index

A pair of chappals

Pakistan has the potential to become a perfectly normal, civilised and prosperous country. Why then does it continue to stay frozen in medieval times? Why has it volunteered to hand over its sovereignty to a decadent clergy and tribal warlords?
It was indeed gracious on the part of Pervez Musharraf and A B Vajpayee to restrain from pressing the "red" buttons during the tense summer months of 2002. But they have not packed up and gone home. They have only made a temporary truce. They could come back with renewed accusations, greater hatred and larger bombs to fulfil their masochistic desire for undoing the subcontinent. We therefore have yet one more opportunity to discover newer approaches to peace. What can be done to help the South Asian states from ridding themselves of the baggage of hatred and rivalries and in forging unity?
India is still indulging in Hindu chauvinism at home and anti-Pakistan propaganda abroad. It is so busy establishing its hegemony in the region that it has failed to focus on building peace in the region and working towards a common Union of South Asian countries. This would have yielded far more in the long run. Pakistan has the potential of becoming a perfectly normal, civilised and prosperous country. Why then, does it continue to stay frozen in medieval times? Why has it volunteered to hand over its sovereignty to a decadent clergy and tribal warlords? Why has it developed such a lop-sided militant world-view, and assumed the role of a self-sponsored flag bearer for an illusionary Ummah? It is ironic that Pakistan spends all its energies trying to liberate others, while it has failed to liberate its own self from the repeated invasions of its own army. An Army that today owns Pakistan, instead of Pakistan owning an Army.
By behaving like a tribal belt instead of a responsible sovereign state, Pakistan has created a turf where every one else can score runs except its own self. A triangular league of mullahs, the military and intelligence agencies now call the shots. The trio implemented policies that led to the destruction of Afghanistan. And now it seems that are going to repeat exactly the same mistakes this side of the Durand line.
Just as Mullah Omar and Osama Bin Laden conveniently disappeared after the US attacked Afghanistan, their Pakistani mentors Qazi Hussain Ahmed, Fazlur Rehman, Samiul Haq, Azam Tariq et al will perform a similar disappearing act at home. Pakistani and US troops have already exchanged fire in a tribal area on the Pak-Afghan border. This does not bode well for the future. With an army that cannot even safely escort a group of prisoners from one place to another, a police that is involved in criminal activities and a judiciary that is scared of punishing terrorists, Pakistan stands on a very unenviable slippery wicket.
Its home-grown Ata-Turk, after marking time for three years has now opted for cushy assignments. The "recycled" politicians, many of whom have shady backgrounds give the people no hope. Two provinces are ruled by zealots whose past achievements include support for the Taliban. The 14th century world they live in continues to revolve around issues like the dress of women, the beards of men, wine, music and killing every one who does not subscribe to their brand of religion. It is unfortunate that they continue to incite and fool the illiterate masses.
Pakistan needs to undertake a fair amount of re-engineering, if it wishes to change the course of history for itself. The initiative must come from the Army. The military must voluntarily step aside. The majors and colonels of the intelligence agencies must stop determining the supreme national interests of Pakistan.
Our desire to rule Kashmir must be completely set aside. The best we can do is to leave Kashmir to the Kashmiris. Countries that cannot govern their existing boundaries should have little reason to look for more territory.
As it is, the state's writ does not extend to the entire country, particularly not in NWFP and Balochistan. The state must be willing to extend its writ at least across its existing boundaries, and do away with all extra-constitutional bodies, the Jirgas, and Panchayats that operate all over the country. It is also time for Pakistan to close its Jihadi factories, and to put an end to militancy. It is more in the interest of Pakistan and less in the interest of USA to make sure that Afghan militants and terrorists do not take refuge in the tribal belt of Pakistan.
Pakistan needs to ensure this in a responsible and professional manner, and not be cowed down by its own tribal mafia. Pakistan needs to separate religion from the functioning of the state. The state and Mullahs are responsible for the hundreds of jail sentences awarded each year under so-called Islamic laws. Such laws must be expunged if there is to be a tolerant, civil and rational society in Pakistan. It is time for India and Pakistan to make peace, reduce their conventional armies and work together to reduce poverty and deprivation. And this cannot be done till the hostilities between the two countries cease. The people of the two countries have been taken for a ride for the past fifty years. They deserve a break. They and their children are entitled to a better tomorrow. In a century where many countries aim for families with two cars, the people of the subcontinent should be able to aim for a pair of "chappals" for every person and a classroom for each child.
The writer is a consultant and trainer for quality management systems

index

Pakistan 'Talibanising' Kashmir: JKLF

The Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) has criticized Pakistan for the ‘Talibanisation’ of Kashmir by pumping in jehadi elements into the state and said this policy had, in fact, resulted in a serious set back to Islamabad's policy.
"Before the mushroom growth of the Kashmiri groups in early 1900s, the JKLF was the main group in the field, and to some extent had powerful voice in the matters. But when interest of those who supported the JKLF changed, it changed the balance of power in Kashmir," wrote London-based senior JKLF leader Shabir Choudhry in the US-based Pakistani web weekly South Asia Tribune.
"Those who deprived the JKLF of the support at this crucial stage and gradually Talibanised the Kashmiri movement thought they were doing that in the national interest," Choudhry, who is the General Secretary of JKLF-Yaseen's European unit, said.
“They (Islamabad) were cautioned that this new approach was wrong and that it was a slow death to the movement, but they did not listen and continued with the policy which they thought was in their national interest," he said.
"Now we all know that the change of policy was wrong, and that it resulted in a serious set back for the movement and caused innumerable problems to Pakistan," the JKLF leader said.

