Crisis India-Pakistan:
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uit de Indiase, Pakistaanse en internationale media.

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Inter Press Service, September 27, 2003

India, Pakistan Back to Sabre Rattling

Commentary - By Praful Bidwai

NEW DELHI, Sep 26 (IPS) - South Asian nuclear rivals India and Pakistan have again crossed swords and revived their barely-suppressed mutual hostility through verbal duels between Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and President Gen Pervez Musharraf.
The only difference is that, this time around, the duelling venue is the United Nations in New York and events on the sidelines of the General Assembly session, which both leaders have addressed in recent days. The two states have also moved closer toward deploying their nuclear weapons and missiles. This highlights the heightened danger from any new confrontation that may begin between India and Pakistan. Barely five months ago, Vajpayee held out ''the hand of friendship'' to Pakistan from Srinagar in the Kashmir Valley. He invited Pakistan to walk the path of peace and reconciliation. Musharraf and other Pakistani leaders responded warmly to the offer, the first after their 10 months-long confrontation - consisting of the deployment of one million soldiers between them -- ended 11 months ago. However, this Wednesday, Musharraf at the United Nations tore into India's position on Kashmir and attacked New Delhi for its ''brutal suppression of the Kashmiris' demand for self-determination and freedom from Indian occupation'' while urging the United Nations and the major powers to intervene to resolve the ''dangerous'' dispute. In a tat-for-tat reply the next day, Vajpayee assailed Pakistan for supporting and using ''cross-border terrorism'' as ''a tool of blackmail''.
He also accused Musharraf of having made ''a public admission for the first time that Pakistan is sponsoring terrorism in à Kashmir. After claiming that there is an indigenous struggle in Kashmir, he has offered to encourage a general cessation of violence à in return for 'reciprocal obligations and restraints'.'' Musharraf demanded, without naming India, that ''states which occupy and suppress other peoples, and defy the resolutions of the (Security) Council, have no credentials to aspire for (its) permanent membership''.
Indian leaders dismissed these remarks as ''rubbish'' and the result of Pakistan's ''annual itch'' on Kashmir.
Vajpayee countered: ''Most U.N. members today recognise the need for an enlarged and restructured Security Council, with more developing countries as à members''. This vocalised India's aspiration for a permanent Security Council seat. How has this degeneration into mutually hostile rhetoric come about? Broadly, it has involved three processes playing themselves out over the past five months. First, India and Pakistan have consciously tried to throttle growing and exuberant people-to-people or civil society contacts between their two countries. Ever since the Lahore-Delhi bus route, suspended in January last year, was recently resumed, there have been a large number of visits of friendly citizens' delegations, businessmen, schoolchildren's groups, and journalists' organisations as well as parliamentarians' conferences.
These were many steps ahead of the extremely slow-paced, reluctant and very guarded official-level exchanges. Now both countries, especially Pakistan, have clamped down on such visits through the simple expedient of denying visas to each other's citizens. The worst cases of such denial are the cancellation of a jurists' and lawyers' delegation, and a high-powered visit by Indian businessmen. Secondly, the two governments have quibbled over the sequence and content of the steps to be taken for normalising bilateral relations. They restored ambassador-level contacts and restarted the bus service. But they failed to reach an agreement on the resumption of severed air and rail links or trade. India made the restoration of rail links conditional upon the resumption of flights between the two countries' cities as well as free passage through their airspace.
Pakistan, in turn, insisted that air links could not be resumed unless India assured it that it would not unilaterally suspend overflights, as it did last year, and earlier, in the 1971 Bangladesh war. The talks held late month collapsed. But the third, and most important, process involved a bloody-minded refusal by both establishments to make sincere attempts to remove mutual misunderstanding, build confidence and take such unconditional steps as they could without compromising their positions.
It is as if both had vowed to ensure that the tentative peace initiative begun in mid-April would collapse. They increasingly made self-fulfilling prophesies of doom and laid down conditions that were destined not to be realised. Thus, India has over the past few weeks hardened its insistence that there could be no meaningful dialogue with Pakistan until ''cross-border terrorism'' is completely ended.
Pakistan in turn has questioned India's willingness to discuss the Kashmir issue and hinted that terrorist activity across the border would not stop until India's repression in Kashmir ends. Islamabad claims that the separatist militancy in Kashmir is fully indigenous and that it only lends it ''moral and political support''. But its general credibility on this issue is low. Islamabad made an identical claim in respect of the Taliban too, although it virtually created it, trained it and infiltrated it into Afghanistan in the early 1990s.
There is pretty strong evidence that Islamabad's secret service cut off support to Kashmiri militants some months ago. But India claims that this was revived in recent weeks. There is no independent verification of this. Underlying the failure to negotiate reconciliation and normalisation is deep-seated resentment and suspicion on both sides, compounded by domestic political considerations.
India is ruled by its most right-wing government in 56 years, led by a strongly Islamophobic party, which often equates terrorism with Pakistan and Islam. In Pakistan, Musharraf faces a tough Islamist opposition that accuses him of having sold out on Kashmir. Amid the mounting India-Pakistan rivalry come intensified preparations in both countries to further build their missile programmes and fissile-material stockpiles and to proceed toward the deployment of nuclear-tipped missiles. On Sep. 1, India's newly formed Nuclear Control Authority held its first-ever meeting and reviewed the arrangements in place for the ''strategic forces programme''. It took ''a number of decisions on further development of the programme'', which will ''consolidate India's nuclear deterrence''. Exactly two days later, in a tit-for-tat response, Pakistan too held a meeting of its National Control Authority. This decided to make ''qualitative upgrades'' in the nuclear programme. Since then, the Indian defence ministry has confined that it is to ''operationalise'' the nuclear-capable intermediate-range Agni missile and that it has sanctioned the raising of two missile groups.
Independent international experts believe that Pakistan is currently more advanced than India so far as the deployment-readiness of missiles goes. Both countries now have short and medium-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and reaching each other's cities in less than 10 minutes. There are no worthwhile crisis-prevention and -crisis-diffusion or confidence-building measures in place between India and Pakistan. They are suspicious of each other's nuclear doctrines and have not hesitated to resort to nuclear blackmail. During the Kargil war of 1999, they exchanged nuclear threats no fewer than 13 times. More recently, in their 10 month-long eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, they came perilously close at least twice to actual combat. India threatened conventional surgical strikes and a ''limited war''. Pakistan warned that any war would escalate to the nuclear plane. With Kashmir as the flashpoint, the threat of Nuclear Armageddon now looms larger over South Asia.

