Deputy Prime Minister Lal Kishenchand Advani on Saturday kick-started the Bharatiya Janata Party's election campaign in Gujarat by throwing a challenge to Pakistan.
Charging Pakistan with nursing a wound since the creation of Bangladesh, he said in Bhuj: "Let us fight it out face-to-face. We have fought thrice; let there be a fourth war."
Advani said had Pakistan fought with the Indian security forces he would have had no reservations. "But killing of innocent civilians by attacking temples like Akshardham
and Raghunath is unacceptable," he added.
I refuse to accept that shooting or blowing up children is a
reasonable concomitant of fighting, no matter how monstrous the
regime being combated. Chechen rebels do it, and so do Russian
soldiers. Palestinian suicide bombers do it and the Israeli army does
it
It does not matter whether you support Kashmiri independence or are a
proponent of any solution to the mayhem in that unhappy region, you
cannot, unless you are a psychopath, condone last week¹s murder of
three women and two children in Indian-administered Kashmir. The
report came in the usual, accurate, matter-of-fact Reuters item with
the by-line of the urbane Sheikh Mushtaq in Srinagar: "A landmine
blast and clashes left 22 dead... on Saturday, the bloodiest day
since a new state government took office earlier this month calling
for an end to the violence."
The outrage came a day after a suicide attack on a Srinagar hotel
being used as a security forces' base in which six soldiers and two
militants died. The Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group said it was
responsible for the hotel raid, and the gallant guys who killed the
kids came from that band and also, apparently, from the
Harkat-e-Jihad Islami.
Let us put aside for a moment the rights and wrongs of the Kashmir
dispute and consider the people on the bus that was blown up while
taking soldiers and their families on leave. It might be claimed that
members of the armed forces take their chances freely and that if
they come to harm, then tough luck. I don¹t buy this, and it is
certainly not the case when children are shot or blown to bits, be
that in conflicts in Kashmir, Israel, Chechnya, Colombia, Algeria,
Sudan, Nigeria, Nepal, Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, or....
Well, you get the message. Murdering children is wicked, no matter
the cause or the place. Try to imagine being one of those waiting in
Jammu for the bus carrying your daughter and grandchildren to arrive.
Then a soldier comes up and asks your name and looks sad and ticks
his list and tells you that, sorry, they won't be coming and that for
you their lives have ended.
I refuse to accept that shooting or blowing up children is a
reasonable concomitant of fighting, no matter how monstrous the
regime being combated. Chechen rebels do it, and so do Russian
soldiers. Palestinian suicide bombers do it and the Israeli army does
it. But the races involved or the location or cause of the
insurrection and the counter-measures mounted against it are
irrelevant. People who kill children are demented terrorists and no
civilised nation should show mercy on those who perpetrate
atrocities. Those concerned should be found, brought to trial, and,
when guilt is proved in court, they should be hanged. And in
parenthesis I state that the Indian army doesn't kill kids. Some of
the weird security forces, such as the evil (and unconstitutional)
Special Operations Group, have done so, but the army is still pretty
clean.
It is obvious what the terrorists want. And all people of goodwill
must hope they don¹t achieve it: failure of the newly-elected
government in Indian-administered Kashmir. The kid-killers want
terror to continue, because without it they would forfeit their
reason for existence. They are not gallant freedom-fighters. They are
cowardly criminals. The latest pronouncement from Mr Rafiq Ahmed Dar
of the Al Umar Mujahideen called for a two day strike this week. If
it is not observed, said this self-appointed autocrat, there will be
terrible consequences: "Any vehicle found on the roads, and shop
found open anywhere shall be set ablaze", he threatens. These are not
the words of a man who cares about his fellow human beings. He
obviously doesn't have to worry about where his next rupee is coming
from - but, by God, the stall-holders and shopkeepers do. And so do
the drivers of scooters and taxis and buses. They have a living to
make, and don't get paid unless they work. Why should they have their
livelihood destroyed just because some repulsive thug wants to make a
point?
Al Umar Mujahideen ostensibly wants union with Pakistan. Let me say
as emphatically as I can that the last thing Pakistan needs is
support by criminal bullies such as this bunch. There are problems
enough with extremists in Pakistan without Al Umar's vicious
gangsters being tacked on to the list. Mr Dar has forbidden some
Muslims to worship at the Jamia Mosque in Srinagar, and threatens
death to any member of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference who does
so. "If any [Hurriyat] leader does not heed the warning and dares to
venture in the mosque he shall be shot dead," he declares.
This is not Islam. Members of the Hurriyat are perfectly good
Muslims. Better Muslims, indeed, than Mr Dar, because they seek
compromise in the name of religion, not killing for the sake of it.
Mr Dar wants to destroy the approaches being made to a peaceful
solution in Kashmir but has no constructive solution for the region's
future. He believes in the bomb and the bullet, not the brain and the
ballot.
Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Syed, the new leader in
Indian-administered Kashmir, seems a good enough person, even if
regrettably naïve. Good, because he wants to move towards compromise
and has been energetic in exploring ways of bringing opposing sides
together. Naïve because he announced that militancy in the region was
"on its last legs", which was an unwise thing to say when psychotic
screwballs like Rafiq Ahmad Dar are able to let loose the filth that
murder children.
Islamabad's Kashmir policy is identical with that of the UN Security
Council whose resolution 122 reinforces previous accord by stating
that "the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be
made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the
democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under
the auspices of the United Nations."
We have seen that the UNSC is able to agree unanimously - if only in
circumstances in which a resolution has been blessed by America. If
Washington wants a resolution badly enough it will go to almost any
lengths to ensure that it is agreed. Its tactics are unpalatable -
fearsome economic pressure, plain outright bullying, devious
horse-dealing involving repudiation of human rights' principles, and
threats of aid denial and trade strangulation - but if the US really
wants to solve the problem that, as Mr Bush himself has said, could
lead to nuclear war between India and Pakistan, then now is the time
to act. There is terrorism in Indian-administered Kashmir, and the
most effective way to combat it is by giving the people the
opportunity to speak. Let Mr Bush show some backbone, and encourage
the UNSC to act on its existing resolutions.
