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Participation of Kashmiris in talks imperative

ISLAMABAD, FEB. 5. The Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, has asserted that participation of Kashmiris in the dialogue process is imperative for establishment of durable peace in South Asia. In his message, read out to the joint session of the Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) Legislative Assembly and Council in Muzaffarabad, capital of PoK, on the occasion of 'Kashmir Solidarity Day', Gen. Musharraf said Kashmiris had an "inalienable" right to decide about their future and their inclusion in the dialogue process was also imperative for taking forward the confidence building measures between Pakistan and India. Perhaps it is for the first since Pakistan and PoK have been practising the tradition of observing February 5 as Kashmir Solidarity Day, in the early 1990s, that neither the Pakistan President nor the Prime Minister was present at the joint session of the PoK Legislative Assembly and Council. The Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz, was originally scheduled to address the session. But later Gen. Musharraf wanted to be in Muzaffarabad. It was announced on the floor of the House, Gen. Musharraf could not make it due to inclement weather and his message had to be read out in absentia.

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Rewriting the History of Pakistan

[Source: Islam, Politics and State: the Pakistan Experience, Ashgar Khan (ed.) Zed Books, London, 1985, pp. 164-177.]

From indoctrination's foul rope
Suspend all reason, all hope
Until with swollen tongue
Morality herself is hung.

Introduction
Education in Pakistan, from schools to universities, is being fundamentally redefined. This development is expected to have profound implications for the future of the country's society and politics. Most changes are traceable to factors related to the stability of the present government, but there are also others which cannot be analysed as a mere response to immediate threats. A new concept of education now prevails, the full impact of which will probably be felt by the turn of the century, when the present generation of school children attains maturity.

Having pledged to divorce education from liberal and secular ideals, Pakistani rulers view education as an important means of creating an Islamised society and as an instrument for forging a new national identity based on the 'Ideology of Pakistan'. Important steps have already been taken in this direction: enforcement of chadar in educational institutions; organisation of congregational zuhr (afternoon) prayers during school hours; compulsory teaching of Arabic as a second language from sixth class onwards; introduction of nazara Qur'an (reading of Qur'an) as a matriculation requirement; alteration of the definition of literacy to include religious knowledge; elevation of maktab schools to the status of regular schools and the recognition of maktab certificates as being equivalent to master's degrees; creation of an Islamic university in Islamabad; introduction of religious knowledge as a criterion for selecting teachers of all categories and all levels; and the revision of conventional subjects to emphasise Islamic values.

It is not the intent of this chapter to analyse in its totality the restructuring of education under the present martial law regime. We focus, instead, on a relatively narrow area - the revised history of Pakistan as currently taught to college students at the intermediate and degree levels. To this end, all officially prescribed Pakistan studies textbooks have, been examined, together with books recommended at different institutions. In addition, material has also been included from a number of other books dealing with the history of Pakistan which were written after 1977 and which have discernible official approval. We have discovered that, apart from relatively minor variations in emphasis and style, all present-day textbooks are essentially identical in content. Thus this chapter accurately represents the currently taught version of Pakistani history.

The task of rewriting history books started in earnest in 1981, when General Zia ul Haq declared compulsory the teaching of Pakistan studies to all degree students, including those at engineering and medical colleges. Shortly thereafter, the University Grants Commission issued a directive to prospective textbook authors specifying that the objective of the new course is to 'induce pride for the nation's past, enthusiasm for the present, and unshakeable faith in the stability and longevity of Pakistan' [1]. To eliminate possible ambiguities of approach, authors were given the following directives:

To demonstrate that the basis of Pakistan is not to be founded in racial, linguistic, or geographical factors, but, rather, in the shared experience of a common religion. To get students to know and appreciate the Ideology of Pakistan, and to popularize it with slogans. To guide students towards the ultimate goal of Pakistan - the creation of a completely Islamised State. [2]

In fulfillment of this directive, modern texts of Pakistani history are centred around the following themes:

1. The 'Ideology of Pakistan', both as a historical force which motivated the movement for Pakistan as well as its raison d'etre
2. The depiction of Jinnah as a man of orthodox religious views who sought the creation of a theocratic state
3. A move to establish the ulama as genuine heroes of the Pakistan Movement
4. An emphasis on ritualistic Islam, together with a rejection of liberal interpretations of the religion and generation of communal antagonism

In the remainder of this chapter, each of the above has been examined in turn.

Genesis of the 'Ideology of Pakistan'
The 'Ideology of Pakistan' occupies a position of central importance in all post-1977 Pakistani history textbooks. This ubiquitous phrase permeates all discussion, serves as the reference point for all debate, and makes its appearance at the very outset in all textbooks: 'As citizens of an, ideological stateÖ it is necessary to first know the basis upon which Pakistan was founded, the ideology of Pakistan.' [3] A virtually identical beginning is found in another book: 'Pakistan is an ideological stateÖ the Ideology of Pakistan was the inspiration and the basis of the Movement for Pakistan.' [4] General Zia ul Haq considers the 'Ideology of Pakistan' to be of crucial importance. In one of his speeches he stressed that 'the armed forces bear the sacred responsibility for safeguarding Pakistan's ideological frontiers'. [5]

The 'Ideology of Pakistan' is defined in a number of ways. For example, one source states that 'the Ideology of Pakistan is Islam'.[6] In another textbook, the 'Ideology of Pakistan' is more explicitly defined as:

. . . that guiding principle which has been accepted by the Muslims of the majority regions of the South Asian subcontinent and which allows them to lead their lives individually and collectively, according to the principles of Islam. [7]

The above definitions do not limit the 'Ideology of Pakistan' to the boundaries of Pakistan. All Muslim majority areas of the subcontinent, including Bangladesh, are covered. Moreover, the manner in which Muslims ought to lead their collective lives in the modern world is assumed to be well defined and beyond controversy. The underlying belief is that there exists a unique definition of an Islamic state.

In stark contrast to modern textbooks, no textbook written prior to 1977 contains mention of the 'Ideology of Pakistan'. Indeed, this phrase was not a part of the political parlance then. Although its precise genealogy is hard to ascertain, ex-Chief Justice Mohammad Munir claims that it has relatively recent origins. In his monograph From Jinnah to Zia he writes:

The Quaid-i-Azam never used the words 'Ideology of Pakistan' Ö For fifteen years after the establishment of Pakistan, the Ideology of Pakistan was not known to anybody until in 1962 a solitary member of the Jamaat-i--Islami used these words for the first time when the Political Parties Bill was being discussed. On this, Chaudhry Fazal Elahi, who has recently retired as President of Pakistan, rose from his seat and objected that the 'Ideology of Pakistan' shall have to be defined. The member who had proposed the original amendment replied that the 'Ideology of Pakistan was Islam', but nobody asked him the further question 'What is Islam?' The amendment to the bill was therefore passed. [8]

While this event may or may not be the first significant use of the term 'Ideology of Pakistan', it does hint at the involvement of the politico--religious party, the Jamaat-i--Islami, in the propagation - and perhaps creation - of the phrase in question. Therefore, with the aim of arriving at a better understanding of this important phrase, we turn to a brief discussion of the Jamaat and its political programme.

