards would have to be made by the IAEA’s Board of Governors, of which India is a member. Mr. Chandra sought to play down attempts by some U.S. lawmakers to link relations with India to its policy on Iran, saying the two issues are separate. “It is unfortunate that the two issues have got connected. There is a need to separate them,” he said. Mr. Shashank said a discussion in Parliament would make the Government’s thinking on the deal clearer. — PTI
NEW DELHI, AUGUST 4 : The Army is ready to consider relocation of troops from the “hinterland” of Jammu and Kashmir if the State Government is confident that local police can maintain law and order in rural areas. Rolling out this offer during an exclusive interview with The Sunday Express, with just a month to go before he demits office, Army Chief General J J Singh said, “Troops involved in law and order duties can be adjusted depending on the level of violence. If the situation improves then they can be reduced. We are in the hinterland in support of the State Government.” Over 75,000 army personnel, mostly from 63 battalions of Rashtriya Rifles, are currently involved in ‘hinterland operations’ in Jammu & Kashmir. Currently, the Army is not deployed in any town or city inside the Valley or Jammu. And hinterland operations, in essence, involve control of key geographical features, protecting lines of communication and supporting law and order in the rural areas. “We can consider relocating troops if the State Government tells us so. We did withdraw from Punjab and Mizoram after the violence levels came down,” General Singh added. However, General Singh ruled out any thinning of troops on the Line of Control till the border is delineated and defined. Echoing a similar view on troops involved in counter-infiltration in J&K, he said, “Our counter-infiltration (CI) deployment is dynamic and keeps changing depending on the requirement in the state. Troops involved in CI duties cannot be relocated as infiltration levels from across the LoC are comparable to the past years.” But the Army Chief made it clear that his troops have been directed to move out of orchards in case an alternate accommodation is available or the orchard owner would be adequately compensated for his land on the basis of revised rates. He disclosed that even the para-military forces have been asked to move out of schools, hospitals and hotels in the state. General Singh reserved his opinion on Siachen and the internal security situation, but stressed that public support for ULFA was dwindling and accused the Northeast outfit of resorting to terrorism. On the Naxalite threat, the Army Chief favoured a solution with a socio-economic basis. “Our experience in Northeast and Kashmir tells us that military application is only a part of the larger package that involves politics, societal changes and sound economics,” he said. Sounding satisfied on his stint as Army Chief, General Singh said his only regret is not having been able to modernise the Army more rapidly. Then, asking his successor, Lt General Deepak Kapoor, not to compromise on military preparedness at any point, General Singh said, “During my two-and-a-half years, we were operationally ready at all the times as this is our primary job.” He also wanted his successor to ensure that human resource in Army is “well treated, well-looked after and well-equipped,” and motivated to the highest levels. On the same note, he maintained that the recent incidents of suicides and ‘fragging’ under Northern Command had nothing to do with operations pressures. Clarifying that figures of such incidents are far below in comparison to other areas, General Singh said, “In percentage terms, such incidents are more in Southern and Central Command as compared to the Northern Command and there is no spurt in such cases. It has more to do with societal changes rather than operations in the J&K.”
Washington: The United States has said India retains the “sovereign right” to explode a nuclear device but hopes that such a situation will not arise. “India retains its sovereign rights, but the U.S. retains its legal rights as well,” Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns told a group of journalists here on Friday. He was asked whether New Delhi had the right to test. The agreement had taken into account the “worst case” scenario, he said, “but we hope very much that it [right of return of nuclear fuel and technology] won’t be necessary because we hope that conditions that prompt it will not materialise.” Mr. Burns suggested that New Delhi might not explode an atomic device. Noting that it was for India to decide on a nuclear test, he said: “But obviously in the modern world, the 21st century, advanced nuclear powers largely do not test nuclear weapons. The United States does not test its weapons, Britain is not testing its weapons.” The U.S. preserved the “legal right” to recall fuel and technology but that would be the “choice” of the President of the day and “not automatic.” “If you look ahead and you try to envision what would constitute a discontinuity of supply, how would that happen? There are four or five or six ways that could happen and only one of them has to do with a nuclear test.” “If somehow supplies for environmental reasons, for political reasons are discontinued to India, then of course India has the benefit of working with the U.S. and other countries in construction of a strategic fuel supply reserve that could help it, if there is discontinuity.” “I think there are probably more likely scenarios than the one you are asking about — nuclear testing,” Mr. Burns said, a day after the text of the 123 agreement was made public. He said the U.S. intended to be “very supportive” of India at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting and to help convince other countries that the India-U.S. nuclear deal was in everyone’s interests. “We are partners with India. This is not an antagonistic relationship. We are friends,” Mr. Burns stressed. — PTI