Colonel Cloughley writes extensively on military and international
affairs. He is also the author of the book, "A history of the
Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections." His website is
www.briancloughley.com
TOSSED by the river¹s swollen waters, Shehnaz Parveen had just one
thought: "I said to the river: 'Please kill me, let me die.' "
Hours before, the young bride had fled the home of her in-laws in
Pakistani Kashmir, her face stinging from blows delivered by her
husband of three months.
Married life had proved a disaster, with endless abuse from her
husband and his family about her inability to conceive a child.
Sobbing, she arrived at the river and threw herself in. But she did
not drown. As the current swept her downstream, three men on the far
bank spotted her and waded in to drag her out.
Despite her distress, she noticed that they were wearing unfamiliar
uniforms. The current had carried her across the invisible line
dividing disputed Kashmir between Pakistan and India.
Many times over the next seven years, Shehnaz had reason to wish she
had drowned that day. Time and again, she fell victim to the enmity
between India and Pakistan. Hers is the human face of that sad and
dangerous conflict.
At first, Shehnaz did not realise that her rescuers were Indian
soldiers. The only thing that she noticed was their guns. "I begged
them to shoot me because I had failed to kill myself," she said.
"Then they asked me what a Pakistani was doing on Indian soil." She
convinced the authorities that she was not a spy, but was sentenced
to a year's imprisonment for entering India illegally. One morning a
male guard, Mohammed Din, entered her cell and raped her.
"I tried to resist, but I was too afraid to scream," she recalls.
"Then I realised no one would help me because I was a Pakistani and
an enemy."
A month later she found that she was pregnant. Her first thought was
that she would never be accepted back into Pakistani society as the
mother of an illegitimate child.
Eight months later, as she was being driven to court to give evidence
against Din, she went into labour. The birth was hard and it was not
until three days later that she first saw her daughter. That moment
transformed her life.
"My in-laws had succeeded in making me believe I was infertile," she
said. "But here, out of the saddest moment in my life, came the
happiest thing I could possess." She named the child Mobin after a
character from the Koran.
By that time Shehnaz had served her sentence, and the Indian
authorities tried to deport her. But Pakistan refused to accept
Mobin, arguing that she was an Indian citizen.
Under Indian law, however, she was not. Mobin's paternity had never
been legally proved, so technically she had no nationality. Mother
and daughter were returned to jail under the Enemies Ordinance Act,
whereby illegal entrants from enemy countries must be interned in the
interests of public safety.
Shehnaz's next chance of freedom came on the eve of the
India-Pakistan summit in July last year. The two countries agreed to
exchange six prisoners each as a gesture of goodwill and Shehnaz and
Mobin were among those chosen. Shehnaz dressed her daughter in her
best clothes and set off for the border. But when they arrived, the
Pakistani Rangers once again refused to take the child. As the other
prisoners crossed over, mother and daughter returned to jail.
By this time, their case had attracted the attention of A. K.
Sawhney, an Indian civil rights lawyer. He brought a public interest
case questioning Mobin's detention. The case came to court last July.
In a landmark judgment, the court awarded Mobin Indian citizenship
and ordered that her mother be allowed to stay in India. Mobin was
also awarded 300,000 rupees (£4,000) in compensation for her illegal
detention, a vast sum by Indian standards. On August 2, Shehnaz and
Mobin were freed.
Four months later, they are still awaiting the compensation and are
due back in court to force the state government to pay up. Until that
happens, they are living with the Sawhney family in a cramped flat
above his practice.
"I would not have survived those years in prison if it hadn¹t been
for Mobin," Shehnaz said. "She gave me hope." She is even willing to
marry Din to give her daughter a name, but he continues to deny
raping her and the case against him is still proceeding.
Shehnaz is uncertain whether she will ever be able return to
Pakistan. Her husband wants nothing to do with her, and their long
separation means that the marriage has been legally dissolved.
Letters from her own family dried up about a year ago.
Shehnaz is suffering from political, as well as cultural, forces far
beyond her control. She will live in limbo until her native and
adopted countries learn to co-exist.
SRINAGAR, India -- The three young guests left as soon as the wedding
feast ended. It was not safe to be out late on the streets of
Srinagar. As they sped along on their motor scooter, relatives said,
the men were stopped at a security checkpoint outside the city and an
officer of India's feared counterinsurgency police, the Special
Operations Group, emerged from the shadows and began to question them.
That was not a good sign.
When they did not arrive home in the Srinagar suburb of Soura that
night three years ago, their families went to the local police
station. Although the motor scooter was parked outside the station,
the relatives could find out nothing about the men's fate. Finally,
after a week, news arrived: Someone had found a body in a jute sack
that had floated to the surface of a nearby lake.
"It was my brother Nazir's tortured corpse," said Farooq Ahmed
Gilkar, 50. The bodies of the other men were found elsewhere two days
later.
Known as the "triple murder case," the killings became the focal
point of surging Kashmiri anger that summer against the Special
Operations Group, or SOG. The widows of the three men and a prisoner
who said he saw police torturing Nazir Gilkar filed a legal
complaint, which is being heard now in a Kashmir state court. The
main police officer accused is still at large, and another has
pleaded insanity.
Jammu and Kashmir, India's only Muslim-majority state, has been the
focus of a 13-year revolt by Islamic separatists backed by
neighboring Pakistan. India has tried to crush the insurgency by
sending thousands of troops to the Himalayan region and has been
accused of running roughshod over civil liberties.