Founded by the late Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, the Jamaat-i--Islami is a fundamentalist party which categorically asserts the superiority of the Islamic Shariah over all other principles and forms of political and social organisation. Much of the Jamaat's appeal derives from rhetorical denunciation of Western civilisation and Western democracy. It has also evolved a version of an Islamic state - the same view currently being popularised by modern textbooks in Pakistan.

The Jamaat's view of an Islamic state is that of an Islamic theocratic state - a state governed according to divinely revealed principles wherein the head of state, elected or otherwise, interprets such principles and translates them into practical matters of the state. Although Maudoodi, in his Islamic Law and Constitution, states that 'Islam vests all the Muslim citizens of an Islamic state with popular vice-gerency', he is quick to point out that all vice-gerents need not be of equal consequence. He demands that constitution makers:

evolve such a system of elections as would ensure the appointment of only those who are trustworthy and piousÖ They should also devise effective measures to defeat the designs and machinations of those who scramble for posts of trust and are consequently hated and cursed by the people in spite of their so-called 'victories' in the elections. [9]

In this 'state without borders' any Muslim anywhere can be a citizen. It will be the best governed not only because its leaders are pious but also because only those will vote who are themselves pious.

With characteristic sternness, the Manifesto of the Jamaat-i--Islami (formulated in January 1951, reapproved by its Majlis-i-Shoora in December 1969) requires all political activity in Pakistan to obey the following code of ethics (note occurrence of 'Ideology of Pakistan' below):

Nobody should indulge in anything repugnant to the Ideology of Pakistan [emphasis added] Ö Any effort directed towards turning this country into a secular state or implanting herein any foreign ideology amounts to an attack on the very existence of Pakistan.

Notwithstanding occasional sparring, there exists a confluence of basic interests and perceptions of the Jamaat and Pakistani rulers. It is highly significant that, with no essential change in meaning, the phrase 'Ideology of Pakistan' has been elevated from the relative obscurity of the Manifesto of the Jamaat-i--Islami into legally unchallengeable national dogma.

Religious Ideology and the Movement for Pakistan
Independent of precisely when and where the phrase 'Ideology of Pakistan' was first used, it is incontrovertibly true that its common use, both by national leaders and in textbooks, is a post-1977 development. In contrast, the 'Two-Nation Theory' - the basis of Pakistan - has genuine historical roots almost a century old. It was Mohammad Ali Jinnah who, for the first time, proclaimed that India was inhabited by two distinct nations - Hindus and Muslims - who could not live together in one state. In his presidential address to the Muslim League session at Lahore in 1940, he argued that 'Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs, literatures'.[10] Jinnah expounded his views with such eloquence and force that most Muslims, and even some Hindus, came to believe in them. The Muslim League demand for Pakistan was rooted in this theory, and India was eventually partitioned on the premise that Muslims constitute a distinct entity. Modern textbooks state that this Two-Nation Theory was the predecessor of the 'Ideology of Pakistan':

This righteous demand (for a separate homeland) was given the temporary name of 'Two-Nation Theory'. Now that right has been achieved, the same theory in this land is called the Ideology of Pakistan. [11]

In post-1977 Pakistan, the 'Ideology of Pakistan' is invariably equated to the 'Two-Nation Theory'. This raises the following questions: prior to 1947, what was the new state envisaged to be? In what sense, and to what extent, was the demand for a theocratic Islamic state the driving force behind the movement for Pakistan? We now turn to a consideration of these questions.

From all historical accounts it appears that in the heat of the struggle for Pakistan the structure of the new state - theocratic, democratic, or whatever - received no serious thought. Although they made their case on the assumption of a distinct Islamic identity, the Muslim League leadership was generally liberal in religious matters, and there had been no sudden revival of faith among them. For Jinnah the matter was particularly clear: he wanted a homeland for the Muslims, not an Islamic state. But there was a definite conflict between this secular constitutional way of thinking and that of the more religious young Muslim Leaguers, who had responded wholeheartedly to the League's call. There was, in fact, a long difference of opinion between Jinnah and the Raja of Mahmudabad, the youngest member of the League's working committee.

Because it throws into sharp focus the issues of the times, it is extremely instructive to study the Raja's memoirs, particularly with reference to the difference in opinion between Jinnah and himself on the nature of the future state:

I was one of the founder members of the Islamic Jamaat. We advocated that Pakistan should be an Islamic state. I must confess that I was very enthusiastic about it and in my speeches I constantly propagated my ideas. My advocacy of an Islamic state brought me into conflict with Jinnah. He thoroughly disapproved of my ideas and dissuaded me from expressing them publicly from the League platform lest the people might be led to believe that Jinnah shared my view and that he was asking me to convey such ideas to the public. As I was convinced that I was right and did not want to compromise Jinnah's position, I decided to cut myself away and for nearly two years kept my distance from him, apart from seeing him during working committee meetings and other formal occasions. It was not easy to take this decision as my associations with Jinnah had been very close in the past. Now that I look back I realize how wrong I had been. [12]

According to the Raja - and this is also a view shared by many scholars - three principal factors, in descending order of priority, transformed the Muslim League from the position of a feeble political minority in 1937 into a great mass movement less than a decade later:

One was the Congress attitude of indifference and, at times, hostility. Another was the leadership which, under Jinnah, broke new ground and fashioned new political strategy. Still another was the part played by religious appeal in the heightening of this consciousness. The leadership at the top was generally secular-minded and trained in modern political methods, but on the lower levels and especially among the field workers propaganda on religious lines was the general practice. [13]

To understand correctly Jinnah's concept of Pakistan, it is necessary to examine his position in greater detail.

Jinnah's Mind: Secular or Communal?
It is frequently said that without Jinnah there would have been no Pakistan, and Jinnah is himself known to have remarked that it was he, with the help of his secretary and typewriter, who won Pakistan for the Muslims.[14] Irrespective of the extent to which this is true, it is certainly the case that Jinnah is revered in Pakistan to an extent which no other political personality approaches even remotely. His speeches and writings, therefore, often serve as a reference point for debates on the nature of the Pakistani state and its future.