index

Failed policies

American attitude toward Pakistanis and their conduct vis-à-vis this country are subjects that make many unhappy. Leaked reports in the US media about Pakistan's unreliability in keeping its nuclear secrets and of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan are ominous. American military's assertions that it has a right to pursue into Pakistan fugitives from Afghanistan have concentrated the minds here. Later the agreement (?) that such issues will be resolved quietly does not wash out the significance of a Pakistani paramilitary trooper having felt obliged to shoot at an American soldier and that American air force dropped a 500 pounds bomb on a target in Pakistan.
Plane loads of Pakistanis have been deported from the US; Pakistani visitors to the US are required to be finger printed and to register with INS. Pakistanis in the US are living in fear, the once land of liberty, because of the hysteria of fear sweeping through it about Muslims and people from South Asia and Middle East. American media and officials are making, or upholding, accusations about Islamabad's commitment tonon-proliferation is uncertain. All this is perplexing in view of the evidence that Pakistan government appears to have given privileges to Americans that smack of extra-territoriality rights. Are US and Pakistan friends or are they foes?
On the other side, India continues to make bellicose statements, refuses to countenance resumption of normal communication links, dialogue and sees little prospect of normal ties in near future. Although the bulk of Indian Army appears to have withdrawn from the international borders, the deployment along LoC in Kashmir is said to be still threatening. Sangh parivar in India made Pakistan, among anti-Muslim tirades, an election issue in the recent Gujarat election and it is expected to repeat the Gujarat methods in the next 10 state elections this year. Pakistan's pleas for talks are disregarded and arrogant bellicosity is all that is emanating from Indian leadership, ostensibly because of "cross border terrorism".
Islamabad denies this "cross border terrorism". But India's 10-month long expensive massing of troops was to threaten a punitive war for just this and has refused to accept Pakistan's denials. Exact truth is not known, of course. Doubtless the background of 50 years of adversarial relations which provided incentives to do down each other. That was the policy number one and friendship with us was consequential and stood at number two.
One thing remains certain: Pakistan's Kashmir policy, indeed almost all of its India policy, and the consequent cold war, arms race and five big and small wars have not succeeded in their aim. India's possession of Kashmir Valley --- the only part that interests Pakistan --- is as firmly under Indian control as ever; the 10 years of Jihad have made no difference. India will either go to a supposedly final war or go on frustrating all that Pakistanis and the Kashmiris can do; it has the resources, will and ability for the purpose.
Few can doubt that this Jihad-promoting policy has been counterproductive on two counts: it was sure to result in a war and India was ready to go to a war last year that did not suit Pakistan: there is no certainty Pakistan would win a war and Kashmir Valley would be its, despite the predictable costs and other uncertainties. Secondly Jihad-promotion could not but have a domestic cost; Jihadis, when and if done with Kashmir, would retrain their guns on targets in Pakistan. And this they partially did. The rampant sectarianism, attacks on the American or other foreign targets resulted, not to mention other conspiracies. Why pursue a policy with results that are unwanted? The Americans too assess that Pakistan is a weak and uncertain friend. While India has been able to win American affections, Pakistan can end up as an additional member of Bush's axis of evil. Isn't it another major failure?
Let's examine: relations with India went into a tailspin without any compensatory advantage. The economy is so much the worse for the still accelerating arms race. Over emphasis on national security, meaning mainly military defence, has led to the rise of militarism, collapse of democracy and provincialism. Power was cornered by a civil and military bureaucracy and it is the foreigners whose purposes were mainly served by Pakistan's armed forces. Apart from the initial loss of Kashmir due to the propensity of using force, the record of armed conflicts with India, Kargil included, is not too uplifting. The conclusive defeat in 1971 led to Pakistan's dismemberment while all other wars can at best be called inconclusive draws. The same approach promises similar results, for India is able to keep several jumps ahead.
Has anyone failed to take notice that all foreign governments -- from Americans to the British, French, Russians, Iranians, Chinese and others -- have asked Pakistan throughout 2002 "to do more". Reference was to President Musharraf's June promise to stop sending Jihadis into Indian held Kashmir. Pakistan said it has stopped; India said Islamabad was still sending infiltrators. Most others took India's words at face value. Pakistan had no supporters, not even China and Iran, otherwise quite friendly. Pakistan's way of solving Kashmir problem has isolated it completely.
Actually Pakistan's earlier Taliban adventure had completed its isolation; only some US oil interests, possibly the coterie around Bush and perhaps CIA were thick with Pakistan's master strategists. The latter should have known that as and when domestically feasible, the US would benefit from Taliban -- or if that did not happen, the opposite would be the case: the US would destroy their regime. As it turned out, thanks to Taliban's rigidity the US desires were not met and the latter punished them by driving them out of power. In the process Pakistan suffered horribly. Public sentiment in NWFP's and Balochistan's Pushtun belt was deeply hurt. That was the immediate price paid in the shape of MMA's power. There will be other installments when it becomes obvious that MMA is not really compatible with either Pakistan's ruling elites or latter's permanent friendship with, or dependence on, the US. Instead of gaining strategic depth, Pakistan has now no influence on the US-governed Afghanistan.
The US and Pakistan seem to be on a collision course. On present showing Pakistan's stability requires continuing injections of cash help: either credits or debt rescheduling. To some observers the brightest achievement of Musharraf government -- the soon-to-be Monetary Reserves at $ 10 billion -- might be a chimera. Within a few years of American displeasure, much of it might be confiscated: go toward adjusting against unpaid debt servicing obligations. At any rate, no details are known about how much is kept where and on what terms. Pakistan has still to cope with the uncertainties that are to unfold after 2004 when full globalisation would come into being. The Musharraf line that Pakistan would no longer depend on IMF and its associates is still a pie in the sky. So long as the GDP growth rate is not 6 per cent or more -- and Pakistan can pay for all its imports with its exports -- there can be no freedom from the need for cash injections from IFIs. This requires US benevolence. The latter can only be bought with apparently utter subservience.
The recent firing on a US soldier and America's punitive bombing incident was investigated by both sides. What was the upshot? It was a 'misunderstanding' -- an ambiguous statement -- and all such misunderstandings will be amicably settled in future 'quietly'! The really significant part of this news item was this 'quietness'. There is no word that brave statements of Foreign and Defence Ministers won recognition from the US government. It does seem as if Pakistan is promising not to publicise such future 'misunderstandings' while the firm statement by American military about its 'right' to pursue fugitives into Pakistan stands. This compromise on sovereignty hurts more as the other side shows increasing signs of beginning to regard Pakistan as a likely foe.
Seven-eighths of Pakistan's foreign policy comprises relations with India and the US. It has been noted that, except for China's finely-calibrated and one-sided friendship and conditional Saudi munificence (rather than friendship), Pakistan has no friends; it is almost totally isolated. Limits of the success in its India (and Kashmir) policy are not known. The other pillar on which the ruling elites have relied on for survival, the US, seems quite as uncertain. But perhaps the elites appear to believe that a few changed faces might see them through, no matter what the cost to national sentiment or even to the country.
But the situation is intolerable for the people who seem to be genuinely divided about national purposes, priorities and friends. Facts need to be faced with courage and imagination. This writer has drawn flak for (only) pointing out uncomfortable facts and for refraining from recommending solutions to difficult problems. The reply is twofold: commentators are not nation-builders; seeking solutions, elaborating them and seeking popular sanction for them is the rightful job of national leaders. Secondly, one can only throw up a few pointers or solutions in outline form. Which is where one's function ends. Next column will be about the bare bones of a new policy orientation.

index

‘Pak claim of being India’s equal is ridiculous’

Former Foreign Secretary J N Dixit has ridiculed Pakistan's claim to be a power equal in status to India.
Terming the claim as "irrational" and "unacceptable", Mr. Dixit said it was a myth to project on the part of Islamabad that the two countries were equal.
“This creates problems," said Mr. Dixit, who was speaking at the Zayed Centre for Coordination and Follow-up at Abu Dhabi on Sunday.
He said Pakistan suffered from inadequacies since independence and they failed to get the required territories because nearly half the Muslims opted to stay back in India after partition.
Besides, the break-up of East Pakistan to form Bangladesh constituted another blow to Pakistan, Mr. Dixit said.
He did not see the possibility of an improvement in Indo-Pak relations. The ex-Foreign Secretary hoped the animosities would not translate into a conflict.
Referring to Indo-Israel relations, Mr. Dixit said New Delhi opened ties with Tel Aviv after some Arab countries established diplomatic contacts with that country. But these relations were not at the cost of ties with Arab countries, according to the Gulf News.
Mr. Dixit sought to ally apprehensions over India's growing ties with Israel. It was wrong to construe these ties as "anti-Islamic" because India supports the Palestinian cause.
"It (ties with Israel) was a decision based on practicality and certain orientations of Arab countries and in no way erodes our support for Palestine cause... India does not need Israeli support for its missile programme. We have (defence) cooperation with France, US and Russia. We also have cooperation with Israel and I do not rule it out but it should be over-emphasized politically," he said.

