Jun. 30--WASHINGTON -- A long-awaited sale of F-16 fighter planes to
Pakistan that could keep up to 4,000 workers at Lockheed Martin Corp.'s
Fort
Worth plant producing aircraft into 2011 has won State Department
approval.
The department confirmed Thursday that it had decided to sell Pakistan up
to
36 new F-16s and 26 others the U.S. Air Force will retire.
Lockheed on Thursday officially notified Congress, which technically has
30
days to veto the deal. But Congress has never exercised that power on a
major arms sale.
The $5 billion deal also includes upgrades for Pakistan's existing fleet
of
34 older F-16s, various munitions for the planes and other support, the
State Department said.
Critics of Pakistan's military government, which exploded a nuclear
device
in 1998, have opposed selling Islamabad advanced aircraft. The Bush
administration, however, has courted Pakistan as a key ally in the war
on
terrorism and in the hunt for Osama bin Laden.
"The sale is part of a larger effort to broaden our strategic
partnership
with Pakistan and advance our national security and foreign policy
interests
in Asia," the State Department said in a written statement.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice offered F-16s to both Pakistan and
its
longtime rival India during a visit to the region in March 2005.
"I fully support the sale of F-16s to Pakistan, our strong ally in the
war
on terror," Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Texas, said in a statement.
"This
sale is estimated to generate $1.6 billion and sustain more than 1,240
jobs
in Texas over a five-year period."
The precise terms of the F-16 sale to Pakistan, which will get new F-16
Block 50/52 C/Ds and 26 used F-16 A/Bs, haven't been negotiated between
Lockheed and Islamabad.
Lockheed officials have been eagerly awaiting State Department approval
of
the deal for months so they could negotiate a contract in time to allow
production to begin by November 2009.
"Timing is everything," said Joseph Cirincione, an expert on arms
proliferation with the Center for American Progress, a liberal think
tank.
"It's no coincidence that this announcement comes as Congress is
readying
approval of the U.S.-India nuclear deal.
"It's not exactly a payoff, but you might consider it a thank-you to
Pakistan for keeping quiet" about the nuclear agreement.
President Bush agreed in March to let India buy nuclear reactors and fuel
in
return for New Delhi allowing international inspections of part of its
nuclear industry.
If Pakistan takes all 36 new F-16s being offered, the deal would extend
F-16
production in Fort Worth until June 2011.
The company currently is producing F-16s for Poland and Chile and has a
backlog of 144 planes on order.
Lockheed's goal is to keep the line open until at least 2012, when the
company is to begin major production of its new F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter,
said spokesman Joseph Stout.
"The big order we're pursuing is in India, where they have a stated
requirement for 126 aircraft," Mr. Stout said.
With the House International Relations Committee
(HIRC) of the United States House of
Representatives gaining overwhelming bipartisan
support for a draft bill to allow resumption of
civilian nuclear commerce between India and the
U.S., the path is clearer for the controversial
nuclear deal signed a year ago between President
George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
Under the Bush-Singh agreement, India would be
allowed to keep its nuclear weapons, but must
separate its civilian nuclear facilities from
military ones and agree to place the former under
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards.
No less than 37 members of the 50-member HIRC
voted in favor of the bill, on Tuesday, while
only five voted against it. The legislation is
now slated for a "markup" to the full House of
Representatives. Thereafter, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee is expected to mark up a
separate version for the Senate.
With this will begin the final push to get U.S.
Congress to make a one-time exception for India
in the global nuclear-military order.
Significantly, one of the amendments approved by
HIRC emphasizes that the change in rules for the
45-member nuclear suppliers group (NSG) would
apply solely to India and no other country.
Another non-binding amendment says that the U.S.
should "secure India's full and active
participation in U.S. efforts to dissuade,
isolate and, if necessary, sanction and contain
Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass
destruction, including a nuclear weapons
capability (including the capability to enrich or
process nuclear materials) and the means to
deliver weapons of mass destruction."
Both supporters and opponents of the deal are
mobilizing themselves hard for the final thrust.
Among the supporters are administration
officials, a large number of Republican
legislators, and the powerful lobby of rich and
influential nonresident Indians settled in the
U.S., all backed by sections of the Indian media
who act as crusaders for the deal.
Already, a series of stories and articles
promoting the agreement, based on selective
back-room official briefings, have appeared in
India in a well-orchestrated campaign. President
Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and
now Vice President Dick Cheney have all thrown
their weight behind the U.S. and India Nuclear
Cooperation Promotion Act, 2006.
Opposing the deal are peace-minded scientists,
numerous nonproliferation experts, including some
being mobilized by the Arms Control Association,
and a cross-section of U.S. lawmakers, especially
Democrats, considered nonproliferation "hawks."
Opponents of the deal are reportedly trying to
make the relevant legislation conditional upon
India limiting the size of its atomic arsenal by
agreeing to freeze the production of
nuclear-weapons fuel (fissile material)
unilaterally, or through regional arrangements
involving China and Pakistan.
The Bush administration has been trying hard to
keep the "markup" drafts of the House and Senate
Committees strictly within the boundaries of the
understandings already reached with India in July
2005 and on March 2.
Many legislators, however, have been pressing for
language that stresses traditional U.S. concerns
about proliferation and strong support for the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which
India has not signed. Some are laying down other
criteria too, such as India's backing for a
fissile materials cutoff treaty (FMCT), now
before the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
However, none of these additional or extraneous
clauses is of an operative, binding, or
deal-breaking character. While their language may
not be palatable to India, it will probably
accept it so long as it does not impose an
additional constraint upon it. If further
amendments are moved, especially relating to the
FMCT, the Bush administration is likely to
mobilize votes to defeat them.