Modern textbooks invariably portray Jinnah as the architect of an Islamic ideological state:

The All-India Muslim League, and even the Quaid-i-Azam himself, said in the clearest possible terms that Pakistan would be an ideological state, the basis of whose laws would be the Quran and Sunnah, and whose ultimate destiny would be to provide a society in which Muslims could individually and collectively live according to the laws of Islam. [15]

Paradoxically, Jinnah began his political career as an exponent of Hindu-Muslim unity and as the leader of the liberal left wing of the Congress. His efforts culminated in the Lucknow Pact of 1916 between the Congress and the League. But when he again led the League almost twenty years later, the call was no longer for unity but for Hindu-Muslim separation. Khalid bin Sayeed, one of his more respected biographers, gives convincing evidence that in the period 1929-1935 the Congress' intransigence was a major factor that changed him from an 'idealist' into a 'realist' who saw no future for Muslims in a united India. [16]

In his personal life, Jinnah was liberal and Westernised. Overcoming the taboos of cross-communal relations, he married a Parsi lady in the face of her parents' opposition - a marriage destined to end in tragic separation and the premature death of his wife. Jinnah maintained his inner secularism even in the seething cauldron of communal hatred following Partition, as is evident from the fact that he appointed Joginder Nath Mandal, a Hindu, to serve in Pakistan's first cabinet. His famous 11 August 1947 speech before the nation is the clearest possible exposition of a secular state in which religion and state are separate from each other:

We are starting with the fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. . . Now I think that we should keep that in front of us as our ideal, and you will find that in due course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual but in the political sense as citizens of the state. Ö You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the business of the State.[17]

In an interview to Doon Campbell, Reuter's correspondent in New Delhi in 1946, Jinnah made it perfectly clear that it was Western-style democracy that he wanted for Pakistan:

The new state would be a modern democratic state with sovereignty resting in the people and the members of the new nation having equal rights of citizenship regardless of their religion, caste or creed. [18]

Note the highly significant phrase 'sovereignty resting in the people'. In contrast, in Maulana Maudoodi's Islamic state, 'sovereignty rests with Allah'. Thus, Jinnah rejects the basis for a theocratic state. This is stated even more explicitly in his 1946 speech before the Muslim League convention in Delhi: 'What are we fighting for? What are we aiming at? It is not theocracy, nor a theocratic state.' [19] The historian K.K. Aziz has remarked that 'on the record of their writings and speeches, Jinnah comes out to be far more liberal and secular than Gandhi'. [20]

All of Jinnah's speeches were not so unequivocal about the nature of the future state. In the 1945 elections, the Muslim League was aided by a number of influential ulama. It is in this period that we find in Jinnah's speeches the greatest number of references to Islam and society. For example, in November 1945 he said that 'Muslims are demanding Pakistan so that they may live according to their code of life and traditions, and so that they may govern themselves according to the rules of Islam'. [21] How does one interpret this speech of Jinnah's, together with others of essentially similar nature, with the outright secular declarations quoted earlier? At least two interesting possibilities suggest themselves.

Jinnah may have made a compromise with the ulama in the interest of achieving unity on the primary goal - the attainment of a homeland for the Muslims. On the other hand, it is possible that he saw Islam in such liberal terms that he saw no essential conflict between it and his desire for a modern, democratic state along Western lines. Here one might add that Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a venerated religious authority whose understanding of the Quran was no less deep than that of his contem-porary, Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, nevertheless interpreted the political message of Islam in a totally different way from the latter. It is evident that Jinnah also did not accept the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam and the Islamic state.

The Role of the Religious Parties
All history bears evidence that religion has been a powerful nexus between individuals and groups, a potent instrument which has often welded a heterogeneous group into a distinct nationality. Through appeal to supernatural authority, religion promotes national unity as a divine command. When coupled with appropriate social and economic forces, it can forge a powerful and irresistible nationalism. Contemporary history is replete with examples: the Greek church as a source for Greek nationalism, the Catholic church as a factor in Irish separatism, Judaism and the state of Israel, Islam and Pakistan.

Since the movement for Pakistan was rooted in the social, cultural, and religious distinctions between Muslims and Hindus, one might logically expect that Muslim religious parties would have played a major, if not a leading, role in mobilising the Muslim masses. Paradoxically, aside from exceptions of no great importance, these parties had bitterly opposed Jinnah and the demand for Pakistan. Indeed, the exponents of Muslim nationalism were forced to battle on three formidable fronts. First, they had to persuade the British of their separate identity. Second, it was necessary to convince Congress of their determination to live as two separate nations. And third, the efforts of the ulama, who opposed Pakistan on grounds that nationalism was antithetical to Islam, had to be nullified.

The pre-Partition position of the politico-religious parties on the Pakistan question contrasts oddly with their present enthusiasm for religious nationalism. Maulana Maudoodi and the Jamaat-i-Islami had rejected nationalism because it 'led to selfishness, prejudice, and pride'. Till 1947 Maudoodi maintained that he would not fight for Pakistan, that he did not believe in Pakistan, and that the demand for it was un-Islamic. Some ten years before Partition he had maintained that 'Muslim nationalism is as contradictory a term as "chaste prostitute" '. [22] Jamaat literature would sometimes use the derogatory word Na-Pakistan for the proposed state. There were frequent indictments of Jinnah as lacking 'an Islamic mentality or Islamic habits of thoughts'. [23]

The Jamaat-i-Islami was not alone in its opposition to Pakistan. The Majlis-i-Ahrar, another politico-religious party, took a similar position. However, unlike the Jamaat, it was aligned with the Congress. Ahrar leaders termed Jinnah the Kafir-i-Azam (the great infidel) as a rebuttal to the title Quaid-i-Azam (the great leader) conferred upon him by the Muslim League. Allama Mashriqi's Khaksar party went a step further and once sought to assassinate Jinnah, albeit unsuccessfully. Signifi-cantly, Jamaat-i-Islami, Jamiat-ul-ulama-i-Hind, Majlis-i-Ahrar, and Khaksar were absent at Jinnah's funeral. A rather curious situation arose after Pakistan became a reality in 1947 since most political-religious parties were confronted with the dilemma of being in a country whose creation they had opposed. Political expediency caused many leaders to abruptly volte-face. For example, Mian Tufail Mohammad, now amir of the Jamaat-i-Islami, who had once denounced as 'sinners' all those who supported or joined Jinnah's government, stated on television recently that, in fact, there had existed an understanding between Jinnah and the Jamaat that both would work separately towards the same goal. It has also become usual for many modern textbooks to refer to Maudoodi as one of the intellectual founders of the Pakistan Movement. This startling fact suggests that the influence of the Jamaat-i-Islami on national education may be deeper than is normally assumed.

Those politico-religious parties which had resisted the creation of Pakistan may well have made good the political damage. Their allegiance to an Islamic state now entitles them to rewards which go beyond mere forgiveness: 'the services rendered by the ulama and mashaikh to the cause of the Pakistan Movement are worthy of writing in golden letters'. [24] One textbook devotes an entire chapter to their role, claiming that 'when Allama Iqbal and the Quaid-i-Azam presented their programme for an Islamic state, it met with the enthusiastic support of the ulama and mashaikh'. [25]

1947 -77: The Gulf of Silence
Nations which can rationally analyse their past, and particularly their defeats and periods of collective suffering, are far more likely to survive and prosper than those in which absence of free expression forbids truthful self-examination. Japan and Germany after World War II, Argentina after the Falklands War - historical examples abound in which positive shifts in national policy, domestic and foreign, occurred as a result of decisive defeat. Indeed, there were expectations of a critical assessment of the role of elites and readjustment of regional policies within Pakistan following the 1971 civil war and the subsequent Indian invasion. In this war, tens of thousands died, millions were displaced, and the country was rent asunder. Thirteen years later, this optimism has proven to be unfounded.