The SOG is perhaps the most controversial force in Kashmir. Comprised
of local police, village informers and former militants, the group is
accused of detaining people without cause and indulging in extortion,
custodial killings and forced disappearances, according to the Public
Commission on Human Rights in Kashmir.
That may now change. The group is under fire from a new coalition
government that took over the state this month. Led by the
Kashmir-based People's Democratic Party (PDP), the government has
promised a "healing touch" with the people and vowed to rein in the
SOG, investigate killings of people in police custody, withdraw a
tough federal anti-terror law and open talks with militant groups.
Perhaps the most controversial promise is the one to make the SOG
more accountable.
"The SOG became a law unto itself. They are killers. Can we let them
go scot-free?" asked Mehbooba Mufti, deputy leader of the PDP and
daughter of the new chief minister, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed.
The SOG men were given cash rewards and promoted when they killed
militants, making service in the group a fast lane for ambitious
officers and turning the lower-rung officers into "bounty hunters,"
according to Pervez Imroz, a human rights lawyer in Kashmir who has
brought hundreds of cases against the SOG.
"There is no accountability in SOG. It is banditry in uniform," said
Ravi Nair, director of the South Asia Human Rights Documentation
Center in New Delhi. "But it is not easy to put the genie back into
the lamp. It's now a Frankenstein."
The PDP's promise of reforms has sent shivers down the SOG apparatus.
Once regarded as an elite police wing, it has become demoralized, and
security officials say that under the new government, it has become
inactive and no new suspects have been detained. On Friday, the
government sacked the entire network of village informers called
"special police officers" who worked with the SOG.
But many admit that the PDP may find it very difficult to dislodge
the force and may be able to make only cosmetic changes.
The Indian army chief in Kashmir recently defended the SOG, saying it
played a crucial role in India's fight against militants by giving
valuable intelligence on militant hide-outs and helping with
cordon-and-search operations.
"When you fight an urban guerrilla warfare," said a senior police
official in the state who worked closely with the SOG, "you need a
committed force" that is "flexible, quick, ready to risk social
stigma and ready to die." He said that sending the SOG officers back
to the regular police barracks would make them easy targets for
militant groups looking for revenge.
Questions about the SOG's future are part of a debate in India over
some of the tactics the country has used in dealing with armed
insurgency over the past two decades, first in Punjab state and now
in Kashmir. K.P.S. Gill, a retired police officer who is credited
with clamping down on Sikh separatist violence in Punjab by creating
a precursor to the SOG about 10 years ago, charged Sayeed of bringing
"sentimentality" into his "perspectives on terrorism."
"You cannot negotiate with terror on your knees," Gill wrote in the
South Asia Intelligence Review.
But a young Kashmiri police officer in Srinagar, who worked with the
SOG for over a year, said he is still "filled with shame and guilt"
when he remembers his association with the group's operations. "I
know you have to fight this war ruthlessly, but interrogation at SOG
usually meant third degree torture, search operations meant
humiliating people," he said on condition of anonymity.
Indian officials are trying to work out a way to make changes without
losing the gains made by the SOG. One official suggested that
suspects be questioned by interrogation cells with representatives
from the army, border police, state police and intelligence agencies.
But for the widow of Ghulam Masood Mattoo, who was killed with
Gilkar, it is a battle that does not end with changing the SOG.
"They killed him once that night," said Gulshan Mattoo, 27, her
7-year-old son at her side. "But I have died again and again every
day since then. I would find my peace only if the killers are
punished, no matter what it takes."
When Mr Jinnah contemplated the new country he had been pivotal in
creating 55 years ago, he did not sell his property in India as he
could not visualize a future in which travel between the two
neighbours would become extremely difficult.
The mass killings and the vast migration that accompanied partition
on both sides of the border must have been a heavy weight on his
conscience.
He could not have foreseen the bloody consequences of the division of
the subcontinent. Indeed, being a rational and secular person, he
probably did not fathom the capacity for hatred and violence
concealed in so many human hearts.
Gandhi, a leader of an altogether different mould, went on hunger
strike to protest against the Congress government's delaying tactics
in transferring Pakistan's share of the divisible cash resources, and
as a result, he was assassinated by a Hindu fanatic.
Many people who fled the violence in both countries left their
property and possessions in the expectation that they would be able
to return to their homes once the madness had faded. Indians and
Pakistanis of that generation still speak nostalgically of growing up
in cities that have suddenly become enemy territory. But despite the
magnitude of their loss, they are not bitter about their old friends
and neighbours; indeed, they retain nothing but fond memories of
their childhood. Their anger is focused on the leadership of both
countries that have made travel between the two such a nightmare.
Despite the political gulf that opened up with partition and the
still-festering Kashmir dispute that erupted immediately afterwards,
the cultural and personal affinities between the two countries
remained largely intact for some time. Until the 1965 war, travel was
relatively simple and people thought little of going across the
border to attend a wedding or watch a Test match.
In short, the slogans and shrill rhetoric that emanated from the
leaders and propaganda machines had not infected the minds of
ordinary citizens who continued to make a distinction between
politicians and people. In short, the demonization of the two
countries had not yet begun in the popular imagination.
During the 1965 war that began in Kashmir (where else?), pilots of
both air forces took great care to avoid civilian targets. Similarly,
artillery fire was directed at military targets only, and the little
activity that the two navies were engaged in did not include
commercial shipping. Although the propaganda war was probably more
fierce than actual combat, most Pakistanis did not consider ordinary
Indians to be their enemies.
Meeting Indians after the war, one did not get the impression that
they felt any differently. Officers from the opposing armies who met
after the end of hostilities did not harbour any personal animosity
either.