"The Indian government has so much to gain from
the agreement going through the U.S. Congress
that it should, logically, show a lot of
flexibility," says Anil Choudhury of the
Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace in
New Delhi. "Having an ineffectual, non-binding
line here or there won't make a difference."
However, a problem might arise if the U.S.
administration and Congress reach a compromise on
the sections dealing with the termination of the
agreement should India conduct a nuclear test or
violate its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
Currently, some furious bargaining is taking
place on these issues. There is only a narrow
time-window open for debating the deal and the
relevant legislation. Congress' calendar has only
15 working days in July. If it does not complete
its deliberations by the first week of August, it
is unlikely to do so before it moves toward
dissolution and fresh elections.
A strong, indeed overwhelming, bipartisan vote in
both Houses is considered a precondition for the
deal to go through. A weak vote would mean that
some congressmen would be reluctant to take up
the entire set of bills because they are
contentious and need a lot of discussion.
From the Indian government's point of view, there
is another risk, which may be linked to an effort
to avert a weak vote. To reach a broad,
bipartisan consensus, the administration may have
to agree to certain amendments to the original
text of the concerned bills.
If, in the process, the final text introduces
oversight conditions or other criteria not
included in the India-U.S. agreements reached so
far, that will make the Indian government
vulnerable to the charge that it has compromised
the nation's vital interests.
Already sensing an opportunity to corner the
government, the pro-Hindu, right-wing Bharatiya
Janata Party, which leads the opposition, has
hardened its stand against the Indo-U.S. deal.
Last week, it submitted a memorandum to India's
president, saying that it opposes it in its
present form and will not consider it binding
upon future governments.
The Singh government must look over its shoulder.
But it knows, like the pro-nuclear Indian elite,
that the price of making small compromises is
well worth paying for a deal that allows India to
keep nuclear weapons and import civilian nuclear
technology or materials, besides strengthening a
"strategic partnership" with Washington, with
which to jointly neutralize China and act as the
U.S.' most trusted partner in South and Southeast
Asia.
However, for purely domestic consumption, the
government presents the deal as a means of
righting a "historical wrong," namely the denial
of dual-use and sensitive technologies to India
for 30 years because of its first nuclear
explosion in 1974.
In reality, there has been very little denial,
except in the civilian-nuclear and missile
fields. Nor has India suffered significantly from
sanctions. It has only suffered a modest and
poorly performing nuclear power program. But now,
India can substantially expand nuclear power
generation and divert imported uranium to
military uses, critics say.
New Delhi: Upbeat about the endorsement on Tuesday of a Bill on nuclear
cooperation with
India by a key U.S. Congressional panel, senior officials here said a
"major hurdle" in the
implementation of the July 2005 nuclear deal had been crossed. A senior
official, however,
cautioned, "We are not quite there yet," as the Bill still has to be
passed by Congress and the
Senate. "But our estimation is that this will be the most difficult stage
- to ensure that the
proposed change of law contains no conditions that we cannot accept. And
we have managed
that." Barring a "killer" amendment on the floor of the House, the
official said the "operational
parts" of the Bill, in its current form, allow the U.S. President to waive
restrictions on nuclear
cooperation on the basis of a "template" that is consistent with India's
obligations under the
July 2005 joint statement and its subsequent plan for the separation of
civilian and military
nuclear facilities. The official conceded that the draft law also had
other elements, including a
statement by Congress on what the policies towards India should be. They
include getting
India to assist in isolating and even sanctioning Iran and to join the
Proliferation Security
Initiative. "Certainly we find the language in the Bill intrusive and even
offensive. But it is of little
consequence as far as we are concerned. Whatever their expectations, we
are not going to be
bound by anything that goes beyond the July 2005 statement and the
separation plan." These
"expectations" had been "tagged on" to the Bill to allow Congressmen feel
that their "pet
themes" have been included. That each of the amendments moved in the
International
Relations Committee of the House of Representatives was "quite handsomely
defeated" was
significant, the official said. The Bill sailed through with 37 votes to
5.
NEW DELHI, WASHINGTON, June 27:Warding off many deal-breaking amendments,
the
juggernaut of Indo-US nuclear cooperation rolled out of the House
International Relations
Committee in Washington tonight with solid support from both Republicans
and Democrats.
The strong bipartisan support in the House Committee tonight suggests the
political
momentum behind the historic but controversial nuclear deal signed by
Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush last July may now be
unstoppable. The
political action now shifts to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
which will consider the
bill on Thursday. After nearly 10 months of intense debate and many
hearings, 37 members,
accounting to more than two thirds of the 50-strong House International
Relations Committee
voted in favour of the legislation. Even some members who pushed
deal-breaking
amendments in the end voted for the bill. Despite the differences on the
nature of the nuclear
deal, they did not want to be seen as acting against India. To be sure,
the congenital
pessimists of the Indian establishment, who never take "yes" for an
answer, will worry about
the ungainly clothes in which the Congress has dressed up the nuclear
legislation. Extracting
its pound of flesh for agreeing to change three-decade old US nuclear laws
in favour of India,
the House Committee has added a long list of demands to the Bill submitted
by the
Administration a few months ago. These include calls on the Administration
to secure Indian
support to prevent Iranian proliferation and ensure imported uranium fuel
will not assist
India´s nuclear weapon programme. While the Congressional references to
Iran might irritate
India, New Delhi would be pleased at the identification of new criteria
which preclude nuclear
cooperation with Pakistan. One amendment approved in the House
consideration last night
insists that the change of nuclear rules in the 45-nation nuclear
suppliers group should apply
only to India and not for any other nation. In the Congress, you win some
and lose some.
