index
NEW DELHI, JUNE 28. India and Pakistan said today that the Foreign
Secretaries, Shashank and Riaz Khokhar, had held a "detailed exchange" of
views on Jammu and Kashmir and agreed to continue their "sustained and
serious" dialogue to find a peaceful, negotiated and "final" settlement of
the issue. In a departure from the past, New Delhi submitted to Islamabad
a set of Kashmir-specific proposals on transport links, trade, cultural
cooperation, tourism, environment and people-to-people contacts. A joint
statement issued after two days of talks said the strength of the High
Commissions would be "immediately restored" to 110 and that the two sides
had agreed, in principle, to re-establish the consulates in Karachi and
Mumbai, the modalities for which would be worked out by the two
Governments. "All apprehended fishermen in each other's custody would be
immediately released and a mechanism put in place for the return of
unintentionally transgressing fishermen and their boats from the high seas
without apprehending them. Steps would be initiated for early release of
civilian prisoners," it said.
Will the current Indo-Pak peace process end in
recrimination, as its predecessors did, when it
reaches the roadblock, Kashmir? That is certain
to happen unless each side seriously begins
to consider a solution to the tangle which it can
realistically expect the other to accept, no less
than its own people. The prime objective of CBMs,
trade and cultural exchanges is to create a
climate of trust in which that one major dispute
can be resolved; and to bring the parties to the
point where the end game begins. That is
precisely where previous efforts failed.
There has been no dearth of solutions to the
Kashmir issue aired on the subcontinent or
abroad. They were either self-serving -
plebiscite or LoC - or harebrained
(confederation, independence or the US Study
Group's Report). Solutions have been bandied
about without a thought to their acceptability,
practicality or the political process which could
yield them. At the minimum, the governments of
both countries must be strong and committed to a
solution, patient and creative in its pursuit,
and skilful in moulding public opinion in its
support.
India's fear that substantive negotiations will
reopen the state's accession to India is unreal.
President Musharraf has virtually abandoned the
UN's plebiscite resolutions. Pakistan's fear and
India's expectation that the dispute will fade
away have been belied by the people of Kashmir
who are now more assertive than ever before. The
state's Law Minister, Muzaffar Hussain Beigh, a
Harvard man, said on May 2, 2003: "While the
alienation can be traced back to 1951, the
militancy started in 1989 and even if the
militancy was rooted out, you will have the
problem of alienation."
A settlement must be based on both the realities
- secession is ruled out, but secessionism
exists. It must be reckoned with honestly and met
in a statesmanlike manner.
There has been little understanding of the
significance of the Abdullah duo's utterances
during the Lok Sabha election campaign. Why did a
Farooq who once advocated "war with Pakistan" cry
at election rallies: "Do not trust New Delhi
because it has always betrayed Kashmiris" and
praise Pervez Musharraf? Sunanda K. Datta Ray
reported from Srinagar: "No one in Kashmir's
electoral fray would dream of condemning the
militants." New Delhi's interlocutor, Umar
Farooq, led the funeral prayers of Rafiq Ahmed
Lidri, operation chief of the pro-Pakistan
Al-Umar Mujahideen, on February 6.
The truth is that even at the best of times there
was a pro-Pakistan constituency in Kashmir. On
August 5, 1948 Sheikh Abdullah pleaded with the
Maharaja, "I have got to turn the minds of
Muslims of the state from Pakistan to the Indian
Dominion." New Delhi's policies helped that
constituency to expand. India cannot yield to it
and concede secession. Nor will Pakistan accept
in a deal what it already has. Kashmiris
themselves reject the LoC. In 1963 Swaran Singh
offered Z.A. Bhutto 3,000 square miles of
territory. But the Valley is the core of this
'core dispute'. Pakistan does not seek tourist
right there. A Kashmir accord will soften the
Indo-Pak boundary. A soft LoC is no concession.
India and Pakistan must evolve the 'Elements of
Settlement' that go beyond the status quo without
entailing the state's secession.
That was the title of a document which the US and
Britain presented in April 1963 during the Swaran
Singh-Bhutto parleys. It said: "Neither India nor
Pakistan can entirely give up its claim to the
Kashmir Valley. Each must have a substantial
position in the Valley." None can accept the
obscenity of its partition. But the fundamental
can be adopted - India cannot give Pakistan a
territorial stake in the Valley, bar
rationalisation of the LoC. But it can give it a
juridical stake in the state, excluding the
strategic Ladakh district, without affecting its
own sovereignty. Pakistan must concede a similar
stake to India in respect of PoK, excluding the
Northern Areas. Parity of treatment preserves the
state's unity. The LoC, thus modified, becomes an
international boundary, notionally.
There are precedents of states resolving similar
disputes with their neighbours by agreeing to
limit the exercise of their sovereignty over a
piece of their territory and granting its people
autonomy, which is guaranteed by agreement with
the neighbour, and accepting its juridical locus
standi in respect of that guarantee. Its
sovereignty over the area is accepted by the
neighbour as part of the deal.
On February 20, 1948, Sheikh Abdullah told the
Under-Secretary of State in the Commonwealth
Relations Office, Patrick Gordon-Walker, in
Nehru's presence, that "the solution was that
Kashmir should accede to both DominionsŠ India
was progressiveŠ on the other hand, Kashmir's
trade passed through Pakistan and a hostile
Pakistan would be a constant danger. The
solution, therefore, was that Kashmir should have
its autonomy jointly guaranteed by India and
Pakistan and it would delegate its foreign policy
and defence to them both jointly but would look
after its own internal affairs."
That joint delegation is a constitutional
impossibility. But Kashmiris can negotiate with
both countries for maximum autonomy possible to
each part of the state, including the right to
conduct foreign trade. The issue of sovereignty
resolved, the LoC becomes an international border
with freedom of movement on both sides,
guarantees to human right, etc.
Now, for the precedents. The Anglo-Afghan Treaty,
signed at Kabul on November 22, 1921, reaffirmed
the validity of the Durand Line. However, by a
collateral letter given to Afghanistan at the
same time, the British representative wrote: "As
the conditions of the tribes of the two
Governments are of interest to the Government of
Afghanistan, I inform you that the British
Government entertains feelings of good- will
towards all the frontier tribes and has every
intention of treating them generously, provided
they abstain from outrages against the
inhabitants of India."
Sweden and Finland settled their dispute over the
predominantly Swedish Aaland Islands under the
auspices of the League of Nations on June 27,
1921. Finland promised "to guarantee to the
population of the Aaland Islands the preservation
of their language, of their culture, and of their
local Swedish traditions". It undertook to
enforce its Law of Autonomy of May 7, 1920. On
September 5, 1946, Italy and Austria signed an
agreement, under which Italy undertook to grant
its German-speaking Bolzano province adjoining
Austria, and the neighbouring bilingual townships
of the Trento province "autonomous legislative
and executive regional power", besides rights.
The details were settled in 1992, including
provision for international adjudication if the
autonomy is violated.
If these models are adopted, each country will
gain enough to sell the accord to its people;
yet, concede enough to make it acceptable to the
other country as well as to the people of the
state. Kashmiris will acquire double guarantees
of autonomy - domestic and international.
Pakistan can claim: "We have secured azadi for
Kashmir for which we are a guarantor." India can
claim "Kashmir's accession is no longer in
dispute". The peace dividends both will reap will
be colossal.
Two parallel international conferences on the
Kashmir issue held in London and Birmingham
recently by the organisations based in Britain
provided an opportunity to know their latest
thinking on the subject as also of those who
attended them from both sides of the LoC. The
London conference was organised by the
International Kashmir Alliance and attended by
the Pakistan People's Party leader Benazir Bhutto
and the Muslim League leader and former minister Shafqat Mehmood from
Pakistan, Justice Abdul Majid Malik, former chief
justice of Azad Kashmir High Court from the
Pak-held part of the state, Mirza Wajahat Hasan
from Gilgit and Baltistan, a large contingent
from Kashmir Valley which included National
Conference delegation led by Farooq Abdullah and
representatives of the PDP, a group from Jammu
which included official spokesperson of the BJP,
four members of the Panthers Party and one each
from Leh and Kargil districts of Ladakh region,
apart from expatriates from the state settled in
the UK, including a few Kashmiri Pandits and a
large number of Mirpuris from the Pak part of the
state.
The Birmingham conference held, barely a week
later on 6-7 June, had a nominal representation
from the Indian part of the state but a larger
representation from the other side and from
Kashmiris settled abroad. Whosoever sponsored
these conferences and whatever be their motives,
one could discern realisation of new realities in
the state amidst the usual rhetoric. Firstly, the
fact that it is a plural, multi-ethnic,
multi-regional and multi-religious state. At
least five regions were clearly identified by
most of the speakers, namely Kashmir valley,
Jammu, Ladakh, "Azad Kashmir" and Gilgit
Baltistan. The demand of each region for
recognition of its identity received sympathetic
attention. In particular the plight of Gilgit -
Baltistan, which had lost its identity and was
renamed as Northern Area was highlighted by
Wajahat Hasan. The region where the state subject
law has been repealed and which has no
representation in the National Assembly of
Pakistan; nor any democratic institution at local
level was, according to Hasan, worse off than it
was during the Maharaja's time.
Need for internal dialogue
The conference stressed the need for internal
dialogue between people on either side of the LoC
and belonging to various regional and ethnic
identities to evolve a consensus on the future of
the state. The idea was also mooted that before a
discussion on the future of the state, the future
of each region within the state should also be
discussed. A plea was made for a democratic
federal and decentralised set-up to reconcile
divergent aspirations of different regions and
communities and help in evolving a harmonious
nature of the state which alone could aspire for
a stable and satisfactory status. Otherwise a
decision of the majority of various groups with
conflicting urges and interests could not be
called valid. For majoritarianism is a negation
of democracy. The final declaration at the
Birmingham Conference, too, assured protection to
all ethnic, regional and religious communities of
the state.
Secondly, the impact of 9/11 was widely
recognised. The British MP from a constituency of
predominantly Pakistani expatriates in the UK,
Khalid Mehmood, urged the audience at Birmingham
to realise that the world opinion no longer
sympathises with the use of violence by the
freedom movements.
He therefore advised the supporters of the
Kashmir movement to highlight human rights
violations by the Indian security forces to
regain world sympathy. Many participants in that
conference quoted figures from eighty thousand to
one lakh Kashmiris who were allegedly massacred
by the Indian forces. As a person who has been
monitoring human rights violations on either
side, I could also cite a series of incidents of
mass killings by the militants of Hindus or
Sikhs. There was obviously not much awareness
about other incidents of mass killings by the
militants. But none contradicted my suggestion to
isolate the incidents of killing of unarmed and
uninvolved innocent civilians whatever be their
religious or political beliefs and raise a voice
of protest jointly against that.
At the London conference where there were more
persons who had first hand experience of the
ongoing violence, its rejection was categoric.
Even those who believed in an independent state
had come to the conclusion that the role of the
gun - and that too a borrowed one - to achieve
their objective was over.