From the year 1947, the establishment of Pakistan, through the year 1977, the start of the Nizam-i-Mustafa Movement, all recent Pakistan studies texts maintain total, or almost total, silence on political events of this period. The most detailed account of history until 1968 to be found in any of these books is reproduced in full here: 'In October 1958, General Ayub Khan imposed martial law and thus saved the country from chaos'. [26] Of the few books which mention the Bangladesh episode, one has the following to say:

As a result of the 1970 elections, the political differences between East and West Pakistan grew and led to their separation. The cause of Islamic unity received a setback, but one should not interpret this as a rejection of Islamic Ideology by the people. Indeed, unless Islam is presented as a whole, and not as just worship and prayers, it remains incomplete. The forces of atheism and worldliness, in this case, can influence the minds of people through modern education and public media. [27]

This strict economy of words is in striking contrast to the extensive coverage given to Islamisation after 1977. Nevertheless, this small paragraph invites more than just cursory reading.

There is little doubt that the painful separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan strikes at the very roots of Pan-Islamism - the belief that Muslims all over the world belong to one nation and that differences among them are insignificant. Modern textbooks, therefore, are reluc-tant to discuss the issue in any detail. It should also be observed that the above quoted paragraph attributes the separation of East and West squarely to the fact that elections were held in Pakistan. This serves to create the fear that if elections and democracy broke up Pakistan in 1971, then Pakistan may again be mortally endangered if elections and democracy are restored at some point in the future. Finally, note that the last lines of the paragraph implicitly acknowledge the lack of success of the Islamic parties in the 1970 elections. However, students are instructed to disregard this because 'modern education' encouraged 'atheism and worldliness' and was the reason for defeat.

The 1947-77 gap in textbooks makes it difficult to develop an adequate background for the Nizam-i-Mustafa Movement, which culminated in General Zia ul Haq's government's accession to power. Restrictions, whether self-imposed or otherwise, do not allow explicit mention of the names of key national figures. This constraint occasionally leads to awkward situations. For example, all textbooks give 'rigging of elections' as a motivation for the Nizam-i-Mustafa Movement, but none can explicitly state that these were rigged by Bhutto. Curiously, we were unable to discover any mention of the PNA (Pakistan National Alliance), which spearheaded the movement against Bhutto.

Subtle propaganda is not a sin of which our textbook writers are guilty.

Islamisation in Textbooks
Islamisation is the central concern of all modern Pakistan studies textbooks. After Partition, only three subsequent events are discussed in detail. First, they treat the Objectives Resolution of 1949, which gave the sovereignty over the state of Pakistan to Allah and which separated Muslims from non-Muslims as having different rights of citizenship. Secondly, they harp on the presentation to the government of a twenty-two point programme framed by thirty-one prominent ulama in 1951. This programme later became part of the Manifesto of the Jamaat-i-Islami, acknowledged on the front cover of this document. The third event, which forms the bulk of post-Partition history, is the implementa-tion of Islamic principles by General Zia ul Haq.

Modern textbooks heavily stress the formal and ritualistic aspects of Islam, as against those which emphasise social justice. Science and secular knowledge are held in deep suspicion. Modern education, according to one book, should be shunned because it leads to atheism and worldliness. Another book describes an utopian society, one which supposedly existed at the time of Hazrat Nizam-ud-Din, as one in which ritual was meticulously adhered to:

Young and old, small and great, everyone had become regular at prayers. Apart from the five prayers, people enthusiastically said supplementary prayers of ishraq, chasht, zawal, and awabin. People used to ask each other of the verses to be read, or how many times to recite drud-sharif after prayersÖ they kept supplementary fasts even after the month of Ramazan. [28]

The emphasis on ritualistic Islam in modern textbooks is accompanied by a conscious promotion of sentiment against certain non-Muslim communities, particularly Hindus and Qadianis. This is not something new, one may legitimately argue, nor is the exacerbation of communal antagonism limited to Pakistan alone. India, which claims to be secular rather than Hindu, is nevertheless regularly ravaged by communal riots with the majority of victims being Muslims. Hindu chauvinism is a powerful factor in Indian politics and expresses itself through a variety of newspapers and magazines, even though propaganda through school texts is officially forbidden. However, in Pakistan, because of the adoption of an exclusivist national ideology, there are no constraints on the free expression of communal hatred. Thus, the Hindu is portrayed as monolithically cunning and treacherous, obsessively seeking to settle old scores with his erstwhile masters. This Hindu is responsible for the break-up of Pakistan:

The same Bengali Hindu was responsible for the backwardness of East Pakistan. But, hiding the story of his two-century old sins, atrocities, and pillage, he used 'Bengali nationalism' to punish innocent West Pakistanis for sins they had not committed. [29]

Justice Shameem Hussain Kadri, ex-chief justice of the Lahore High Court, writes of the 'diabolical Hindus' and 'Hindu conspiracies' in his officially circulated book.[30] There are countless similar examples.

In part, the existence of anti-Hindu sentiment is a consequence of the wholesale communal massacres during Partition, which left around half a million dead on each side. Even under the best conditions the scars would need many decades to heal. But the explanation for the revival of communalist sentiment is not to be found wholly in the tragedies of 1947. An examination of history texts written soon after Partition - a time when the grief of shattered families was at its peak - shows them to be incomparably more liberal. The history of the subcontinent was taken to start with the ancient Indus valley civilisations rather than with the conquest of India by the first Muslim invader, Mohammad bin Qasim, in 712. In contrast to present-day books, these books contained discussions of the empires of Ashoka and the Mauryas. The movement for Pakistan was presented as a defence against Hindu domination, not as a movement for religious revival.

The deliberate revival of communal antagonism over 30 years after Partition suggests that political expediency, rather than religious factors, has asserted a dominant influence in this matter. The permanent militarisation of society requires a permanent enemy. For many reasons, Pakistan's other neighbours are unsuitable for this purpose. On the other hand, rulers in both India and Pakistan have long found mutual hostility and tension indispensable political tools.

Conclusion
The change in character of Pakistani education, and the rewriting of Pakistan's history, coincide with the change in nature of the ruling elites and altered needs. The Westernised liberal elite, which had inherited political power from the British, had given to education a basically secular and modern character which might have eventually created a modern, secular-minded citizenry. But the self-seeking and opportunistic nature of this elite forced it progressively to abandon liberal values in the face of exigencies, political and economic. Discriminatory laws against non-Muslim minorities were passed, the feudal structure of rural society was left intact, and quality education was limited to a tiny minority. The ambient corruption in society gradually diffused into institutions which could have transformed and modernized Pakistani society. By the time of the 1977 army coup, liberalism was already moribund.