Although the 1971 war evoked far greater bitterness, it was largely
confined to the eastern theatre. In West Pakistan, the fighting was
more of a defensive nature. But despite the air superiority the
Indian air force enjoyed over Pakistani skies, it did not engage in
deliberate attacks on civilian targets. I was in Lahore then and
remember watching an Indian jet attacking the radar installation at
the old airfield in Gulberg (which, incidentally has been taken over
by our air force for officers' housing colony). Despite the target
being close to so many private residences, I do not recall any
reports of civilian casualties.
It was in the seventies that travel became more and more difficult.
An entire generation of Pakistanis and Indians grew up with no
personal knowledge of each other, their minds poisoned by jingoistic
textbooks and official propaganda. More and more young people on both
sides of the border began to harbour a personal animus without really
knowing very much of the cultural ties that still existed. Even
though Pakistanis watched (and continue to watch) Bollywood
blockbusters and Indians were enthralled by Pakistani TV soap operas,
the gulf between the two countries grew. Popular music, cricket and
hockey supplied just about the only glue to the relationship.
Over 30 years have passed since the 1971 war, and apart from Kargil,
we have not engaged in any major conflicts. But Kargil was a
watershed in many ways. For the first time, there were allegations of
uncivilized conduct when infiltrators from this side were accused of
having mutilated the bodies of Indian soldiers.
Right or wrong, ordinary Indians were shocked and outraged that the
peace moves initiated by their government had been answered by an act
of perceived aggression. Being mostly unaware of the hold the
military has on decision-making even when a civilian is nominally in
power, they saw the infiltration as an act of treachery. More than
that, they became convinced for the first time that Pakistan was not
interested in peace.
Coming as it did after a decade of escalating violence in Kashmir,
for many Indians, Kargil was the proverbial last straw. A hit movie
was soon churned out showing Pakistanis as brutal killers; a computer
game carried the same message. On our side, the official media and
many private newspapers spared no effort in showing Indians in the
same light.
Similarly, when General Musharraf travelled to Agra last year, many
of us in Pakistan wished him to succeed, and were bitterly
disappointed when the talks were broken off when they seemed so close
to success. The general perception was that the hawks in India had
succeeded in derailing the negotiations just when there was promise
of a breakthrough.
Whatever the reality, the fact is that relations between the two
nations have never been worse. Despite the economic, cultural and
geographic imperatives, we are further away from normality than ever
before. Whenever I have written about the urgent need for peace, I
have been tauntingly reminded of Kargil by Indian readers who have
also gratuitously informed me that their country is far ahead of
Pakistan and does not need us. Several of them gloatingly sent me
reports of the successful visit of Microsoft's Bill Gates to India.
Pakistani detractors, on the other hand, go on at length about the
rights and wrongs of the Kashmir issue and advise me to return to
India if I am unhappy about the state of affairs in Pakistan.
Irrespective of whose fault it is, the fact is that we have succeeded
in partitioning the subcontinent far more thoroughly than was
originally visualized for we have achieved a division of a shared
culture and a shared past.
The custodians of power with elements of communalism and military
interests in India and Pakistan would want us to believe that there
are irreconcilable differences between Pakistanis and Indians and
also between Muslims and Hindus; hence all these hatred, wars, and
enmity.
To ascertain whether this hateful and destructive thesis has any firm
logic to stand on its own or is it, simply a policy to control and
keep people of both countries apart by exaggerating the normal
differences one can find in any society or even a household, we have
to ask few questions: 1. Is there an enmity? If yes, how widespread
it is? 2. Do Hindus and Muslims in both countries have anything in
common? 3. Is reconciliation impossible?
Is there an enmity, and how widespread? Out of India, Pakistan was
created in 1947 when the British colonial rule ended. It was a bloody
partition in the true sense of the word: about a million people died
and more than 10 million people migrated in the opposite direction -
Hindus and Sikhs to India, and Muslims to Pakistan. Still millions of
Muslims decided to stay in India for various reasons. In East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh), about 15 percent of the population was
Hindu and there remained a tiny fraction in West Pakistan. The
British - being honorable and civilizedleft for India and Pakistan a
one-time alimony in the form of Kashmir, for which both are still
fighting while gradually destroying the alimony.
After the partition, there was some trade between both countries and
an exchange of films. The 1965 War resulted in a ban on Indian movies
in Pakistan and vise versa. To say that the partition did not create
any ill feelings would be a big lie. Nevertheless, it was an internal
problem among the same people who had lived together and survived for
thousands of years. Once the Partition trauma was over, the hate
intensity was never that severe. However, to maintain it, the
governments relied on propaganda and wars; to some degree, they
succeeded too. Later on, also the religious bigots joined in this
dirty war.
However, many people, both ordinary and intellectual, have always
wished that peace would prevail in South Asia - where a fifth of the
world's people live but in a wretched condition.
Due to wars, travel restrictions, and little trade, most of the
avenues for any meaningful contact between the two neighbors had
ceased for a long time. The things that kept the people of both
countries in some contact were music, movies, and TV dramas.
Pakistanis have always craved for Indian movies. The members of the
elite class would slip into the Indian embassy and consulates quietly
to watch movies. Then there were those who would visit India on a
pleasure trip and fulfill their entertainment needs, and yet others
who would go to meet their relatives and would try to see as any many
movies as possible. This was when the visa restrictions were not in
force. In the 1970's, with the advent of VCRs, the Indian movie
cassettes became a household thing1. On the other hand, in India, TV
dramas from Pakistan, because of their high - and in many cases
intellectualquality became common. The availability of satellite
channels in the 1990s has enabled people in Pakistan to watch several
Indian channels. During visits to Pakistan, one can notice that in
most places people watch Indian channels2. The satellite TV has done
a wonderful job of letting people know both beautiful and ugly sides
of the "enemy" - rather than relying on the official media.
For a long time many people on both sides of the border have pointed
out that the common people of both countries do not want adverse
relations between them; "it is the politicians who have created this
mess.