The proposed opening of the Srinagar-Rawalpindi
road was welcomed in this context. But the
Mirpuri audience, in both the conferences, was
more enthusiastic about my proposal to also open
a road between Nowshera (on the Indian side) and
Mirpur (on the Pakistan side), a distance of 25
miles, to enable people of the same ethnic stock
on both sides of the LoC to meet each other.
Religious divisions opposed
Both the conferences opposed division of the
state on religious or ethnic grounds. In fact the
factor of religion was downplayed in the
discussion on the Kashmir problem; except for the
issue of Kashmiri Pandits, whose right to return
to their homes with full security was conceded.
However those who pleaded for a unified state did
not spell out what would be its status vis a vis
India and Pakistan. On the whole, there was a
greater emphasis on starting a process than on
final goals.
Those who claim to be better representatives of
the people and suspect the bonafides of the
sponsors of British conferences owe it to
themselves and to the people of the state to
initiate internal dialogue, at least on its
Indian side, between different regions,
communities and viewpoints. For nobody can claim
to represent all the diversities of the state.
But there is hardly any dialogue not only among
these diversities but also among the same ethnic
and religious community. Unless a culture for
dialogue and respect for dissent and diversity is
restored, there is little scope for any headway
towards a solution of the Kashmir problem.
NEW DELHI, JUNE 27. The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan,
Shashank and Riaz Khok-har, discussed a wide range of subjects,
including terrorism and the reduction of troop levels, under the broad
rubric of peace and security in three-and-a-half hours of talks at
Hyderabad House here today. A joint statement on a number of points of
agreement such as raising the staff strength of High Commissions,
reopening of consulates and a calendar to discuss other issues such as
Siachen, Sir Creek, economic cooperation and cultural exchanges is
expected after the Foreign Secretaries talk on Jammu and Kashmir tomorrow.
It is the first time in recent history that the Foreign Secretaries of the
two countries have met with guns silent along the Line of Control (LoC).
The ceasefire, agreed to be tween the two countries on November 26 last
year, continues to hold. Though the spokesmen of the External Affairs
Ministry and the Pakistani Foreign Office, Navtej Sarna and Masood Khan,
briefed presspersons separately, the opening statements made by both of
them were identical - indicating that both sides were in broad agreement
on how to approach the talks. Both spokesmen said the Foreign Secretaries
"met today to commence the composite dialogue.
Dispelling fears that it would be stalled, the
India-Pakistan dialogue process has got off the
mark within barely a month of the swearing-in of
the Manmohan Singh government in New Delhi.
Sustained preparations preceded the take-off.
Besides a reported "secret" meeting between
National Security Advisers J.N. Dixit and Tariq
Aziz, there were at least three telephonic
conversations between Foreign Ministers Natwar
Singh and Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri in the past
fortnight. Then came the June 20 agreement on
nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs). This
was followed by a meeting between the two Foreign
Ministers in China over a "working lunch" in a
"very cordial, friendly and warm atmosphere".
Their "chemistry" was "pretty good". After
assessing "the progress on all aspect of
bilateral relations including Jammu and Kashmir",
and implementation of the dialogue framework,
they described the result as "positive" and
"productive".
Clearly, both governments have decided to impart
a serious momentum to the dialogue process
leading to formal ministerial-level discussions
in August. The Foreign Secretaries' meeting
should see progress towards a comprehensive
dialogue on a range of issues. Both governments
want the next summit-level talks to be a success;
they are agreed that they can't afford a failure.
This should put at rest fears, especially in
Pakistan, that the United Progressive Alliance
government would not have the same commitment to
seeking reconciliation with Pakistan as Mr Atal
Behari Vajpayee's regime.
As this Column has argued, there is
across-the-broad support in both countries for a
dialogue for peace and reconciliation. Civil
society solidly favours it. In India, many UPA
constituents and supporters have always been keen
on it. Some of them took sober positions when the
NDA, including Mr Vajpayee, was hysterically
threatening Pakistan with an "aar-paar ki ladai"
(battle to the finish), and had declared peaceful
co-existence with it virtually impossible. The
resumption of the peace process is good news
indeed.
Amidst these hope-bearing developments, it might
seem somewhat off-key to sound a note of caution.
Yet, that has become necessary after the nuclear
CBMs agreement. The measures, it must be stressed
at the outset, are welcome even though half of
them restate what was agreed in Lahore in 1999.
They put the issue of nuclear risk-reduction on
the negotiating table and promote a degree of
transparency, itself a rare commodity in the
subcontinent. South Asia would be worse off
without the CBMs.
However, the CBMs are modest and hesitant, and
may prove inadequate in reducing the nuclear
danger in our tension-ridden region. It would be
a grave error to celebrate the CBM agreement as a
way of stabilising the strategic balance between
India and Pakistan. They don't even establish any
kind of "control" over the nuclear "genie" they
unleashed in 1998. Contrary to exuberant claims,
the two nuclear "twins" have not learnt how "to
tango" happily-in sane and secure ways.
First, the positive side. Pakistan and India have
reiconfirmed the agreement evolved in Lahore-1999
to notify each other in advance of impending
missile test-flights, and to continue with their
"unilateral" moratoria on nuclear test
explosions. Besides, they will establish a
"dedicated and secure" hotline between their
Foreign Secretaries and upgrade the existing
hotline between their Directors-General of
Military Operations, which functions somewhat
erratically. Secondly, they will "work towards
concluding an agreement with technical parameters
on pre-notification of flight-testing of
missiles". In plain English, they will furnish to
each other details on the timing of their missile
test-flights and flight-paths. This will mark a
minor improvement on the practice followed even
before the 1998 blasts.
However, these are, strictly speaking, not
confidence-building but transparency measures.
They cannot generate confidence that India and
Pakistan are really moving towards a restraint
regime which will substantially reduce and
eventually eliminate the nuclear danger. The
hotline between the two Foreign Secretaries will
doubtless help clear some misunderstandings,
especially in crises. But these officers are not
the key decision-makers in nuclear-military
matters. They can at best act as conveyors of
information and facilitators of decision-making
by the political leadership. (In Pakistan, the
military leadership.) This arrangement might
discourage "loudspeaker diplomacy"-in favour of
quiet consultations. But it cannot be a
substitute for genuine nuclear risk-reduction
measures (NRRMs).
I have three simple reasons for saying so. First,
the grave nuclear danger that India-Pakistan face
is that of potential use of nuclear weapons,
whether by intent or accident. This danger is not
imaginary. The two came close to the brink of a
nuclear confrontation at least three times since
1998: over Kargil (when Pakistan apparently got
its nuclear-tipped missiles ready), and in
January and June 2002, when one million soldiers
eyeballed one another. The only way of reducing
this danger is to agree to non-deployment of
nuclear weapons-by keeping nuclear warheads
separated from delivery systems (missiles,
aircraft, ships, etc.). Once nuclear weapons are
deployed in the field, there is a definite risk
that they might be used-unauthorisedly,
unintentionally, or by design. The two
governments should have agreed to non-deployment
at least for one to three years. They didn't.
Second, there is an urgent need to halt the twin
nuclear and missile arms races between India and
Pakistan. Once medium- and long-range missiles
are fully developed and deployed, the likelihood
of their use becomes high-unacceptably high in
South Asia. This is because there is little
strategic distance between India and Pakistan.
Missile flight-time between some of their major
cities is as little as 3 to 8 minutes-too little
to clear misperceptions, prevent unauthorised
use, or take other corrective action before
disaster strikes.
Logically, India and Pakistan should have frozen
missile development through a moratorium on
further test-flights for, say, two to three
years. This could have been done without
compromising security. But they failed to
negotiate this. Even worse, the agreed
nuclear-test moratorium clause takes away with
one hand what the other hand has given. The test
ban will hold-"unless, in exercise of national
sovereignty, [either state] decides that
extraordinary events have jeopardised its supreme
interests". This qualification is fatal.
Third, the two states should have agreed to
measures to address four specific risks
highlighted by peace activists: use of nuclear
weapons through miscalculation because of faulty
information processing or technologies;
unauthorised use of nuclear weapons by "rogue"
groups or fanatics; accidents, such as fires and
explosions near nuclear weapons; and rumours of
imminent use and the resultant panic response,
including panic reactions in crowed urban
centres. They did none of this. There have been
serious accidents in both countries' military
installations and nuclear facilities, including
scores of aircraft crashes, fires, and
adventurist actions by commanders. Good NRRMs
must address these risks-for instance, by making
authorisation procedures transparent, and by
installing systems to detect preparations for
unwarranted launches. The two failed to negotiate
or agree to such NRRMs.
The result is a very inadequate set of steps that
do not reduce nuclear dangers much. This
inadequacy's roots lie in two assumptions: first,
that "deterrence", including hair-trigger
readiness, is more important than safety; and
secondly, that nuclear weapons possession
"constitutes a factor for stability". The first
assumption is dangerously untenable in the
India-Pakistan context, marked by a history of
war, strategic miscalculation and
volatility-making for inherent instability during
their 57 year-long hot-cold war. The second is
falsified by experience. Nuclear weapons have not
promoted stability in South Asia. Rather, they
have been immensely destabilising. Their
possession has encouraged nuclear sabre-rattling
and adventurism. Kargil would not have happened
without the belief among Pakistani generals that
nuclear weapons provide them a secure shield for
armed incursion.
The real downside of the CBMs is that India and
Pakistan are anxious to appear "responsible"
nuclear weapons-states so they get to keep their
nuclear weapons. That's why there isn't a single
word about nuclear disarmament in the agreement,
not even as a long-term goal. Equally important
is the clause jointly calling for "regular
working-level meetings to be held among all
nuclear powers to discuss issues of common
concern", and also for "bilateral consultations"
on "security and non-proliferation issues within
the context of negotiations Š in multilateral
fora." In other words, India and Pakistan want a
place in the Global Nuclear Club-itself the
greatest danger to world security. They have no
intention of promoting regional nuclear restraint
or global disarmament. But we should know better.
True safety and security lies in the total
elimination of nuclear weapons. NRRMs are best a
transitional step to that goal.
One final word. Experience everywhere shows that
CBMs and their verification don't create trust.
Rather, it is the pre-disposition to trust that
guarantees that CBMs will work effectively and
promote greater trust. For instance, India and
Pakistan agreed to conventional CBMs in the early
1990s-such as prior warning of large-scale
military exercises near the border and a
commitment not to violate each other's airspace.
These CBMs were not adhered to because there was
no pre-disposition to trust; mistrust and
hostility prevailed. Now that a more favourable
climate exists, thanks to the peace process,
India and Pakistan should have aimed high. They
didn't. Their CBMs could fall below the critical
threshold.
For the last few months, we have been shown
tantalising glimpses of the possibility of peace
between Pakistan and India - with Kashmir, the
'core issue' lurking contentiously in the
background, bogging down both countries in their
own narrow notions of nationalism and threatening
whatever progress is made towards peace. To
emerge from this quagmire, it is necessary to put
aside prejudices, fears and positions, and engage
in a genuine dialogue that breaks through these
national versions of the Kashmir story that have
been developed on all sides of the conflict.