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Karachi, September 22, 2003

What's US doing in S. Asia

By M.B. Naqvi

The US appears to have made a breakthrough with regard to India. A strategic partnership is developing between them and a third dimension to it is the inclusion of the 'natural alley': Israel. Brajesh Mishra had called it a natural axis, which seems to have been all but formalized by the Israeli PM Ariel Sharon's recent India visit. In the current US visit of the Indian Premier AB Vajpayee, he is expected to sign a major agreement with the US, probably over the "trinity of issues" --- high tech trade, civilian nuclear energy and cooperation in space programme --- that may be expected to give substance to the growing "strategic partnership" between the two.
The US role in the Subcontinent cannot be understood without reference to the old US-Pak relationship. It has seen many ups and downs. What is its current status? Probably an international commission of inquiry would be needed to do justice to the subject. For one's part, one takes Ambassador Nicholas Platt's, the Chief of New York's Asia Society's, recent enunciation of the major US concerns vis-à-vis Pakistan as the text. These are four: (a) Taliban remnants trying to undermine Afghanistan's reconstruction; (b) the possibility of Indo-Pak nuclear conflict; (c) the danger of Pakistan succumbing on political and economic fronts; and (d) the rising tide of Islamic extremism.
Platt's is a succinct summing up of the US view of this country. Many would agree with the prognosis, though not necessarily with what the Bush Administration proposes to do. The question arises that in view of the long sorry story of Pak-India relations, with many quasi and full wars and a year-long military eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, with frequent exchange of threats of the use of nuclear weapons, what does the US propose to do in the region? Apart from persuading both sides not to go to war and advising them to talk --- a sort of fire fighting --- what are the concrete US actions?
It can be briefly summed up, if we ignore the currently urgent US worries about al-Qaeda, Afghanistan and Iraq, as the effort to firm up a strategic alliance among itself, Israel and India --- and to help India 'arrive', both economically and militarily. The expected major agreement between the US and India ---- mainly to permit Israel sell some of the high tech military equipment and its own policy regarding sales of dual use technology --- gives enough indication of the US desire to see India emerge as a major power in the region.
Vis-à-vis Pakistan, the recent US munificence --- a package of $ 3 billion in military and military-related economic assistance programmes, permission to help Pakistan spend $ 9 billion of its own money in American arms Bazaar and the declaration that the US intends to help maintain a balance of power between Pakistan and India --- is noteworthy. Doubtless the US values Pakistan's cooperation in catching the major al-Qaeda and Taliban fugitives. It probably expects that Pakistan would, out of gratitude, find a way of sending troops to Iraq, if not recognize Israel.
Let's relate the major US worries regarding Pakistan with the action it promises. Would the latter promote the achievement of what the US desires with reference to the four factors that constitute Pakistan's vulnerabilities? India does not need money from the US; it only needs US technology. The Bush Administration looks like obliging India very substantially. As for Pakistan, it needs American money as well as a resumption of old military relationship with the US. The latter involved permissions to buy military hardware, purchase of spares, training of personnel and American help in the maintenance of US-given equipment. The US, in pursuit of its balance of power design, is again giving Pakistan some money and permission to buy military equipment --- so long as India does not cry foul i.e. that it will disturb the balance of power.