"An incident which happened this August says a great deal about this
mess. Since last many years, peaceniks from both Pakistan and India
have regularly gathered at the Wagah border around 14th and 15th of
August (Pakistan's and India's Independence days, respectively) with
the aim of bringing both countries closer. This year, a Pakistani
journalist wanting to see more people on the border, published a news
item that Madhuri Dixit and Shahrukh Khan (famous Indian actors) were
also expected at the border3. Playwright Shahid Nadeem writes that
the march-organizers and the rangers were caught unawares when
thousands of "patriotic Pakistanis" converged at the border. It was
uncontrollable and the mounted police was called in4. Madhuri is
Hindu and Shahrukh is Muslim5.
Before delving any further, one thing need to be understood: India
and Pakistan - that is, the governments of both countries, a section
of over and/or pretentious patriots, and religious nutsare
archenemies. Both nations have gone to war four times, or three and
half times as M. J. Akbar (editor, "Asian Age") puts it.6. But
majority of the people in both countries do not have ill feelings
towards each other. However, one has to admit that the establishments
in both countries have succeeded in poisoning quite a few people's
minds. Contributing further, since late 1970s in Pakistan and early
1980s in India, (Bangladesh is not far behind), is the menace of
communalism - with a great increase in both the number of fanatics
and of violent activities. Additionally, the historical baggage is
still there: the Indian establishment holds a grudge against Pakistan
as a breaker of the "Akhand Bharat" or the pre-partitioned India
portraying it as a villain; where as the Pakistani establishment's
strategy is to present Hindus in bad light and thus implying Islam's
superiority.
However, as can be seen from the above incidenteven after fifty-five
years - the Pakistani establishment has not succeeded totally: (a)
People in Pakistan are well aware that Madhuri is Hindu. They also
know that sometime back she got married to a Hindu doctor. (b) They
know that Pakistan was created out of India. (c) They know that India
is an "enemy."
(d) They know that India is committing atrocities in Indian held
Kashmir. (e) They know what happened to Muslims in Gujarat. Still
they thronged in thousands to the border7. Nevertheless, they also
know that there is a difference between the Indian government and the
common Indians, as there is a divergence between the rulers and the
common Pakistanis.
(In old Pakistani films, one could hear phrases like "Ram naam satya
hai" or Lord Rama's name is truth8. After 1965 war, things started
to change and especially, after the loss of East Pakistan.)
It is not a wholly one-sided affair. Pakistani artists are also
immensely popular in India. Mehdi Hasan, Ghulam Ali, Munni Begum,
Farida Khanum, Abida Parvin, late Noor Jahan, and Nusrat Fateh Ali
Khan are household names in India. Pop singers, including Ali Haider,
are recognized names. Pakistani female artists have played hosts on
Indian TV programs interviewing Indian artists. There has been
collaboration between artists of both countries in making music
albums. More Pakistani artists perform in India than their
counterparts perform in Pakistan - not that they would not like to,
but because of restrictive atmosphere, clergy's street power, and
government's cool response, their number is small. Singers Jagjit
Singh, Chitra, Lucky Ali, late Talat Mehmood, tabla maestro Zakir
Hussain, and others have performed in Pakistan. However, sometime
back, internationally acclaimed Indian actor and activist Shabana
Azmi and Farooq Shaikh were to act in Feroz Khan's play, "Tumhari
Amrita," but was cancelled because the sponsors could not guarantee
their safety.
(Think about this ironic tragedy: Pakistan was created for Indian
Muslims; the Muslim sponsors were arranging the play; Azmi, Shaikh,
and Farooq are Indian Muslims. Their Muslim ness does not count, but
their Indianess definitely bothers the Muslim fanatics.)
In India, hostile reaction to Pakistani artists is rare. In 1998, the
Shiva Sena party supremo Bal Thackeray's goons known as Shiva Sainiks
stopped Pakistani singer Ghulam Ali's show in Mumbai. Few years back,
a Pakistani filmmaker offered the Nepali born Hindu Indian actress
Manisha Koirala to act in a Pakistani film. Thackeray9 refused
permission. (Recently, a Pakistani filmmaker came up with a novel
idea: he is using footage of Manisha from a Nepali film and would
somehow connect it in his film.) Not long ago, Indian singers Kavita
Krishnamurti, Sonu Nigam, and Kumar Sanu recorded songs for
Pakistani films. Famous Indian singer Asha Bhonsle sang for Zeba
Bakhtiar and Adnan Samii's film "Sargam, but the government
controlled PTV (Pakistan Television) refuses to play her songs.
Bhonsle and Sami also have few music albums together. Sami is in
India and has applied for a citizenship. He is very popular over
there without losing any popularity in Pakistan. In India, one of his
songs has been on the top slot for months now. Another one of his
video song "Lift karade" is also immensely popular. (In 1997, I
bought an audio cassette with that song from Pakistan, however, it
needed huge Indian market to gain worldwide popularity among the
South Asians.) Zeba Bakhtiar has worked in few Indian movies too.
(Bakhtiar is the daughter of former attorney general of Pakistan,
Yahya Bakhtiar.) The Bollywood Awards held every year in New York
invites few Bangladeshi and Pakistani artists to perform on stage. In
a recent interview, Pakistani actor Mira has openly expressed her
desire to work in an Indian movie. I used the word "openly", because
many of them are afraid of being labeled as "non-patriotic." Actress
Rima was accused as such for taking part in Indian Zee TV's program,
"Antakashari," on which she sang few lines of both Indian and
Pakistani national anthems. The famous Pakistani music group Junoon
experienced similar wrath for its interview given in India in which
they expressed their support for Indo-Pak friendship.
Is there anything in common? Yes. There are many things common
between themand up until 1947, they had the same history.