The recasting of Pakistani history is an attempt to fundamentally redefine Pakistan and Pakistani society and to endow the nation with a historic destiny. Islam is the integrative ideology, its enforcement a divine duty. Viewed from this angle, it becomes essential to project the movement for Pakistan as the movement for an Islamic state, the creation of which became a historic inevitability with the first Muslim invasion of the subcontinent. The revised history of Pakistan uses much the same idiom, and the same concepts of Islamic state and of politics in Islam, as the Jamaat-i-Islami. Its wholesale dissemination through educational institutions demonstrates both the influence of the Jamaat on education as well as the confluence of interests and philosophy of military rulers and the Jamaat.

Notes:
[1.] University Grants Commission directive, quoted in Azhar Hamid, et al. Mutalliyah-i-Pakistan (Islamabad: Allama Iqbal Open University, 1983), p. xi.
[2.] Ibid., pp. xii-xiii.
[3.] Government of Pakistan, Federal Ministry of Education, Pakistan Studies (Compulsory) For Intermediate Classes by Safdar Mahmood, et al. (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan). Approved for the Departments of Education of the Punjab, Sind, NWFP, Baluchistan, Federal Areas, and liberated Kashmir vide notification number F.11-16/81-HST, dated 2 November 1981, as the sole textbook for intermediate classes.
[4.] S. Husain and M. A. Hasan, Mukhzun Mutalliyah-i-Pakistan (Lahore: Kitab Khana Danishwuran, 1981), p. 1.
[5.] Nawa-i-Waqt (Karachi), 14 August 1984.
[6.] S. Husain and M. A. Hasan, Mukhzun Mutalliyah, p. 2.
[7.] M. D. Zafar, Pakistan Studies for Medical Students (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1982), p. 20.
[8.] Mohammad Munir, From Jinnah to Zia (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd.,1980), p. 26.
[9.] Abul Ala Maudoodi, Islamic Law and Constitution, ed. Khurshid Ahmed (Karachi: Jamaat-i-Islami Publications, 1955).
[10.] Jamiluddin Ahmed, Recent Writings and Speeches of Mr. Jinnah (Lahore: Sheikh Mohammad Ashraf, 1947), p. 176.
[11.] Azhar Hamid, et al., Mutalliyah-i-Pakistan, p. 27.
[12.] Raja of Mahmudabad, 'Some Memories', in Partition of India - Policies and Perspectives 1937-1947, eds. C. H. Philips and M. D. Wainwright (Cam-bridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 388-9.
[13.] Ibid., p. 389.
[14.] C. H. Philips and M. D. Wainwright, Partition of India, p. 32.
[15.] Azhar Hamid, et al., Mutalliyah-i-Pakistan, p. 221.
[16.] Khalid bin Sayeed, 'Personality of Jinnah and his Political Strategy', in C.H. Philips and M. D. Wainwright, Partition of India, pp. 276-93.
[17.] M. Munir, From Jinnah to Zia, p. 30.
[18.] Ibid., p. 29.
[19.] Jamiluddin Ahmed, Recent Writings and Speeches, p. 248.
[20.] K. K. Aziz, The Making of Pakistan (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1976).
[21.] Quoted in Sarwat Sawlat, Pakistan Ke Baray Log (Lahore, 1982), pp.295-6.
[22.] Abul Ala Maudoodi, Mussalman Aur Maujooda Syasi Kashmakash, quoted in K. K. Aziz, The Making of Pakistan, p. 148.
[23.] Maulana Kausar Niazi, Maudoodiat Awam Ki Adalat Men (Lahore: n.d.).
[24.] Zia-ul-Haq, quoted in M. D. Zafar, Pakistan Studies, p.147.
[25.] S.M. Rafeeq, Tehrik-i-Pakistan (Lahore: Standard Book House,1983), p. 271.
[26.] Azhar Hamid, et al., Mutalliyah-i-Pakistan, p. 233.
[27.] Ibid., p. 235.
[28.] Ibid., p. 41.
[29.] Ibid., p. 32.
[30.] Justice Shameem Hussain Kadri, The Creation of Pakistan (Lahore: Army Book Club, 1983).

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Building a Nuclear disarmament Movement in India, Pakistan and South Asia: Some Policy Perspectives

There are always two stages in the process of developing an effective progressive force like the nuclear disarmament movement, whether regionally in South Asia, or globally. In the first phase it cannot hope to change policy but aims to attack and undermine the popular legitimacy that all governments seek to obtain from their publics for their policies. It is only when such disarmament movements develop on a very large scale and achieve a critical mass that they can then hope to impact on actual policy. The Indian and Pakistani anti-nuclear weapons movements are, and will remain for a considerable period of time, in the first phase. But to expand in the first phase and then to transit towards and further expand in the second phase, the pre-requisite conditions are the same - to develop the appropriate political perspectives that must guide propaganda and agitational activities and to develop the necessary organizational skills and practices to carry out such activities successfully. This paper aims to be a modest contribution to clarifying thinking in respect of building a strong disarmament movement in India specifically, and in South Asia more generally.