The news report about adoption of 100 militancy
affected children from Jammu and Kashmir by an
NGO affiliated with the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak
Sangh (RSS) carries a mixed omen of both good and
bad. The good things first. The unfortunate
children, mostly said to be orphans, are being
given an opportunity to get education upto higher
secondary level which may make them fit for
higher education or any desired vocation. This
would have sounded like Beethoven's symphony to
the ears had it not been for the saffron
brigade's hidden agenda behind this gesture of
benevolence. The RSS is known to operate
politically in the grab of social work and
starting indoctrination camps for the very young,
invoking its hate-soaked Hindutava philosophy,
which may not be healthy for anyone, much less
the children from Jammu and Kashmir who have
already borne the brunt of violence and grown up
in an atmosphere of turmoil and insecurity,
forbidding them to think liberally and logically.
The act of charity may be appreciable if there
were no exterior motive or hidden agenda. Whether
the RSS contests this, the fact is that the
organization carries a baggage of history, which
may not sound too appeasing. The organization, in
the name of social work and cultural promotion
has been motivating youngsters to attend its run
schools and imparting its own curriculum with
distorted histories and untruths about India's
history or politics. The saffron brigades brush
with distortion of history during the BJP led NDA
rule at the Centre is already too well known. The
RSS goes a step further with its own curriculum
of social history, which preaches nothing but
hatred against most of Indian neighbours,
particularly Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
It raises the perverted ideology of Hindutava to
lofty heights and labels everybody who does not
believe in this philosophy as anti-nationals.
If the news report about adoption of these
children is to be believed, the army, through its
Sadbhavana policy, has also facilitated the
handing over of 57 children to this RSS
affiliated NGO. This indeed is a cause for
concern. The army, which is a visible face of the
state could have done better than associating
itself, at any level, with an NGO which has
political designs and ambitions to fulfill. The
needs of the orphaned children need to be
fulfilled and this is important. Though primarily
the task of the government, which has virtually
done nothing for the state's growing number of
orphans in the last sixteen years, the local NGOs
and those from outside without a political design
could have done a greater service. Unfortunately,
while not many local NGOs have come forward to
cater to the needs of the orphans, as these often
lack funds and infrastructure; the government
help is always wanting in this regard. Recently
when the Centre had embarked on the course of
sending a group of orphans, wrongly projected as
earthquake victims, outside the state for
studies, the move drew flak from various
quarters. One of the points of argument against
the move was that the children from the state
should be looked after in the state itself as
sending them outside would be an attempt to cut
them from their roots. This is a plausible logic.
And, though the basic education and basic needs
of the orphans - quake victims, militancy
affected or naturally orphaned children - should
be a priority, it is also important to maintain
that cultural and social link between the already
victimized children and their original
environment. Permitting NGOs with a bias to swoop
in on the state's orphans and fulfill their evil
designs by playing politics with the tragedy and
grief of the children will be even more criminal.
While the government needs to take steps in this
regard to ensure that the orphans are not doubly
victimized by any kind of petty politicking, this
is essentially a task for the civil society,
which can not only ensure safeguards against such
a practice but also come forward to generously
donate, in terms of money or time, for the cause
and needs of the victimized children.
After, over a year's waiting, another
breakthrough has been achieved across the LoC --
this time connecting Poonch with Rawlakote. Of
course, there was less hoopla about the opening
of this route than what had greeted the opening
of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road -- because the
latter is in much-talked about Kashmir and the
first in the series of new routes between the two
divided parts of Jammu and Kashmir -- this one is
certainly far more important in bringing nearer
to one another divided families and separated
friends. In the Kashmir valley the LoC has
followed, more or less, the ethnic faultline
separating the Kashmiris and the non-Kashmiris,
leaving not many families divided in that
process. Of course, quite a few Kashmiris did
migrate to Muzaffarabad after the cease-fire of
December 1948, when the going was still good.
But, in the case of the north-western border of
Jammu division, the situation was much different.
Here the LoC, just cut through the homes and
villages of thousands of families, arbitrarily
and cruelly separating, for over half-a-century,
near and dear ones closely linked to one another
through manifold ties, ethnic, emotional and
economic. Naturally, people on both sides of the
LoC here have greeted the re-opening of this
route with considerable enthusiasm and
expectation.
However, to enable this route live up to the
expectations of the local population, the
authorities on both sides of the LoC will have to
work out an arrangement with both sympathy and
imagination. They should bear in mind that,
although the volume of trade across this route
may never be very heavy, many more people will be
regularly availing of this route on a regular
basis and most of them are the common poor people
of this region. So, to enable them come and go
across the border frequently, the travel
procedure must be made simple and easy. The
authorities permitting travel on this route must
be there at Poonch and Rawlakote, so that
intending travellers do not have to travel to
Delhi or Islamabad for getting such a permission.
Besides, police verification should be made much
simpler, if not altogether done away with and the
entire process of securing a permit must not be
expensive and time-consuming. If the local
authorities can issue a certificate, in a week,
why should not a travel permit be available in
24, 48 hours? The buses should be just
comfortable, but need not be expensive and the
fair charged for this 29 km route should not be
exorbitant. However, endeavour should be made to
ply the buses daily for the common man.
