Crisis India-Pakistan:
Achtergrondinformatie, analyse en nieuws
uit de Indiase, Pakistaanse en internationale media.

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The Dallas Morning News, June 30, 2006

U.S. approves sale of F-16s to Pakistan:

State Department's OK could keep up to 4,000 employed at Lockheed

Richard Whittle

Jun. 30--WASHINGTON -- A long-awaited sale of F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan that could keep up to 4,000 workers at Lockheed Martin Corp.'s Fort Worth plant producing aircraft into 2011 has won State Department approval.
The department confirmed Thursday that it had decided to sell Pakistan up to 36 new F-16s and 26 others the U.S. Air Force will retire.
Lockheed on Thursday officially notified Congress, which technically has 30 days to veto the deal. But Congress has never exercised that power on a major arms sale.
The $5 billion deal also includes upgrades for Pakistan's existing fleet of 34 older F-16s, various munitions for the planes and other support, the State Department said.
Critics of Pakistan's military government, which exploded a nuclear device in 1998, have opposed selling Islamabad advanced aircraft. The Bush administration, however, has courted Pakistan as a key ally in the war on terrorism and in the hunt for Osama bin Laden.
"The sale is part of a larger effort to broaden our strategic partnership with Pakistan and advance our national security and foreign policy interests in Asia," the State Department said in a written statement.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice offered F-16s to both Pakistan and its longtime rival India during a visit to the region in March 2005.
"I fully support the sale of F-16s to Pakistan, our strong ally in the war on terror," Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Texas, said in a statement. "This sale is estimated to generate $1.6 billion and sustain more than 1,240 jobs in Texas over a five-year period."
The precise terms of the F-16 sale to Pakistan, which will get new F-16 Block 50/52 C/Ds and 26 used F-16 A/Bs, haven't been negotiated between Lockheed and Islamabad.
Lockheed officials have been eagerly awaiting State Department approval of the deal for months so they could negotiate a contract in time to allow production to begin by November 2009.
"Timing is everything," said Joseph Cirincione, an expert on arms proliferation with the Center for American Progress, a liberal think tank. "It's no coincidence that this announcement comes as Congress is readying approval of the U.S.-India nuclear deal.
"It's not exactly a payoff, but you might consider it a thank-you to Pakistan for keeping quiet" about the nuclear agreement.
President Bush agreed in March to let India buy nuclear reactors and fuel in return for New Delhi allowing international inspections of part of its nuclear industry.
If Pakistan takes all 36 new F-16s being offered, the deal would extend F-16 production in Fort Worth until June 2011.
The company currently is producing F-16s for Poland and Chile and has a backlog of 144 planes on order.
Lockheed's goal is to keep the line open until at least 2012, when the company is to begin major production of its new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, said spokesman Joseph Stout.
"The big order we're pursuing is in India, where they have a stated requirement for 126 aircraft," Mr. Stout said.

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Inter Press Service, June 29, 2006