NEW DELHI: India on Friday made public the agreement for civil nuclear cooperation with the United States which does not hinder its military nuclear programme and provides for uninterrupted supplies of fuel. It incorporates a right of return of all the U.S. supplied equipment and material if New Delhi conducts a nuclear test but after consultations and also pursuing arrangements for restoration of supplies from other sources. The agreement, setting the stage for ending over three decades of India’s isolation from world commerce in nuclear technology, says that only further amendments would allow India to import reprocessing and enrichment technologies. Trade in dual use technologies would take place after changes in the U.S. laws. The 22-page document also stipulates putting all new facilities under the surveillance (safeguards) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and promises U.S. help in creating a separate fuel reserve facility that could be used to keep the reactor going in case Washington pulls out. The agreement also assures help to India in obtaining the approval of the 45-country Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The “Agreement for cooperation between India and the U.S. concerning peaceful use of nuclear energy,” which is amendable, would remain in force for 40 years and is extendable by periods of 10 years. In the eventuality of a nuclear test or diversion of material (without saying so in as many words), the agreement sets out a multi-layered approach to termination and cessation of cooperation. It stipulates a year’s written notice along with reasons but consultations would be held before the termination is effected. In case of violation of the IAEA safeguards agreement, the findings of the IAEA would be crucial. Both sides have agreed to take into account whether the circumstances that led to the termination were due to a “changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security.” The U.S. will have the right to seek return of nuclear fuel and technology but it will compensate for the costs incurred as a consequence of such removal. If fuel supplies are disrupted, the U.S. will convene a meeting of supplier countries including Russia, France and the U.K. to take steps to restore the supply. Granting consent for reprocessing, the pact envisages an IAEA monitored facility for the purpose. An agreement on guidelines for physical protection, storage and environmental protection for this facility would be finalised within a year. Of crucial interest to India are Articles 2, 4, 5, 6 and 14 of the agreement. Defining the scope of cooperation, Article 2 allows advance nuclear R&D and the setting up of a reserve stockpile of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply during the lifetime of the rectors. It also affirms that the agreement will not affect military nuclear activities and the three-stage nuclear programme. The next clause sets out the fields covered by the agreement which include exchange of information on research in controlled thermonuclear explosion and the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor project, in which India recently became a participant.
In his farewell address on January 17, 1961,
President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered the
prophetic warning: "In the councils of
government, we must guard against the acquisition
of unwarranted influence, whether sought or
unsought, by the military-industrial complex." He
was talking of the influence of the complex (for
which his epithet was to prove enduring) in
Washington's corridors of power.
We in India had to wait until the second term
of a distant successor with very different views
on the subject to discover the relevance of the
warning to us. The US military-industrial complex
(along with its strategic-business partners
elsewhere) has just given us proof of its
influence in the councils of government in New
Delhi as well. The influence has, in fact, been
as important a factor behind the dramatic advance
towards the finalization of the US-India nuclear
deal as the diplomatic skills said to have been
displayed on both sides.
Conspicuous has been the omission of the role
of the complex in official versions of the
advance. By these accounts, it was the brilliant
negotiators on both sides who brought about the
advance. On July 18, 2005 President George W.
Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh sprang a
nasty surprise on the peace-loving world with the
announcement of a nuclear deal to be worked out
in detail. On the same date last month,
high-ranking Indian officials started fresh talks
with their US counterparts in Washington to give
a final shape to the deal in the form of a
bilateral agreement, as required under American
law.
Days later, the two sides proclaimed to a
dead world that the deal had been clinched at
last. The text of the agreement was ready, with
well-advertised differences vanishing as if at
the touch of a magic wand. Nuclear scientists and
others, who had made so much noise about '"the
national sovereignty" involved, suddenly fell
silent, with some of them even turning into
eulogists of the deal.
There is no doubt, of course, that India's
"strategic concerns" over the deal seem to have
been addressed, to the satisfaction of nuclear
hawks here. The discretionary powers of the US
president, it has been delicately hinted, will
take due care of the letter of American law,
which had seemed to prohibit further nuclear
testing in India, for example. But there was more
to the advance than met the eye in mere official
statements.
Less than due publicity was given to the fact
that the military complex was conducting its own
parallel negotiation process. Buried in reports
on the advance was a semiofficial acknowledgement
of this accompanying exercise.
The former chairman of India's Atomic Energy
Commission, M. R. Srinivasan, a late addition to
the pro-deal lobby, let the cat out of the bag. A
newspaper story reported him as saying that, once
the 123 Agreement was legislatively approved in
both countries, "French and American nuclear
businesses, holding talks with Nuclear Power
Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) could go
ahead with the selection of sites for power
plants and other modalities."