index

Sliding into nuclear abyss

The more the rulers of countries like Pakistan and India emulate, collaborate with, or strain to demonstrate their loyalty to, hegemonic powers like the United States, the more they caricature themselves-and mock at their own national interest. That is what happened during the exchange of hostilities between Pakistani and US troops in Southern Waziristan when Washington asserted its "right" of "hot pursuit" in the "war against terrorism" and went on to bomb a madrassa.
The US has once again shown just how disdainfully it treats its allies. This is not the first time it has done this, least of all to a state outside its core-alliance, NATO. America routinely treats NATO members much like an emperor treats his vassals. Within an alliance which is asymmetrical and demands unquestioning obedience from the top, the minor allies are at best "consulted", or simply told what to do.
For instance, there has never been a "dual trigger" on NATO's weapons, one operated by the host member-state, and the other by the US. Operationally, there has always been a single, unified, line of command. Therefore, it's not for nothing that the UK, America's most loyal ally, has been called its "Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier". The latest report of a Pakistan-US deal on "hot pursuit", albeit to be conducted "quietly", underscores the same asymmetry.
India may soon experience Pakistan's sense of hurt and humiliation thanks to its two latest acts: signing away some of its sovereign rights in Washington's favour, and doctrinally emulating the US. On December 26, India signed a "bilateral" treaty with the US which gives impunity to their citizens who may be wanted by multilateral agencies or third countries for human rights offences including genocide or crimes against humanity. By signing it, India has joined the ranks of states like Gambia, Tajikistan, East Timor and Israel.
These bilateral pacts are worse than Status of Forces Agreements. They are meant to sabotage the worthy global effort to bring into force the International Criminal Court, to try crimes against humanity. As of now, 139 states have signed the ICC's Rome Statute; 87 have ratified it. Notable exceptions are the US, China, India and Pakistan. The US was originally a signatory, but "unsigned" the Statute under Bush.
That isn't all. America blackmailed the UN into delaying the functioning of the ICC and is asking a host of states to bypass the Court altogether. That means that, say, if Henry Kissinger were to be hauled up for war crimes while on a visit to India, New Delhi would refuse to surrender him. This will work against the interests of Indian (and American) citizens-as the Bhopal case shows.
The second example, of imitation, is worse. On January 4, India's Cabinet Committee on Security offered a general commitment to no-first-use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. But closely following the December 2002 US "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction", it said India would use nuclear weapons in response to "a major attack against India or Indian forces anywhere" made with "biological or chemical weapons" too. This means killing lakhs of non-combatant citizens in response to chemical or biological weapons which kill on a smaller scale ie, a few hundred soldiers.
This further dents India's claim to nuclear "restraint" and sobriety-even assuming that the embrace of horror weapons, and search for "security" based on them, is compatible with "restraint". This is part of New Delhi's further plan to "operationalise" its "nuclear deterrent" by setting up a Nuclear Command Authority.
The NCA announcement validates this Column's assessment that India and Pakistan are "hurtling towards inducting nuclear weapons into their armed forces" and getting into a form of rivalry from which they will find it hard to extricate themselves. The establishment of India's NCA comes almost three years after Pakistan set up its own command. The principal difference between the two NCAs pertains to two items.
First, in India, authorisation for a nuclear strike is solely vested with the civilian leadership, the Political Council, chaired by the Prime Minister. The Executive Council, which is expected to have military personnel and bureaucrats on it, will have a limited role: eg, advise on security threats, etc.
In Pakistan, the military is unlikely to easily give up its hitherto-unquestioned control over nuclear weapons and policy. In February 2000, Islamabad announced that the NCA would be chaired by the Head of Government. Then, the head was Chief Executive Musharraf. Today, he is Prime Minister Jamali. But going by the NCA meeting last Monday, which Jamali "attended", declaring Pakistan's nuclear weapons to be in "good hands", he seems loath to assert his authority over the NCA.
Exclusive control over nuclear weapons by the military poses a problem: no military has the popular mandate to take a life-and-death security decision, although civilian control doesn't guarantee "responsible" decision-making-witness Hiroshima-Nagasaki.
The second difference is doctrinal. Pakistan has a nuclear first-strike policy. India doesn't, but is under pressure to abandon NFU. According to one report, the last National Security Advisory Board-whose first avatar in 1999 produced the "Draft Nuclear Doctrine"-had recommended that New Delhi rescind NFU. In practice, it is unclear, given the lack of "strategic distance" between India and Pakistan, if NFU will mean much once hostilities break out. The temptation to retaliate the moment a strike is considered imminent will be high. Differences notwithstanding, both India and Pakistan face three similar problems in operationalising their "deterrents"; neither says how it proposes to resolve them. First, there is the question of survivability of nuclear "assets", and, very important, command structures. This problem is acute in a situation of "decapitation" of military and political leaderships.
Second, and related to this, is succession within the command authority and the ability of each state to install uninterruptible communications channels between different levels of succession. The general technological backwardness and accident- or disaster-proneness of both societies will complicate matters here.
Third, India and Pakistan will inevitably have to move towards demonstrating their capacity to inflict "unacceptable damage" upon each other. This means they must be far more transparent in projecting their capabilities: through deployment and high-alert readiness to pull the trigger. This will impel both to escalate from a state of "existential deterrence" to actual threats, backed by battle-readiness.
Given the secrecy prevalent in the subcontinent's military establishments, the absence of adequate testing of many sub-systems, and lack of symmetrical perceptions of each other's specific capacities, this could make for terrible strategic miscalculation and panic reaction, greatly raising the chances of a pre-emptive or launch-on-warning response.
The only way to contain these risks is to undertake Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measures, discussed in this Column (July 4). But that presumes a high degree of transparency and the will to negotiate. That seems infeasible in today's situation, marked by the lowest point in bilateral relations-lower even than in 1971.
This makes a Nuclear Armageddon likelier than before-unless India and Pakistan urgently pull back from the brink. Kargil happened barely a year after they overtly crossed the nuclear threshold. With their NCAs and their ramshackle nuclear deterrents, the present situation may be infinitely worse-to the collective peril of 1.3 billion South Asians.

index

Pakistan-India tensions more dangerous than Cold War: US

NEW DELHI, Jan 8: The United has described the tensions between India and Pakistan as more dangerous than the scariest period during the Cold War, according to the text of an official statement made available by the US embassy on Wednesday.
In what can only be construed as a major policy statement on the way ahead for India-Pakistan relations but downplayed by the Indian media, US State Department envoy Richard Haass spoke tersely and directly to New Delhi about the need to mend fences with Islamabad. The following is an excerpt from an address Haass delivered in Hyderabad on Tuesday. "Let me now talk about another area that continues to colour the US partnership with India: that of Indo-Pakistani relations," Haass said. "Neither the United States nor India want our bilateral relationship to be conducted through the prism of India's relationship with Pakistan.
"The United States - as much as India - wants to devote the time we spend talking about the threat of conflict in South Asia to other, more positive issues. America - as much as India - is eager to see a thriving, peaceful and democratic India take its place in the world. "But it is simply a fact of life that India will not realize its immense potential on the global stage until its relationship with Pakistan is normalized. "If India were to have a better relationship with Pakistan, it would be free to emerge as the major world actor that it ought to be. The festering conflict with Pakistan distracts India from its larger ambitions, helps create the environment that scares off capital, and absorbs valuable resources.
"The ability of both Pakistanis and Indians to reap the benefits of the 21st century will depend to a large degree on their willingness to build a more normal relationship with one another.
"The current situation is distinctly abnormal - even by the standards of adversaries. Today, the Indo-Pakistani relationship is less developed than that between the United States and the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. "Even in the worst of times, trade flowed between the two countries, Washington and Moscow hosted ambassadors from the other country, and cultural exchanges went ahead.
"Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union - who were not neighbours like India and Pakistan, but two countries on opposite sides of the globe - recognized that maintaining considerable interaction was in their mutual interest.
"In the absence of the most basic contacts and the most minimal lines of communication, tension between India and Pakistan constantly risks sparking a broader conflict with potentially cataclysmic consequences - for India, for Pakistan, for the region, and, if I might say, for the United States.
"But, even if such a conflict never materializes, the omnipresent spectre of it has huge tangible costs. It limits the ability of both India and Pakistan to seize opportunities to better the lives of their peoples.
"The time, energy, and resources New Delhi and Islamabad now devote to countering one another could instead be focused on tackling respective domestic challenges as well as the problems of Asian stability writ large.
"Given the wide repercussions of Indo-Pakistani tensions, it is no wonder that the international community has repeatedly called on the Indian and Pakistani governments to normalize their relationship. It is a responsibility they have to their own peoples, to their neighbours, and all of humanity.
"The world is not asking India and Pakistan to do anything that other states have not done. Numerous countries have moved beyond their own contentious histories in order to secure a better future. Look at Germany and France, Japan and Korea, Brazil and Argentina. And now the United States and Russia.
"A more normal relationship between India and Pakistan is not impossible to envision. Normalcy does not mean an absence of disagreement. Rather, normalcy means a resilient relationship that would allow India and Pakistan to weather inevitable shocks and setbacks without the risk of violent conflict or a nuclear crisis. "Normalcy means that differences are resolved through diplomacy, not force. In this time of heightened tension, we are in an unusual situation where neither country has a High Commissioner in the capital of the other.
"But even in less tense times, diplomatic presence and exchange was minimal. An expansion of diplomatic links could facilitate people-to-people contacts and lay the groundwork for greater bilateral cooperation on a range of common interests.
"Normalcy also means a relationship wherein Indians and Pakistanis from all walks of life can easily travel to the other country for family visits, tourism, sports or business. It should not take more time to fly from New Delhi to Islamabad than it does to fly from Delhi to London.
"Normalcy means that the cricket matches between India and Pakistan that once captivated millions in South Asia and around the world would be only one of many kinds of people-to-people interaction. Normalcy means market-driven commerce. Today, legal trade and investment between the two countries is virtually non-existent. "Developing natural commercial links could bring greater prosperity to both countries and, in the process, build constituencies for normalization and increase the stake that each country has in the peaceful resolution of disputes. In this regard, it is time to take practical steps to bring about a South Asian Free Trade Area.
"Most of all, normalcy means that Kashmir would be addressed peacefully. In fact, much has already changed in Kashmir, even since my last visit to South Asia this past autumn.
"The US welcomes the new state government in Jammu and Kashmir and commends its bold initiatives to reduce tensions and bring about a climate of reconciliation in a region that has too long been mired in strife."And we are pleased by the commitment of the central government to hold a serious dialogue with the J&K state government and others in Kashmir. These discussions are essential if the quest to improve the lives and livelihoods of the Kashmiri people is to succeed.
"Now is clearly a moment of opportunity in Kashmir - one that New Delhi, the Mufti government, and the people of the region can collectively translate into tangible political and economic benefits. "Such efforts will not in themselves 'solve' the complex issues of Indo-Pakistani differences, terrorist violence, human rights, and governance that converge in Kashmir. But they are important steps in the right direction.
"They will bring Kashmir closer to a solution that will be peaceful and honourable for all sides, one that will allow Kashmiris to live their daily lives in safety, with dignity and opportunity.
"Sadly, this opportunity continues to be narrowed by terrible acts of violence in Kashmir. I am saddened by the recent assassination of Abdul Aziz Mir, one of the governing coalition's Assembly members. "I am also deeply disturbed by the horrific murders of three young Kashmiri women on 19 December and by the deaths of others in subsequent weeks. Let me be clear: violence serves the interests of no one. As Mehbooba Mufti, vice-president of the People's Democratic Party, said in a recent party statement, 'it is a historic fact that the gun yields nothing, but adds miseries to the people and users'." "I cannot predict what a solution to the Kashmir problem might look like or when it will come. But there are a few things about which I am certain. First, the status of the Line of Control will not be changed unilaterally.
"Second, the LoC will also not be changed by violence. To the contrary, in the absence of a jointly agreed Indo-Pakistani alternative, everyone should act to ensure the continued sanctity of the LoC. For its part, the US will continue to urge President Musharraf to do everything in his power to permanently end infiltration into Kashmir. Pakistanis must realize that this infiltration is killing their hopes for a settlement to Kashmir. "I have been to Pakistan many times, most recently this past October. I believe I have an appreciation for the depth of feeling Pakistanis have for Kashmir. "Nevertheless, I would discourage Pakistanis from allowing their focus on resolving the Kashmir dispute to block progress on other issues that involve India and that hold out the promise of an improved bilateral relationship. I have worked on regional conflicts for almost three decades - be it Cyprus, Northern Ireland, or the Middle East. "And if there is one lesson I have learned, it is that the inability to resolve big issues should not stop progress on the little ones. The path to large breakthroughs is often paved with agreements on small issues.
"The US stands shoulder to shoulder with India in its battle against terrorists, be they those who struck at New York and Washington in September 2001 or those who targeted the Indian parliament a few months later.
"Indeed, given all that India has suffered at the hands of terrorists, I can understand Indian government's statements that India will not have a dialogue with Pakistan until terrorism emanating from Pakistani territory ends. However, I am concerned that such a position does not provide the basis for a sound, long-term policy for India to deal with its neighbour.
"Indeed, I would argue that India, like Pakistan, has an interest in removing conditions to dialogue. India is too great a country, too important a regional and potentially global player, to allow a relationship with a neighbour to keep it from realizing its potential on the world stage.
"Resuming a range of contacts with Pakistan at this time would not mean rewarding terrorism. Indians should not view efforts to improve relations with Pakistan as a favour to its neighbour. Rather, Delhi should seek to diminish tensions with Islamabad as a way of securing a better future for itself. India should also recognize that there are important developments unfolding in Pakistan that can contribute to a more stable, secure region.
"I would hope that New Delhi would respond to these changes by taking small steps - beyond the welcome reduction in military deployments on the international border. India could acknowledge encouraging events where they exist, including Pakistan's assistance in the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, President Musharraf's vision of a reformed Pakistan, and the emergence of civilian leaders.
"India should look for opportunities to reach out to and reinforce the new civilian government in Islamabad. Supporting positive developments in Pakistan does not mean condoning or overlooking the many serious matters that Pakistan still must address. But it does mean saying and doing things that help encourage favourable trends within Pakistan and make possible more normal ties with it."