Indo-US Nuclear Deal Clears First Hurdle

by Praful Bidwai

With the House International Relations Committee (HIRC) of the United States House of Representatives gaining overwhelming bipartisan support for a draft bill to allow resumption of civilian nuclear commerce between India and the U.S., the path is clearer for the controversial nuclear deal signed a year ago between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Under the Bush-Singh agreement, India would be allowed to keep its nuclear weapons, but must separate its civilian nuclear facilities from military ones and agree to place the former under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
No less than 37 members of the 50-member HIRC voted in favor of the bill, on Tuesday, while only five voted against it. The legislation is now slated for a "markup" to the full House of Representatives. Thereafter, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is expected to mark up a separate version for the Senate.
With this will begin the final push to get U.S. Congress to make a one-time exception for India in the global nuclear-military order.
Significantly, one of the amendments approved by HIRC emphasizes that the change in rules for the 45-member nuclear suppliers group (NSG) would apply solely to India and no other country. Another non-binding amendment says that the U.S. should "secure India's full and active participation in U.S. efforts to dissuade, isolate and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability (including the capability to enrich or process nuclear materials) and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction."
Both supporters and opponents of the deal are mobilizing themselves hard for the final thrust. Among the supporters are administration officials, a large number of Republican legislators, and the powerful lobby of rich and influential nonresident Indians settled in the U.S., all backed by sections of the Indian media who act as crusaders for the deal.
Already, a series of stories and articles promoting the agreement, based on selective back-room official briefings, have appeared in India in a well-orchestrated campaign. President Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and now Vice President Dick Cheney have all thrown their weight behind the U.S. and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act, 2006.
Opposing the deal are peace-minded scientists, numerous nonproliferation experts, including some being mobilized by the Arms Control Association, and a cross-section of U.S. lawmakers, especially Democrats, considered nonproliferation "hawks." Opponents of the deal are reportedly trying to make the relevant legislation conditional upon India limiting the size of its atomic arsenal by agreeing to freeze the production of nuclear-weapons fuel (fissile material) unilaterally, or through regional arrangements involving China and Pakistan.
The Bush administration has been trying hard to keep the "markup" drafts of the House and Senate Committees strictly within the boundaries of the understandings already reached with India in July 2005 and on March 2.
Many legislators, however, have been pressing for language that stresses traditional U.S. concerns about proliferation and strong support for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which India has not signed. Some are laying down other criteria too, such as India's backing for a fissile materials cutoff treaty (FMCT), now before the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. However, none of these additional or extraneous clauses is of an operative, binding, or deal-breaking character. While their language may not be palatable to India, it will probably accept it so long as it does not impose an additional constraint upon it. If further amendments are moved, especially relating to the FMCT, the Bush administration is likely to mobilize votes to defeat them.
"The Indian government has so much to gain from the agreement going through the U.S. Congress that it should, logically, show a lot of flexibility," says Anil Choudhury of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace in New Delhi. "Having an ineffectual, non-binding line here or there won't make a difference." However, a problem might arise if the U.S. administration and Congress reach a compromise on the sections dealing with the termination of the agreement should India conduct a nuclear test or violate its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Currently, some furious bargaining is taking place on these issues. There is only a narrow time-window open for debating the deal and the relevant legislation. Congress' calendar has only 15 working days in July. If it does not complete its deliberations by the first week of August, it is unlikely to do so before it moves toward dissolution and fresh elections.
A strong, indeed overwhelming, bipartisan vote in both Houses is considered a precondition for the deal to go through. A weak vote would mean that some congressmen would be reluctant to take up the entire set of bills because they are contentious and need a lot of discussion.
From the Indian government's point of view, there is another risk, which may be linked to an effort to avert a weak vote. To reach a broad, bipartisan consensus, the administration may have to agree to certain amendments to the original text of the concerned bills.
If, in the process, the final text introduces oversight conditions or other criteria not included in the India-U.S. agreements reached so far, that will make the Indian government vulnerable to the charge that it has compromised the nation's vital interests.
Already sensing an opportunity to corner the government, the pro-Hindu, right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party, which leads the opposition, has hardened its stand against the Indo-U.S. deal. Last week, it submitted a memorandum to India's president, saying that it opposes it in its present form and will not consider it binding upon future governments.
The Singh government must look over its shoulder. But it knows, like the pro-nuclear Indian elite, that the price of making small compromises is well worth paying for a deal that allows India to keep nuclear weapons and import civilian nuclear technology or materials, besides strengthening a "strategic partnership" with Washington, with which to jointly neutralize China and act as the U.S.' most trusted partner in South and Southeast Asia.
However, for purely domestic consumption, the government presents the deal as a means of righting a "historical wrong," namely the denial of dual-use and sensitive technologies to India for 30 years because of its first nuclear explosion in 1974.
In reality, there has been very little denial, except in the civilian-nuclear and missile fields. Nor has India suffered significantly from sanctions. It has only suffered a modest and poorly performing nuclear power program. But now, India can substantially expand nuclear power generation and divert imported uranium to military uses, critics say.

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The Hindu, June 29, 2006

Nuclear deal: 'major hurdle' crossed

New Delhi: Upbeat about the endorsement on Tuesday of a Bill on nuclear cooperation with India by a key U.S. Congressional panel, senior officials here said a "major hurdle" in the implementation of the July 2005 nuclear deal had been crossed. A senior official, however, cautioned, "We are not quite there yet," as the Bill still has to be passed by Congress and the Senate. "But our estimation is that this will be the most difficult stage - to ensure that the proposed change of law contains no conditions that we cannot accept. And we have managed that." Barring a "killer" amendment on the floor of the House, the official said the "operational parts" of the Bill, in its current form, allow the U.S. President to waive restrictions on nuclear cooperation on the basis of a "template" that is consistent with India's obligations under the July 2005 joint statement and its subsequent plan for the separation of civilian and military nuclear facilities. The official conceded that the draft law also had other elements, including a statement by Congress on what the policies towards India should be. They include getting India to assist in isolating and even sanctioning Iran and to join the Proliferation Security Initiative. "Certainly we find the language in the Bill intrusive and even offensive. But it is of little consequence as far as we are concerned. Whatever their expectations, we are not going to be bound by anything that goes beyond the July 2005 statement and the separation plan." These "expectations" had been "tagged on" to the Bill to allow Congressmen feel that their "pet themes" have been included. That each of the amendments moved in the International Relations Committee of the House of Representatives was "quite handsomely defeated" was significant, the official said. The Bill sailed through with 37 votes to 5.

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Indian Express, June 28, 2006

First vote won hands down, nuclear deal gathers new momentum up Capitol Hill

NEW DELHI, WASHINGTON, June 27:Warding off many deal-breaking amendments, the juggernaut of Indo-US nuclear cooperation rolled out of the House International Relations Committee in Washington tonight with solid support from both Republicans and Democrats. The strong bipartisan support in the House Committee tonight suggests the political momentum behind the historic but controversial nuclear deal signed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush last July may now be unstoppable. The political action now shifts to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which will consider the bill on Thursday. After nearly 10 months of intense debate and many hearings, 37 members, accounting to more than two thirds of the 50-strong House International Relations Committee voted in favour of the legislation. Even some members who pushed deal-breaking amendments in the end voted for the bill. Despite the differences on the nature of the nuclear deal, they did not want to be seen as acting against India. To be sure, the congenital pessimists of the Indian establishment, who never take "yes" for an answer, will worry about the ungainly clothes in which the Congress has dressed up the nuclear legislation. Extracting its pound of flesh for agreeing to change three-decade old US nuclear laws in favour of India, the House Committee has added a long list of demands to the Bill submitted by the Administration a few months ago. These include calls on the Administration to secure Indian support to prevent Iranian proliferation and ensure imported uranium fuel will not assist India´s nuclear weapon programme. While the Congressional references to Iran might irritate India, New Delhi would be pleased at the identification of new criteria which preclude nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. One amendment approved in the House consideration last night insists that the change of nuclear rules in the 45-nation nuclear suppliers group should apply only to India and not for any other nation. In the Congress, you win some and lose some.