He added: "All these things will begin
rolling once the agreement ... gets final
approval from the Union Cabinet." The Cabinet, it
may be noted, has already approved the agreement,
though the text is going to be placed before
Parliament only on or after August 10.
On July 21, Ron Somers, president of the
US-India Business Council, articulated the main
concern of the military-industrial complex in the
matter. While hailing US civilian nuclear
cooperation with the "world's largest free-market
democracy," he said the agreement "will present a
major opportunity for US and Indian companies
...."
He took the opportunity to plead for adoption
by the US Congress and India's Parliament of a
"multilateral Convention of Supplementary
Compensation (CSC), so US and Indian
private-sector companies can engage in India's
nuclear power build-out." The convention will
provide a compensation mechanism against
unforeseen liabilities. "Without this mechanism,"
Somers said, "Americans would be put at a
disadvantage in competition with public-sector
companies from France and Russia."
The US-India Business Council, a division of
the three-million-member US Chamber of Commerce,
has been spearheading advocacy of the deal
through the Coalition for Partnership with India.
We have noted before in these columns the
expectations of corporations and experts from the
deal, and these bear repetition. Expert
projections made in December 2006 envisage an
increase in India's nuclear arsenal by 40 to 50
weapons a year as a result of the deal. The
country is also expected to acquire 40 nuclear
reactors over the next two decades or so.
According to more recent reports, India has
announced plans to expand its current installed
nuclear-energy capacity from 3,500 megawatts to
60,000 megawatts by 2040. The expansion is valued
at $150 billion.
Last year, Somers said the deal would create
27,000 "high-quality" jobs a year over the next
decade in the US nuclear industry, "which has
been losing orders in a world increasingly wary
of nuclear power."
Corporations on both sides spent large
fortunes on hard-selling the deal to an initially
reluctant Congress. New Delhi has spent about
$1.3 million dollars in this regard on two
lobbying firms, one of which (Barbour, Griffith
and Rogers) is headed by US Ambassador to India
Robert Blackwill. The US-India Business Council
has not revealed the amount it paid Patton Boggs,
a lobbying firm known for its larger fees.
The Confederation of Indian Industries, for
its part, has helped to fund numerous business
trips to India by US congressmen and their staff
over the past few years. Modest estimates place
the cost of nuclear tourism at $550,000.
The US military-industrial complex does not
conceal its excitement at the mega-sized defense
agreements with India and the proposed Indian
cooperation with Bush's missile-defense program.
Last year, talk in the complex was about a $9
million contract for Lockheed Martin to supply
126 fighter planes. There is talk now of more
profits ahead for the arms merchants from the $40
billion budget for India's defense purchases by
2020.
When the nuclear warship USS Nimitz came
calling at the port of Chennai on India's
southern shore last month, US Ambassador David
Mulford used the occasion to talk of a "new era
of defense cooperation." He recalled that last
year India had purchased the troop carrier USS
Trenton and hoped for the possible sale to this
country of C-130 aircraft, "the celebrated
workhorse of multi-role lift airplanes with the
longest continuous production run of any military
aircraft."
The cost of all the commerce the agreement
will make possible, for the poor people of India
and for peace in South Asia, of course, does not
enter at all into the calculations of the
military-industrial complex.
A freelance journalist and a peace activist
in India, J. Sri Raman is the author of
"Flashpoint" (Common Courage Press, USA). He is a
regular contributor to
New Delhi, Aug. 2: The United National Progressive Alliance on Thursday announced that it would oppose the Indo-US nuclear deal on the floor of Parliament during the Monsoon Session, which begins at the end of next week. AIADMK chief J. Jayalalithaa has set the tone for her front’s stand on the nuclear deal, describing it as detrimental to the national interest. The UNPA has decided to adopt an aggressive posture on the nuclear deal while both the Left, which provides crucial outside support to the UPA government, and the BJP reserved comment on the 123 agreement which has been finalised between India and the US, on the grounds that they would like to see the text of the 123 agreement before reacting to it. The UNPA parliamentary board will meet here on August 9, a day before the session, and all its senior leaders will finalise the strategy that it will adopt on the floor of the House. The eight-party front, which began pulling in different directions in the just-concluded presidential elections, will now try to present a united face. Said Mr Amar Singh of the Samajwadi Party, a constituent of the front: "We will ensure that our presence is felt in Parliament. The Indo-US nuclear deal will result in mortgaging India’s sovereignty. The Congress-led UPA government is pledging to Washington the country’s self-reliance, sovereignty and policies. The UNPA will expose the Manmohan Singh government in Parliament. The 123 agreement is verbal jugglery. It is clearly a pro-America and anti-Bharat agreement." Ms Jayalalithaa took the position that the nuclear deal was unnecessary and detrimental to India’s interests, and said it would be a good thing if it were called off. "India does not need a nuclear deal at all."