Developing the Appropriate Political Perspectives

Six-and-a-half years down the line from Pokharan and Chagai in May 1998, where do matters stand for South Asians committed to regional and global nuclear disarmament? The US remains committed doctrinally to developing the Ballistic Missile Defense system and Theater Missile Defense systems, to developing battlefield and mini-nukes, to blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons on one hand and to doing the same with respect to weapons of mass destruction so that the use of nuclear weapons might be justified as a retaliation against enemy use of chemical or biological ones. India and Pakistan have not made overt deployments of nuclear weapons systems but remain committed to further quantitative and qualitative development of warheads and of related delivery vehicles. The Indian government reiterates from time to time its commitment to No First Use even as this pledge has now been diluted to exclude non-nuclear allies of nuclear opponents and to allow for possible retaliation against a non-nuclear opponent using other weapons of mass destruction against India. It has called on Pakistan to follow suit with a similar NFU pledge, while Pakistan under Musharraf's reign has, on a number of occasions declared its willingness to contemplate regional nuclear disarmament as its way of obtaining diplomatic one-upmanship vis-à-vis India.
There can be no doubt that regional disarmament is greatly facilitated by progress in respect of global nuclear disarmament and that the latter must mean, above all, changing the behaviour of the US. How is this to be achieved? There are two strategic directions that a global disarmament movement can take, faced as it is today by the determination of the US government and political establishment to secure an informal global empire. The crucial foundation for this project of Empire-building is, of course, the US's exceptional military power including its expanding nuclear capacities. It is the credibility of this military foundation that must be undermined. One way of trying to do this is to demand that the global anti-war movement recognize the importance of the specifically nuclear dimension and shift some of its resources and some of its focus to precisely the issue of pursuing global nuclear disarmament. The other way is to press the global nuclear disarmament movement to recognize the priority of opposing the US occupation of Iraq and its general imperial ambitions, and therefore for it to shift some of its resources and some of its focus towards support for this anti-war/anti-imperialist movement, even as it must maintain its distinctive concern with the nuclear issue.
The second way is, to my mind, the better strategic avenue to follow today. Iraq (and behind it Palestine) is the crucible of world politics now and for some time into the future. The best way to undermine the credibility of claims made for the military-political value of nuclear weapons is to help undermine the general credibility of the military-political value of the US's conventional and overall military might. And the best way to do that is to be part of a global movement that will help defeat the US's imperial ambitions in West Asia where Iraqi resistance (and Palestinian resistance to Israel/US) is already undermining the political will and authority of the US-led occupying forces and its local puppets. In short, the best route today towards generating a greater momentum in the future against nuclear weapons is to generate an ever greater and stronger momentum of opposition to the US's imperial ambitions today. A political defeat of the US in West Asia in the coming years will have profoundly positive effects for all progressive movements concerning issues of global scope.
It is sometimes claimed that to build the widest possible nuclear disarmament movement we must not allow this single focus to be diluted by taking positions on issues, which many actual or potential supporters of nuclear disarmament would disagree with it. In today's political context, such an approach would be seriously mistaken. If it is mistaken for the worldwide anti-nuclear movement and for the specifically US branch of this global anti-nuclear movement, it is even more so for the Indian and Pakistani anti-nuclear movements. Both the Pakistan Peace Coalition (PPC) and the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP), as the two main umbrella bodies opposing regional nuclearisation, must be deeply involved in the development of the wider anti-war/anti-imperialist movement in solidarity with Iraq and Palestine. We introduce our specific concern with nuclear issues into this broader movement of opposition to US imperialism, a movement whose breadth and strength we are ourselves committed to consolidating and expanding. In India it is precisely this perspective that justifies the involvement of the CNDP in the Indian Anti-War Assembly.
But if the role of the South Asian nuclear disarmament movement in the anti-war movement is more modest, namely to be a serious participant in it; it still has the responsibility to be the leading spearhead in the more specific struggle against nuclear weapons. In this respect one cannot hope to build a strong campaign and an enduring movement simply by talking about and fighting for global nuclear disarmament or concentrating overwhelmingly on the P-5 or on the US as the biggest culprit, which it is. We have to have a movement focusing on the iniquities of our own governments in South Asia, namely the governments of India and Pakistan, and to mobilize against them. The principal regional goal of our nuclear disarmament movement can only be the call and demand for a South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. From a political-tactical point of view this is far superior to alternatives like calling for unilateral disarmament in India or Pakistan. This can, of course, be a demand expressed by individuals and groups within a wider movement united by collective agreement to this particular demand for a regional NWFZ. The merits of such a demand are several: (i) it is much more politically attractive than say, unilateral disarmament, to people in India and Pakistan; (ii) it brings in, as it should, the governments and peoples of the neighbouring countries of South Asia who do not like what happened in 1998 and resent the new danger that is also imposed on them since a nuclear exchange is not likely to leave their countries unscathed. The wider and deeper is the spread of anti-nuclear sentiment in South Asia, the better. Here, the already existing sentiments against the 'big brother' attitudes of India and Pakistan are an invaluable asset that progressives need to collectively tap into.
Moreover, two other developments since the 1998 tests make this call for a regional NWFZ the best overarching objective that should guide the propaganda and agitational activities of the anti-nuclear movements in South Asia. Since General Musharraf's accession to power in Pakistan, there have been six occasions on which he has officially declared his government's willingness to entertain and move towards such a de-nuclearised zone provided India is willing to do the same. Obviously, much of the motive for Musharraf making such a declaration is simply embarrassing an Indian government that he knows will not accept this, as well as projecting a more 'responsible' image for himself. But being an official government position it provides anti-nuclearists with a handle it would be extremely foolish not to use. The second positive development is that the CPM, the major mainstream party of the left in India has finally come out with a signed article by its current general secretary, Harkishen Singh Surjeet, (in the October 3, 2004, issue of "Peoples' Democracy" - the party paper) declaring for the first time that even as the goal of global nuclear disarmament must be pursued, we must also seek denuclearisation of this region. In mid-December 2004, at the closing plenary of the Anti-War Assembly in Hyderabad, Prakash Karat, senior politburo member and likely future general secretary of the CPM, has been reported in the press as saying the same thing. This too, is a political advance that must now be seized upon, especially by disarmament activists in India. There can be no successful movement without clarity regarding final objective, and maximum unity in support of achieving that objective. In my view, the CNDP must move towards achieving this clarity, the sooner the better. The same can be said of the PPC and it would be tremendous if both coalesce around the same central demand - hence the cross-border value of a call for a South Asian NWFZ. Of course, arriving at such an agreement will be done through the distinct national structures and norms of the PPC and of the CNDP, separately from each other.
Apart from making the establishment of a South Asian NWFZ our central demand, the very concept of an NWFZ lends itself to all kinds of fruitful tactical possibilities. Even though it might seem to go against the idea of a South Asian NWFZ, could not the idea of Nepal as a 'nuclear free-nation' along the lines of existing declarations to this effect by Mongolia and Austria, be seen as a useful plank to promote discussion around in Nepalese civil society; and one whose achievement is quite compatible with the eventual achievement and declaration of a wider and encompassing regional NWFZ? It could even be seen as a valuable transitional approach towards popularizing the general idea of NWFZs and of introducing the thin end of the wedge to legitimize NWFZs in the South Asian region. Moreover, this is something that, unlike a wider regional NWFZ, would not require agreement between several governments but is something that Nepal can on its own declare under pressure from its own populace. There is something of a political precedent for this in the earlier idea of Nepal declaring itself a 'zone of peace'. This angered the Indian government, which correctly saw this as partly or largely directed against it, expressing a suspicion of its possible intentions and of its future behaviour. It also suffered from being the proposal of a reactionary monarchist government in Nepal's past. But it was still a good proposal. Nepali anti-militarist groups can begin pushing both the ideas of a wider South Asian NWFZ and that of a Nuclear Free Nepal which in turn can have as its corollary demands not just the call for India and Pakistan to respect such a zone formally, but also to show their respect in a more practical form by 'thinning' their own deployments, i.e., by declaring that they will not deploy nuclear-armed delivery systems near the Nepali border nor overfly Nepal with such delivery systems (don't forget the India-China nuclear face-off).