Geographically, they are tied; linguistically, they are linked;
culturally, they are connected. Of course, there are differences
between Hindus and Muslims, and between Pakistanis and Indians. Then,
there are also differences between Hindus and Hindus - that is,
between the high caste Brahmins and the low caste Dalits (keeping in
mind that even within the same caste there could be lack of unity),
and between Muslims and Muslims - that is the majority Sunnis and the
minority Shias. Within India, different states have differences as
there are between the provinces in Pakistan. However, it is the
similarities between Pakistanis and Indians and between Hindus and
Muslims which pricks the fundamentalistswho are hell bent on
bringing uniformity among their co-religionists to segregate the
"other." The ruling classes work on not very dissimilar pattern. On a
broader level, there are similarities in food, clothes, customs,
ingenuity10 corruption, entertainment, etc. One has to keep in mind
that South Asia is made up of several ethnic groups, multiple
languages, innumerable dialects, variety of food dishes, many
religions, uncountable denominations, infinite customs and
traditions, and so on and so forth. It is a huge medley. So on a
broader level one may find quite a few similarities between people of
different religions and different ethnicities, one may find more
affinity among the same ethnic group, even though the religions may
be different. A Sindhi Muslim or a Sindhi Hindu in Pakistan may be
able to converse with a Pushtun Pakistani on a general level,
provided both can converse fluently in Hindi/Urdu, but both Sindhi
Hindu and Sindhi Muslim would be more comfortable in talking to each
other despite the difference of religion - unless one or both of them
are religious zealots. It is also true for Pushtun or any other
group. However, same cannot be said for a Pakistani Muslim and a
Muslim from Saudi Arabia. May be, they'll pray togetherprovided they
are practicing Muslims, but then what? They can converse only if they
know each others' language, and even then they will be lacking that
cultural affinity, which a Hindu and a Muslim (and a Sikh, and a
Buddhist, and a Christian) has whether they share the same language
or not.
In some places in India, even the religious customs are similar.
There are some Muslims who burn their dead and there are some Hindus
who bury their dead. There are Muslim shrines in India which are
visited by Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Muslims, and others. Now
imagine a Saudi Wahabi seeing this. Either he will have a heart
attack or he will kill himself. Every religion has its own peculiar
brand of religious practices, and they differ in each region of the
world. The Islam in South Asia with its shrines and Sufis has its own
specialties. In addition, throughout the history of South Asia, there
have been people of all religions and without religion who have tried
to bridge the gap. The poet Akbar Allahabadi (1846-1921) once wrote:
"I asked the water of the Well of Zamzam Why did you mix with the
water of the Ganges?" It replied, "Sir, don't you see, I was shut up
in a bottle, And have now begun to flow"
(Muhammad Sadiq's translation. Zamzam is a well, considered holy by
many Muslims and is situated in the Great Mosque in Mecca, Saudi
Arabia, Ganga or Ganges is a river in India, considered holy by many
Hindus. One explanation for the United States' corporations: the
Zamzam well has just the water in it!) Just recently, writer Mukul
Dube made this suggestion: "Is it too far-fetched to visualize an
on-going exchange of children between the two religions? A Hindu
child could go to spend two days in a Muslim household, possibly one
in which there is a class-mate or age-mate. Traffic could be reversed
over the next weekend. There might be no monsters left after this,
only Uncles and …" ("The Hindustan Times," September 5, 2002.) The
custodians of both religions would want their co-religionists to do
otherwise!
In these circumstances, for the governments and the fundamentalists,
it becomes a full time job to manufacture differences - it is not
only a matter of bread and butter but also of power and politics. So
what they do first is to distort history. For the Pakistan government
and the Muslim fundamentalists, the whole universe was created just
fourteen hundred years ago when Muhammad, Prophet of Islam, emerged
on the world scene. On the other hand, for the Hindu fundamentalists,
Indian history began with the Aryans - easily forgetting the Indus
Valley Civilization and the original tribal people residing in India
for thousands of years.
Irreconcilable Differences? Many years back, a thought struck me that
if Islam would have never come to India, probably South Asia would
have been relatively peaceful, or if it came then it should have
succeeded in converting everyone to Islam. Well, any irrationality,
if attacked on time, has an effervescent existence, and so the next
thought was about the religious violence being committed among the
followers of the same religions: in Pakistan, Muslims are gunning
down Muslims not only on the streets but also in the mosques; and in
India, barring few, majority of the Dalits are still awaiting humane
and equal treatment from their higher caste fellow religionists.
Most probably, it was poet Sahir Ludhianwi (19211980) who once
wrote: mandir ko jala do, masjid ko gira do, dunya se mazhab ka nam o
nishan mita do or the temple, burn it; the mosque, demolish it every
trace of religion from this world, erase it.
The main issue of contention between both countries is the Kashmir
problem. At the time of partition, Pakistan's claim on Kashmir -
where majority of the population was Muslimwas fully justified and
India was wrong in getting Prince Hari Singh's assent for joining
India, because the basis of partition was that areas with Muslim
majority would go to Pakistan and areas with Hindu majority would go
to India. The British should not have left this problem. But then
they should not have come to South Asia (or for that matter anywhere
else) in the first place.
However, the subsequent events in South Asia have changed the whole
basis upside down. Pakistan's claim on Kashmir rested on it being a
Muslim majority province, but then the West Pakistan based rulers
could not treat their fellow Muslims, the Bengalis (in the eastern
wing or East Pakistan), as equal human beings. In 1971, East Pakistan
separated and became Bangladesh, On the other hand, India's claim
that loss of Kashmir would injure its secular nature, is nothing but
a hoax. Since partition, India has witnessed numerous religious and
caste riots or more appropriately violence where the victims are
mostly members of minorities, especially Muslims, and low caste
Hindus. In the last two decades, there have been four major
incidents11. So at this juncture in history, both Pakistan's and
India's claims are flawed and should be thrown into the trash bin.