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Kashmir Times, June 27, 2006

Benevolence with bias:
Adoption of orphans by RSS outfit fraught with danger

The news report about adoption of 100 militancy affected children from Jammu and Kashmir by an NGO affiliated with the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh (RSS) carries a mixed omen of both good and bad. The good things first. The unfortunate children, mostly said to be orphans, are being given an opportunity to get education upto higher secondary level which may make them fit for higher education or any desired vocation. This would have sounded like Beethoven's symphony to the ears had it not been for the saffron brigade's hidden agenda behind this gesture of benevolence. The RSS is known to operate politically in the grab of social work and starting indoctrination camps for the very young, invoking its hate-soaked Hindutava philosophy, which may not be healthy for anyone, much less the children from Jammu and Kashmir who have already borne the brunt of violence and grown up in an atmosphere of turmoil and insecurity, forbidding them to think liberally and logically. The act of charity may be appreciable if there were no exterior motive or hidden agenda. Whether the RSS contests this, the fact is that the organization carries a baggage of history, which may not sound too appeasing. The organization, in the name of social work and cultural promotion has been motivating youngsters to attend its run schools and imparting its own curriculum with distorted histories and untruths about India's history or politics. The saffron brigades brush with distortion of history during the BJP led NDA rule at the Centre is already too well known. The RSS goes a step further with its own curriculum of social history, which preaches nothing but hatred against most of Indian neighbours, particularly Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. It raises the perverted ideology of Hindutava to lofty heights and labels everybody who does not believe in this philosophy as anti-nationals. If the news report about adoption of these children is to be believed, the army, through its Sadbhavana policy, has also facilitated the handing over of 57 children to this RSS affiliated NGO. This indeed is a cause for concern. The army, which is a visible face of the state could have done better than associating itself, at any level, with an NGO which has political designs and ambitions to fulfill. The needs of the orphaned children need to be fulfilled and this is important. Though primarily the task of the government, which has virtually done nothing for the state's growing number of orphans in the last sixteen years, the local NGOs and those from outside without a political design could have done a greater service. Unfortunately, while not many local NGOs have come forward to cater to the needs of the orphans, as these often lack funds and infrastructure; the government help is always wanting in this regard. Recently when the Centre had embarked on the course of sending a group of orphans, wrongly projected as earthquake victims, outside the state for studies, the move drew flak from various quarters. One of the points of argument against the move was that the children from the state should be looked after in the state itself as sending them outside would be an attempt to cut them from their roots. This is a plausible logic. And, though the basic education and basic needs of the orphans - quake victims, militancy affected or naturally orphaned children - should be a priority, it is also important to maintain that cultural and social link between the already victimized children and their original environment. Permitting NGOs with a bias to swoop in on the state's orphans and fulfill their evil designs by playing politics with the tragedy and grief of the children will be even more criminal. While the government needs to take steps in this regard to ensure that the orphans are not doubly victimized by any kind of petty politicking, this is essentially a task for the civil society, which can not only ensure safeguards against such a practice but also come forward to generously donate, in terms of money or time, for the cause and needs of the victimized children.

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Kashmir Times, June 22, 2006

Bridging the gulf: Re-open other routes, simplify travel procedure

Editorial

After, over a year's waiting, another breakthrough has been achieved across the LoC -- this time connecting Poonch with Rawlakote. Of course, there was less hoopla about the opening of this route than what had greeted the opening of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road -- because the latter is in much-talked about Kashmir and the first in the series of new routes between the two divided parts of Jammu and Kashmir -- this one is certainly far more important in bringing nearer to one another divided families and separated friends. In the Kashmir valley the LoC has followed, more or less, the ethnic faultline separating the Kashmiris and the non-Kashmiris, leaving not many families divided in that process. Of course, quite a few Kashmiris did migrate to Muzaffarabad after the cease-fire of December 1948, when the going was still good. But, in the case of the north-western border of Jammu division, the situation was much different. Here the LoC, just cut through the homes and villages of thousands of families, arbitrarily and cruelly separating, for over half-a-century, near and dear ones closely linked to one another through manifold ties, ethnic, emotional and economic. Naturally, people on both sides of the LoC here have greeted the re-opening of this route with considerable enthusiasm and expectation.
However, to enable this route live up to the expectations of the local population, the authorities on both sides of the LoC will have to work out an arrangement with both sympathy and imagination. They should bear in mind that, although the volume of trade across this route may never be very heavy, many more people will be regularly availing of this route on a regular basis and most of them are the common poor people of this region. So, to enable them come and go across the border frequently, the travel procedure must be made simple and easy. The authorities permitting travel on this route must be there at Poonch and Rawlakote, so that intending travellers do not have to travel to Delhi or Islamabad for getting such a permission. Besides, police verification should be made much simpler, if not altogether done away with and the entire process of securing a permit must not be expensive and time-consuming. If the local authorities can issue a certificate, in a week, why should not a travel permit be available in 24, 48 hours? The buses should be just comfortable, but need not be expensive and the fair charged for this 29 km route should not be exorbitant. However, endeavour should be made to ply the buses daily for the common man. Since this one is the third new route to be opened in the last one year and the heavens have not crashed, both New Delhi and Islamabad should take courage in both hands and carry forward the process by reopening similar routes between Jammu and Sialkot and between Jourian and Bhimber and Jhangan and Kotli. That will help, more than any thing else, in bringing nearer to one another a people arbitrarily divided into two. The opening of these routes, allowing free movement of people and goods and several other CBMs are no doubt important in themselves. But these cannot be taken as an end in themselves. In no case such CBMs can be the substitute for a final settlement of the Kashmir problem. These can no doubt push forward the ongoing peace process and facilitate the final settlement of the vexed Kashmir problem. To remove any suspicions in this regard it is important that the dialogue for a solution of the basic problem moves in tandem with such measures.