index

Trade term for trip to Pak

New Delhi, Jan. 7: Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee is not averse to going to Pakistan if the Pervez Musharraf regime gives an assurance to start normal trading relations with India.
The Saarc summit, earlier scheduled to be held in Islamabad this week, was called off by the Pakistani authorities last month after India refused to confirm Vajpayee’s participation when the two countries failed to agree on preferential trade arrangements for each other.
Though the other South Asian nations were willing to agree to such an arrangement, it was Pakistan’s reluctance to offer normal trading rights to India that created the stumbling block.
Highly placed government sources said Vajpayee could still go to Islamabad if the Pakistani leadership assured that it would give up its rigid stand and offer normal trading ties with India.
In fact, Musharraf was a party to the agreement of the last Saarc summit in Kathmandu, where all the seven member states decided to complete the preferential trade arrangement by the year-end along with the framework for a free-trade zone in South Asia.
Pakistan’s refusal to offer normal trading rights to India perhaps stems from its fear that such a move would dilute the “centrality” of the Kashmir issue in its relations with Delhi.
Though a signatory to the World Trade Organisation, Islamabad has so far not given India the most-favoured-nation (MFN) status. Delhi, also a signatory to the WTO, however, has given Pakistan the status, which, in effect, means normal trading rights.
The Pakistani leadership has refused to reciprocate on the plea that till the Kashmir dispute is settled, it will not offer MFN status to India.
“Pakistan had a chance and still has the chance of restarting the stalled dialogue with India if it makes positive gestures towards the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (Sapta) and the South Asian Free Trade Area (Safta),” a senior Central official said. Till it shows such an inclination, however, there is little possibility of Vajpayee going to Pakistan.
The US, keen to cool down tempers in South Asia, has been nudging India towards the talks table. But every time the issue is broached by Washington, Delhi makes it clear that till a conducive atmosphere is created, the dialogue would not be resumed.
Indian leaders have based their argument of not talking to Pakistan on three broad points. First, there will be no dialogue till the Musharraf regime gives up completely cross-border terrorism in Kashmir.
Second, as the US has not negotiated with the al Qaida or the Taliban or Saddam Hussain, it should not adopt double standards in South Asia by asking India to talk with Pakistan.
Third, the Indian leadership has argued that Pakistan’s sincerity in resuming a dialogue and normalising relations with Delhi is in serious doubt because it has not shown any flexibility in a simple thing like offering normal trade relations to India.

index

Pak., Bangla overstayers should be deported: Advani

NEW DELHI JAN. 7. The Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani, has said that Pakistani and Bangladesh nationals who were living in India illegally should be located and deported.
Addressing the Conference of the Chief Secretaries and the Directors-General of Police here today, Mr. Advani said the 11,500 or so Pakistani nationals and half a crore or so Bangladeshis who had remained in India after the expiry of their visas posed a serious threat to the country's internal security.
He said the powers of the Central Government to deport the overstayers had been delegated to the State Governments and the Union Territories.
The conference today agreed to strengthen Centre-State intelligence gathering arrangements by setting up Multi-Agency Centres and a joint task force on intelligence. The MAC, which is now operational at the Centre, would be "activated soon'' in the States, the Union Home Secretary, N. Gopalaswami, told a press conference.
The Intelligence Bureau will act as the nodal agency for the MAC, which will include representatives of the Central and State intelligence agencies and the intelligence wings of Central para-military forces. A.K. Bhandari, Special Secretary in the Home Ministry, said the MAC would pool the information from these separate sources, work out the actionable areas allowing action to be taken quickly.
Mr. Gopalaswami said there was also agreement that in the States affected by left-wing extremism, issues pertaining to development and grievance redress should be prioritised. With this in mind, the Planning Commission has allocated Rs. 15 crores a year for five years for each of the nine affected States. This would be used as a "topping up fund'' for development activity under existing schemes.
He said several States had also asked the Centre to consider re-structuring the form in which Central funds for police reform were allocated. Currently, the State matches the Centre's allocation.
The Centre will now consider making a 50 per cent outright contribution and a 25 per cent loan, with the State making up the remaining 25 per cent. This financial arrangement would also be extended to the scheme to modernise and improve jails, Mr. Gopalaswami said.
The Centre has asked the States to improve the conviction rates in crimes committed against women. The rate at present was "very low, between five and seven per cent''. The States had been told they must ensure that these cases progressed quickly and that the conviction rate went up.

index

Pak. n-blackmail no worry: Fernandes

HYDERABAD Jan. 7. The Defence Minister, George Fernandes, said here today that Islamabad's ``nuclear blackmail'' need not be a cause for worry since ``there will be no Pakistan left'' if India retaliated with atomic weapons.
The Pakistani leadership should not talk of using the ``bomb'' and should abandon the idea of committing "suicide," he said. India's nuclear doctrine clearly laid down the policy of ``no-first use'' and employing its capabilities only as a deterrent.
"But if the deterrent is not adequate and Pakistan uses the bomb, we will suffer a little but there will be no Pakistan left later. I hate having to say this but Pakistan should know its strengths and vulnerability and stop making these stupid statements,'' Mr. Fernandes said, addressing the ninth partnership of the Confederation of Indian Industry.
Mr. Fernandes was referring to the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf's reported remarks at Karachi that a war between New Delhi and Islamabad was averted after the United States conveyed to the Indian leadership his country's resolve to wage a non-conventional war. Gen. Musharraf had spoken even earlier of using the nuclear option when he saw the size of India's troop deployment and its state of readiness.
On the growing possibility of a U.S. attack on Iraq, he said in a brief interaction with the media that India would make efforts to see that the United Nations had the last word on the issue. The U.S. stand lacked transparency because it was saying different things each day about its objective - inspection of weapons, removal of armaments and overthrow of Saddam Hussain. "We will wait and watch for the final stand of the U.S.''
Speaking on ``Military Strategy: fighting the unseen enemy,'' the Minister said that the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban activists, having lost their jobs in Afghanistan, were looking at Kashmir and that Pakistan was willing to provide all material and logistic help to them. Though the Army was doing a good job in Jammu and Kashmir, the problem in eliminating terrorism involved ``jehad'' and Pakistan's support to it.
It was ironical that Pakistan was still being considered by the U.S. as an ally in the global war against terrorism. "I am now convinced that we have to fight terrorism on Indian soil ourselves and not as part of global coalition. Yet, we will keep the commitments we have made to the coalition.''
The former U.S. Deputy Secretary for Defence, John Hamre, said though Iraq posed a problem to his country, Pakistan remained a far bigger threat. Gen. Musharraf had survived six assassination attempts by radical forces, which could pose a serious risk to Washington and New Delhi. The worst prospect was of the Taliban laying its hands on nuclear weapons.