The probable solution is to make the Line of Control or LoC, which is
the ceasefire line, a permanent border. The Kashmir problem is not of
such nature that it cannot be resolved; it is simply in the hands of
the ruling classes in both countries to permanently solve this
problem - provided that they really want to.
Just look at Pakistan and Bangladesh; both governments have amicable
relations. It is hard to believe, but it is true. Here it becomes
necessary to give a brief synopsis about what had happened between
them. The East Pakistan's population was about 55 percent, mostly
Bengalis ("non-martial" race, the British colonialists labeled so)but
the power rested in the hands of the Punjabis, about 27 percent (the
"martial" race.) Bengalis were economically exploited, socially
humiliated, politically subjugated, and religiously ridiculed.
Gradually, they started demanding autonomy. In the 1970 election, the
first fair one since 1947, the East Pakistan based Awami League won
the majority of seats. It was denied power and instead in 1971, the
West Pakistan based army, mostly Punjabis, went on a killing and rape
spree. Thomas Payne says the "massacres" went on for months in all
areas. "Muslim soldiers, sent out to kill Muslim peasants, went about
their work mechanically and efficiently, until killing defenseless
people became a habit like smoking cigarettes or drinking wine.
Before they had finished, they had killed three million people. Not
since Hitler invaded Russia had there been so vast a massacre"12.
And thousands of Muslim women were raped by the Muslim soldiers from
the Land of the Pure or Pakistan because those women were not proper
Muslims - according to the rulers-due to their cultural traits which
were same as those of West Bengali Hindu women of India. None of the
Pakistani government has ever repented or asked for forgiveness from
their victims - let alone trying those criminals. A few years back,
Nawaz Sharif said a few words to the Bangladeshis and recently
Pakistan's ruler, Pervez Musharraf used the word "excesses.
"If these Punjabi Muslim soldiers would have been asked - that is,
before the atrocities began - to marry the Bengali Muslim women, they
would have thought about all the negative labels imposed on that
ethnic group and would have refused. But they would not mind raping
those same women - because rape was an act of patriotism and of
degrading Bengali women. So where is religion in this? Where is the
"Islamic brotherhood" in this?
India is beset with similar contradictions. Just recently, five Dalit
Hindu men were murdered by the high caste Brahmin Hindus. Their crime
was that they were skinning a dead cow! More surprising or rather
more tragic is that one of the Hindu fundamentalist, VHP leader
Giriraj Kishore justified the murders on the ground that dead cow is
more precious than those Dalits!).
No doubt, the agony and bitterness of Partition created immense
hatred in many people, but with the passage of time, the wounds
healed. One cannot deny that there would always be a group of people
who would nurse the past pain and would hold grudge and/or oppose
amiable relations. However, as we can see among most of the people,
the bond of music, movies, and TV dramas is still intact and is
helping to fight back the religious insanity. Just by changing
religion, one cannot escape from a set of patterns, which has a
history of thousands of years. There are too many commonalities among
the Hindus and Muslims (and Jains, and Jews) of South Asia. It would
take many Ashok Singhals and Fazlur Rahmans and Samiul Haqs and
Praveen Togadias to really break the link totally. And if Bangladesh
and Pakistan can establish normal relations - realpolitik is there,
of course - why cannot the governments of India and Pakistan do the
same - if for nothing else than at least for realpolitik.
End notes:
1. Occasionally, police officers conduct raids to stop stores from
carrying Indian movies, but usually they are there to extract money
from the owners. Moreover, everybody knows it. Many a times it has
happened that when a new movie was released on Friday, somebody in a
cinema house in Bombay was tapping that film in the three o clock
show and would then fly to Karachi the same evening. The same night,
pirated copies were available. (Distance between the two cities is
about 500 miles.)
2. In 1998, in one of the Karachi neighborhood I was visiting, for a
couple of days due to some clash between the local channel operators
and the TV networks Indian channels disappeared. The people came to
know the stories of the missed segments of their favorite TV serials,
particularly, "Saas bhi Kabhi Bahu thi or "Once, a Mother-in-Law was
a Daughter-in-Law too," from their masis. (Literally, aunt, i.e.,
mother's sister, but is also used for domestic female workers who
clean houses and wash dishes and clothes. Here it is used in the
later sense.)
3. The Indian actors and actresses are very popular in Pakistan and
other South Asian countries, and among people of South Asian origin
residing in other countries. The Indian movies are also popular in
the African countries, the Middle East, the Central Asia, and the Far
East.
4. "Culture Vulture: Let the Children Play," "Daily Times," August 15, 2002.
5. Basically, Indian film industry is quite secular and the
inter-religious marriages are common. Shahruhk, Amir Khan ("Lagaan"
fame), Nasiruddin Shah ("Monsoon Wedding" fame), Arbaaz Khan have all
Hindu wives; Saif Ali Khan is married to a Sikh actress; Salman Khan
has a Hindu actress as a girlfriend whom he wants to marry; Hrithic
Roshan (a Hindu) is married to a Muslim girl. Three of the top four
heroes are Muslims (Shahrukh, Amir, and Salman; Hrithic is the fourth
one. In her 1959 novel, "Aag ka Darya" or "River of Fire" (her own
translation), Qurratulain Hyder has compared the Muslim presence in
the Indian film industry with that of the Jewish presence in
Hollywood.
6. Two months after independence in October 1948 over Kashmir, in
1965 over the same issue, in 1971 over East Pakistan (which became
Bangladesh when the war ended), and in 1999 a small battle in the
Kargil area of Kashmir. However, there have been times when the
leaders of India and Pakistan decided that they wanted to end
hostilities, and were courageous enough to meet. Somehow, they have
proved themselves more courageous in blowing up - that is, alwaysat
the last minute.