Since this one is the third new route to be
opened in the last one year and the heavens have
not crashed, both New Delhi and Islamabad should
take courage in both hands and carry forward the
process by reopening similar routes between Jammu
and Sialkot and between Jourian and Bhimber and
Jhangan and Kotli. That will help, more than any
thing else, in bringing nearer to one another a
people arbitrarily divided into two. The opening
of these routes, allowing free movement of people
and goods and several other CBMs are no doubt
important in themselves. But these cannot be
taken as an end in themselves. In no case such
CBMs can be the substitute for a final settlement
of the Kashmir problem. These can no doubt push
forward the ongoing peace process and facilitate
the final settlement of the vexed Kashmir
problem. To remove any suspicions in this regard
it is important that the dialogue for a solution
of the basic problem moves in tandem with such
measures.
Pakistan’s financial constraints mean it can only maintain a strategy of
“minimum deterrence” in its nuclear weapons and missile programmes and
will
not enter an arms race with India or any other country, senior defence
planners said.
Responding to concerns over rising defence spending, they said Pakistan
had
learned from the experience of the Soviet Union, which many believe
collapsed because of its expensive arms race with the US. “We are only
going to maintain a minimum deterrence. We are aware of our resource
constraint,” a senior defence official said.
Recently announced plans to buy conventional arms worth $7bn-9bn over the
next five years have prompted analysts to warn of potential dangers for
the
Pakistani economy, which has only begun to recover in the past two years.
Military spending is set to rise 11 per cent to Rps250bn ($4.2bn, €3.3bn,
£2.3bn) a year.
According to the defence official, spending on nuclear weapons and
missiles
programmes has averaged only 2.3 per cent of total military spending over
the past 35 years.
Without elaborating on a target for the number of nuclear warheads and
missiles to be developed, he said “financial constraints” were built into
future plans and that “minimum deterrence rather than missile-for-missile
or bomb-for-bomb is our goal”.
Pakistan’s strategic weapons programme is focused mainly on India, which
introduced nuclear weapons to south Asia with its maiden tests in 1974.
Pakistan carried out its first tests in 1998. Another senior official,
responsible for the nuclear establishment, said the average cost of
missile
production was lower than that incurred by the US or the Soviet Union, as
“India and Pakistan are neighbours and we do not have to invest in systems
requiring additional flying time over thousands of miles”.
Pakistan’s nuclear programme has been under international scrutiny since
revelations in 2004 that Abdul Qadeer Khan, the country’s top nuclear
scientist, traded know-how and technology with Iran, Libya and North
Korea.
Hasan Askari Rizvi, a prominent analyst on defence affairs said: “As long
as you don’t have civilian scrutiny of military affairs, military spending
will remain controversial. Pakistan is run by the military; civilian
politicians are a subservient force.”
Power devolution to J&K and its regions is a
logical step forward within constitution
The Prime Minister's suggestion at the second
round table conference of power sharing among the
regions of Jammu and Kashmir was perhaps the
significant move for internal reform. Regional
imbalances and the Centre-State relations add to
complications prevailing in the state. Conscious
of this fact I pleaded for recognition of
regional identities with Nehru in my meeting with
him on April 14, 1952. I also reminded him that
"the greatest problem of the state is to maintain
cordial relations between its constituent units."
On the eve of Nehru-Abdullah agreement on
Centre-State regions in July 1952, called the
Delhi Agreement, I reiterated my demand for
regional autonomy. The Prime Minister announced a
press conference on July 24, 1952, in the
presence of Abdullah that "the state government
was considering regional autonomies within the
larger state."
Regional identities
Unfortunately the Nehru-Abdullah agreement was
opposed by the Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Hindu Maha
Sabha and Ram Rajya Parishad and their
ideological protégé the Jammu Praja Parishad
which neither recognized regional identities nor
a distinct identity of Kashmir. They started an
agitation for abrogation of Article 370 of the
Constitution, which guaranteed autonomy of the
state within India and withdrawal of commitment
to regional autonomy in November 1952.
Dr SP Mukerjee, founder president of the Bhartiya
Jana Sangh, who led the agitation was arrested on
entering the state. However, Mukerjee offered on
February 17, 1953, to withdraw the ongoing
agitation in Jammu and accept the Delhi Agreement
"if the principle of autonomy would apply to
Jammu as a whole and of course also to Ladakh and
Kashmir." This was precisely the assurance I got
from Nehru and Abdullah.
However Mukerjee's death triggered demonstrations
by Hindu parties in Jammu and some towns of north
India demanding "quatil Abdullah ko phansi do"
(hang Abdullah, the murderer). This caused a
great provocation among Kashmiri Muslims who
thought that they had fought against Pakistan, a
Muslim country to join India and now their leader
was called a murderer. This was one of the
factors that alienated Abdullah, who sought
options other than India, leading to his
dismissal and detention. Thus the first emotional
rupture between Kashmir and the rest of India was
caused.
State's autonomy
The Jana Sangh resumed its opposition to the
state's and regional autonomy, which added
further complications to the Kashmir problem. In
October 1968, Sheikh Abdullah, as leader of the
Plebiscite Front convened the J&K State People's
Convention to discuss the future of the state. It
was inaugurated by Jayaprakash Narayan. The
Sheikh accepted my plea to discuss the future of
regions ahead of the state's future.
Being the only member on the convention's
steering committee from Jammu, I was asked to
draft an internal constitution of the state that
pleaded for a five tier constitutional set up for
the state apart from regional autonomy. The
formula envisaged further devolution of power to
the districts, blocks and Panchayat.
Delegates of the convention, Kashmir valley's
most represented political gathering, unanimously
accepted the draft constitution. The Praja
Parishad and its patron the Jana Sangh rejected
the draft constitution as it would strengthen
disintegrating forces.