index

US tells India to reach out, talk to Pak

Hyderabad, January 7: Rejecting New Delhi’s argument that there could be no dialogue with Pakistan until it ended cross-border terrorism, the US today said India would not be able to realise its immense potential globally until its relationship with Islamabad was normalised.
While sharing India’s concern on cross-border terrorism, Richard N. Haass, director, policy planning staff in the US State Department, said India should look for opportunities to reach out to and reinforce the civilian government in Pakistan.
Disagreeing with Indian stand that there could be no dialogue with Pakistan until cross-border terrorism was stopped, he said: ‘‘I am concerned that such a position does not provide the basis for a sound, long-term policy for India to deal with its neighbours.’’
He said the US stood shoulder-to-shoulder with India against terrorists, be they those who struck at New York and Washington or those who targeted Indian Parliament.
Participating in the plenary session on ‘‘US and India - a transformed relationship’’ - at the ongoing CII Partnership Summit 2003 here, he said India would not be able to realise its immense potential on global stage until its relationship with Pakistan was normalised.
Haass said there was an ‘‘unusual situation’’ where neither country has a high commissioner in the capital of the other. ‘‘Resuming a range of contacts with Pakistan at this time will not mean rewarding terrorism. Indians should not view efforts to improve relations with Pakistan as a favour to its neighbour. Rather, New Delhi should seek to diminish tensions with Islamabad,’’ he said.
Favouring improved trade relations between the two neighbours, he said supporting positive developments in Pakistan did not mean ‘‘condoning or overlooking’’ the many serious matters that Islamabad ‘‘still must address.’’ He said the US would continue to urge President Musharraf to do everything in his power to permanently end infiltration.
‘‘I would discourage Pakistanis to allowing their focus on resolving Kashmir dispute to block the progress on other issues that involve India and that hold the promise of an improved bilateral relationship,’’ he said.

index

'India, Pakistan delinquent in following Shimla Agreement'

ISLAMABAD Jan. 5 . Pakistan must serve a two-year notice of intent to renounce the 1972 Shimla Agreement as an `unequal treaty', if there is no meaningful progress on resolution of core (Kashmir) and non-core disputes with India, according to former Pakistani parliamentarian and commentator, M.P. Bhandara.
In an article in the English daily, Dawn, he argues that the Shimla accord, which has been the framework of the Indo-Pak relationships in the past 31 years, appears fair and equitable. It proclaims recognition of the respective positions of India and Pakistan on Kashmir, within the framework of the United Nations.
But both sides have been delinquent in observing the provisions of the Shimla Agreement in letter and spirit. India, in pursuance of its own interpretation of the cease-fire line, known post-Simla, as the Line of Control (LoC), in Kashmir, occupied the Siachen glacier. The Kargil conflict of 1998 started by Pakistan was a belated response to Siachen.
"These warlike skirmishes in a backdrop of militancy supported by Pakistan and the counter-terrorism of the Indian Army on the Kashmiri people has brought the two countries to the brink of a nuclear war. As of today we are in a deep-freeze relationship. Prospect of negotiations have been reduced to a sorry pass.
All we ask for is "meaningful talks" on Kashmir. India replies that it will talk at a time of its choosing, when it judges Pakistan to have stopped supporting terrorism in Kashmir and the dismantling of the terrorist infrastructure... ." Mr. Bhandara says India post-1971 is not prepared to yield an inch on Kashmir.
According to him India's present strategy is to reach direct accommodation with disaffected Kashmiris represented by the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) at one end, and the moderate government of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, at the other. Pakistan by design is to be shut out of the process.

index

'Musings' set the agenda for Indo-Pak. talks?

Because of the widespread interest, understandably stirred up by the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee's definition of Hindutva in his latest musings, the meaning of his reference to Pakistan has gone unnoticed. He mentioned India-Pakistan relations and Kashmir briefly, beginning with Islamabad's role in fomenting terrorist violence in India. He then made some points, apparently routine, but, in practice, having a close bearing on the course of bilateral dealings in the near future.
Pakistan, Mr. Vajpayee said, must stop cross-border terrorism and abandon its insistence on the "centrality'' of the Kashmir issue. It was the divergence on these two issues that had led to the collapse of the Agra summit. The draft of the joint declaration could not be finalised because India was not proposed to accept the "centrality'' of Kashmir, while Pakistan objected to the "cross-border'' prefix to terrorism. New Delhi, it was clear from Mr. Vajpayee's formulation in the musings, stuck to the position it had taken then - and would regard it as constituting the parameters for future dialogue.
At the same time, he set his agenda for the talks, clearly stating his preference for trade and economic issues. This, obviously, was the meaning of these words: "Let our two countries agree to provide mutually beneficial trade and economic ties, strengthen cultural relations and encourage greater people-to-people contacts. Once our two peoples experience the fruits of a tension-free and cooperative environment, we will be able to see the Kashmir issue in its proper dimension and arrive at an amicable and a lasting solution.''
On the other hand, Islamabad, as was known, regarded Kashmir as a "core issue'' and, in the absence of a move towards its resolution, would not engage in any substantive discussion on economic matters. This was evident from its conduct since the last SAARC summit in Kathmandu a year ago. Islamabad had been conspicuously slow in its response to suggestions for positive steps for a preferential trade arrangement, as a prelude to a free trade area in South Asia. As regards the India-Pakistan trade, Islamabad was not prepared to go beyond limited dealings. The negative list (of items on which the two sides were not to trade) was unusually long. Pakistan did not want to accord India the most-favoured nation treatment, as mandated by the WTO regime. India gave such a treatment to Pakistan long ago.
All this was a reflection of the prolonged stalemate, evident, among other things, from the cancellation of the SAARC summit, scheduled to be held in Islamabad in the second week of January, as also from the bleak prospects for the resumption of the bilateral dialogue. Mr. Vajpayee mentioned India-Pakistan relations and Kashmir in his first musings in January 2001 as well. Then, as now, he had spoken of Pakistan's mindset, arising out of the two-nation theory, leading it to follow an untenable policy on Kashmir. However, there was a note of cheer and hope then. "India is willing and ready,'' he said, "to seek a lasting solution to the Kashmir problem. Towards this end, we are prepared to recommence talks with Pakistan at any level, including the highest level, provided Islamabad gives sufficient proof of its preparedness to create a conducive atmosphere for a meaningly dialogue.''
This was followed by a highly positive formulation - "in our search for a lasting solution to the Kashmir problem we shall not traverse solely on the beaten track of the past. Rather, we shall be bold and innovative designers of a future architecture of peace and prosperity for the entire South Asian region.''
From January 2001 onward, the two countries have moved away from the end of the tunnel.

index

The hydro-politics of conflict

My contention is that the Kashmir dispute is at bottom a dispute over water. My firm conviction is that it can only be solved through increased cooperation between the two states. War is not an option. Moreover the question of water is part of the overall need for environmental conservation and development