The really serious concerns of the US are that Pakistan should not collapse for political or economic reasons; there should be no nuclear exchange on the Subcontinent; and of course the more imprecise and difficult task of saving Pakistan from Islamic extremism. Take the first: Why is Pakistan so brittle, unstable and politically divided? A few reasons are: its elites adopted a militarist view of Kashmir, thought it necessary and feasible to wrest it from India by military means. That led to the rise of the military and eventually it inherited the Pakistan state as a whole. That in turn caused multiple polarizations. The military elites reliance on Islamic rhetoric and alliance with the religious bigots led successively to ideological confusion, identity crisis, collapse of democracy, adoption of a militarist course of action and of course Islamic extremism flourished, a manifestation of which was the Taliban regime and the general fascination with terrorism by segments of society.
The question is would Pakistan's buying military equipment and training worth $ 10.8 billion help counter any of the foregoing tendencies? Remember that India in any case is embarked on a programme of military greatness and the signs are that it will now go for the cutting edge of technology. The Indian reaction to what the US is doing for Pakistan will be to render it ineffective by a greater and speedier build up. Which in turn will force Pakistan military to push for even greater acquisitions. Would its possible implosion not come nearer?
In plain words, the US permission to Pakistan to buy military goodies worth $ 9 billion in addition to $ 1.8 billion military aid is, in conjunction with what it is going to do for India, is the surest way to intensify the various arms races between these two states. It is optional to regard the American friendliness to Pakistan as a two-in-one strategy: while buying gratitude of Pakistani generals, Pakistan's unusual Monetary Reserves at $ 11 billion can be recycled to the profit of American arms manufacturers. One can be sure that if Pakistan were to spend $ 10 to 11 billion on arms, India will devote $ 50 [billion] or more to offset Pakistan's perceived gain --- all to the benefit of American arms Bazaar.
Let's ignore India. After noting that fires of the arms races are being stoked strongly and deliberately, there is the proposition: how this balance of power strategy will affect the likelihood or otherwise of Pakistan's going belly up for political or economic reasons? If militarism and arms build up, along with empty Islamic sloganeering, has brought Pakistan to the present pass, how can such a heavy military build up and support to the Musharraf regime can normalize, democratize and strengthen Pakistan? Pakistan economy's health is not robust enough; the present praises for its supposed stabilization hide an ugly reality: shorn of western largesse and if debt payment reschedulings do not remain available, Islamabad will be back to 1998 conditions. The possibility of default and worse may come closer.
How will the US goal of preventing an atomic war in South Asia be served by its plan to intensify Indo-Pak cold war and arms races? If it is true that civilian nuclear power generation is vitally linked to the country's plans for military uses of nuclear technology, if any, how then the American-Indian cooperation on that "trinity of issues" make the two countries move toward nuclear disengagement? Indeed, ordinary citizens are more likely to suspect that the US is moving toward filling the gaps in India's nuclear programmes with new dual use technology without directly assisting it in its purely military programmes. The US may end up giving impetus to nuclear arms races, as Pakistan will beg, borrow or steal to get similar technology.
Insofar as countering Islamic extremism is concerned, the course the US has adopted in South Asia can only worsen the situation. The short-term purpose of the Americans is to elicit stronger cooperation from Musharraf government in both fighting the Taliban remnants in Afghanistan, arresting the fugitive Taliban and al-Qaeda notables and to get him to adopt a more secular approach. The political course that Musharraf may be forced to adopt in sending troops to Iraq and possibly recognizing Israel will almost be like a lighted match near a powder dump. The Islamic extremists will cry 'sell out' and there will be echoes of these denunciations. Pakistan's greater integration into American schemes is sure to backfire and intensify its many divisive and debilitating trends. The US cannot do a greater disservice than to intensify the arms races between India and Pakistan.