Also, what about the idea of stretching the existing Southeast Asian NWFZ or Bangkok Treaty to include Bangladesh and/or Sri Lanka? Again, while such demands might seem to go against the idea of fighting for the establishment of a South Asian NWFZ, could they not also be seen as transitional demands towards this goal or as measures that are not incompatible with the idea of an eventual single regional NWFZ, and perhaps even conducive towards its formation? Again, this is something that the Bangladesh government and civil society organizations, for example, can pursue irrespective of support from neighbouring governments and publics. What in the end can the Indian and Pakistani governments do if in pursuit of its 'national interest' and in exercise of its sovereign independence Bangladesh decides to become a part of a 'stretched ' (there is a precedence for this in the stretching of the Treaty of Tlatelolco to include parts of the Caribbean) Bangkok Treaty? They would certainly be unhappy about it and the political value lies of such a measure lies precisely in its being a resounding political slap in the face to the Indian and Pakistani governments and their nuclear postures. At the same time, since it is quite conceivable that the other nuclear weapons states (P-5) and the existing members of the Southeast Asian NWFZ can see the value of such a stretching, there is real space for diplomatic negotiations between Bangladesh and the relevant countries irrespective of India and Pakistan. Once again, Bangladesh civil society can at least begin a public debate on this and the South Asian NWFZ proposal.
There is, again, yet another possible application of the NWFZ perspective in the South Asian context that, I believe, can prove very fruitful. We should also be consciously promoting the idea of a NWFZ in Kashmir, i.e., a zone covering all of Kashmir on both sides of the border. In what way would this be useful? Consider the following points. Even the Indian and Pakistani governments say they don't like the constant references from other governments and 'outside' bodies about Kashmir being a nuclear flashpoint, suggesting as it does their distinctive irresponsibility in going nuclear as compared to other nuclear powers. Well, declaration of an NWFZ in all of Kashmir, we can argue, is an excellent way of both the governments assuring each other's publics, the governments and publics of neighbouring countries, and the governments and publics of the rest of the world that India and Pakistan are 'responsible' nuclear powers determined not to allow Kashmir to become such a feared flashpoint. What is more, it does not require either government to make any practical adjustments or changes to their nuclear preparations and deployments since neither country has or intends to have nuclear related deployments in their respective occupied parts of Kashmir. The value of such a declaration lies in it political message! It also becomes a form of reassurance on the part of both governments to the people of Kashmir itself! It is, furthermore, a truly creative political initiative whose impact on announcement would be quite dramatic.
Pushing such a proposal allows us, the peace movement in South Asia to say to the two governments-"okay so unlike us, you think you must have nuclear weapons. You also say that you are responsible nuclear powers and that you will not let Kashmir drag the two countries into a nuclear war at least. Well, in that case, why are you afraid to declare Kashmir a NWFZ, especially since it does not hamper your nuclear preparations? Indeed, if you are serious about not letting Kashmir drag the two countries into any kind of war then what about a no-war pact? If on the Indian side you feel this might legitimize cross-border terrorism indirectly supported by the Pakistan establishment, then on this score you can certainly have no objections to declaring a NWFZ in all of Kashmir." Since even substantial sections of pro-nuclear people in both countries, who do not otherwise support the peace movement's call for nuclear disarmament, can be attracted to this idea it becomes on our part a creative initiative to strengthen our movements and to put pressure on our governments. But apart from its already described virtues, it is also of value for two other important reasons. Once you legitimize the existence of a part of South Asia as a NWFZ you are introducing the thin end of the wedge with regard to the general legitimization of the concept and therefore strengthening the prospects of further such applications of the principle of the NWFZ in the region. In this way it would be a tremendous gain in our effort to mobilize support for a South Asian NWFZ. Second, one of the big problems so far in the discussion by the two governments over Kashmir is how the people of Kashmir are separated from each other and not allowed to propose any 'unified' initiative. An NWFZ for all of Kashmir (including Jammu and the Northern Territories) would also be the first such measure, if sanctioned, that implicitly, if not explicitly, expresses the unity of the region since its division in 1947-48.
On this issue of South Asia and NWFZs, I believe, the respective peace and disarmament movements must now move very seriously towards the following actions and positions. (1) Adopt as its fundamental and unequivocal operational goal the establishment of a South Asian NWFZ. (2) Work towards a more selective workshop comprising legal experts, civil society activists, progressive media people, from all the main countries of South Asia - namely, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal - to discuss the various forms of NWFZ projects (including the idea of city and municipal NWFZs not discussed above) and whether and how they should be promoted and pursued collectively and/or nationally. (3) Actually go about preparing a Model South Asian NWFZ Treaty along the lines of the Model Nuclear Weapons (Abolition) Convention, but of course learning from the already existing NWFZ treaties and making our own Model Treaty even better and stronger in its provisions. We should even spell out possible verification measures and mechanisms for monitoring any such Treaty.
The point is that by undertaking and fulfilling such a task we can take the public debate to a higher level of not just demanding such a regional NWFZ, but actually declaring that there are really no serious technical difficulties in establishing regional de-nuclearisation, only the lack of political will on the part of governments. While you the governments of India and Pakistan and your accompanying 'strategic establishments' pay lip service to eventual nuclear disarmament we in the peace movement are more serious - we actually undertake the task of working out how such a disarmament regime would operate. This becomes another way of pushing the two governments, of embarrassing them, of putting pressure on them and winning over more public support. It is to the credit of MIND (Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament) and to such eminent anti-nuclear activists in India and Pakistan like M.V. Ramana, Pervez Hoodbhoy, Zia Mian, Abdul Nayyar, Prof. Rajaraman that they prepared in great detail, nuclear risk reduction proposals as a way of reducing current dangers. But these transitional measures are neither seen as, nor proposed as, substitute measures replacing the need for pursuing complete regional and global disarmament. Once again, our pro-nuclear experts have not done anything comparable, though they incessantly talk of the importance of nuclear risk reduction measures, although from their point of view, as a way of eliminating issues of actual nuclear disarmament from the public agenda. Even so, in the seven years after May 1998, all we have are prior notifications of missile test flights and hot lines for periodic and emergency communications - so much for serious thinking about nuclear risk reduction measures!
Among the transitional risk reducing measures we in the peace movement should be promoting and demanding are the following: a) In the interests of enhancing nuclear safety there should be de-mating of warheads and delivery vehicles and maximization of the time taken to then put the two components together. There should also be institutionalization of transparent monitoring of this fact of separation and public accountability of what has been done in this regard in both countries. b) There should be a certain no-deployment zone for all nuclear equipped delivery vehicles on both sides of the border between India and Pakistan. c) Both countries should go in for a bilateral nuclear test ban pact. d) There should be periodic joint inspection teams comprising scientific personnel from both countries to some of each other's nuclear related facilities to be followed by expansion of the frequency and range of such visits.
What, finally, of the issue of nuclear power or energy? As far as the Indian anti-nuclear weapons movement is concerned, this continues to be a source of division. While for many the link between the two is seen as being of such an obvious character and of such obvious import that they would insist that the CNDP move towards declared rejection and opposition to the development of nuclear energy and all its attendant policies and apparatuses, others are not prepared to accept such a position. What holds as the position of the CNDP is the lowest common denominator of insisting on maximum transparency, the highest standards of safety, and appropriate compensation for all those harmed in one way or the other by the workings of the Department of Atomic Energy in India. Given the sharp difference on this score and the need for the CNDP to work unitedly despite this, perhaps the most that can be done is to more seriously help in whatever way it can, existing groups that are concerned about safety measures, issues of transparency and public accountability, and of adequate recompense to radiation sufferers, displaced people, etc. In particular, there is need to establish a new Atomic Energy Act which eliminates current secrecy, i.e., which by clearly separating the civilian establishment from the military one (now that India has gone openly nuclear) prevents the former from hiding its activities behind the cloak of 'national security considerations'. Again, perhaps the CNDP in collaboration with say, the Right to Information Campaign (and sympathetic lawyers) could work towards drafting a new Model Atomic Energy Act to replace the old one and to thus push the issue onto the public agenda for debate and discussion.