The state government-appointed Regional Autonomy
Committee (headed by me) was another defining
exercise. Studying various experiments in India
and abroad, I had discussions with top experts of
international law and social scientists of the
country. The draft report more precisely defined
powers at various tiers of the administration. It
also called for safeguarding interests of every
ethnic identity in the state and prescribed an
eight point formula for objective and equitable
allocation of funds at various levels. It may not
be the final word, but could be the basis for
further discussion.
BBC News, Peshawar
"There is nothing we cannot copy," grins Haji Munawar Afridi, an arms
trader at Darra Adam Khel near Pakistan's northern city of Peshawar.
"You bring us a Stinger missile and we will make you an imitation that
would be difficult to tell apart from the original."
It is not uncommon to come across such swagger from Pashtun tribesmen
populating the lawless tribal belt along the country's western border with
Afghanistan.
But it would perhaps be unwise to dismiss it as sheer bluster.
The hot, dry and dusty little town of Darra Adam Khel, barely a half-hour
drive from Peshawar, is one of the major suppliers of small arms to the
residents of the tribal belt.
From a distance, it looks no different from any suburban settlement in
North-West Frontier Province.
The main road meanders into a market where few outlets are larger than a
single room.
But the fare they flaunt is deadly: revolvers, automatic pistols, shotguns
and Kalashnikovs line the shelves of a typical shop.
Only five years ago, the list would also have had items such as
anti-personnel mines, sub-machine guns, small cannons and even rocket
launchers.
Betrayal
"This farcical war on terror has been hard on us," says Haji Afridi.
"The government has forced us to stop manufacturing heavy arms. It says
such weapons are used by terrorists."
For Darra tribesmen, the government's crackdown amounts to a betrayal of
sorts.
They say it was the government itself that transferred heavy weapons
technology to Darra in the late 1980s.
In April 1988, a major ammunition dump in Rawalpindi used for stockpiling
US and Saudi-funded arms for the Afghan fighters blew up.
The entire dump, called the Ojhri camp, was gutted in a day-long inferno
during which dozens of people were killed as unarmed missiles rained down
on citizens living in the heavily-populated areas around.
Tribesmen say the government sold all the destroyed ammunition as scrap to
arms dealers in Darra Adam Khel, a claim never quite denied by the
authorities.
Haji Afridi, who has been a member of parliament and is an active player
in
the bazaar's politics, say it was a windfall for local manufacturers.
"From those destroyed weapons, we overnight acquired the technology for
manufacturing mines, machine guns, small cannons and even multi-barrel
rocket launchers."
It made Darra a household name in neighbouring Afghanistan, where the
Afghans had descended into factional infighting after the Soviet
withdrawal.
Amid waning international interest in Afghanistan, Darra became the focal
point for various antagonists engaged in the country.
Within a couple of years, it had outgrown other tribal arms bazaars such
as
those in Bajaur and Jundollah.
But the so-called war on terror seems to have put paid to the glory
days.
Under threat
Analysts say these open arms markets were an invaluable asset for
Pakistani
policy-makers before 9/11.
Influential traders in Darra Adam Khel proudly talk about their role in
arming the Islamist fighters engaged in Kashmir.
Others recall the times when the Pakistani authorities would encourage
them
to supply more to one Afghan commander than the other.
This privileged status now seems to be under threat.
Senior military officials say open arms markets are contributing
significantly to the conflict between Taleban fighters and Pakistani
security forces in the tribal belt.
One official told the BBC News website that Pakistan's top army
intelligence unit had recommended the immediate closure of all arms
markets
in the tribal belt soon after 9/11.
For several years now, the government has been seen encouraging the arms
manufacturers in Darra to participate in international defence weapons
exhibitions held annually in major Pakistani cities.
The idea is to introduce the tribesmen to the international arms market
and
create new, above-board relationships that are more easily regulated.
That was perhaps the thought behind the government's decision to route all
export orders awarded to Darra arms manufacturers through the ministry of
defence.
The move backfired, however, as most of the tradesmen started accusing the
government of channelling international orders to their "favourites".
At present, only a handful of the 2,000-odd families involved in arms
manufacturing in Darra are supplying clients abroad.
The rest continue to focus on local markets.
"Punjabis love small arms and Punjab is our major market," says Haji
Afridi.
His claim is rubbished by intelligence officials, who say places such are
Darra are critical in sustaining major conflicts in the region.
Whatever the reality, it is clear that the government will have to come up
with a highly innovative and aggressive strategy to bring this lethal
trade
under control.
NEW DELHI: As the United States and India held yet another round of
intensive talks this week to flesh out the landmark nuclear deal they
signed in July, it became clear that they will both explore how far
they can push each other for concessions that would ease
Congressional approval. Both sides are bargaining hard as they test
each other's will to implement the agreement quickly. They are
mobilising their energies both in bilateral talks and through media
comments.
Under the deal, the US has offered a one-time exception for India in
the existing global non-proliferation regime so that India can keep
its nuclear weapons without signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). India is coming under increasing pressure to
demonstrate its loyalty to a larger "strategic partnership". Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh absented himself from an important meeting of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, (SCO) this week, largely
because the US views the SCO with suspicion and New Delhi does not
want to antagonise Washington.
The SCO includes China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan. Two of these, Russia and China are nuclear powers
while India and Pakistan, which have observer status at the SCO, are
aspiring nuclear power status having carried out nuclear tests in
1998.
Iran, which also has observer status and is accused by the West of
trying to develop nuclear weapons, sent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
to the Shanghai summit. While Indian nuclear hawks run a spirited
campaign against the deal as a "sellout" and a "coup" to defame
India, an impressive number of US Nobel laureates have issued a
strong statement against the agreement. In the nuclear poker between
Washington and New Delhi, two sets of issues have become critical for
settling the agreement and getting it ratified by the Congress.