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Financial Times, June 22, 2006

Pakistan ‘cannot afford nuclear arms race with India’

By Farhan Bokhari in Islamabad

Pakistan’s financial constraints mean it can only maintain a strategy of “minimum deterrence” in its nuclear weapons and missile programmes and will not enter an arms race with India or any other country, senior defence planners said.
Responding to concerns over rising defence spending, they said Pakistan had learned from the experience of the Soviet Union, which many believe collapsed because of its expensive arms race with the US. “We are only going to maintain a minimum deterrence. We are aware of our resource constraint,” a senior defence official said.
Recently announced plans to buy conventional arms worth $7bn-9bn over the next five years have prompted analysts to warn of potential dangers for the Pakistani economy, which has only begun to recover in the past two years. Military spending is set to rise 11 per cent to Rps250bn ($4.2bn, €3.3bn, £2.3bn) a year.
According to the defence official, spending on nuclear weapons and missiles programmes has averaged only 2.3 per cent of total military spending over the past 35 years.
Without elaborating on a target for the number of nuclear warheads and missiles to be developed, he said “financial constraints” were built into future plans and that “minimum deterrence rather than missile-for-missile or bomb-for-bomb is our goal”.
Pakistan’s strategic weapons programme is focused mainly on India, which introduced nuclear weapons to south Asia with its maiden tests in 1974. Pakistan carried out its first tests in 1998. Another senior official, responsible for the nuclear establishment, said the average cost of missile production was lower than that incurred by the US or the Soviet Union, as “India and Pakistan are neighbours and we do not have to invest in systems requiring additional flying time over thousands of miles”.
Pakistan’s nuclear programme has been under international scrutiny since revelations in 2004 that Abdul Qadeer Khan, the country’s top nuclear scientist, traded know-how and technology with Iran, Libya and North Korea.
Hasan Askari Rizvi, a prominent analyst on defence affairs said: “As long as you don’t have civilian scrutiny of military affairs, military spending will remain controversial. Pakistan is run by the military; civilian politicians are a subservient force.”

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Deccan Herald, June 21, 2006

Challenges in Kashmir

By Balraj Puri

Power devolution to J&K and its regions is a logical step forward within constitution

The Prime Minister's suggestion at the second round table conference of power sharing among the regions of Jammu and Kashmir was perhaps the significant move for internal reform. Regional imbalances and the Centre-State relations add to complications prevailing in the state. Conscious of this fact I pleaded for recognition of regional identities with Nehru in my meeting with him on April 14, 1952. I also reminded him that "the greatest problem of the state is to maintain cordial relations between its constituent units."
On the eve of Nehru-Abdullah agreement on Centre-State regions in July 1952, called the Delhi Agreement, I reiterated my demand for regional autonomy. The Prime Minister announced a press conference on July 24, 1952, in the presence of Abdullah that "the state government was considering regional autonomies within the larger state."

Regional identities

Unfortunately the Nehru-Abdullah agreement was opposed by the Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Hindu Maha Sabha and Ram Rajya Parishad and their ideological protégé the Jammu Praja Parishad which neither recognized regional identities nor a distinct identity of Kashmir. They started an agitation for abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution, which guaranteed autonomy of the state within India and withdrawal of commitment to regional autonomy in November 1952.
Dr SP Mukerjee, founder president of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh, who led the agitation was arrested on entering the state. However, Mukerjee offered on February 17, 1953, to withdraw the ongoing agitation in Jammu and accept the Delhi Agreement "if the principle of autonomy would apply to Jammu as a whole and of course also to Ladakh and Kashmir." This was precisely the assurance I got from Nehru and Abdullah.
However Mukerjee's death triggered demonstrations by Hindu parties in Jammu and some towns of north India demanding "quatil Abdullah ko phansi do" (hang Abdullah, the murderer). This caused a great provocation among Kashmiri Muslims who thought that they had fought against Pakistan, a Muslim country to join India and now their leader was called a murderer. This was one of the factors that alienated Abdullah, who sought options other than India, leading to his dismissal and detention. Thus the first emotional rupture between Kashmir and the rest of India was caused.

State's autonomy

The Jana Sangh resumed its opposition to the state's and regional autonomy, which added further complications to the Kashmir problem. In October 1968, Sheikh Abdullah, as leader of the Plebiscite Front convened the J&K State People's Convention to discuss the future of the state. It was inaugurated by Jayaprakash Narayan. The Sheikh accepted my plea to discuss the future of regions ahead of the state's future.
Being the only member on the convention's steering committee from Jammu, I was asked to draft an internal constitution of the state that pleaded for a five tier constitutional set up for the state apart from regional autonomy. The formula envisaged further devolution of power to the districts, blocks and Panchayat.
Delegates of the convention, Kashmir valley's most represented political gathering, unanimously accepted the draft constitution. The Praja Parishad and its patron the Jana Sangh rejected the draft constitution as it would strengthen disintegrating forces.
The state government-appointed Regional Autonomy Committee (headed by me) was another defining exercise. Studying various experiments in India and abroad, I had discussions with top experts of international law and social scientists of the country. The draft report more precisely defined powers at various tiers of the administration. It also called for safeguarding interests of every ethnic identity in the state and prescribed an eight point formula for objective and equitable allocation of funds at various levels. It may not be the final word, but could be the basis for further discussion.