This is what the documentary 'Crossing The Lines:
Kashmir, Pakistan, India' (Eqbal Ahmad
Foundation, 2004; 45 minutes) by the well known
academics and peace activists Pervez Hoodbhoy and
Zia Mian courageously attempts to do. Screened at
private venues in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad
over the last couple of months, the film is a
straightforward narrative presented by Hoodbhoy -
far more effectively than in his previous
documentary, 'Pakistan and India Under the
Nuclear Shadow' (2001), scripted by Mian.
"Nations and nationalism, borders and boundaries
- these are ways of separating people and land.
These are all old ideas, ideas that have failed
us again and again," says Mian, with reference to
the Kashmir film. He points out that there is a
new government in India, but no one expects
Indian position on Kashmir to change very much.
Similarly in Pakistan, civilian or military,
there is no change on Kashmir. Following up on
Gen. Musharraf's admission that Pakistan cannot
realistically hope for a plebiscite to end the
Kashmir dispute and, therefore, is willing to
explore other ways, Hoodbhoy in an article last
December had argued that for Pakistan to insist
on plebiscite "is the surest way of guaranteeing
that a bloody stand-off continues."
The film presents the urgent need for a dialogue
to discuss other options, challenging the people,
and civil and military establishments on both
sides to break out of their own national versions
of the Kashmir story. There are many who will
remain trapped in these notions, and refuse to
see the film in this spirit. They will attack
Hoodbhoy and Mian because they present both sides
of the story in a way that the public in either
country never sees.
Particularly moving and difficult to watch are
the scenes of a recent bombing, that Hoodbhoy's
cameraman in Kashmir caught by chance, although
one would have liked to see more on struggle of
Kashmiri women. Conservative Indian thought will
also resent the film's presentation of the
disillusionment of the Kashmirs with Indian rule,
as encapsulated through a candid interview with
the wild-bearded Hizb commander Syed Salahuddin.
The film traces the background of the conflict,
using interviews of key figures and ordinary
people from all sides, rare archival footage and
excellent computer animation. Neither Hoodbhoy
nor Mian have ever been afraid of controversy, or
of tackling contentious issues head on, whether
it is to demand equal rights for religious
minorities or contest distorted facts in our
history textbooks. Their respective stands on
peace with India and the nuclear issue are well
known. In taking on Kashmir, they continue this
tradition, of asking awkward questions that force
people to think about issues that it is more
comfortable to ignore.
These issues include the building of national
identity through cultivating prejudice and hatred
towards the other - by both India and Pakistan.
The result is views from both sides that mirror
each other. This in fact, is one of the strong
points of the film - its inclusion of footage and
interviews from India and Kashmir. Since the end
of the Afghan war, Pakistan's continued patronage
of religious militants has strengthened local and
foreign militants who not only threaten the
social fabric in Pakistan but have also upped the
ante in Kashmir. Their conviction that Kashmir is
part of a greater struggle, is reflected by
radical Hindu leaders in India - a side that we
in Pakistan don't hear about very often.
Also clear is Hoodbhoy and Mian's stand on the
nuclear issue, as the film shows how the nuclear
tests only served to intensify tensions between
both countries. In the end, one is left with more
questions than answers - but perhaps that is the
intention of the filmmakers.
"The past almost sixty years have brought war and
hate, big armies, nuclear weapons and mass
poverty. The past can be no guide to show us the
way to the future," says Mian. "It's time to make
a break with the old ways and the old dreams. We
need to search for new ideas, and find the
courage to take a step forward."
This can happen if a genuine, open-minded
dialogue is initiated, possibly catalysed by this
film through screenings at joint meetings of
parliamentarians, foreign offices and military
establishments. Most importantly it needs to be
brought out of private halls, and onto television
in both countries as well as in Kashmir.
NEW DELHI: Lamenting the absence of a "credible nuclear weapon triad", the
Navy says it's "vital" for India to possess nuclear submarines capable of
launching missiles with nuclear warheads to achieve strategic deterrence.
While India does have 'Agni' missiles and Mirage-2000 and Sukhoi-30MKI
aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons, the Navy has long bemoaned the
absence of sea-based strategic platforms. This has now found reflection in
Navy's newly-finalised maritime doctrine. Pointing to "major players" on
the global stage, the doctrine says: "India stands out alone as being
devoid of a credible nuclear triad." It especially underlines the massive
strides taken by China to strengthen its Navy, the only Asian country with
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
The usual suspect, Pakistan, also finds mention as the "long-established
threat" on the western seaboard, which is steadily inducting military
hardware from abroad. With the US now designating Pakistan a "Major
Non-Nato Ally", a "quantum increase" in its naval capabilities can be
expected.
The doctrine says a nation's ability to adopt "a truly independent"
foreign policy in the post-Cold War era is inexorably linked with having
credible strategic capabilities. "Thus there is a strong case for India to
acquire a non-provocative, strategic capability, and the most viable
platform by all accounts is the submarine," it adds.
Senior Navy officers contend the nuclear triad's most effective arm is the
one which moves silently under the "relatively opaque" sea.
They say US and Russia, under arms reduction agreements, will eventually
retain 3,500 and 3,000 strategic warheads respectively. And of these, as
many as 66% will be SLBMs.
Having nuclear submarines becomes important for India since it has a
declared policy of 'no first-use' of nuclear weapons. But India's plan to
build a nuclear submarine, the Advanced Technology Vessel project, and a
submarine-launched missile, christened "Sagarika", is nowhere near
completion even after two decades.
ISLAMABAD, JUNE 20. The Joint Committee on
Kashmir appointed by the Pakistan-India People's
Forum has recommended the release of all
prisoners held without charge and the declaration
of a general amnesty for all those held in
detention under special laws, civil or military
detention laws or without trial.
At its meeting in Lahore today, the Committee
also favoured free movement of people of Kashmir
on either side of the border without requirement
of passport or visa and rapid reduction in the
size and presence of troops throughout the
`former' state.
Tapan Bose, Pushpa Bhave, Sumit Chakravarty and
Amit Chakravarty attended the meeting from India.
Anees Haroon, Abdul Majeed Malik, Haji Mohammad
Adeel, Farooq Niazi, Munir Hussain, Shahid Fiaz
Kishwar Naheed and Mubashir Hasan represented
Pakistan.
The Committee has been asked to facilitate a
dialogue between the people from both sides of
the LoC and interact with all organisations
involved in the efforts to achieve peace and
democratic resolution of the Kashmir issue.
It deliberated in the light of the stand of the
Forum that Kashmir not merely being a territorial
dispute between India and Pakistan, a peaceful
democratic solution in accordance with the
aspirations of all the peoples of the former
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir has to be
achieved.
It recommended that there was need to mobilise,
besides political parties, activists in the civil
society, especially among the groups such as Bar
Councils, Bar associations of districts,
teachers, human rights organisations, women,
chambers of commerce and industry, labour unions,
youth and others.
The panel demanded that the judicial process
provided in the laws should be activated for all
other Kashmiris who are in custody in Kashmir,
India or Pakistan and tribunals to investigate
missing persons set up.
NEW DELHI, JUNE 20: EXACTLY six years after they conducted tit-for-tat
nuclear tests, India and Pakistan today successfully concluded their first
official-level dialogue on the subject and stated that their nuclear
capabilities constituted a "factor for stability" in the region. A joint
statement issued after two days of talks now sets the stage for the first
meeting of Foreign Secretaries on peace, security and Kashmir, which
constitute the most important part of the Composite Dialogue process, at
the end of this week in New Delhi. Announcing a series of nuclear
confidence-building measures today so as to make increasingly transparent
their respective nu clear doctrines, the two sides agreed to establish a
dedicated and secure hotline between the two Foreign Secretaries "to
prevent misunderstandings and reduce risks relevant to nuclear issues." An
existing hotline between the two Directors-General of Military Operations
(DGMOs), which has functioned every Tuesday through the most tense
conditions, including during the Kargil war, will be "upgraded, dedicated
and secured."
Peace efforts should not be allowed to lose momentum
MUZAFFAR (name changed) is a handsome 22-year old
who lives in a middle class Srinagar locality.
Over the past couple of years, he has developed a
close friendship with a married woman of the
neighbourhood who is separated from her husband.
Her little children are very fond of Muzaffar and
enjoy outings with him, but it is of course the
sort of relationship that is frowned upon in a
conservative society.
Having known the young man's family for several
years, I can vouch for the fact that he is not
involved in any way with the secessionist
movement. Indeed, he holds the view - common
enough, incidentally, among the generation that
grew up amid the staccato rattle of gunfire -
that economic development is what Kashmiris need
rather than a changed political status.
Nonetheless, Muzaffar has been picked up by the
security forces several times and tortured.
Each time, it turns out, his lady friend's
husband has reported him as a terrorist. For
although the couple are separated, the man shares
the male mentality so common across the
subcontinent, that she is his property and that
it is his right and duty to beat up any other
male friends that she might have.
The difference is that, in the peculiar
circumstances of Kashmir, such a man finds it
easier to get the security forces to do his dirty
work for him. Any security force set to combat a
guerrilla war thrives on information about who is
covertly involved with one or other guerrilla
group and so they lap up such tips and act on
them expeditiously.
Torture being the favoured method of security
forces in not just Iraq, the typical reaction to
such a tip about a young man like Muzaffar is
that he is picked up and bundled into a closed
security force vehicle and driven straight to a
torture chamber. The forces' logic is that they
must extract information about the whereabouts of
other members of the group and of weapons dumps
before the group realises their fellow has been
caught and changes hideouts. The result is that
the torture victim's family is left searching
high and low for him for perhaps a couple of days
- or, at times, forever. Muzaffar has been
treated to electric shocks and the application of
chilly paste to wounds and other exposed areas of
a naked body, apart from thrashing and
humiliation.
When the Border Security Force has picked up
Muzaffar - twice so far over the past couple of
years - he has been released after the first
round of torture. It does not take long for them
to figure out that the fellow is innocent - at
least of the sort of crime they are trying to
stop. The local police, on the other hand, are a
different kettle of fish. The police picked up
Muzaffar on his little nephew's birthday a few
weeks ago and, although they too knew the fellow
was innocent, they wanted money and other favours
to let him go. Given the pattern of police forces
in many parts of the subcontinent, the man who
had reported him had also no doubt paid them.
Muzaffar's is not an isolated case.
Unfortunately, this sort of thing has been almost
a pattern through the traumatic 15 years that
Kashmir has spent in the grip of turmoil.
Property disputes and rivalry of one sort or
another have all too frequently led to such
malicious reports.
The forces cannot know which complaints are
genuine and which are motivated, unless they
investigate. But such action only creates fresh
bitterness and alienation among people who have
nothing to do with secessionist politics or
militancy.