NEW YORK (IPS) - The U.S. decision last week to
proceed with a controversial civilian nuclear
deal with India has triggered strong negative
responses from peace activists, disarmament
experts and anti-nuclear groups.
"The development of a nuclear/strategic alliance
between the United States and India may promote
arms racing between India and Pakistan, and
(between) India and China," says John Burroughs,
executive director of the New York-based Lawyers'
Committee on Nuclear Policy.
The deal, he told IPS, also undermines prospects
for global agreements on nuclear restraint and
disarmament.
An equally negative reaction came from former UN
Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs
Jayantha Dhanapala: "It has the dangerous
potential of triggering a nuclear arms race among
India, Pakistan and China, with disastrous
consequences for Asian peace and stability and
Asia's emerging economic boom."
But the Indian government argues that the nuclear
agreement would neither destabilise the region
nor prompt an arms race.
Nor will it trigger a "copycat deal" between
Pakistan and China, India's national security
adviser N.K. Narayanan told reporters last week.
"This agreement was not an excuse to enhance our
strategic capabilities," he told a press briefing
in New Delhi.
Zia Mian of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs at Princeton University
says the United States sees strategic and
economic benefits in the nuclear deal with India.
"But the people of India and Pakistan will pay
the price, since the nuclear deal will fuel the
India-Pakistan nuclear arms race," he added.
The deal will allow India to increase its
capacity to make nuclear weapons materiel, and
Pakistan has already said it will do whatever it
can to keep up with India.
"This means nuclear establishments in both
countries will become more powerful, drain even
greater resources away from social development,
and increase the nuclear danger in South Asia,"
Mian told IPS.
Nicholas Burns, the U.S. undersecretary of state
who led the negotiations, denied the deal was a
clear example of political double standards by an
administration which has been trying to punish
Iran for its nuclear ambitions but gives its
blessings to India.
"This agreement sends a message to outlaw regimes
such as Iran that if you behave responsibly, you
will not be penalised," he told reporters last
week.
India -- along with Pakistan and Israel -- has
refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), but Iran has.
Called the "123 agreement", last week's nuclear
deal will help create a civil nuclear enrichment
facility in India, mostly with U.S.-made reactors
and expertise.
Still, in a major speech in February 2004, U.S.
President George W. Bush said that "enrichment
and reprocessing are not necessary for nations
seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes."
"The details of the so-called '123 agreement' are
still shrouded in secrecy but, on the basis of
what has been disclosed, it is clear that the
U.S.-India nuclear cooperation deal is an example
of crude realpolitik trumping nuclear
nonproliferation principles in total disregard of
the NPT," Dhanapala told IPS.
He warned that it sends "a bad signal to the
overwhelming majority of NPT parties who have
faithfully abided by their treaty obligations."
Last week Burns told reporters that the deal
would not act as an incentive for other countries
to develop nuclear weapons outside the NPT.
Burroughs said that India made it clear when the
NPT was negotiated that it could not accept a
world divided into nuclear haves and nuclear
have-nots, and stayed out of the treaty.
"The problem with the deal is not that it
acknowledges that India has nuclear weapons,"
Burroughs told IPS. "The problem is that both
India and the United States are showing no signs
of working towards the elimination of their
arsenals together with other states possessing
nuclear weapons."
Under the deal, neither country agrees to ratify
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
"And while India agrees to work with the United
States towards a treaty banning production of
fissile materials for nuclear weapons, India is
not required to stop producing materials for
weapons now or to refrain from building
additional weapons from existing material," he
added.
Nor does India assume the obligation the United
States has under the NPT, to negotiate in good
faith cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and the elimination of nuclear
arsenals.
In short, the deal seems to certify India as a
member of a permanent nuclear weapons club,
Burroughs declared.
Mian of Princeton University pointed out that the
deal is also a clear violation of UN Security
Council Resolution 1172, adopted on 6 June 1998,
which was passed unanimously, and called upon
India and Pakistan "immediately to stop their
nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain
from weaponisation or from the deployment of
nuclear weapons, to cease development of
ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear
weapons and any further production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons."
That resolution also encouraged all States to
"prevent the export of equipment, materials or
technology that could in any way assist programs
in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons," said
Mian who along with M. V. Ramana co-authored
"Wrong Ends, Means, and Needs: Behind the U.S.
Nuclear Deal With India", in the January/February
2006 issue of Arms Control Today.
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