One set pertains to 'technical', but important, questions: What kind
of safeguards must India accept on its civilian nuclear programme?
Assuming India is allowed to import nuclear fuel, what criteria will
determine how it is modified/processed, stored and/or reprocessed?
What guarantees can be there that it will not be diverted to military
uses? And under what terms the agreement can be terminated by either
side? The second issue concerns possible further nuclear testing by
India. Must it sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or a bilateral
agreement with the US not to conduct future tests? Or will a
voluntary moratorium of the kind declared in 1998 and reiterated in
the July 2005 accord is enough?
Ideally, the US would like India to offer something more than the
July assurance so that the deal can pass relatively smoothly through
the Congress: e.g. a legally binding commitment not to conduct a
nuclear test. But India flatly rejects this. It wants to keep the
moratorium voluntary. Such a moratorium can easily be violated. Under
existing US laws, a country that conducts a nuclear test
automatically attracts sanctions and forfeits civilian cooperation
with the US These issues will figure in the coming round of talks
next month. Both sides are proceeding with cautious optimism.
India's options here are extremely limited. For all practical
purposes, the Manmohan Singh government cannot amend or go beyond its
understanding of the nuclear deal recorded in the July 18 agreement,
which notifies as "civilian" only 14 out of its 22 power reactors
(under operation or construction). However, the Bush administration
may not find it possible to pilot the agreement through unless it is
seen to have extracted an additional assurance from India against
further tests.
New Delhi is under pressure from its nuclear super hawks to test a
hydrogen (thermonuclear or fusion) bomb so as to have a powerful
deterrent not just against Pakistan, but against the major nuclear
powers which have such weapons. It has conducted five tests of the
less powerful, but immensely destructive, fission bomb. But its May
1998 hydrogen bomb test is widely believed to have been a dud.
India, meanwhile, has opened yet another front in the negotiations.
It demands that it be allowed to build a stockpile of nuclear fuel
for each of its civilian reactors. This would guarantee that supply
of imported fuel would continue uninterrupted. After India's first
(1974) nuclear blast, the US suspended supply of lightly enriched
uranium to two of India's reactors at Tarapur. "Although the Indian
government cites this as the reason for demanding the 'strategic
stockpile' guarantee, the real reason may be more complex", says
Kamal Mitra Chenoy of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal
Nehru University, and a member of the Coalition for Nuclear
Disarmament and Peace. "India is desperately short of uranium. Its
sole operating uranium mine is running out of ore and there is public
opposition to opening new mines."
The current negotiations between the US and India are focused on what
is called the "123 agreement", pertaining to an amendment of Section
123 of the US atomic energy act dealing with nuclear exports. This is
likely to be "marked up" soon in the form of bills to be voted by
both Houses. This is expected to set the stage for passing the
substantive "nuclear cooperation" agreement inked last July. The
bill's passage may not be smooth. There is significant opposition to
the deal in the House of Representatives and from non-proliferation
experts. Indian-American groups as well as the Indian government's
lobbying agencies are working furiously to garner support for the
deal.
Opposition to the deal has now been joined by eminent scholars and
scientists in the US. As many as 37 Nobel laureates have urged the
Congress not to approve the deal "in its current form" because it is
a "formula for destroying American non-proliferation goals."
In a letter, supported by the pro-peace federation of American
scientists, they argue that "the agreement weakens the existing
non-proliferation regime without providing an acceptable substitute.
Presumably because I'm Jewish and write about
India, I received an invitation to a
'Jewish-Indian Reception' held earlier this year
at Columbia University in New York.
"Did you know that Jews have lived in India for
over 2000 years without any signs of
Anti-Semitism?" the invitation began. "Did you
know that annual bi-lateral trade between India
and Israel reached $2.7 billion this past year?
Interested in learning more about the historical,
cultural, and political connections and
similarities between Jewish and Indian Americans?
Join us for a night of great speakers ..."
These speakers included the Indian
Consul-General, the Israeli Deputy-Consul General
and Congressman Gary Ackerman. The event was
organised by a pro-Israel student group called
LionPAC, with support from the South Asian Law
Students Association, among others. It offers a
microcosm of the burgeoning India-Israel-US axis,
a phenomenon supporters of the Palestinian cause
need to be more aware of.
Let's start with Gary Ackerman, the ranking
Democrat on the House International Relations
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. A
loud voice for Israel on Capitol Hill, Ackerman's
career "highlights", according to his website,
include "authoring legislation that required
President Bush to impose sanctions against the
Palestinian Authority". He championed the Israeli
military offensive of spring 2002, and denounced
the ICJ finding on the wall as "shameful".
Ackerman is also a Congressional point-man for
the "India lobby". A former chairman of the
Congressional Caucus on India and Indian
Americans, he unequivocally backs India on
Kashmir, lays all the blame for the conflict
there on Pakistan and pushes for increased
US-India arms trade and military collaboration.
In 2003, Ackerman helped organise the first-ever
joint Capitol Hill forum between AIPAC and AJC,
on the one side, and the newly formed US Indian
Political Action Committee, on the other.
Ackerman stressed the two countries' common
concerns: Israel, he said, was "surrounded by 120
million Muslims" while " India has 120 million
Muslims [within]". Last year, he was the leading
Democratic sponsor of Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh's address to a joint session of
Congress.