One must remain constantly alert to the fact that
the extraordinary powers that have been given to
the security forces in Kashmir can and do lead to
abuse. The powers that be should never become
complacent about these extraordinary powers.
Although Dr Manmohan Singh's government intends
to repeal the draconian Prevention of Terrorism
Act (POTA), the answer finally is to repeal all
the special powers acts in Kashmir. The best road
towards that is the peace process. It must not be
allowed to lose momentum. The talks between the
Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan over
the next few days should push forward the process.
How successful are operations against al Qa'eda
and Taliban supporters in South Waziristan?
As far as this operation is concerned it is
fairly successful. We do not know the results as
yet. The operation is still on. We need to see
the results once we flush out everyone and enter
those complexes, then only we know what damage
has been caused, the exact number of casualties.
Firing was very accurate from our side, therefore
a lot of damage must have been done.
Will this have an inflammatory effect on the rest
of the country and in tribal territory?
No, I don't think it is going to spread in the
tribal territory because of the right policies we
followed. We followed the political path first.
The jirga took certain decisions and the jirga
ordered a lashkar to be formed and a laskhar was
formed and it went inside but it failed and
therefore according to regulations we were
authorised to take certain actions against the
subtribe which had failed to deliver, and that
was followed by this military action.
In fact, we suffered casualties because of
certain actions by the militants and therefore
all the more reason that we undertook this
military operation. I don' t think it is going to
spread to other tribal regions. But it can have a
fall out - these people have contacts elsewhere
in the country and they can retaliate in the rest
of the country in the form of bomb blasts,
attacks on important persons and installations -
and so we have to guard against that.
Looking at the law and order situation in
Pakistan with frequent bomb blasts, the recent
attack on your Corps Commander in Karachi - how
connected is this with what is going on in tribal
territory?
We are not very sure if it is related to Wana. We
have apprehended the people who were involved. We
will show them on television also at the right
time. But we are not really sure if there is
linkage with Taliban, al Qa'eda and the people
who carried out this terrorist attack against the
Corps Commander.
Now seems an ideal time to work towards
incorporating tribal territory into Pakistan, but
in view of the confused situation, are you having
to go slow on plans to 'democratise' tribal
territory?
Under the present circumstances we have to go
slow. Because we don't know the undercurrents
working there. It is a society which has been
deprived in the past, ill educated, backward so
we would not like to take actions where religious
extremists get some kind of a hold in some areas,
which could be counter-productive to the
democratic process.
Because there would be a vacuum if you moved against the tribal leaders?
Yes, so we would much prefer acting with the
tribal leadership - the maliks - who we are sure
are not religious extremists.
Recently there have been a number of suicide
bombings, is this a new phenomenon and much more
difficult to control?
Yes - it is a new phenomenon. But it is not
widespread; there have been a few incidents in
Pakistan but it is not as bad as Palestine or
Israel or Iraq. Because most of the incidents
which you are seeing are not suicide bombings.
There are a few. However yes it is the most
dangerous act because counter measures are
difficult. We have to take coun ter measures in
the form of breaking the groups. And may I very
proudly say that the Intelligence agencies are
doing an excellent job in breaking these groups.
As I said the Corps Commander's attack was just a
few days back and we have already got the people
who were in the action.
So I think it's a great achievement if we can
keep breaking these various factions who are
either operating under sectarian extremism or
religious extremism. Both these groups have to be
battled with.
You are not prepared to release the names of
those involved in the Karachi attack.
Not as yet. There are a few more left. We are
very hopeful that we will get them in a few days.
Until that time I don't want to comment.
In your talks with the government of India over
Kashmir: you are intending to approach the
Kashmir issue with flexibility - can you outline
what Pakistan's position might be in terms of
that flexibility?
I have used this word 'flexibility' very boldy.
It does not go well in our domestic environment
because there is a UN Security Council resolution
of 1948 which says there has to be a plebisicte.
Now our stand is unchanged. It does not meant
that when I say flexibility that we have given up
on our previous stand We are still holding onto
the stand that there is a United Nations Security
Council resolution.
However when we come to the negotiating table to
find a solution, that is the time where I
personally feel that each party needs to give up
- you can't hold on to your maximalist position.
Each party - Pakistan, India and the people of
Kashmir. Maximalist positions will have to be a
compromised by all in a spirit of flexibility.
And that is what I meant.
All the groups have to show this spirit of
flexibility. If we keep sticking to our rigid
maximalist positions, then we will never reach a
solution. So this issue of flexibility should be
seen in that context. It cannot be unilateral, it
cannot be one sided. It has to be by all parties
involved.
If the Indian government says that there will be
no change in its policy to Kashmir, will the
peace process break down? Or will you continue
with the confidence building measures?
I am afraid if there is no movement forward on
Kashmir, then there can be no movement on
Confidence Building Measures. There is no doubt
in my mind that the core issue bedevilling
relations between India and Pakistan is the
Kashmir dispute.
But Pakistan is prepared to resolve all disputes
in a sincere and honourable manner. But if this
core issue is not being addressed and if India is
intransigent and they say that is all, we are not
moving forward, and this core issue is out, then
all the issues are out.
Then effectively the peace process is being held hostage to this one issue?
No, it is not a hostage. The peace process is
Kashmir. We are not fighting on the [inaudible]
and Wular dams and Sri Creek.
But in terms of normalisation, easier access,
trade - would you see that going forward?
Where there is hatred, when there is mistrust,
how can we normalise? When you have cultural
activites, these are between countries which have
cemented friendly harmonious relations. How can
you have trade relations, commerce, cultural
activity between countries who are fighting wars
and killing each other daily on the line of
control. Isn't that very unnatural.? How is it
possible?
Some people might say if there was movement on
cultural exchanges, then there would be a better
spirit of goodwill and it might be easier to
resolve the Kashmir issue.
That is putting the cart before the horse.
Anybody who is saying this, is not realistic.
Or they have ulterior motives of shelving the
Kahsmir issue and just going ahead on culture and
trade and commerce. I don't think it is
practical..
After the revelations about Dr AQ Khan last
February, he was put under house arrest, what is
his position at the moment?
He has been pardoned. He is not under house
arrest. But he is in Islamabad in his house. For
his own security he is not moving much at all.
But certainly the family is moving around, the
children are going to school. There is no
restriction on them at all. They can move around
but in their own interests and for their own
security, it is better that they stay in one
place as much as possible.
But he is not permitted to make any statements?
There is already too much confusion. We would not
like to any create more confusion by the media
going in and interacting and then coming up with
all kinds of stories.
There have been reports of his supporters
infiltrating the police and armed forces.
I do not think he is into any extremist gangs. This is absolutely wrong.
Earlier you said that he could 'keep his money'.
Is this still the position or are you making any
effort to remove any funds that he managed to
amass?
We don't know where his funds are.
Are you confident that there are no more leakages from AQ Khan's associates?
Until now whatever we have investigated, we are
reasonably sure that this is it, that we have
extracted all the intelligence from them. I can't
guarantee that something more crops up. And we
will again have to investigate and find out our
involvement.
As far as our nuclear programme is concerned, we
have put the best possible custodial measures
protecting our installations. We have a National
Command Authority, the highest body controlling
our strategic assets, then there is a very well
organised strategic planning division, headed by
a very capable lieutenant-general who is looking
after all our strategic assets.
As far as those assets are concerned, they are
under very strong controls of the armed forces of
Pakistan. Here we have created an Army Air Force
Navy strategic forces command, commanding all
these assets. So I think we are very well
organised.
As far as our strategic organisation is
concerned, the intelligence and security
arrangements have been beefed up, they have been
strengthened. All possible doubtful areas have
been removed. I think we have taken tremendous
action. I am very sure that there cannot be any
proliferation, there cannot be any assets falling
into wrong hands. I am very sure about that.
There have been two serious assassination
attempts on your life recently - if a further
attempt is successful, what measures have you
taken for your successor so that the initiatives
you have taken are carried forward?
No - I haven't taken any political measures, if
you are talking of some kind of succession.
There is a political system in place. The
Assemblies are functioning, the Senate is there.
If I am not there, it is the chairman of the
Senate who is the President of Pakistan until
such time as the Assemblies elect a new
President. The political institutions are in
place to find a new President.
I don't see this an issue of succession, there is
no monarchy going on. There is a parliamentary
democracy in place and through the political and
democratic system, a successor has to be found to
everyone.
Is your alliance with the MMA pushing you in a
direction you would prefer not to go?
There is a total misperception. There is no
alliance with the MMA. There was an agreement
with the MMA on the Legal Framework Order. We
reached an agreement with them and passed the LFO
in the interests of bringing political stability
with a two-thirds majority.
We could have reached an agreement with the
Peoples Party but somehow they did not come
forward. So we reached an agreement with the MMA
and we put the LFO issue aside. Now they are in
the opposition. The leader of the opposition is
Fazul ur Rehman of the MMA.
Do you think you will be able to move forward on women's rights?
I think on women's issues the vast majority in
the assembly will support, I am very confident
that these bills need to be drafted, hadood,
blasphemy, honour killings, all these must be
debated and we must bring in any change which is
required, but without violating the Islamic
tenets, but ensuring that no victimisation is
done against anybody. Whatever elements of these
issues are not in line with Islamic tenets should
be removed or corrected. And we will do it.
Are you intending to honour your pledge to take
off your uniform and step down as COAS?
I will take a decision when we reach it. I will
cross the bridge when we reach it. Or shall we
put it like this, there is the 17th amendment
which has been passed in which the Legal
Framework Order is a part.
I will adhere to the 17th amendment to the
Constitution of Pakistan. I will adhere to the
Constitution of Pakistan. Having said that, my
word that I gave - that I will remove the
uniform- if the MMA is talking - because they are
talking of the word, of the pledge, that I gave -
they themselves have violated two pledges that
they gave: firstly, to support my vote of
confidence in the Assembly and the second was the
National Security Council Bill, supporting that.
They backed out on both. And so therefore I have
no qualms at all as far as my word to them. They
have broken their word and so I am under no
obligation of pleasing them. So that can be set
aside.
Now the issue that has to be taken into account
is: firstly, sticking to the Constitution, and
secondly, the national interest. Now these are
two issues which I need to consider seriously and
then only will I reach a conclusion.
What about the pledge to the people?
Insofar as the people are considered, I know that
the vast majority of people are alarmed at why
did I give my word. The number of letters,
telephone calls, and the number of people who
have contacted me asking me why did I give my
word to step down. There are a lot of people are
pressurising me not to give my word. It has had
an opposite effect that I should not have given
my word.
When will a decision will be taken - perhaps in August?
I would not be able to comment, obviously it is
closer to December. August is my birthday all
right, but there is no link.
Would you consider stepping as COAS but retaining
your military links by making yourself a Field
Marshal like Ayub Khan?
I have no intention of assuming the office of
Field-Marshal. It would not have a good impact at
all. I do not want to promote myself.
What achievements are you most proud of in the
four/five year period since you took power?