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BBC News, June 21, 2006

Pakistan's flourishing arms bazaar

By Aamer Ahmed Khan

BBC News, Peshawar

"There is nothing we cannot copy," grins Haji Munawar Afridi, an arms trader at Darra Adam Khel near Pakistan's northern city of Peshawar.

"You bring us a Stinger missile and we will make you an imitation that would be difficult to tell apart from the original."
It is not uncommon to come across such swagger from Pashtun tribesmen populating the lawless tribal belt along the country's western border with Afghanistan.
But it would perhaps be unwise to dismiss it as sheer bluster.
The hot, dry and dusty little town of Darra Adam Khel, barely a half-hour drive from Peshawar, is one of the major suppliers of small arms to the residents of the tribal belt.
From a distance, it looks no different from any suburban settlement in North-West Frontier Province.
The main road meanders into a market where few outlets are larger than a single room.
But the fare they flaunt is deadly: revolvers, automatic pistols, shotguns and Kalashnikovs line the shelves of a typical shop.
Only five years ago, the list would also have had items such as anti-personnel mines, sub-machine guns, small cannons and even rocket launchers.

Betrayal

"This farcical war on terror has been hard on us," says Haji Afridi.
"The government has forced us to stop manufacturing heavy arms. It says such weapons are used by terrorists."
For Darra tribesmen, the government's crackdown amounts to a betrayal of sorts.
They say it was the government itself that transferred heavy weapons technology to Darra in the late 1980s.
In April 1988, a major ammunition dump in Rawalpindi used for stockpiling US and Saudi-funded arms for the Afghan fighters blew up.
The entire dump, called the Ojhri camp, was gutted in a day-long inferno during which dozens of people were killed as unarmed missiles rained down on citizens living in the heavily-populated areas around.
Tribesmen say the government sold all the destroyed ammunition as scrap to arms dealers in Darra Adam Khel, a claim never quite denied by the authorities.
Haji Afridi, who has been a member of parliament and is an active player in the bazaar's politics, say it was a windfall for local manufacturers.
"From those destroyed weapons, we overnight acquired the technology for manufacturing mines, machine guns, small cannons and even multi-barrel rocket launchers."
It made Darra a household name in neighbouring Afghanistan, where the Afghans had descended into factional infighting after the Soviet withdrawal.
Amid waning international interest in Afghanistan, Darra became the focal point for various antagonists engaged in the country.
Within a couple of years, it had outgrown other tribal arms bazaars such as those in Bajaur and Jundollah.
But the so-called war on terror seems to have put paid to the glory days.

Under threat

Analysts say these open arms markets were an invaluable asset for Pakistani policy-makers before 9/11.
Influential traders in Darra Adam Khel proudly talk about their role in arming the Islamist fighters engaged in Kashmir.
Others recall the times when the Pakistani authorities would encourage them to supply more to one Afghan commander than the other.
This privileged status now seems to be under threat.
Senior military officials say open arms markets are contributing significantly to the conflict between Taleban fighters and Pakistani security forces in the tribal belt.
One official told the BBC News website that Pakistan's top army intelligence unit had recommended the immediate closure of all arms markets in the tribal belt soon after 9/11.
For several years now, the government has been seen encouraging the arms manufacturers in Darra to participate in international defence weapons exhibitions held annually in major Pakistani cities.
The idea is to introduce the tribesmen to the international arms market and create new, above-board relationships that are more easily regulated.
That was perhaps the thought behind the government's decision to route all export orders awarded to Darra arms manufacturers through the ministry of defence.
The move backfired, however, as most of the tradesmen started accusing the government of channelling international orders to their "favourites".
At present, only a handful of the 2,000-odd families involved in arms manufacturing in Darra are supplying clients abroad.
The rest continue to focus on local markets.
"Punjabis love small arms and Punjab is our major market," says Haji Afridi.
His claim is rubbished by intelligence officials, who say places such are Darra are critical in sustaining major conflicts in the region.
Whatever the reality, it is clear that the government will have to come up with a highly innovative and aggressive strategy to bring this lethal trade under control.