In recent years, political scientists have put forth the concept of hydro-politics to capture the type of conflicts which are emerging in some regions of the world. Water resources are fast depleting because of the combined impact of population growth, inefficient usage and technology and expanding consumption life styles that accompany modernisation and urbanisation.
In South Asia the access to clean tap water for the poorer sections of society has always been severely limited, but the fact that the population of South Asia has increased from some 400 million in 1947 to around 1. 4 billion, and this trend is likely to continue for some time to come, means that we have to quickly do something to arrest, and if possible, reverse such a trend. In the Indian states of Gujarat and Rajasthan droughts have become endemic and the situation in the Pakistani Sindh and Balochistan is not much better. The situation is not much better elsewhere in the subcontinent.
Both India and Pakistan have invested heavily in the agricultural sector which forms a major portion of their economies. Some of the most developed regions of Indian agricultural production and almost the whole Pakistani agricultural sector are dependent on the waters from the Indus and the six rivers of Punjab which originate in the mountains of Kashmir or the adjacent Himalayan range. These rivers meander into the territories of both the states. Consequently, in the absence of cooperation and goodwill the state which controls the upper riparian can draw strategic advantage if it diverts the flow of water or even denies it to the other. This advantage at present is enjoyed by India.
The irony is that from the second half of the 19th century the British began to construct a vast network of water dams, barrages and irrigation canals on the Indus and its five tributaries in the Punjab - Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas rivers. All such schemes, however, were planned for a united Punjab and a common administration. It resulted at that time in the creation of the largest artificial irrigation system in the world. As a result much of the formerly semi-desert areas of Punjab were converted into rich, fertile agricultural land. However, when British rule ended in 1947 the Punjab was also divided between India and Pakistan. Such changes undermined the assumptions on which the irrigation schemes had been constructed.
Surprisingly, although tension and hostility between India and Pakistan over Kashmir was built into the process whereby they gained independence and resulted in armed skirmishes and wars, both sides realised that they could not afford to postpone an agreement on water sharing until the final status of Kashmir was settled. Consequently, under the auspices of the World Bank the Indus Waters Treaty was agreed between them in 1960 whereby the waters of the three eastern rivers - Ravi, Sutlej and Beas - were awarded to India. Pakistan was allocated water from the western rivers of Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. The treaty allowed Pakistan to construct a system of replacement canals to convey water from the western rivers into those areas in West Pakistan which had previously depended for their irrigation supplies on water from the eastern rivers.
In subsequent years Pakistan has built the Mangla and Tarbela dams and several other similar facilities on the waters of Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. The funding has come from international donors. Similarly India has been building various dams and barrages on the Ravi, Sutlej and Beas. As a result the stability of the Indian and Pakistani economies is dependent upon the status quo over Kashmir not being disturbed too radically. Recent Pakistani reports suggest that India has been building the hydro-electric Baghliar project in Jammu on the Chenab River with a view to diverting water allocated to Pakistan under the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. India denies such allegations. My contention is that the Kashmir dispute is at bottom a dispute over water. My firm conviction is that it can only be solved through increased cooperation between the two states. War is not an option. Moreover the question of water is part of the overall need for environmental conservation and development. Recently the Pakistani environmental scientist Dr Saleem H Ali at Vermont University, USA, has suggested the idea of a Peace Park in Kashmir. According to him, Kashmir is an environmentally sensitive region which both sides should have an interest in protecting. By using environment as a neutral issue one could potentially bring the parties together. Amazingly, Air Marshal Nanda Cariappa of the Indian Air Force (he was shot down in Pakistan during the 1965 war and was treated with special regard by Field Marshal Ayub Khan because his father and the Field Marshal had served together in the British Indian army) has come up with a very similar idea. He narrows his idea to a "trans-boundary peace park" in the Siachen area. According to him this would preserve for posterity the most spectacular mountain region in the world. Such policy would defuse armed confrontation and many lives would be saved. Billions of rupees would then be available for the development needs of both the countries. It is obvious that the schemes put forward by Dr Ali and Air Marshall Cariappa would require a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. However, if it is approached in the spirit of cooperation, a solution can be found which satisfies all genuine concerns and aspirations.
It should be noted that the concept of "peace parks" goes back 70 years; there are now 169 such parks in 113 countries. Some of them were conceived specifically with the intention of furnishing a peaceful solution to conflicts or potential conflicts. Among some such examples are the peace parks between La Costa Rica and Nicaragua and another between Ecuador and Peru. Greece and Turkey share one on either side of the Evros River. Hopefully one day Turkey, Syria and Iraq would move in such a direction, and when a just and fair peace treaty between the independent states of Israel and Palestine has been agreed upon, the hydro-politics of conflict will give way to peaceful sharing of water symbolised by peace parks.
The author is an associate professor of Political Science at Stockholm University. He is the author of two books

index

No pressure to resume talks with Pak., says Advani

Hazaribagh (Jharkhand) Jan. 2. The Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani, said here today that there was no international pressure on India to initiate a dialogue with Pakistan.
``Some people say there is international pressure on us to go in for talks with Pakistan. But there is absolutely no pressure on India at all,'' he told a gathering. Mr. Advani, who laid the foundation stones for a dozen development projects worth Rs. 94 crores said, ``We have made it clear. We will not talk to Pakistan till it stops all forms of terrorism, including cross-border.''
``Any world leader who visits Pakistan asks it to stop terrorism.... but no international leader ever tells the same to India. Rather they ask India to fight against terrorism,'' he said.
Stating that Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, had given a new direction to India after the 1998 nuclear tests, Mr. Advani said, ``we belied the world's apprehension when Pakistan imposed Kargil on us.''
He said ``your wishes will be fulfilled'' when the gathering chanted ``Jay Shri Ram ...Ram mandir banayenge hum''.
He was speaking about his 1997 ``Swarna Jayanti rath yatra'', when the crowd began raising the slogans for the Ram Temple at Ayodhya.
Earlier, talking to reporters, he ruled out snap polls in the country, saying the NDA Government at the Centre was strong. ``The NDA is strong and stable. There is no reason to hold a mid-term election,'' he said.
The Centre was determined to fight terrorist activities in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal and Orissa and some other States, where the MCC and PW had let loose a reign of terror.
``The Centre cannot tolerate the activities of extremist organisations and will fully cooperate with the States to counter their activities,'' he said. The Centre had deployed para-military forces and was ready to supplement them to curb extremist activities in the States.
PTI

index

Chilling nuclear disclosure

Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's disclosure that he planned an "unconventional" response to a possible Indian attack across the border last year has sent tremors through the international community. His statement, and the Indian response to it, are a grim reminder that South Asia is still "the world's most dangerous place".
To be fair, Gen Musharraf's statement-that Indian troops "should not expect a conventional war" if they "moved a single step across the international border or the Line of Control", and further that this was conveyed to "Prime Minister Vajpayee through every international leader who came to Pakistan" did not explicitly use the words "nuclear weapons".
It is also true that Maj Gen Rashid Qureshi later "clarified" that "the President only meant unconventional forces, and not nuclear or biological weapons...They (a section of the media) took this unconventional form of people rising against the Indian armed forces as meaning nuclear weapons..."
However, the world is likely to interpret the statement as a disclosure, or at least a broad hint, that Islamabad had made preparations to use nuclear weapons at some point during the 10-month-long post-December 13, 2001, eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, as New Delhi in all probability did; he also conveyed a nuclear threat, however obliquely, to India.
This conclusion is not unwarranted. For one, historically, nuclear threats have been generally made not through overt, explicit references to nuclear weapons, but through warnings of "horrible" consequences, etc. For another, it is broadly understood, especially after the Kargil war, that both Pakistan and India would have contingency plans to use nuclear weapons; both have doctrines that permit such use (in Pakistan's case, a first strike).
And for a third, the specific context to which Musharraf referred was an exceptionally dangerous situation, with a distinct potential for escalation from "limited" skirmishes, to large-scale war (with conventional weapons and methods), on to a nuclear exchange.
Even assuming that Musharraf had in mind "non-traditional" war, involving far more lethal armaments than those deployed in past India-Pakistan wars, or the use of unconventional manoeuvres (encircling of Indian forces by the Kashmiri people), the immediate response from India's forces suggests the assumption of a more aggravated scenario.
Thus, outgoing army chief Gen S Padmanabhan said: "We were absolutely ready to go to war. Our forces were well located but such a decision is ultimately a political decision." Padmanabhan dismissed the notion that Pakistan's nuclear capability had deterred India from going to war twice last year. He said: "When we assess our adversaries, we assess all [their] capabilities. We had evaluated it [Pakistan's nuclear capability] and were ready to cope with it." Padmanabhan hinted that an "informal" nuclear command structure has already been in existence. "What is invisible today will become visible tomorrow."
The lightest interpretation that can be put on this exchange is that the threshold for an India-Pakistan nuclear confrontation has now fallen to a dangerous new low. Amidst the heightened visceral hostility, which the two states' rulers mutually nurture, nuclear weapons could be used not at the fag-end of a conventional conflict, when the defeat of one adversary appears imminent. They may be used early-without much warning.
This week's verbal exchanges have further raised the temperature of India-Pakistan rivalry. There have been several such recent exchanges, including the hubris-driven claim by each state that it "won" the recent border confrontation against the other. Two months ago, India's defence minister George Fernandes declared "victory". Now, Musharraf has announced: "We have defeated our enemy without going into war...The enemy has withdrawn its forces..."
In reality, both India and Pakistan lost billions of dollars in staging the globe's biggest military mobilisation since World War II, involving a million troops. Both imposed avoidable hardship and fatigue upon their forces by keeping them on high alert for long periods.
Both sacrificed the lives of scores, if not (a few) hundreds, of their soldiers-in landmine blasts, shelling, and accidents. In India, the estimate is 300 armed personnel dead, and an unspecified number of civilians, along with loss of limb to several hundreds, and the death of countless sheep, goats and cattle. Neither gained strategic advantage or political-diplomatic leverage from the confrontation.
Both India and Pakistan parody, ridicule or altogether demonise each other's intentions, plans and actions. Thus, The Hindu quotes officials to say that India believes that Musharraf was "addressing a domestic audience" on Monday. He "wanted to show" that it was India which "backed down" after mobilising its troops. "India believes Musharraf wanted to bring the India-Pakistan issue under the spotlight once again" when the international community's interest in it is "waning". India treats Musharraf's statement "with disdain".
At the same time, New Delhi has termed Musharraf's statement "highly dangerous" and "provocative" and used it to reject any meaningful "forward movement" in mutual relations.
Such casual, cavalier exchanges between the two receive tub-thumping reception from the expected cheerleaders: strategic "experts" and hawkish politicians. This sows the irrational illusion that each side is in some sense "prepared" to match/counter the other's "nuclear" challenge, that nuclear wars are winnable, that "protection" is possible against these mass-annihilation weapons.
This is heady Macho mythology, the most dangerous part of the pathological mystique associated with nuclearism. For there are, can be, no victors in a nuclear war. Nuclear weapons are strategically irrational. They cannot protect civilian non-combatants. Rather, they make them especially vulnerable.
The best "security" nuclear weapons afford is of a negative kind -- based on fear, insecurity, balance of terror. It is at best cold comfort to know that retaliation is possible after the adversary's first attack. But nuclear retaliation is an act of senseless revenge, not of regaining security.
Yet, both India and Pakistan are hurtling towards inducting nuclear weapons into their armed forces. Pakistan announced last April it was upgrading its strategic nuclear command. India is planning to establish this month its Strategic Forces Command (SFC) tasked with managing the nuclear arsenal. "The Cabinet Committee on Security is expected to give the formal go-ahead...A nuclear command post in the shape of a concrete underground structure is also being built," reports The Times of India.
For the moment, the nuclear system's different components will be kept separately. The radioactive cores will be with the Department of Atomic Energy, the detonation assembly will be in the custody of the Defence Research and Development Organisation, and the delivery vehicles with the armed forces.
This is one more step in the direction of raising the nuclear danger in South Asia. Yet, given its preoccupation with the Middle East, and the many actions of the US government in legitimising nuclear weapons, the world community is unlikely to intervene in this region to counsel restraint and halt India and Pakistan's descent into a nuclear arms race.
The pressure for such restraint will have to come from within. In today's vitiated climate, that is a tall order. India's government, the country's most rightwing and conservative since Independence, has decided that it will obstruct the normalisation of relations with Pakistan as much as possible. That's what the latest visa restrictions mean. Pakistan has duly reciprocated this hostility. Only a strong peace movement can alter this dismal situation.