Economic revival, of course. Setting the economy
- bringing health to the economy, that is the
biggest achievement. - all the macro economic
indicators, that is an achievement.
Secondly, I would like to comment on the local
government - that is the greatest achievement I
would like to convey to the Commonwealth, if they
are talking about real democracy, which was not
existing here. We were living in a colonial
period where the people were governed by a Deputy
Commissioner, one man, a bureaucrat, who used to
be king in his district. We have broken that and
made the people govern themselves. Now the DCO
comes under the people's representative who is
the Mayor or Nazem. Now this is our greatest
achievement - introducing democracy at the grass
roots level and empowering the people
politically, administratively, financially.
This is the real development, the real future of
Pakistan. There are also many other issues,
emancipation of women...
Do you feel that Pakistan will be suspended again
from the Commonwealth if you don't step down as
COAS?
It's a pity if they do that. I don't accept any
conditionality. Pakistan does not accept any
conditionality. Pakistan should not be taken for
granted. It is a pity and very saddening very
annoying, when I see my country being taken for
granted and conditions laid on it. This is just
not on.
We will take our decisions in accordance with
Pakistan's dictates and not according to the
Commonwealth's dictates. If they can't understand
what democracy is really in its holistic form,
then they should leave Pakistan alone on deciding
on what is the best form of democracy for us, and
they should not base our inclusion into the
Commonwealth on any future actions of mine.
How successful have you been in eradicating
corruption, as you pledged four years ago?
Corruption has been checked in a very big way at
the top level. The corruption of billions, the
loot and plunder of banks, all banks were
bankrupt, all our organisations, our
corporations, PIA, steel mills were bankrupt
because of the loot and plunder from the top.
That has been stopped. That is our biggest
achivement.
At a practical level, the lower level corruption
continues and that has a lot to do with many
issues, it certainly has a mindset, an attitude
and a social problem. And the government
structure, maybe the salaries are defective. It
is a complex issue which leads to corruption at
the lower level which we need to tackle. We have
identified that the basis of corruption at a
lower level is when a person's salary is not in
consonance with what he needs and not sufficient
to give him security for him and his family and
his future retired life.
We have to make sure that the salary structure
ensures these things. This is the root of the
elimination of poverty and corruption at the
lower level. At a higher level, where there is no
reason for the person to be corrupt because they
already have sufficient resources, punitive
measures, very harsh actions are the only action
because they don't deserve any sympathy.
Are you satisfied with your relationship with the
United States? By your critics you have been
called a puppet of the West.
We are very satisfied with our relationship with
the United States. There is concern domestically
with people thinking that we have become the
puppet of the United States. That is not true at
all. People who do understand do realise that.
Some politicians keep harping on this issue
because they want to put me down on any issue
which can be controversial. So we have got this
issue of my being dictated by the United States,
but we don't get dictated to by anyone. There are
many areas where we have followed a different
line from the United States (for example on
nuclear issues, Iraq, the issue of handling
terrorism in Pakistan, of handling al Qa'eda in
tribal territory).
We are following what we want, we are handling
these issues in the interest of Pakistan; if our
interests in this issue of handling terrorism is
the same as US interests, then that is perfectly
fine, and that is the case, what is in Pakistan's
interest happens to be in US interest also, then
we are acting in perfect cooperation and
coordination.
Did the US want a more direct presence in tribal territory?
Initally they did. They thought we might not be
able to handle. But that could not be allowed and
we did not allow it.
What about reports of American aircraft overflying Pakistani territory?
Unnecessarily they make an issue of these minor
issues. Whenever there is a violation which can
be totally innocent without knowing where the
boundary is, because not everyone knows where the
boundary is.
These are not deliberate violations. They are
unintentional. We launch our complaints and
protests; they normally apologise and say they
will not do it again. So let's not create a
problem out of of a very minor issue.
LAHORE: Indian and Pakistani peace activists have
demanded both governments promote friendship.
The Asr Resource Centre arranged a reception in
honour of the six-member Indian delegation of the
Pak-India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy
(PIPFPD) on Saturday. Tapan Bose, a peace
activist, said, "PIPFPD is striving for the
promotion of friendship between the two
countries." He said the forum would have to work
for the new generation. He said both countries
were spending their finances on defence but not
on health, the education and other social sectors.
"People have been kept in the dark by their
rulers," Mr Bose said. "Please, don't have the
misconception that army generals from both sides
want peace." Peace was a plural process, he
added. Anees Haroon said the Pakistanis had
nothing but flowers for Indians. "Let us enhance
political, economic, trade and friendship
circles," she said, adding the forum would hold a
peace march in Lahore on September 4. "A
candle-light ceremony at the border will be held
on the independence days of both countries," she
said. Similar celebrations would be held on the
Sindh-Rajhistan border. Syed Mazher Hussain, Amit
Kumar Chakraborty, Sumit Chakravartty, Jatin
Desai, Pushpa Anant Bhave, Nighat Said Khan,
Kishwar Naheed and people from Azad Jammu and
Kashmir also addressed the meeting. The meetings
of the PIPFPD joint committees on Kashmir and
minorities would be held today.
Pakistan-India peace march on PIPFPD's 10th anniversary in Sept
LAHORE: Indian human rights' activists and
journalists from the Pak-India Peoples' Forum for
Peace and Democracy (PIPFPD) who crossed the
Wagah border on Friday at noon said Pak-India
relations would be strengthened with increased
public involvement and people-to-people contact.
The five-member delegation from PIPFPD reached
Lahore after crossing the Wagah border on foot.
Dr Mubashir Hasan, Saida Deap, Kamran Islam,
Idrees Sheikh, ASR Resource Centre people and a
number of PIPFPD activists received the
delegation at the Wagah border.
The head of the delegation, noted human rights
activist, Tapan Bose, has already arrived in
Pakistan. The delegates who arrived on Friday are
Syed Mazher Hussain, Amit Kumar Chakraborty,
Sumit Chakravartty, Jatin Desai, and Pushpa Anant
Bhave. Two delegates are expected Saturday
morning. The meetings will be held at Asr
Resource Centre, where the delegates are also
residing.
The delegation is scheduled to attend the
meetings of the PIPFPD joint committees on
Kashmir, minority rights, a proposed peace march
from Karachi to Delhi and a peace convention.
The delegates told Daily Times that they hoped
Pak-India relations would improve even more in
the new Congress regime.
"Manmohan Singh is not political in that sense.
The atmosphere might be more conducive for peace
under the Congress regime," Ms Bhave said. "We
have been striving for peace for the last 10
years on the PIPFPD platform."
Ms Bhave said Kashmir was the major bone of
contention on which both sides would have to
change their attitudes. She also said Kashmir
should not be made a target of external powers
like America.
"We must be especially cautious of America's plan
to split Kashmir because of its strategic
importance," she said. "Also, we should not let a
religious division take place. Kashmiris must
come ahead to decide what must be done."
Journalist and editor of weekly newspaper
Mainstream, Mr Chakravartty said the change in
the Indian government was qualitatively a
different situation. He said Congress and Sonia
Gandhi had taken positive stands on peace process
and that the Indian Foreign Minister, Natwar
Singh, in a recent meeting with Mr Chakravartty
had been very honest about the peace process. "We
have to settle everything including Kashmir,"
said Mr Chakravartty, quoting the foreign
minister.
Mr Chakravartty appreciated President Musharraf's
stance and the invitation extended to Sonia
Gandhi for a meeting in December. He said another
positive development was the strength that the
left wing parties had acquired in this Indian
election.
Mr Desai, another senior journalist and human
rights activist, hoped that the upcoming meetings
of the Pakistani and Indian foreign ministers
would strengthen the peace process. "Relations
are bound to improve with the support of the
people and their aspiration for peace," he said.
He mentioned that the ruling United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) in India had displayed cordial
relations with its neighbours in the Common
Minimum Programme (CMP), specifically with SAARC
countries, which included Pakistan.
"Kashmir is a sentimental issue for both sides,"
Mr Desai said. "Importance should be given to the
Kashmiris and their involvement in the process."
Another delegate and HR activist, Mr Hussain,
however, expressed that the regime change in
India would retard the peace process to some
extent since the governments would take time to
get comfortable with each other.
"The new government will not undermine the peace
process but can definitively delay it," he said.
Mr Hussain said the aim of the meetings in
Pakistan was to enhance people-to-people contact.
"There has to be decision making on the part of
political leadership," said senior office bearer
of the PIPFPD, Mr Chakraborty, who was also
doubtful of the expected progress in peace
relations. He said the governments would have to
be forced into better relations by the public.
Dr Mubashir Hasan also from the PIPFPD told Daily
Times that the forum representatives would
discuss the Kashmir issue, minorities and gender
issues.
"A proposal for a convention and a Pakistan-India
peace march on PIPFPD's 10th anniversary in
September 2004 will also be discussed," said Dr
Hasan. He said different meetings had been
arranged to develop the programme.
Talking about peace relations and the new
Congress regime, he said Pakistan-India peace was
a vital issue for the Pakistani and Indian
governments and new governments could not
undermine major foreign policies of a country
The Asr Resource Centre is hosting a dinner in
the honour of the delegation on Saturday night.
THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS in the hands of India and Pakistan have made the region
a much more dangerous place is in the nature of an axiom that only advocates
of the discredited doctrine of deterrence will bother to contest. Nuclear
weapons are weapons of mass destruction, instruments of genocide. In India,
democratic opinion has always regarded such weapons with horror. However,
subsequent to the Pokhran and Chagai explosions of mid-1998, there has been
a concerted effort by the so-called strategic affairs community and by
influential sections of the political establishment to legitimise, even
glorify, nuclear weapons as acceptable means of achieving regional and
global power. The sophisms of deterrence theory and false claims made to the
effect that nuclear bombs are political weapons meant not for use but for
self-defence and national empowerment have been recruited to the job of
inuring public opinion to the real implications of producing, stockpiling,
inducting and deploying these weapons of mass destruction. Until Pokhran-II,
official Indian policy ranged itself firmly against the doctrine of nuclear
deterrence. That position was subverted by a bizarre South Asian variant: a
`minimum credible nuclear deterrent' not backed by any coherent doctrinal
elaboration. An extraordinarily hawkish nuclear doctrine was drafted only to
be left on hold; nobody knows what India's nuclear doctrine amounts to in
practice. A fallout from Pokhran was that India's voice was virtually
silenced on issues of global nuclear disarmament. Indeed its establishment
became a late convert to the discriminatory global nuclear bargain, going so
far as to welcome the National Missile Defence and Theatre Missile Defence
proposals of the United States. There was also dubious posturing: India's
nuclear weapons, it was claimed against the evidence, were not
Pakistan-centric.