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Dawn, June 20, 2006

Testing times for Indo-US nuclear deal

By Praful Bidwai

NEW DELHI: As the United States and India held yet another round of intensive talks this week to flesh out the landmark nuclear deal they signed in July, it became clear that they will both explore how far they can push each other for concessions that would ease Congressional approval. Both sides are bargaining hard as they test each other's will to implement the agreement quickly. They are mobilising their energies both in bilateral talks and through media comments.
Under the deal, the US has offered a one-time exception for India in the existing global non-proliferation regime so that India can keep its nuclear weapons without signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India is coming under increasing pressure to demonstrate its loyalty to a larger "strategic partnership". Prime Minister Manmohan Singh absented himself from an important meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, (SCO) this week, largely because the US views the SCO with suspicion and New Delhi does not want to antagonise Washington.
The SCO includes China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Two of these, Russia and China are nuclear powers while India and Pakistan, which have observer status at the SCO, are aspiring nuclear power status having carried out nuclear tests in 1998.
Iran, which also has observer status and is accused by the West of trying to develop nuclear weapons, sent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Shanghai summit. While Indian nuclear hawks run a spirited campaign against the deal as a "sellout" and a "coup" to defame India, an impressive number of US Nobel laureates have issued a strong statement against the agreement. In the nuclear poker between Washington and New Delhi, two sets of issues have become critical for settling the agreement and getting it ratified by the Congress.
One set pertains to 'technical', but important, questions: What kind of safeguards must India accept on its civilian nuclear programme? Assuming India is allowed to import nuclear fuel, what criteria will determine how it is modified/processed, stored and/or reprocessed? What guarantees can be there that it will not be diverted to military uses? And under what terms the agreement can be terminated by either side? The second issue concerns possible further nuclear testing by India. Must it sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or a bilateral agreement with the US not to conduct future tests? Or will a voluntary moratorium of the kind declared in 1998 and reiterated in the July 2005 accord is enough?
Ideally, the US would like India to offer something more than the July assurance so that the deal can pass relatively smoothly through the Congress: e.g. a legally binding commitment not to conduct a nuclear test. But India flatly rejects this. It wants to keep the moratorium voluntary. Such a moratorium can easily be violated. Under existing US laws, a country that conducts a nuclear test automatically attracts sanctions and forfeits civilian cooperation with the US These issues will figure in the coming round of talks next month. Both sides are proceeding with cautious optimism.
India's options here are extremely limited. For all practical purposes, the Manmohan Singh government cannot amend or go beyond its understanding of the nuclear deal recorded in the July 18 agreement, which notifies as "civilian" only 14 out of its 22 power reactors (under operation or construction). However, the Bush administration may not find it possible to pilot the agreement through unless it is seen to have extracted an additional assurance from India against further tests.
New Delhi is under pressure from its nuclear super hawks to test a hydrogen (thermonuclear or fusion) bomb so as to have a powerful deterrent not just against Pakistan, but against the major nuclear powers which have such weapons. It has conducted five tests of the less powerful, but immensely destructive, fission bomb. But its May 1998 hydrogen bomb test is widely believed to have been a dud.
India, meanwhile, has opened yet another front in the negotiations. It demands that it be allowed to build a stockpile of nuclear fuel for each of its civilian reactors. This would guarantee that supply of imported fuel would continue uninterrupted. After India's first (1974) nuclear blast, the US suspended supply of lightly enriched uranium to two of India's reactors at Tarapur. "Although the Indian government cites this as the reason for demanding the 'strategic stockpile' guarantee, the real reason may be more complex", says Kamal Mitra Chenoy of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and a member of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace. "India is desperately short of uranium. Its sole operating uranium mine is running out of ore and there is public opposition to opening new mines."
The current negotiations between the US and India are focused on what is called the "123 agreement", pertaining to an amendment of Section 123 of the US atomic energy act dealing with nuclear exports. This is likely to be "marked up" soon in the form of bills to be voted by both Houses. This is expected to set the stage for passing the substantive "nuclear cooperation" agreement inked last July. The bill's passage may not be smooth. There is significant opposition to the deal in the House of Representatives and from non-proliferation experts. Indian-American groups as well as the Indian government's lobbying agencies are working furiously to garner support for the deal.
Opposition to the deal has now been joined by eminent scholars and scientists in the US. As many as 37 Nobel laureates have urged the Congress not to approve the deal "in its current form" because it is a "formula for destroying American non-proliferation goals."
In a letter, supported by the pro-peace federation of American scientists, they argue that "the agreement weakens the existing non-proliferation regime without providing an acceptable substitute.