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India seeks consular access to prisoners in Pak

NEW DELHI, FEBRUARY – 3 INDIA on Thursday sought consular access to the 182 Indian prisoners named in a list said to have been prepared on the basis of a survey by the Pakistan Interior Ministry. The News, a Pakistani daily, which published the list states that these people are languishing in Pakistani prisons on "unknown charges". The list apparently contains names of Indians in Pakistani prisons since 1971 but a preliminary check by New Delhi shows that the list does not contain the names of 54 Indian prisoners of war. It may be noted that New Delhi has handed over the list of 54 Indian PoWs to Islamabad, and according to the report, the survey was carried out after the receipt of this list. It is learnt that while seeking consular access to these prisoners, India has also asked Pakistan to officially release this list if a survey has been conducted. As the report suggests that many of these prisoners are now suffering from memory loss, sources said that Islamabad ought to take a compassionate view and allow consular access. India believes that there are over 1,500 Indians in Pakistani prisons including fishermen who strayed across territorial waters. Pakistan is providing consular access to 630 fishermen this month, which follows the release of 266 Indian fishermen in January.

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Pak report lists 180 Indians in its jails

NEW DELHI, FEBRUARY 2: IN a development that will revive hope among countless Indian families with loved ones believed to be missing in Pakistan, the Pakistani Interior Ministry has reportedly identified over 180 Indian prisoners, including five women, languishing in jails in the country on "unknown charges-" since 1971. Quoting a classified report of the ministry, Pakistani daily The News said a survey was conducted recently in the first ever official recording of data on Indian prisoners by Islamabad. This was reportedly done after India handed over a list of 54 of its citizens believed to be in Pakistani jails. India believes over 1,400 Indians, including 54 prisoners of war, are lodged in various jails in Pakistan. The report says many of the 182 Indian prisoners entered Pakistani territory mistakenly, and several are suffering from memory loss.

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Nuclear buildup continues apace

NEW DELHI - Not only are the year-old peace talks between India and Pakistan floundering, but the South Asian neighbors are also steadily increasing their nuclear arsenals, warn leading physicists on both sides of the common border.
"Those who say that the chances of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan are small might like to consider that a little over a month ago the probability of a tsunami killing over 200,000 people around the Indian Ocean was also considered small," R Rajaraman, professor emeritus of physics at the Jawaharalal Nehru University, told IPS in an interview.
Rajaraman is in agreement with visiting peace activist and physicist from the Qaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, Pervez Hoodbhoy. Both say that India and Pakistan have been beefing up their nuclear arsenals and delivery mechanisms, even while they have been engaged in a "composite dialogue" aimed at building peace that started in January 2004.
Hoodbhoy, who is currently on a lecture circuit in India on an invitation from the Ministry of Science and Technology, believes that India has a bigger nuclear weapons program than Pakistan. India, he says, has about 100 warheads, while Pakistan possesses half that number.
Both South Asian countries declared themselves as nuclear powers in 1998 and within a year came close to testing their weapons on each other after skirmishes over a few hills at Kargil on the Line of Control (LoC) that runs through the disputed territory of Kashmir. Kargil saw the use of fighter aircraft and the Pakistani and Indian navies in battle maneuvers.
In 2001, an attempt by a suicide squad to blow India's parliament using a car bomb led to India mobilizing 700,000 troops along the border. The Indian troops were prepared to attack Islamic militant camps in Pakistani-controlled areas within Kashmir amid threats and counter-threats that nuclear weapons would be resorted to.
Alarmed governments around the world advised their nationals in India and Pakistan to evacuate. They also scaled down the presence of diplomatic staff in their respective missions, fearing a nuclear exchange between both countries. Deft diplomacy, however, by the United States helped defuse what easily might have been a nuclear holocaust.
According to Hoodbhoy, the only reason Washington did not get any more involved in the Kashmir problem beyond Kargil was because "there is no oil there". Hoodbhoy, who won the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO's) prestigious Kalinga Award for Peace in 2003, said the current series of bilateral talks and confidence-building measures were meaningless as long as "both sides kept on testing missiles and sabre-rattling each other".
"What should be done is to reduce the testing of missile and fissile material," stressed Hoodbhoy. Instead of spending money on glaringly neglected social sectors like education and health, both countries have - over the past year - been busy acquiring sophisticated weapons systems or building them.
In what seems like a new edition of the Cold War, India has in collaboration with Russia built supersonic guided missiles and acquired frontline Sukhoi fighters, while Pakistan is awaiting delivery of F-16 fighters cleared by Washington for its "closest ally outside NATO" - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Neither Hoodbhoy nor Rajaraman was prepared to accept the idea of nuclear weapons acting as a deterrence and say that there is every possibility of nuclear war breaking out between India and Pakistan because of an irrational decision or even by accident. "Anyway, as long as you are talking about nuclear weapons acting as deterrence, the fact is that both countries already have more than enough weapons to serve that requirement," Rajaraman said.
Confidence in the progress of peace talks between India and Pakistan were shattered by a dispute that arose earlier this month over the sharing of the waters of the Indus river and its tributaries that were supposed to have been settled decades ago by the 1960 Indus Water Treaty.
After joint inspections, a Pakistani team said that a 450-megawatt hydroelectric dam being built at Baglihar on the Indian side of the LoC in Kashmir violated the 1960 treaty and Islamabad announced that it would seek the arbitration of the World Bank, which mediated the treaty but is not its guarantor. But the Bank doesn't seem to want to get involved in the dispute.
"The treaty does not envisage a role for the World Bank in the determination of any issues which might be brought before a neutral expert. The bank will not participate in any discussion or exchange beyond its role in the process of appointing a neutral expert,' it said in a January 28 statement.
The dispute between the two countries over Kashmir goes back to 1947 when the two countries were partitioned on the basis of religion into Muslim Pakistan and Hindu-majority India following decolonization and the end of British rule on the sub-continent.
After the formal grant of independence in August 1947, Kashmir continued to remain as an independent princely state, but within two months the first of a series of wars over the territory had broken out between India and Pakistan.
With more than half a century of war and diplomacy failing to resolve the dispute over Kashmir, leading analysts have been calling for fresh approaches to the long-festering problem. Hoodbhoy believes that the Kashmir issue is best kept aside for now. "People-to-people contact, including student exchange programs, demilitarization in the area and the softening of borders should be encouraged first," he said.
The future of the peace talks now hinge on meetings between Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Shaukat Aziz on the sidelines of the summit of the seven-nation, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation scheduled to be held from February 6-7 in the Bangladeshi capital of Dhaka.
(Inter Press Service)

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