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The Daily Times [Pakistan], September 22, 2003

What's in a flag?

By Sarmila Bose

An Indian lady of my acquaintance who harbours profound prejudice against Muslims in general and Pakistanis in particular told her husband that her ideal man was Imran Khan - a common occurrence I suspect

This year around Independence Day public notices from the government of India instructed the populace on the 'do's' and 'don'ts' of the national flag. Following litigation by a citizen, Indians are at last allowed to display their national flag, a common occurrence in the United States, but the world's largest democracy clearly has no confidence in what its people might actually do with this national symbol.
The flag cannot be draped over anything, for example - except coffins of soldiers, I suppose. It cannot be worn as clothing - maybe this warning is due to the incident in which a female Indian designer wore the national flag as a skimpy dress. That was valiant of her, as the flag is so over-burdened with symbolism that it is difficult to make a tasteful dress out of it. I mean, what on earth does one do with the 'Ashok chakra'! Yet white sarees with saffron and green borders have been around for years and no one objected. American and British flags are routinely worn on clothing. Would the guardians of proper patriotic conduct object to the increasingly common practice of the national flag being painted on the faces of its citizens? Or a patriotically positioned tattoo?
If so much is made to ride on the 'right' symbols of patriotism, inevitably, the 'wrong' symbols cannot be far behind. Terrorist outrage in Mumbai has been followed by the swift arrest of the alleged culprits and the death in a police 'encounter' of the alleged mastermind. It reminds one of an earlier incident when Indian security forces shot dead two dreaded militants allegedly involved in an attack on the American Center in Calcutta in which several policemen were killed. Both the dead men were described as Pakistani - dreaded and dead militants in India are presumed to be Pakistani these days, unless proven otherwise later, if anyone bothers to do that.
They also often carry diaries on their persons, which give details of their dastardly deeds. And they tend to carry mobile phones, those must-have accessories of modern life, seemingly inseparable from murderous extremists as well. These reveal incriminating calls to mysterious puppeteers across the border. At least such is the breathless reportage every time such an incident occurs, and they do seem to occur with disquieting frequency.
It makes one wonder if extremist frenzy makes dreaded militants lose sight of the most elementary steps to cover their tracks, or whether being a terrorist zealot goes hand in hand in the first place with being 'analytically challenged'. In the American Center case, according to the authorities one of the dreaded and dead Pakistanis confessed his own name and address, his companion's name and address and admitted to conducting the attack before succumbing to his grievous injuries.
The very next day a man was arrested in Calcutta and charged with being a key conspirator in the American Center attack. All manner of incriminating evidence was allegedly found in his home and in the apartment used by the militants. Media reports said the findings included photos of Osama bin Laden. Of course, by then it would have been difficult to find any household that was completely free of the image of Osama in some form. However, worse was to come. A week later a second search of the suspect's home allegedly yielded - horror of horrors - a Pakistani flag, which was 'seized' by the police. It appeared to have been overlooked in the earlier 'search and seizure'. In the trial now in progress of all the apprehended suspects including this hoarder of incriminating 'anti-national' symbols, the 'seized' Pakistani flag has duly made its appearance as part of the evidence produced by the prosecution. At that point in the proceedings the accused protested from the dock that he had had no such thing in his