Then there's LionPAC, the main pro-Israel group
at Columbia. A couple of years ago LionPAC
members played a key role in the documentary film
'Conduct Unbecoming', in which it was alleged
that Jews and supporters of Israel at Columbia
faced systematic intimidation and bias, and which
slandered a number of Columbia professors as
anti-semites. The ensuing uproar led the
university to appoint a committee of
investigation, which, in due course, dismissed
the film's allegations and reprimanded the
methods used by the film-makers. LionPAC is
clearly in need of campus allies and the
reception was an attempt to seek friends among
just about the only people of colour at Columbia
for whom Israel is not anathema - career-minded
students of Indian origin.
According to the Columbia Spectator, "Around 200
people, mostly undergraduate and graduate
students," attended the reception. The speakers
"highlighted... the similarities between Jewish
and Indian values and culture, and the shared
efforts by the US, India, and Israel to combat
terrorism."
Note how "values", "cultures", states and
geo-politics are interwoven here. The existence
of coherent "Indian" or "Jewish" value systems or
cultures is casually assumed, and in each case
casually attached to a state. These two entities
are then somehow said to have "similarities" and
the whole package is tied up with the help of the
USA and the "war on terror".
Back in the days of the freedom struggle, Gandhi
and the Indian National Congress opposed the
creation of a 'Jewish National Home' in
Palestine. Nehru insightfully analysed the
relationship between Zionism, Arab Nationalism
and British imperialism. Newly-independent India
voted against the UN Palestine partition plan in
1947 and the admission of Israel to the UN in
1949. As a leading force in the Non-Aligned
Movement, India backed anti-colonial movements in
the middle-east and enjoyed close links with
Nasser's Egypt.
Nonetheless, a clandestine relationship with
Israel developed, thanks in part to Mossad, which
acted as an unofficial - and deniable -
diplomatic courier. During the 1971 war with
Pakistan, Israel supplied India with mortars and
ammunition. In the following years, intelligence
collaboration was established, with an exchange
of information about Pakistan, which at that time
was building alliances with Arab regimes in the
Middle East. In the late 1980s, Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi, keen on improving relations with
the US, began the process of upgrading ties with
Israel. As the Indian press put it at the time,
"The road to Washington passes through Tel Aviv."
Since full diplomatic relations were established
in 1992, military and commercial links have grown
exponentially. The process escalated under the
right-wing BJP-led government of 1998-2004. The
BJP is the political wing of the Sangh Parivar,
the family of organisations dedicated to the
ideology of Hindutva (roughly, 'Hinduness'): an
authoritarian, Hindu supremacist, virulently
anti-Muslim movement. Its founders were admirers
of Hitler and Mussolini, but it also has a long
history of support for Israel and Zionism.
In many respects, Hindutva and Zionism are
natural bedfellows. Both depict the entities they
claim to represent as simultaneously national and
religious. Both claim to be the sole authentic
spokespersons for these entities (Hindu and
Jewish). Both share an ambivalent (to say the
least) historic relationship with British
colonialism. Both appeal to an affluent diaspora.
And, most importantly at the moment, both share a
designated enemy ('Muslim terrorism').
During the Kargil War of 1999 (in which India and
Pakistani troops clashed in Kashmir), Israel
supplied India, at 24 hours notice, with high
altitude surveillance vehicles and laser-guided
systems. In the wake of 9/11, the alliance was
deepened, with Hindutva and Zionist world-views
dovetailing snugly with the US war on terror. In
May 2003, India's then National Security Adviser
Brajesh Misra spelled out the strategy in an
address to the American Jewish Congress, in which
he pleaded for a "Tel Aviv-New Delhi-Washington"
axis. A few months later, Ariel Sharon arrived in
India as an hounoured guest.
When a Congress-led coalition replaced the BJP
after the 2004 elections, its left supporters
urged it to abandon the previous government's
foreign policy, notably the embrace of Israel and
the USA. They have been ignored. The government
has signed deals with the US for military
purchases, joint military exercises and most
recently, in the course of Bush's state visit,
nuclear collaboration. In February, India
abandoned Iran at the IAEA, voting with the US to
refer the country - usually considered one of
India's major strategic allies - to the Security
Council.
At the same time, the link with Israel has been
consolidated. In the course of 2005, India's
Ministers of Science and Technology, Commerce and
Industry, and Agriculture and Food all visited
Israel, holding high-level meetings with
political and business leaders. In February 2006,
Israel's National Security Council Chairman Giora
Eiland was welcomed in Delhi.
Israel is now the second largest supplier of arms
to India (after Russia). It provides India with
missile radar, border monitoring equipment, night
vision devices, the new Phalcon reconnaissance
aircraft, among other items. India, in turn, is
the biggest purchaser of high-tech Israeli
weapons and accounts for almost half of Israel's
arms exports. In addition, several thousand
Indian soldiers have received "anti-insurgency
training" in Israel.
In a speech at Tel Aviv University in March, the
Indian Ambassador described India and Israel as
"heirs to great and ancient civilizations" which
"emerged from foreign domination as independent
nations around the middle of the last century"
and whose "historical interaction... is vividly
embodied in the presence of Judaism in India for
over 1600 years."
While the ambassador was speaking in Tel Aviv,
the Jewish-Indian reception was being held in New
York, knitting together the same alliance and
using the same themes. The Indian presence in the
USA is highly diverse (many are Muslims), but an
affluent, suburban constituency within it
identifies with the Indian right and more broadly
with Indian elite aspirations for economic and
military status. Many see American Jews as the
"model minority" and seek to emulate their
political clout. A number have openly declared
their intention of constructing a lobby similar
to the Israel lobby. The attraction has been
reciprocal. The American Jewish Committee is soon
to open an office in New Delhi.