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zmag.org, June 18, 2006

India, Israel and the US

by Mike Marqusee

Presumably because I'm Jewish and write about India, I received an invitation to a 'Jewish-Indian Reception' held earlier this year at Columbia University in New York.
"Did you know that Jews have lived in India for over 2000 years without any signs of Anti-Semitism?" the invitation began. "Did you know that annual bi-lateral trade between India and Israel reached $2.7 billion this past year? Interested in learning more about the historical, cultural, and political connections and similarities between Jewish and Indian Americans? Join us for a night of great speakers ..."
These speakers included the Indian Consul-General, the Israeli Deputy-Consul General and Congressman Gary Ackerman. The event was organised by a pro-Israel student group called LionPAC, with support from the South Asian Law Students Association, among others. It offers a microcosm of the burgeoning India-Israel-US axis, a phenomenon supporters of the Palestinian cause need to be more aware of.
Let's start with Gary Ackerman, the ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. A loud voice for Israel on Capitol Hill, Ackerman's career "highlights", according to his website, include "authoring legislation that required President Bush to impose sanctions against the Palestinian Authority". He championed the Israeli military offensive of spring 2002, and denounced the ICJ finding on the wall as "shameful".
Ackerman is also a Congressional point-man for the "India lobby". A former chairman of the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans, he unequivocally backs India on Kashmir, lays all the blame for the conflict there on Pakistan and pushes for increased US-India arms trade and military collaboration.
In 2003, Ackerman helped organise the first-ever joint Capitol Hill forum between AIPAC and AJC, on the one side, and the newly formed US Indian Political Action Committee, on the other. Ackerman stressed the two countries' common concerns: Israel, he said, was "surrounded by 120 million Muslims" while " India has 120 million Muslims [within]". Last year, he was the leading Democratic sponsor of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's address to a joint session of Congress.
Then there's LionPAC, the main pro-Israel group at Columbia. A couple of years ago LionPAC members played a key role in the documentary film 'Conduct Unbecoming', in which it was alleged that Jews and supporters of Israel at Columbia faced systematic intimidation and bias, and which slandered a number of Columbia professors as anti-semites. The ensuing uproar led the university to appoint a committee of investigation, which, in due course, dismissed the film's allegations and reprimanded the methods used by the film-makers. LionPAC is clearly in need of campus allies and the reception was an attempt to seek friends among just about the only people of colour at Columbia for whom Israel is not anathema - career-minded students of Indian origin.
According to the Columbia Spectator, "Around 200 people, mostly undergraduate and graduate students," attended the reception. The speakers "highlighted... the similarities between Jewish and Indian values and culture, and the shared efforts by the US, India, and Israel to combat terrorism."
Note how "values", "cultures", states and geo-politics are interwoven here. The existence of coherent "Indian" or "Jewish" value systems or cultures is casually assumed, and in each case casually attached to a state. These two entities are then somehow said to have "similarities" and the whole package is tied up with the help of the USA and the "war on terror".
Back in the days of the freedom struggle, Gandhi and the Indian National Congress opposed the creation of a 'Jewish National Home' in Palestine. Nehru insightfully analysed the relationship between Zionism, Arab Nationalism and British imperialism. Newly-independent India voted against the UN Palestine partition plan in 1947 and the admission of Israel to the UN in 1949. As a leading force in the Non-Aligned Movement, India backed anti-colonial movements in the middle-east and enjoyed close links with Nasser's Egypt.
Nonetheless, a clandestine relationship with Israel developed, thanks in part to Mossad, which acted as an unofficial - and deniable - diplomatic courier. During the 1971 war with Pakistan, Israel supplied India with mortars and ammunition. In the following years, intelligence collaboration was established, with an exchange of information about Pakistan, which at that time was building alliances with Arab regimes in the Middle East. In the late 1980s, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, keen on improving relations with the US, began the process of upgrading ties with Israel. As the Indian press put it at the time, "The road to Washington passes through Tel Aviv."
Since full diplomatic relations were established in 1992, military and commercial links have grown exponentially. The process escalated under the right-wing BJP-led government of 1998-2004. The BJP is the political wing of the Sangh Parivar, the family of organisations dedicated to the ideology of Hindutva (roughly, 'Hinduness'): an authoritarian, Hindu supremacist, virulently anti-Muslim movement. Its founders were admirers of Hitler and Mussolini, but it also has a long history of support for Israel and Zionism.
In many respects, Hindutva and Zionism are natural bedfellows. Both depict the entities they claim to represent as simultaneously national and religious. Both claim to be the sole authentic spokespersons for these entities (Hindu and Jewish). Both share an ambivalent (to say the least) historic relationship with British colonialism. Both appeal to an affluent diaspora. And, most importantly at the moment, both share a designated enemy ('Muslim terrorism').
During the Kargil War of 1999 (in which India and Pakistani troops clashed in Kashmir), Israel supplied India, at 24 hours notice, with high altitude surveillance vehicles and laser-guided systems. In the wake of 9/11, the alliance was deepened, with Hindutva and Zionist world-views dovetailing snugly with the US war on terror. In May 2003, India's then National Security Adviser Brajesh Misra spelled out the strategy in an address to the American Jewish Congress, in which he pleaded for a "Tel Aviv-New Delhi-Washington" axis. A few months later, Ariel Sharon arrived in India as an hounoured guest.
When a Congress-led coalition replaced the BJP after the 2004 elections, its left supporters urged it to abandon the previous government's foreign policy, notably the embrace of Israel and the USA. They have been ignored. The government has signed deals with the US for military purchases, joint military exercises and most recently, in the course of Bush's state visit, nuclear collaboration. In February, India abandoned Iran at the IAEA, voting with the US to refer the country - usually considered one of India's major strategic allies - to the Security Council.
At the same time, the link with Israel has been consolidated. In the course of 2005, India's Ministers of Science and Technology, Commerce and Industry, and Agriculture and Food all visited Israel, holding high-level meetings with political and business leaders. In February 2006, Israel's National Security Council Chairman Giora Eiland was welcomed in Delhi.
Israel is now the second largest supplier of arms to India (after Russia). It provides India with missile radar, border monitoring equipment, night vision devices, the new Phalcon reconnaissance aircraft, among other items. India, in turn, is the biggest purchaser of high-tech Israeli weapons and accounts for almost half of Israel's arms exports. In addition, several thousand Indian soldiers have received "anti-insurgency training" in Israel.
In a speech at Tel Aviv University in March, the Indian Ambassador described India and Israel as "heirs to great and ancient civilizations" which "emerged from foreign domination as independent nations around the middle of the last century" and whose "historical interaction... is vividly embodied in the presence of Judaism in India for over 1600 years."
While the ambassador was speaking in Tel Aviv, the Jewish-Indian reception was being held in New York, knitting together the same alliance and using the same themes. The Indian presence in the USA is highly diverse (many are Muslims), but an affluent, suburban constituency within it identifies with the Indian right and more broadly with Indian elite aspirations for economic and military status. Many see American Jews as the "model minority" and seek to emulate their political clout. A number have openly declared their intention of constructing a lobby similar to the Israel lobby. The attraction has been reciprocal. The American Jewish Committee is soon to open an office in New Delhi.
It's ironic that Indian Jews should find themselves used as a lynch-pin in this marriage of convenience. Of course, India's population is so diverse, its diaspora so far flung, that it can claim some kind of relationship with almost anyone anywhere. India's small Jewish communities were themselves highly diverse - in language, ritual, origin - but today they number merely 6000 (out of a population of one billion). During the 50s and 60s, most Indian Jews went to Israel, many to the US. The motives were mainly economic. The niche they had occupied collapsed after independence.
Although there's no history of anti-semitism in India, it's striking that one of the country's best-selling books is Mein Kampf, openly available at bookshops, stationers and street stalls. One young man pursuing a degree in business administration explained that the book was popular because it was "an excellent management text". Ironically, the aspirant bourgeoisie buying Mein Kampf is precisely that section of Indian society most keen on the alliance with Israel. The mentality is summed up by a catchphrase currently favoured by India's foreign policy-makers: "Non-alignment is for losers."
Manmohan Singh described India's deal with the US and its vote against Iran as acts of "enlightened self-interest". The same excuse is applied to the link with Israel. The reality is that India's betrayal of the Palestinians, however profitable for a few, is not remotely in the interest of the vast Indian majority. It certainly diminishes India's status and influence in the developing world. What price favor in Washington?