possession. He charges the police with planting the flag in order to paint him a 'traitor' in the eyes of the public. Be that as it may, the inclusion of an allegedly Pakistani flag found in a private home in India as evidence in a terrorism case poses an awkward dilemma for this writer. For if the police turned up at my house they would find a Pakistani flag there too! They would not have to 'search' for it really, as the Pakistani flag is prominently displayed on the mantelpiece in the living room! There it is among all the other South Asian flags, the stars and stripes, the Union Jack, the Irish tricolour and a clutch of other national flags diligently acquired from the United Nations. I had certainly had no idea that the possession of a neighbouring country's flag might constitute a cognisable offence in India!
To make matters worse, my children are fans of 'Junoon'. They are particularly keen on a catchy tune called 'Jazba-e-junoon' and have been known to dance riotously to blaring renditions of 'Pakistan hai hamara, Pakistan hai tumhara, kabhi na bhulo'. This item, I found later, is missing in the 'Junoon' albums available in India. One concerned relative did suggest to me that I might want to keep the volume down, in case the neighbours shopped us and the children got hauled off under POTA. Mercifully the children have moved on to a folksong called 'Pocha-kaka' - 'Rotten Uncle' - in the East Bengali dialect by the Bengali band 'Bhoomi', about a man who would not come home from the river until he had caught a fish.
To return to the 'offending' Pakistani flag - I wonder what would happen if a person accused of terrorist offences in India were found to be in possession of the British flag, or the Japanese one, or how about the Saudi flag (along with those pictures of Osama). Does one have to keep one's voice down to sing the beautiful song by Rabindranath Tagore, 'Amar Sonar Bangla' - 'My golden Bengal' - in the Bengali folk style called 'baul', because it is now the national anthem of Bangladesh? What about the flags of all the other countries of the world? Clearly none is estimated to have the impact of the Pakistani one. Is it an offence to possess an Indian flag in Pakistan? India seems to be riven in contradictions regarding all symbols Pakistani. Indians appear to love Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan and Abida Parveen. An Indian lady of my acquaintance who harbours profound prejudice against Muslims in general and Pakistanis in particular told her husband on her wedding night that her ideal man was Imran Khan - a common occurrence I suspect for Indian men foolish enough to ask! I pointed out that Imran Khan was both Muslim and Pakistani, but the lady waved me away. Clearly Imran Khan was Imran Khan!
Nor is he the only Pakistani cricketer with subcontinental appeal. A few months back I was sitting in Dubai airport, exhausted, waiting for the connection to Lahore at an unearthly hour, when a tall man with a most spectacular torso came and sat down right opposite me. Glancing up I recognised the familiar face of Wasim Akram. I must confess that my travel-weariness vanished in an instant and I was able to get through the last leg of the journey in a refreshed state of mind! No wonder that while Wasim Akram cannot play cricket in India, his smiling image can be plastered all over Indian billboards in advertisements.
Still, in a 'borderless world' full of resurgent militant nationalism, narrow-minded little 'patriot acts' seem to be sprouting all over the place. Flags, emblems, colours, melodies; will they all be divided up and loaded with meanings in black and white, or will they be swept away by the cross-border currents of global citizenship? If the alleged possession of a Pakistani flag in India can be endowed with the connotation of treacherous villainy, what might be the infinite ways of falling afoul of the official guidelines on the Indian tricolour?
Sarmila Bose is Assistant Editor, Ananda Bazar Patrika, India & Visiting Scholar, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University



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