The new Congress-led Government in New Delhi is yet to indicate its nuclear
doctrine. However, the Common Minimum Programme adopted by the United
Progressive Alliance promises that while "maintaining a credible nuclear
weapons programme," the Government will evolve "demonstrable and verifiable
confidence-building measures with its nuclear neighbours" and, on the
international stage, "assume a leadership role in promoting universal
nuclear disarmament and working for a nuclear weapons-free world." Against
this background, External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh's informal advocacy
of a "common nuclear doctrine" to be worked out among India, Pakistan and
China holds much appeal; so far as the first two neighbours are concerned,
it looks like an idea whose time may have come. The first ever official
meeting between Indian and Pakistani experts to discuss nuclear confidence
building measures, which opens in New Delhi today, provides an opportunity
to identify common ground and work on a practical agenda to reduce nuclear
risk in South Asia. In this connection, an article by M.V. Ramana and R.
Rajaraman, both physicists, published on the editorial page of The Hindu
(June 4, 2004) made two eminently sensible recommendations that "do not
compromise national security in any real sense." The first is that the
Indian Government should offer not to deploy nuclear weapons. The second is
that it should stop installing early warning systems that clearly, in the
specific South Asian context where the response time is dangerously short,
increase the risk of accidental or unauthorised nuclear war. These two
positive elements could constitute the basis of a common nuclear doctrine
with Pakistan - and prove far more credible, as confidence building
measures, than repetitions of the `no-first-use' mantra that has virtually
no practical value. But a red herring must be got out of the way: the quest
for some kind of nuclear parity with China, which is in a different league
and poses no strategic threat of any kind - any more than nuclear weapons in
the hands of the United States, the United Kingdom, France or Russia
threaten India.
New Delhi: India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 1998, fought
each other in Kargil a year later and nearly went to war in 2001-02, but
it is only on Saturday, more than six years later, that the two countries
will finally get down to discussing specific measures to reduce the risk
of nuclear conflagration. On the table will be the question of how to
operationalise and build upon the ambitiously worded India-Pakistan MoU of
February 21, 1999. That document commits India and Pakistan, inter alia to
* Consult each other on security concepts and nuclear doctrines with a
view to developing confidence-building measures (CBMs) aimed at avoiding
conflict
* Provide advance notification of missile tests
* Establish an
"appropriate communication mechanism" to deal with the accidental or
unauthorised use of nuclear weapons
* A moratorium on further nuclear
tests
* Conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea.
Of these,
only the agreements to notify each other of missile tests and to not
further test nuclear weapons are 'operational'. But on the communications
and conflict-avoiding CBMs fronts, there has been no forward movement
despite the crises of 1999 and 2001-2 making it amply clear that
appropriate arrangements need to be put in place as a priority.
SRINAGAR (Reuters) - The peace process between India and Pakistan will fail unless it does more to improve the lives of ordinary people in disputed and divided Kashmir, a leading local politician said on Thursday.
Mehbooba Mufti is head of the ruling party in Jammu and Kashmir, and the public face of the state government's "healing touch policy".
Less than two weeks before India and Pakistan get down to their first serious dialogue on Kashmir in years, Mufti said she was concerned the peace process was passing Kashmiris by.
And she challenged the two governments to open a road between their regional capitals that has been closed for more than 50 years. The road links Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, capital of the Pakistani part.
"Something has started," Mufti told Reuters in her heavily fortified house in Srinagar. "But unless the people of Jammu and Kashmir are involved, it will not bear fruit.
"If the two countries are not able to agree on opening the road, how can they arrive at a decision on a complex issue like Kashmir? If they are not able to agree on this I don't see much hope."
The 57-year-old division of Kashmir has separated thousands of families, and opening the road link would be an enormously popular step. But talks have stalled on the issue of what papers or passports travellers would use.
As India and Pakistan prepare to open their dialogue, India's new centre-left government also hopes to meet moderate separatist leaders from the All Parties Hurriyat Conference next month.
Mufti warned that the moderates needed to have something to show from the talks to convince Kashmiris they were not being strung along by the government in New Delhi.
GET ON THE BUS
On the other hand, progress at both the bilateral talks and the discussions with the Hurriyat Conference could unlock some of the doors to peace, she argued, and even bring hardliners and militants into the peace process.
"If people feel there is a serious debate, that both countries are ready to get down to business, if Hurriyat is being accommodated, then people who are sitting on the fence will want to get on board the bus," she said.
Mufti applauded the renewal of transport links between India and Pakistan, visits by students from both sides and an enormously successful Indian cricket tour to Pakistan this year. But she said those "confidence-building measures" had not yet extended to Kashmir.
A ceasefire between the armies of India and Pakistan has improved conditions for villagers near the frontline, and tourists are returning to Kashmir this year, promising a boost for the state's sickly economy.
But Mufti complained that Pakistanis were still not allowed to visit Indian-held Kashmir, nor were Kashmiris from the area allowed to visit Pakistan.
"A dispute has a lot to do with public opinion," she said. "Through confidence-building measures, if people from across can talk to each other, it will strengthen the leadership of both countries and even allow them to take decisions they could not take at first."
Mufti's father is chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir but she is seen as the more respected figure -- a Kashmiri version of powerful Congress leader Sonia Gandhi in Delhi.
Her father's government has been heavily criticised for not delivering on its promises, especially the release of political prisoners and the curbing of human rights abuses by Indian security forces.
Mufti blamed politicians in New Delhi for tying the state government's hands but said progress had still been made.
"I would not say human rights violations have totally stopped but things have really come down," she said.
Four workers from Mufti's party were kidnapped by militants on Tuesday. One was killed and three were shot in the leg.
LONDON, JUNE 16. The scope of the current dialogue between India and
Pakistan would be "enlarged" to give it a new momentum, the External
Affairs Minister, Natwar Singh, said here today. He said he would be
meeting the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Khurshid Mehmud Kasuri, soon. "We
will try and enlarge the scope of the subjects we discuss and we will
carry the dialogue further, " he added. He said the Congress president,
Sonia Gandhi, had accepted the invitation to visit Pakistan, but no dates
had been fixed yet. At a press conference this evening after meeting his
British counterpart, Jack Straw, Mr. Singh said the Congress was always in
favour of a dialogue with Pakistan despite cross-border terrorism. The
Congress-led Government in New Delhi would work for resolving all
outstanding issues with Pakistan within the framework of the Shimla
Agreement, the Lahore accord and the joint statement issued by the two
countries in January this year, he said. However, Mr. Singh denied that
the issue of redrawing the existing borders was under consideration. "The
question of altering borders does not arise until we reach a broad stage
of what we discuss so that neither of us lose out," he said in Hindi
replying to a question from the BBC's Hindi service.
SRINAGAR (Reuters) - Kashmiri separatists remain sceptical about India's sincerity in wanting to resolve its dispute with Pakistan over the troubled Himalayan region.
But while hardliners said it was not worth talking to New Delhi, moderates said they were ready for dialogue with India's new centre-left government -- provided there was progress in curbing human rights violations by the army.
"To address a problem, either you can fight or you can talk -- and as far as political parties are concerned, we have to talk," Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Kashmir's chief Islamic priest and a moderate separatist leader, said on Wednesday. "But you can't talk and be intimidated at the same time."
As nuclear-armed neighbours India and Pakistan conduct a tentative peace process, New Delhi also held two round of talks with moderate separatist leaders from Kashmir, the divided region at the core of their dispute.
The new Congress-led government in New Delhi says it wants to hold another round of talks with separatists next month, but has not yet issued a formal invitation.
Farooq said separatists wanted to talk but first needed to see the Indian government take "concrete measures" to address arbitrary arrests and killings by security forces in Kashmir, which he said had flared up again in the past month.
The 31-year-old said the Congress-led government also had to prove it was willing to address the Kashmir dispute seriously.
"The government of India doesn't seem to recognise the political reality vis-a-vis Kashmir," he told Reuters. "They are still trying to buy more time rather than enter into a meaningful dialogue with Pakistan over Kashmir."
CONCERNED
Farooq said he was concerned that India's new government would not be able to take bold steps on Kashmir, partly because nationalists would pounce on any weakness displayed by Italian-born Congress leader Sonia Gandhi.
The priest's family has paid a high price for its moderate views -- his father was assassinated in 1991 and his uncle killed in recent weeks. Still grieving, he said Kashmiris were ready to compromise in the search for peace.
"My position might be independence, but is it acceptable to India? Will Pakistan accept it? I have to be realistic."
Kashmir's main separatist alliance split last year over the issue of whether to talk to India. Hardliners are even more sceptical about the Indian government's intentions.
"This talk of peace is only a slogan," Pakistan-backed hardliner Syed Ali Geelani told Reuters. "There is no sincerity to it."
Geelani, who wants Kashmir to join Pakistan and enjoys the backing of many militants fighting Indian rule, said there was no point in talks with New Delhi unless it recognised Kashmir was a disputed territory.
India says the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of the country. Geelani said Delhi should first renounce this position and then enter three-way talks with Pakistan and Kashmiris.
The 74-year-old also demanded India withdraw troops to their barracks in Kashmir, release hundreds of political prisoners and account for thousands of missing people.
"Unless and until they meet these necessary conditions, no dialogue will be meaningful or helpful to the resolution of the dispute," the white-bearded Geelani said, sitting cross-legged on the floor of his home on the outskirts of Srinagar.
Geelani's comments underline the problems in getting hardliners and militants to the negotiating table, something which many people see as essential if the almost 15-year-old insurgency in Kashmir is to be brought to an end.
New Delhi, June 9: Did Pakistan's National Security Council secretary
Tariq Aziz meet India's new national security adviser J.N. Dixit during a
secret trip to New Delhi? And was he carrying an urgent message from
Pakistan President Gen. Pervez Musharraf? Pakistani newspapers, quoting
government sources, insist that the meeting took place. India remains
tightlipped, with Mr Dixit himself remaining unavailable for comment.
Pakistan, however, officially denied on Wednesday that Mr Aziz made a
secret trip to Delhi. There are some differences between the news reports
carried by the Pakistani newspapers, although the overall thrust suggests
a quick visit by Mr Aziz, along with India's high commissioner to Pakistan
Shivshankar Menon, for a meeting with Mr Dixit. The News is of the view
that the meeting took place in New Delhi and that Mr Aziz returned to
Pakistan on Tuesday by road. The Daily Times report suggests that Mr Tariq
Aziz travelled by road with Mr Menon to Amritsar where he met with a
"senior government official" and returned to Lahore "at around 3.30 pm."
The meeting was described as important by the government sources quoted by
the newspaper, which said it had tried to contact Mr Aziz who was not
available for comment. The details, however, suggest a high-level leak and
the silence of both governments appears to confirm the visit. Pakistan has
given top billing to the peace dialogue with India and has pulled out all
the plugs to ensure that the agenda, agreed to with the NDA government, is
followed assiduously.
India is adopting a new naval doctrine that calls for building a nuclear ballistic missile submarine and a blue-water fleet able to project power into the Arabian Gulf and beyond.
Adopted in May by Navy leaders, the Indian Maritime Doctrine spells out
the service’s role in national security and the concepts it will use to
fulfill it, said Navy spokesman Cmdr. Vinay Garg.