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Deccan Herald, June 17, 2006

Pakistan - India Peace Talk: No progress on the ground

By M.B. Naqvi

New Delhi and Islamabad have to change their mindsets towards each other for promotion of peaceful relations

Two and a half years have elapsed since Pakistan and India have been busy trying to improve mutual ties. There is certainly a noticeable relaxation in atmospherics created by emotive governmental pronouncements. But insofar as the hard issues that require to be settled are concerned, there have been absolutely no progress, not even on supposedly minor ones. Things on the ground are exactly as they were in January 2004.
The occasion for this comment is two statements made by two important officials: Mr MK Naraynan, India's National Security Advisor, has said that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh might not visit Pakistan this year. He gave the reason that terrorism emanating from Pakistan is causing trouble in India and unless Pakistan does something significant to stop this, India's Prime Minister can scarcely be expected to visit Pakistan. After all he wants to visit to do something. If he cannot achieve solid results - on any of the eight recognised disputes - what will be the point of his visit.
The second statement was made by Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee of the Pakistan armed forces. Addressing senior military officers in Islamabad recently that the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) which are being agreed to, do not amount too much; the real issue is Kashmir and unless India is ready to do something to move the dialogue forward, the entire effort is futile.
On the Pakistan side there has been a division of work. The President has been airing, from time to time, various ideas on a Kashmir solution. Some of them were based on American experts' thinking with inputs from both India and Pakistan. And he is still at it. But he took good care of making his Prime Minister say, sotto voce, that unless Kashmir is solved the dialogue cannot really yield results. This time round the President has made the second senior most General to articulate the same idea.
It is time to judge. The two governments have so far given their peoples a number of CBMs to play with. To repeat, there has been no real progress.
The situation needs to be faced both by Pakistan and India with realism. Political parties too have to realise that further negotiations within this framework will be fruitless.
Although one has always stood for an Indo-Pakistan friendship based on a thorough going reconciliation covering the entire South Asia, hard realities of inter-state situation makes one pessimistic. Let's try and move the compass. Two solid and antagonist state apparatuses, with powerful vested interest in Indo-Pak hostility, have grown up. Each has conflicting core issues or botttomlines. While each pursues power, vis-à-vis each other, the chances of the two security establishments settling down to a friendly co-existence are next to nil. Substance of two national efforts involves collision.
A real change requires qualitatively different national aims. Unless the main purpose of national endeavour in both countries changes achieving easily verifiable improvements in the way the two people live and work in villages, towns and city mohallahs, nothing substantial will change. But if the quality of politics changes in both countries, the sky will be the limit to their cooperation and coming together. But that sounds utopian. But that is the only way forward. Perhaps reasons should be adduced to why current realism will end in a blind alley.
One reason is that no one has realised the mischief that the nuclear weapons are playing. The two governments do not know, or acknowledge, that two antagonistic deterrents sitting cheek by jowl cannot long accept any nuclear restraint regime. Look, there have three rounds of negotiations by the Foreign Secretaries to roughhew even an MOU on the restraint subject, let alone a proper treaty.
Fact is the two countries are engaged in a fierce and comprehensive arms race. The race is on to increase and improve conventional and nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. Why else are constant missile experiments being made? Second fact is neither establishment can acquiesce in the other's Bomb; it simply must not be. A factoid is that the only likely use of nuclear weapons by India or Pakistan can only be on each other's territory. All else is fluff. So long as the two governments evade the issue and cover it up with deceptive words, things would not move forward.
Kashmir is moving into this league. India's bottomline is that its sovereignty over the Kashmir valley remains unalloyed. Few are deceived by beautiful words. Pakistan has actually agreed to this but its backwoodsmen apparently inside the Army would seem to demand something more than mere words, CBMs buses and more travel etc.
They want some role across the Line of Control whether or not they would extend similar facilities to Indian forces on this side of the Line of Control. It is an emotive issue. Indians cannot conceive of a future without the Kashmir Valley being safely inside India. Pakistani hardliners apparently cannot conceive a future without the Kashmir Valley becoming free of Indian control.
All one can say is that new thinking is needed.



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