It's ironic that Indian Jews should find
themselves used as a lynch-pin in this marriage
of convenience. Of course, India's population is
so diverse, its diaspora so far flung, that it
can claim some kind of relationship with almost
anyone anywhere. India's small Jewish communities
were themselves highly diverse - in language,
ritual, origin - but today they number merely
6000 (out of a population of one billion). During
the 50s and 60s, most Indian Jews went to Israel,
many to the US. The motives were mainly economic.
The niche they had occupied collapsed after
independence.
Although there's no history of anti-semitism in
India, it's striking that one of the country's
best-selling books is Mein Kampf, openly
available at bookshops, stationers and street
stalls. One young man pursuing a degree in
business administration explained that the book
was popular because it was "an excellent
management text". Ironically, the aspirant
bourgeoisie buying Mein Kampf is precisely that
section of Indian society most keen on the
alliance with Israel. The mentality is summed up
by a catchphrase currently favoured by India's
foreign policy-makers: "Non-alignment is for
losers."
Manmohan Singh described India's deal with the US
and its vote against Iran as acts of "enlightened
self-interest". The same excuse is applied to the
link with Israel. The reality is that India's
betrayal of the Palestinians, however profitable
for a few, is not remotely in the interest of the
vast Indian majority. It certainly diminishes
India's status and influence in the developing
world. What price favor in Washington?
New Delhi and Islamabad have to change their
mindsets towards each other for promotion of
peaceful relations
Two and a half years have elapsed since Pakistan
and India have been busy trying to improve mutual
ties. There is certainly a noticeable relaxation
in atmospherics created by emotive governmental
pronouncements. But insofar as the hard issues
that require to be settled are concerned, there
have been absolutely no progress, not even on
supposedly minor ones. Things on the ground are
exactly as they were in January 2004.
The occasion for this comment is two statements
made by two important officials: Mr MK Naraynan,
India's National Security Advisor, has said that
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh might not
visit Pakistan this year. He gave the reason that
terrorism emanating from Pakistan is causing
trouble in India and unless Pakistan does
something significant to stop this, India's Prime
Minister can scarcely be expected to visit
Pakistan. After all he wants to visit to do
something. If he cannot achieve solid results -
on any of the eight recognised disputes - what
will be the point of his visit.
The second statement was made by Chairman of
Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee of the Pakistan
armed forces. Addressing senior military officers
in Islamabad recently that the Confidence
Building Measures (CBMs) which are being agreed
to, do not amount too much; the real issue is
Kashmir and unless India is ready to do something
to move the dialogue forward, the entire effort
is futile.
On the Pakistan side there has been a division of
work. The President has been airing, from time to
time, various ideas on a Kashmir solution. Some
of them were based on American experts' thinking
with inputs from both India and Pakistan. And he
is still at it. But he took good care of making
his Prime Minister say, sotto voce, that unless
Kashmir is solved the dialogue cannot really
yield results. This time round the President has
made the second senior most General to articulate
the same idea.
It is time to judge. The two governments have so
far given their peoples a number of CBMs to play
with. To repeat, there has been no real progress.
The situation needs to be faced both by Pakistan
and India with realism. Political parties too
have to realise that further negotiations within
this framework will be fruitless.
Although one has always stood for an
Indo-Pakistan friendship based on a thorough
going reconciliation covering the entire South
Asia, hard realities of inter-state situation
makes one pessimistic. Let's try and move the
compass. Two solid and antagonist state
apparatuses, with powerful vested interest in
Indo-Pak hostility, have grown up. Each has
conflicting core issues or botttomlines. While
each pursues power, vis-à-vis each other, the
chances of the two security establishments
settling down to a friendly co-existence are next
to nil. Substance of two national efforts
involves collision.
A real change requires qualitatively different
national aims. Unless the main purpose of
national endeavour in both countries changes
achieving easily verifiable improvements in the
way the two people live and work in villages,
towns and city mohallahs, nothing substantial
will change. But if the quality of politics
changes in both countries, the sky will be the
limit to their cooperation and coming together.
But that sounds utopian. But that is the only way
forward. Perhaps reasons should be adduced to why
current realism will end in a blind alley.
One reason is that no one has realised the
mischief that the nuclear weapons are playing.
The two governments do not know, or acknowledge,
that two antagonistic deterrents sitting cheek by
jowl cannot long accept any nuclear restraint
regime. Look, there have three rounds of
negotiations by the Foreign Secretaries to
roughhew even an MOU on the restraint subject,
let alone a proper treaty.
Fact is the two countries are engaged in a fierce
and comprehensive arms race. The race is on to
increase and improve conventional and nuclear
weapons and their delivery vehicles. Why else are
constant missile experiments being made? Second
fact is neither establishment can acquiesce in
the other's Bomb; it simply must not be. A
factoid is that the only likely use of nuclear
weapons by India or Pakistan can only be on each
other's territory. All else is fluff. So long as
the two governments evade the issue and cover it
up with deceptive words, things would not move
forward.
Kashmir is moving into this league. India's
bottomline is that its sovereignty over the
Kashmir valley remains unalloyed. Few are
deceived by beautiful words. Pakistan has
actually agreed to this but its backwoodsmen
apparently inside the Army would seem to demand
something more than mere words, CBMs buses and
more travel etc.
They want some role across the Line of Control
whether or not they would extend similar
facilities to Indian forces on this side of the
Line of Control. It is an emotive issue. Indians
cannot conceive of a future without the Kashmir
Valley being safely inside India. Pakistani
hardliners apparently cannot conceive a future
without the Kashmir Valley becoming free of
Indian control.
All one can say is that new thinking is needed.
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