In contrast to earlier, inward-looking strategies, the new doctrine seeks to deal with "conflict with extra-regional power" and "protecting persons of Indian origin and Indian interest abroad", an Indian Navy long-range planning officer said.
The depletion of world oil reserves will inevitably bring more regional
powers to the Indian Ocean, which controls water access to the oil-rich
Arabian Gulf. This compels the Indian Navy to beef up its striking power and its command-and-control, surveillance and intelligence abilities, he said.
The planning officer said the doctrine takes particular note of China,
which has nuclear missile subs and growing ties with Indian Ocean Rim
nations such as Bangladesh, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri
Lanka and Thailand.
Nuclear Comparisons
The 148-page document lists China, the European Union, India, Japan,
Russia and the United States as major naval players and claims India is
the only nuclear state without a nuclear triad, the ability to launch
nuclear weapons from land, sea and air an assertion that is not quite
right. Countries with a declared nuclear triad include Britain, China,
France, Russia and the United States. Pakistan and Israel are nuclear
states that, like India, do not appear to have a seaborne deterrent
capability.
"There is a strong case for India to acquire a non-provocative, strategic capability and the most viable platform by all accounts is the submarine," says the document, a copy of which was obtained by Defense News.
Defense analyst Nitin Mehta said the doctrine calls for development of a fleet that could operate far from Indian coastal waters toward the Arabian Gulf.
"There is a good indication from the doctrine that India will place
[greater] emphasis on the sea for its nuclear delivery systems, including the establishment of nuclear command-and-control structures", Mehta said.
Stuart Slade, a naval analyst at Forecast International, Newtown, Conn., said the doctrine reflects a decades-long ambition for India.
"This realizes an Indian naval ambition that goes back to the 1950s",
Slade said. "They take the term Indian Ocean very seriously and have a
picture of themselves as a regional power. That means your defense starts at sea. They never quite funded the Navy, but the dream has always been there."
Stephen Cohen, a Foreign Policy Studies senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution, Washington, noted this doctrine has been in the works for
some time.
"They’re going very slowly because of costs", said Cohen, an expert on
India, Pakistan, South Asian security and proliferation issues. "I look at this as more of a theoretical goal, an emulation of the U.S. and France" in terms of building a nuclear deterrent.
He said the country’s conventional capabilities "are far more important
than nuclear capabilities. The only question is if they developed a
capability to reach East Asia. This government is less likely than the
previous government to develop such a capability."
"I would take this as more a statement of policy" of the government of
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee that was ousted in April elections, he said. "What’s a surprise is that this [new] government is reiterating the previous government’s policy without modification."
The Indian planning officer said the new government of Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh could choose to review the doctrine, but likely would not because it represents up to three years of work by several government departments.
An Indian Boomer?
The doctrine codifies the strategic framework for the nation’s existing
plan to acquire nuclear-missile subs, the Indian planning official said. Under the 30-year plan known as Project 75, Indian shipyards will use foreign technology to build about two dozen subs by 2030, the Navy
official said.
India is considering licensing designs for the French Scorpene and Russian Amur-class subs.
As an interim measure, India is considering leasing at least one Russian attack submarine, likely of the Akula class, which would be delivered in about two years.
India also is building its own nuclear submarine, the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV), and now expects to roll it out by the end of 2005, two years earlier than originally planned.
The submarine is the result of a classified, $1.5 billion program run by the Navy, the state-owned Defence Research and Development Organisation, and the state nuclear research agency, Bhaba Atomic Research Centre.
Either the Akulas or the ATV could be used as missile boats, Slade said. The ATV is based on Russia’s Cold War-era Charlie-class nuclear-powered cruise missile sub, with eight vertical launching tubes. India leased a Charlie-class boat from Russia between 1988 and 1991.
"Akula originally was intended as a cruise missile carrier, but was
redesigned for attack", Slade said. "But it has 26-inch diameter torpedo tubes that could be used to launch missiles. Rough calculations indicate that the Indians might be able to get five or six missiles of six to seven hundred mile range on an Akula."
With that kind of range, Slade said, India could strike about 80 percent of what it would consider a target in China.
Indian vs. Chinese Subs
"From a military perspective, it’s a long way from India to Northern
China. But it’s not a long way from the North China Sea to Northern
China."
The expansion of the Indian Navy comes as China also presses ahead with a major naval modernization effort that includes new nuclear attack and
ballistic missiles submarines, analysts said.
"The Chinese submarines aren’t very good", Slade said. "The five Han-class attack subs represent a very early level of nuclear submarine technology. They are dangerous, extraordinarily noisy, not well armed, and their sensors are primitive and limited. They have one boomer, the Xia, but it’s not entirely clear what its status is."
The Xia is not very good, Slade and other analysts said, in large part
because it’s a Han attack boat that has been crudely increased in size by cutting it in half and welding in a 12-missile section.
"It has the same flaws as the Han, only louder", Slade said. "Two new
classes of sub are coming down the road, one a hunter killer, the Project 093, that may be based on a Russian design, and the Project 094, a missile sub that is a 093 with a missile compartment added."
China’s diesel submarine force is of either the antiquated Romeo type, or derivatives with only a handful of more modern Kilo boats.
"The Indians have a more modern force with their four German Type 1500s
and eight, with two more coming, Russian Kilos", Slade said. "It’s more
modern, and if the Indians get the two Akulas they want, they should be
able to clean the Chinese clock."
"The PLA’s Navy will move from brown- to blue-water, i.e., transit from
being a coastal navy to become an ocean-going one", said one Navy
long-range planning officer. "In addition to the existing potent submarine force, the PLA Navy plans to configure its force levels around two carrier groups. This is clearly indicative of China’s resolve to acquire a formidable naval capability."
Expeditionary Forces
The document also calls for a marine-based rapid mobility force: "The war on land and mounting of expeditionary forces from the sea in support of the war on land has become a prime element", the document says, as have aircraft carriers.
"An enemy’s littoral cannot be dominated unless his air and underwater
forces can be suppressed. Strong air support is critical and navies with integral air capability which only aircraft carriers can provide are best positioned to deal with such a situation", it says.
The Indian Navy will get a second aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov, from Russia this year after it is refitted and equipped with MiG-29K fighters and Kamov Ka-31 helicopters.
India also is developing its own aircraft carrier, called the Air Defense Ship, to be built at state-owned Cochin Shipyard, Kochi. The ship is expected in 2012, three years later than planned, thanks to a last-minute decision to increase the ship’s size from 30,000 metric tons to more than 37,000 metric tons.
The planning officer said the Navy intended to increase its spending by 40 percent over the next decade. The Navy received about $7.5 billion between 1997 and 2001, and $18.3 billion has been slated for 2002 through 2007.
Among other things, this will build three frigates at state-owned Garden Reach Shipbuilding and Engineers Kolkata and buy a third Krivak-class stealth frigate from Russia.
Vago Muradian and Christopher P. Cavas contributed to this report from
Washington.
Delhi, June 6: Seeking to clear the air in the wake of certain remarks
attributed to him, external affairs minister K. Natwar Singh and his
Pakistani counterpart Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri spoke to each other on
Sunday during which Mr Singh asserted that India held the Pakistani leadership in the "highest esteem" and was committed to the dialogue process.
According to official sources, Mr Singh said that the dialogue process
with Pakistan would be carried forward in every area and contacts would be
further intensified. "Both sides have vested interests in promoting good
bilateral relations," the sources quoted Mr Singh as saying. Mr Singh
told Mr Kasuri that in keeping with the well-articulated policy of the
government, the dialogue process with Pakistan will be carried forward in
every area and contacts would be further intensified. During the
conversation, Mr Singh also quoted an Urdu couplet "Kuch nahi to kam se
kam, khwab-e-sher dekha hai; jis tarafdekha na tha ab tak, us tarafdekha
hai (At least we are seeing a happy dream, a dream which we did not see
for till now)." This gesture of Mr Singh was appreciated by the Pakistani
foreign minister. Mr Singh and Mr Kasuri agreed that distortions in the
media should be ignored.
As a primary risk reduction measure India should
not deploy nuclear-armed missiles and aircraft or
induct an early warning system.
THE RECENT change of Government offers an
important opportunity to reconsider Indian
nuclear policy. The Common Minimum Programme of
the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) is brief on
this subject and mentions only that India will
maintain a credible nuclear programme while
evolving demonstrable and verifiable
confidence-building measures with its nuclear
neighbours. In and of itself, such a statement is
not very different from what leaders of the
Bharatiya Janata Party have said in the past. If
the new Alliance wants to put a distinctive stamp
on our nuclear policy, it would have to
distinguish itself from the BJP by implementing
some concrete changes through policy declarations
and directives as well as actual on-the-ground
practice. We would like to offer two specific
recommendations that do not compromise national
security in any real sense but are expressions of
the commitment to nuclear disarmament and
constitute confidence building measures.
The most important and basic commitment that the
UPA should offer is not to deploy nuclear
weapons. Deployment means keeping the warheads
armed with nuclear explosives on delivery
vehicles (ballistic missiles or aircraft) and
keeping them ready for attacking a designated
target. The United States and Russia keep
thousands of nuclear weapons deployed on high
alert, ready to be launched in a matter of
minutes, owing to a combination of Cold War
crises, military planning, technological
advances, and nuclear doctrines, all tied closely
to one another. From all public accounts, India
and Pakistan are yet to deploy nuclear-armed
missiles and bombers on a regular basis. However,
there are early signs of the same factors that
led the U.S. and Russia to deploy their weapons.
It is this impending change of weapon status that
should be explicitly and definitely ruled out by
the UPA Government.
At least two dangers would result from such
deployment. The first and greatest danger is that
deployment opens up the possibility that nuclear
weapons may be used accidentally or by
unauthorised personnel, especially during a
crisis. Deployment will almost inevitably involve
delegating some authority to military officers on
the field, allowing them to make the vital
decision about using nuclear weapons. This is
compounded by the poor state of communication
obtaining in South Asia. (In November 2001, it
was reported that Prime Minister Vajpayee could
not make a direct phone call from Air India One.)
It is the threat of unauthorised use that command
and control systems are supposed to avert.
However, even the most advanced command and
control systems are not foolproof. (The many
hazards of command and control for South Asia are
discussed in Zia Mian's essay in M.V. Ramana and
C. Rammanohar Reddy, eds., Prisoners of The
Nuclear Dream [New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2003]).
Deployed nuclear weapons pose conflicting
demands. On the one hand, they have to be
dispersed and with the military so that they
could be used upon warning of an attack. On the
other hand, the decision to use these weapons is
so momentous that one would like only the highest
political levels to be able to order their use,
that too after due deliberation. All this is
complicated by the widespread, large-scale
effects of nuclear war, which could disrupt
communication systems that link leaders or
commanders with field personnel.
The complexities involved in preparing for all
contingencies, especially given the short flying
times for Indian and Pakistani missiles and
airplanes to each other's territory, would
inexorably involve situations where military
personnel would have the authority to launch a
nuclear attack without explicit orders from the
highest levels of political authority. This
possibility is ruled out by not deploying nuclear
weapons.