index

Press Statement

Pak-India Forum slates visa curbs

Lahore, December 31: The Pakistan Chapter of Pakistan-India Peoples' Forum for Peace and Democracy expresses its concern and dismay at the new visa restrictions announced by the government of India on Pakistanis visiting India. These steps amount to fueling the confrontation between the two countries at the cost of ordinary people, may of whom have legitimate humanitarian reasons to travel to the neighboring country. The Forum was hoping that with the start of troops' withdrawal from the frontlines, the two countries would find ways of restoring air and ground travel links between them in accordance with the wishes of the people on both sides. These wishes have again been disregarded. The Forum reiterates its view that the people of India and Pakistan have a right and a duty to maintain as regular a contact as possible and to contribute to the return of sanity to their benighted sub-continent. It therefore calls upon both governments to facilitate travel between their countries. Instead of devising new restrictions they should immediately reopen air and ground routes.

Iftikhar-ul-Haq I. A. Rehman
Secretary-General Chairperson
Pakistan Chapter of Pakistan-India Peoples' Forum for Peace and Democracy

o o o
[ Related news reports]

The Hindu
Friday, Jan 03, 2003

Asma Jehangir denied visa

By Our Special Correspondent
HYDERABAD Jan. 2. The Pakistan delegation to the Asian Social Forum here led by Asma Jehangir, leading women's and human rights activist, has been denied visa by India. This was announced by Nirmala Deshpande, Gandhian and Sarvodaya leader, at the opening plenary of the ASF.
The announcement was greeted with a chorus of "shame, shame'', by a large number of delegates. A disappointed Ms. Deshpande said the Pakistani delegates would not be able to come as they had been denied visas by India. She expressed the hope that the people's voice would reach the powers that be in Delhi and it would be forced not to repeat it.

o o o
Yahoo News India
Monday December 30, 1:28 PM

Gujral slams travel curbs on Pakistani nationals

By P. Jayaram, Indo-Asian News Service
New Delhi, Dec 30 (IANS) Former Indian prime minister I.K. Gujral Monday slammed the Vajpayee government for its move to put curbs on visits by Pakistani nationals and warned it would be counter-productive.
"Terrorists do no travel legally or on visas. This type of restrictive practices and indiscriminate restrictions will do more harm than good because they keep out those sections of civil society which believe in building friendship between our countries," Gujral told IANS.
Minister of State for Home Vidyasagar Rao announced Sunday that the government would introduce new regulations restricting the movement of Pakistani visitors to three cities, as against 12 now.
He said the government would also ask local sponsors to give a prior undertaking about their guests from Pakistan till their actual return. He said 11,208 Pakistani visitors had overstayed in the country and 2,324 of them could not be traced and the state governments had been directed to launch a "special drive" to identify them to prevent them from indulging in "anti-India activities."
"You need only one Osama bin Laden to cause a disaster," Rao said. But Gujral, a strong advocate of people-to-people contact and who as prime minister liberalised visits by Pakistanis to India, said: "My faith in such contacts is abiding."
He said the minister should bear in mind that many Pakistani visitors found it difficult to go back because there was no direct road, rail or air links between the two countries, a result of tit-for-tat steps taken by the two countries that nearly went to war this year.
"How do they go back?" he asked.
"Such generalised statements (as Rao's) do a great deal of harm to friendly neighbourly relations," he said and added the minister's statement would make bilateral ties "murkier.'
"Ultimately, we are neighbours and the prospects of good relations should never be destroyed," Gujral said.
He said the entire world was against terrorism today. India has been a victim of terrorism and Pakistan also was a victim of "internal terrorism."
"Our best friends in Pakistan are members of civil society, many of them outstanding people who have contributed a great deal to bring our nations closer," he added.

o o o
Dawn, Dec 30, 2002

India to put curbs on Pakistani visitors

www.dawn.com/2002/12/30/top11.htm.

index

India, Pak. exchange list of n-installations

NEW DELHI Jan. 1. India and Pakistan today exchanged lists of their nuclear installations and facilities as stipulated under the Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities between India and Pakistan, 1988.
Today's exchange, which took place simultaneously through diplomatic channels in Islamabad and New Delhi, is the 12th occasion where the two countries have undertaken such an exercise. While the non-attack Agreement was signed in 1988, it came into force in 1991.
``Under the agreement, the two countries are to inform each other on January 1 of every calendar year of the nuclear installations and facilities to be covered by the Agreement. The first such exchange of lists took place on January 1, 1992,'' a Foreign Office statement said.

B. Muralidhar Reddy reports from Islamabad:
The Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman and Additional Secretary, Aziz Ahmed Khan, handed over at the Foreign Office here the Pakistani list to the First Secretary in the Indian High Commission, Vikram Misri. Similarly, the Indian list was handed over to the Pakistani High Commission representative at the Foreign Office in New Delhi.
Even at the height of tensions at the end of last year, both the countries exchanged information on the nuclear installations and demonstrated their commitment against attack on each other's nuclear installations much to the relief of the rest of the world.

index

Pakistan's nuclear bluff

General Pervez Musharraf's chilling disclosure the day before yesterday that Pakistan's nuclear weapons deterred India from going to war came on the last day in office of outgoing Army Chief, General S Padmanabhan, when he noted he was "absolutely ready" for war and also to cope with Pakistan's nuclear capability.
So why did India's coercive diplomacy, which included Operation Parakram, not succeed in full and India not go to war? Pakistan has claimed a moral victory. It believes it can continue to bleed India through a proxy war including cross-border terrorism without running the risk of retribution. Is this true and should Pakistan and the neighbourhood live with this grand delusion? This and other questions arising out of the India-Pakistan confrontation that you always wanted answers to but were afraid to ask, follow in some 'Questions and Answers'.

Q: What were the ingredients of India's coercive diplomacy?
A: Besides political and diplomatic measures, the military was the weapon of last resort to back diplomacy. Built into Parakram were both the implicit threat and the actual use of force. Some Western security experts called the massive deployment a 'show of force' rather as 'play-acting', suggesting that India sought Pakistani compliance without intending to go to war and that the fear of a nuclear conflagration would secure international, notably United States cooperation in meeting India's objectives. Others believed India was dead serious about the deployment.
Q: Did Pakistan deter, both by its conventional and nuclear capability, India from forcing compliance?
A: This is serious misjudgment of India's conventional superiority and second-strike nuclear capability, especially the former across the international border, in the air and at sea. Unfortunately, Pakistan drew the wrong lesson from Kargil, turning its defeat into victory. During Parakram, it touted its nuclear weapon to deter India; later it changed tack: That its conventional forces were adequate to contain an attack. Pakistan has a history of lowering its nuclear threshold to attract international attention and internationalise Jammu & Kashmir. The first nuclear threat was delivered by Pakistan in 1987 during Operation Brass Tacks to Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad, SK Singh. This was followed by nuclear threats in 1990. During Kargil, the Pakistan Foreign Minister issued nuclear threats four times and during Parakram at least twice, once each by President Pervez Musharraf and Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar. India however chose not to cross the Rubicon for other reasons. Pakistan's military and nuclear deterrence was not one of them.
Q: How close was India to taking punitive military action against Pakistan?
A: On the very brink, and twice. Once, in the first flush of deployment around January 7, 2002, when Pakistani troops were still off balance. But President Musharraf's January 12 speech of partial compliance resulted in the postponement of the D-Day. The US played a key role in getting more time for General Musharraf. Infiltration dropped noticeably. Then Kaluchak happened in May and a new D-Day was selected- June 15. On US prodding, General Musharraf made his May 27 speech reaffirming compliance. Once again operational plans were deferred. But now the window for war had also closed. It would reopen only after the monsoons in September or October when elections had been held in J&K.
Q: What were the other reasons for India not going to war?
A: The US figures high on this list. The presence of US soldiers and airmen in Pakistani air bases and its naval armada in the Arabian Sea, fighting the war in Afghanistan. The Indian Navy had to be limited in its deployment upto 72 degrees longitude to ensure separation of forces. It is no secret Indian diplomacy failed to get the US to make General Musharraf act on his pledge and, in the words of US Secretary of State Colin Powell, to end cross border terrorism permanently, irreversibly, visibly and to the satisfaction of India. In fact, US President George Bush said that India has the right to defend itself against terrorism.
But the paramount reason for India's "restraint " was the knowledge that any military action would not achieve the political objective of stopping cross-border terrorism. It would inflict punishment but not extract total compliance within the threshold of limited war, the gains from which were estimated to be of doubtful utility. The cardinal principle of war (which is the failure of diplomacy) is that you don't start it unless you are sure you can end it by being better off.
Q: Is India's restraint a liability?
A: It is reflected in the political will and reluctance to follow, unlike the Israelis, the policy of instant retribution: An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. India's restraint in the face of constant provocation is both a matter of marvel and mirth to outsiders. Even so, there is space for offensive action across the Line of Control, like doing a reverse Kargil. During Parakram, the Pakistan Army tested the waters by intruding 800 m inside the Neelam sector in J&K and was immediately repulsed by an overwhelming application of force that made General Musharraf call up Mr Powell to say India had declared war. It is clear that India did not pick up the gauntlet, no doubt after undertaking a cost benefit analysis. In Pakistan's perception, India's tolerance threshold has lowered even further.
Q: How much strategic autonomy does India enjoy in the choice of options?
A: After the nuclear tests, India claimed it would now exercise greater strategic autonomy. A study of recent history belies this notion as autonomy has been receding gradually. This was most telling during times of war. In 1947, India and Pakistan fought for 18 months, in 1965 for 16 days, in 1971, 13 days and in 2002, 0 days. But for the six Soviet vetoes in the United Nations, the victory in 1971 would not have been a total surrender for Pakistan. A nuclearised subcontinent has made outside interference even more imminent, reducing both time and space for application of force, not to mention the US's long-term presence on the subcontinent. In 2002, the US restrained India twice from going to war. Travel advisories given by the US and the UK to their citizens were direct pressure on India and Pakistan to deescalate.
Q: What was the cost benefit of this stand-off ?
A: General S Padmanabhan has noted deployment forced General Musharraf to admit on January 12 Pakistan's culpability in cross-border terrorism. It amounts to saying: "We admit we made a mistake and it will not happen again." He also said infiltration had reduced by 53 per cent this year compared to last year and he could exercise his whole Army during the deployment, repudiating Pakistani claims troop morale was low due to deployment fatigue. The money and material costs of coercive diplomacy are huge: Nearly 187 mobilisation-related casualties plus nearly Rs 7,500 crore. The Pakistan figure is near Rs 4,500 crore. But the US has given to its stalwart ally a handsome package of $ 1.3 billion and military assistance for the help it has provided in fighting the US war in Afghanistan.
Q: So what are the lessons from the confrontation-the war that never was?
A: Much before our own ultimatum, the lesson in coercive diplomacy was taught by the US to General Musharraf in September 2001 when he accepted 100 per cent the terms stipulated to abandon the Taliban. For India, it is essential the National Security Advisory Board and the newly-created Integrated Defence Staff start working on the lessons. Limited war is feasible even for a limited political objective. Pakistan's nuclear bluff (make Kashmir a nuclear flashpoint) needs to be called and its military disabused of its delusion of deterrence. To hurt Pakistan below the nuclear threshold so that it gives up jihadi terrorism, refining overt and covert capabilities which are usable, is a must. The last question: How to wish Kashmiris a Happy 2003?

index

Countering Pakistan's nuclear blackmail

NEW DELHI Dec. 31. If there were any doubts that the development of missile defences was one of India's most important national security imperatives, they should be removed once and for all by the latest statements of the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, on his country's nuclear posture.
Gen. Musharraf's refusal to end cross-border terrorism and his threat to use nuclear weapons in the very first stages of a military conflict should make the early deployment of missile defences an urgent national priority for India.
The central lesson from Gen. Musharraf's nuclear blackmail is simple. Without neutralising Pakistan's nuclear calculus based on the first use of nuclear weapons, New Delhi will not be able to bring effective military pressure on Islamabad to give up cross-border terrorism.
Intuitively, India has already been engaged in an effort to acquire missile defences. It has been negotiating with Israel for the purchase of the Arrow missile, which has some capability to intercept an incoming missile with a nuclear warhead. India has also been looking at advanced air defence systems from Russia, besides trying to develop some of its own.
There has also been some talk here on considering the purchase of the more advanced Patriot system from the United States. The Bush Administration, sections of which have been sympathetic to India's strategic requirements, has offered to make a preliminary assessment of India's missile defence needs. Senior officials from India and the U.S. will meet later this month for a substantive discussion on the subject.
The time has come for India to move beyond this tentative exploration of missile defence options to a more robust effort that would involve early acquisition of systems from abroad as well as the initiation of a substantive national research and development effort to create indigenous capabilities in missile defence technology.
Two national security considerations must guide India. One is the organic link between Pakistan's nuclear posture and its support to cross-border terrorism. Once it acquired nuclear weapons in the late 1980s, Pakistan deliberately chose cross-border terrorism as its national strategy against India.
Pakistan was confident that it had neutralised India's conventional military superiority with its nuclear weapons. It believed that New Delhi had no options to threaten military action against Islamabad's provocative support to cross-border terrorism.
India's coercive diplomacy after the attack on the Parliament in December 2001 was a serious attempt to get out of this difficult corner. Although India's threat to launch an all-out war against Pakistan produced some diplomatic dividends, it could not, in the end, compel Gen. Musharraf to give up cross-border terrorism. But the challenge remains.
One of the few options available for India is to find ways to blunt the nuclear blackmail of Pakistan. While the immediate effectiveness of missile defence may be limited, technologies are beginning to evolve and even the available ones can certainly complicate the nuclear calculations of Pakistan.
Uncertainty over the long-term evolution of Pakistan is another reason why India should be investing in missile defences. The prospect of the state failing in Pakistan and the nuclear weapons falling into the hands of extremists is not one that India should be scoffing at. Missile defences would be a huge hedge against such a development.
Although India boldly supported the missile defence initiative of the Bush Administration in May 2001, apprehensions about Russian and Chinese reactions tended to dampen that initial enthusiasm. Russia is now on-board the missile defence bandwagon and it is only a matter of time before China begins to develop its own capabilities in the area.
In any case, the task of Indian diplomacy should be to promote India's national security interests.
The immediate diplomatic challenge is to overcome the residual resistance in Washington against Indo-U.S. cooperation in missile defences and the opposition there to Israeli sale of Arrow system to India.
The U.S. State Department, which has been unable to get Gen. Musharraf to deliver on his promises to end cross-border terrorism, has little credibility in opposing the transfer of missile defence technologies to India.
In fact, every argument that has been used by Washington to justify its missile defence project applies with greater urgency to New Delhi.
Besides the U.S., India must also begin to engage Japan, South Korea and other Asian countries who are threatened by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology to irresponsible regimes like those in Pakistan and North Korea.

index

HOME Landelijke India Werkgroep

pagina KRUITVAT INDIA-PAKISTAN

Landelijke India Werkgroep - 24 september 2003