The second risk resulting from deployment, over
and above the risk of nuclear war from
unauthorised use, is of serious accidents
involving nuclear weapons themselves or their
delivery vehicles such as missiles and aircraft.
Such accidents might be initiated by an explosion
or fire involving the delivery vehicles,
especially missiles. A recent example of a
serious accident involving a missile occurred on
February 23, 2004 at the Sriharikota High
Altitude Range. Engineers were testing a motor
for the Agni missile when it caught fire and
exploded, killing at least six people. If such an
accident were to occur in an Agni missile loaded
with a nuclear warhead, it could well lead to the
dispersal of fissile material (plutonium or
enriched uranium) into the atmosphere,
potentially causing thousands of fatal cancers
among the nearby population.
The above estimate of casualties is not for a
nuclear explosion, but only for the detonation of
the chemical explosive in the weapon. This
chemical explosion could well trigger a nuclear
explosion. An accidental nuclear explosion with a
yield of 15 kilotons, the same as the weapon
detonated over Hiroshima, would destroy over 5
square kilometres from the combined effects of
blast and firestorms. Over 24 square kilometres
would be subject to radioactive fallout at such
levels that half the healthy adult population
would die of radiation sickness. If this were to
happen in the vicinity of a large South Asian
city, several hundreds of thousands of people
would die. In addition, such an explosion,
especially in times of crises, might be assumed
to be a nuclear attack and lead to a nuclear
response. Thus an accidental nuclear explosion
may even initiate a nuclear war, which could
cause millions of casualties.
In fact these risks prompt going beyond simply
non-deployment of nuclear weapons to actually
keeping the weapons disassembled.
Our second recommendation is that the UPA
Government immediately stop installing early
warning systems. These systems are intended to
detect incoming ballistic missiles and, it is
hoped, inform decision makers that nuclear war
has begun before the warheads themselves explode.
The last few years have witnessed the acquisition
of key components of an early warning network,
including the Green Pine radar from Israel. There
have also been reports of attempts to purchase
the Arrow anti-ballistic system. However, as we
have calculated in some detail elsewhere, these
systems simply cannot offer more than a few
minutes of warning in the South Asian context.
This is grossly insufficient for decision making
in any meaningful sense of the term.
The deployment of a hugely expensive early
warning system is worse than useless. It brings
with it the danger of accidental nuclear war due
to false alarms and miscalculations. There are
numerous examples from the experience of the U.S.
and Russia. Over the decades, the U.S. built an
elaborate and sophisticated system, involving a
worldwide network of satellites and radars and
using state-of-the-art technology, with layers of
filters to remove false signals. Yet from 1977
through 1984, the only period for which official
information has been released, the early warning
systems gave an average of 2,598 warnings each
year of potential incoming missiles attacks. Of
these about 5 per cent required further
evaluation. Needless to say, all of them were
false.
Information about the Russian experience is
limited, but there have been many false alarms
there too. In 1995, for instance, a Norwegian
scientific rocket launch was interpreted by the
Russian early warning system as a possible attack
and the matter went all the way up the command
chain to President Yeltsin.
Fortunately in all these cases, the mistake was
discovered in time to forestall any counter
attack decision. Nevertheless, the shocking fact
is that on many of these occasions, the world was
just minutes away from a possible nuclear
holocaust through error. The geographical
proximity of Pakistan and India does not allow us
even the minor reassurance that may be sought
from the much greater distance between the U.S.
and USSR, and longer missile flight times.
The only sure way to eliminate nuclear risks is
to abolish all nuclear weapons, regionally and
globally. This should be the goal of all rational
and peace loving people. The CMP assurance that
the new Government "will take a leadership role
in promoting universal, nuclear disarmament and
working for a nuclear weapons-free world" is
therefore welcome. But India and Pakistan already
possess dozens of nuclear weapons. With every
additional day that they exist they continue to
pose the serious dangers we have outlined.
Therefore even as we strive to eliminate them
altogether, it would in the meantime be prudent
to institute various risk reduction measures,
which would lower the chances of a destructive
nuclear war. The primary risk reduction measures
we recommend is that India not deploy, as a
matter of stated formal policy and practice,
nuclear-armed missiles and aircraft, or induct an
early warning system. This requires no new
technologies or organisations - indeed not
deploying would reduce enormously the demands on
nuclear infrastructure while increasing safety
and national security.
(M.V. Ramana is Fellow, Centre for
Interdisciplinary Studies in Environment and
Development and co-editor of Prisoners of the
Nuclear Dream. R. Rajaraman is Professor Emeritus
of Theoretical Physics, Jawaharlal Nehru
University and Visiting Research Scholar at the
Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton
University, U.S.)
There is no word from Mr Vajpayee or Mr Advani to
explicitly recant on their recent rhetoric over
the "India-Pakistan peace moves". These moves
were no more convincing to many, including this
columnist, than an Adolf Hitler announcement
abjuring war may have been
There are no fairy tale endings in real life -
especially in the political life of a country.
Parties can come together to form a ruling
coalition, after much strife and struggle, but
seldom do they live happily ever after. The
problems of the new alliance in New Delhi are,
thus, nothing new. What is less realised is that
witches and other vile creatures, vanquished at
the end of the fairy tale, don't stay put in the
netherworld forever. Nor are those dislodged from
power through democratic means going to accept
defeat and walk into the sunset without further
ado.
In less than three weeks since the declaration of
election results of the Lok Sabha (Lower House of
India's Parliament), there have been a series of
notices served by the rejected Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) and associates that they are not
going to accept and abide by the electoral
mandate, in any but a technical sense. The BJP,
of course, is going to sit in the opposition in
parliament. It, however, has left no doubt about
its determination to demonstrate that the
peoples' mandate makes no difference.
It has made this point in the most shocking and
sordid manner through its response to the
inevitable outcome of the mandate - the
appointment of Sonia Gandhi as the country's
prime minister. No sooner had President A P J
Abdul Kalam summoned Mrs Gandhi, as the head of
the single largest party in the Lok Sabha, to
discuss the formation of a new government than
the BJP raised a banner of rebellion against the
verdict. Three of the stranger specimens from the
BJP menagerie were unleashed, and they launched a
wild assault on parliamentary democracy as India
has known it.
Govindacharya, former BJP ideologue, exiled a
couple of years ago from the party for candidly
describing outgoing Prime Minister Atal Behari
Vajpayee as a 'mask', surfaced from nowhere to
announce a 'self-respect movement'. This was to
oppose the ascent to the highest office of a
'foreigner', as Italian-born Sonia Gandhi was
called despite her full Indian citizenship and
her record as the leader of the opposition in the
outgoing Lok Sabha.
A wilder attack was mounted by former
Parliamentary Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, who
ought to have been more aware of the norms of the
Westminster-model democracy of Indian adoption.
She threatened to cut off her tresses, wear
white, sleep on the floor and survive on green
gram until Mrs Gandhi withdrew from the race. The
attempt to rouse obscurantist passions was
obvious. Uma Bharati, saffron-clad chief minister
of Madhya Pradesh joined in and spoke of
resigning on the day of a 'foreign' takeover. The
media, not embarrassed at all about its exit
polls proving so fake, claimed that the
development had deeply distressed Mr Vajpayee. As
I write, however, we hear that he has broken his
silence on the issue to say that he, too, was of
the same opinion as the infamous three.
Mrs Gandhi, according to the same media, has
silenced the three and the rest of her critics by
her 'stunning sacrifice', rejecting the
premiership offered to her on a platter. This may
be true, for the time being. The more important
point, however, is that the Swarajs and Bharatis
of Indian politics, the fascists who had become
more than a fringe over the past few years, have
tasted blood. They have seen and shown that they
have a power beyond parliamentary mandates.
Mr Vajpayee was switching over to a less
saintly-looking role after a session of the BJP
policymakers and parliamentarians, where not he,
but former Deputy Prime Minister L K Advani was
chosen as the leader of the opposition in the Lok
Sabha. The BJP has not let anyone miss the
significance of the choice. Party spokespersons
and media mouthpieces have been at pains to point
out that Mr Advani was the man who led the party
from a two-seat nadir to the status of the main
opposition in parliament in the early 90s - and
that he had achieved this through his Ayodhya
movement that culminated in the demolition of the
Babri Masjid and the edifice of secularism.
There is no word from Mr Vajpayee or Mr Advani to
explicitly recant on their recent rhetoric over
the 'India-Pakistan peace moves'. These moves
were no more convincing to many, including this
columnist, than an Adolf Hitler announcement
abjuring war may have been. The coming months,
however, may see the BJP and its camp returning
to the militarism and jingoism with renewed
vigour. What makes it all a matter of graver
concern is the absence of hope for an effective
response from the Congress and its coalition to
the BJP counter-offensive.
The writer is a journalist and peace activist based in Chennai, India
NEW DELHI, JUNE 1: EXTERNAL Affairs Minister K Natwar Singh today sought
to put a personal stamp on the country's foreign policy by indicating
that India would not send troops to Iraq and that a solution to the
Palestine imbroglio without Arafat was unrealistic Singh also placed a
high premium on relations with the Islamic world and granted a carte
blanche to Pakistan to discuss "whatever it wants", be it Kashmir,
nuclear issues or even terrorism. At his maiden press conference alter
the regime change in New Delhi, Singh announced that nuclear talks with
Pakistan would be held from June 19-20, to be followed a week later by a
dialogue at the Foreign Secretary-level from June 27-28. Spread across an
hour, the Foreign Minister's remarks were peppered with phrases that
hadn't been heard in New Delhi for the last five years, and which many had
thought had been buried along with the Cold War. As Singh admitted, he was
from a different era and had returned to a different Foreign Office
after 15 years.
NEW DELHI, JUNE 1. The External Affairs Minister, Natwar Singh,
announced today that India-Pakistan expert-level talks on nuclear
confidence building measures (CBMs) would take place here on June 19-20
while the Foreign Secretaries would meet for the first round of their
resumed composite dialogue on June 27-28. Mr. Singh said at his first
press conference that the National Security Adviser, J.N. Dixit, would be
India's pointman for dis-cussions with China - taking over as Special
Representative from Brajesh Mishra. The Special Representatives would meet
very soon. The Minister also said that India, China and Pakistan could
work out a common nuclear doctrine. With the fixing of the dates for
talks on the nuclear CBMs and the first round of resumed Foreign
Secretary-level talks, any uncertainty surrounding the composite dialogue
process has ended. The Foreign Secretaries will discuss the issues of
peace and security, including CBMs, as well as Jammu and Kashmir. Mr.
Singh made it clear that while India would play a role in the
reconstruction and rehabilitation of Sri Lanka's northern and eastern
regions, New Delhi would not agree to "Tamil Eelam" under any
circumstances.
index |  HOME Landelijke India Werkgroep | pagina KRUITVAT INDIA-PAKISTAN |
Landelijke India Werkgroep - 1 september 2004