7. Ninety-seven percent of the people in Pakistan are Muslims and so
it is safe to assume that most of the people who went to border were
Muslims - besides, the minorities have never been aggressive in
Pakistan, and especially after mid seventies they lost any faith they
might have had in the justice system. In addition, they would not
want to take any risk in this charged atmosphere.
8. It was used in
Khwaja Khurshid Anwar's beautiful film, "Ghunghat." One of the finest
music director of South Asia, he gave music in Indian films and after
partition moved to Pakistan. He was multi-talented and made many
movies which he himself wrote, directed, and gave the music.
9. Thackeray's party is one of the coalition partners in the central
government made up of about two dozen parties, the biggest is BJP or
Bhartiya Janata Party of Atal Behari Vajpayee. Basically, Thackeray
is a roguish communalist who is famous for issuing hateful and
provocative statements against the Muslim minority, Pakistan, and
against various ethnic groups. Though his street power is limited to
Mumbai, his political influence is slightly more. He openly boasts of
controlling the central government through "remote control." His hold
on Mumbai's film industry or Bollywood is phenomenal. He has also
successfully opposed holding of cricket matches in Bombay.
10. Few years back, in the restroom at the Karachi airport, a person
gave me paper towels for wiping hands. I could have taken it myself,
but it was his way of earning a living; one cannot blame him. After
few hours, I was at the Bombay or Mumbai airport, where I had an
exactly similar experience. If I were a believer in telepathy, I
would have thought that this person's counterpart in Pakistan would
have given him the message to serve me.
11. In 1984, when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by
her Sikh bodyguards, more than 2,000 Sikhs were massacred, Rajiv
Gandhi, the successor and son of Indira, said, "when a big tree
falls, many suffers." In 1991, after the Babri Masjid was demolished,
more than 2,000 people were killed, mostly Muslims. In 2000, many
Christians were murdered and their churches were burnet down or
demolished. This year, more than 2,000 Muslims were massacred in
Gujarat.
12. Robert Payne, "Massacre: The Tragedy at Bangladesh and the
Phenomenon of Mass Slaughter throughout History" (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1973).
The verdict was overwhelmingly against New Delhi's Kashmir policy, of
which the NC was seen as an uncritical representative. It was not an
endorsement of New Delhi's "anti-terrorist" measures, or of J&K's
categorical "integration" with India...The Kashmiris long for a
return to more peaceful, less violent, life and to human rights. They
also voted for an unconditional dialogue with all shades of opinion
and scrapping of draconian laws, including POTA.
The Congress has done something unusual. It has agreed to share power
with another party in a coalition with a negotiated agenda. It has
even handed over the leadership of the Jammu and Kashmir alliance to
the People's Democratic Party (PDP). This is something its instincts
militate against.
The maturity, and one might say, grace, with which the Congress has
acted in the larger interests of Kashmir and of India, reduces the
damage from J&K's fortnight-long-jockeying for power.
It also conveys the seriousness with which the Indian political
system can sometimes respond to certain issues.
The deal between the Congress, PDP, Democratic People's Front led by
Mr Yusuf Tarigami, and other, falls in the same class as the
Rajiv-Longowal (Punjab) Accord, or the Mizoram and Assam agreements.
These had the potential to create a political breakthrough in a
situation of great social turmoil, administrative chaos, popular
alienation and militant violence.
The central issue in J&K is how to convert today's opportunity into a
solid, enduring gain. This needs a three-pronged approach: roll back
the damage wreaked by 13 years of violence; establish responsible
governance to win the people's hearts and minds; and engage the world
on the J&K issue to bring about a peaceful settlement.
The Congress-PDP alliance's Common Minimum Programme outlines this
approach's domestic component. This must be supplemented by the
international component, including a dialogue with Pakistan.
The onus here falls squarely upon the Centre. It also holds the key
to the success of Mr Mufti Mohammed Sayeed's attempts at
reconciliation. India's national leadership must seriously
reconceptualise its entire understanding of Kashmir and radically
rethink strategy.
J&K's electoral verdict was a resounding rejection of the National
Conference, and in the Jammu region, of the BJP. The NC was punished
for its opportunist national-level alliance with the communal BJP,
for its monumental corruption, betrayal of "autonomy", and
unresponsiveness to people's needs. The BJP was virtually wiped out
from Jammu.
The verdict was overwhelmingly against New Delhi's Kashmir policy, of
which the NC was seen as an uncritical representative. It was not an
endorsement of New Delhi's "anti-terrorist" measures, or of J&K's
categorical "integration" with India.
The Kashmiris long for a return to more peaceful, less violent, life
and to human rights. They also voted for an unconditional dialogue
with all shades of opinion and scrapping of draconian laws, including
POTA.
Going by opinion polls and field reports, including this writer's
recent visit, the Kashmiris regarded this as the most credible and
fair election since 1977. They voted without prejudice to their views
about a long-term Kashmir solution. They want an administration more
alive to their immediate needs related to water, jobs and roads.
The elections were undoubtedly fair, if not entirely free. But that
doesn't mean the "Kashmir problem" has gone away, and popular
alienation has ended. The problem has only acquired a less malign,
more manageable, shape.
The CMP recognises this. Seventeen of its 31 points are welcome
peace-restoration measures, including putting POTA on hold,
rehabilitation of violence-affected families, establishment of an
ehtisab institution to enforce accountability, and abolition of the
STF-Special Operations Group of former militants.
Implicit in the promise to heal "emotional wounds" is acknowledgement
that such wounds were indeed inflicted by hawkish policies which
involved cheating on India's own Constitution, rigging elections,
imposing unrepresentative governments, and committing large-scale
human rights violations.
These wounds will take long to heal, but the process must begin with
a demonstration of good faith.
The CMP is somewhat overcautious -- reflecting the Congress' sense of
vulnerability to the BJP's criticism that it is "compromising" with
pro-azadi opinion. Instead of an unconditional dialogue with all
currents of opinion, as promised by Ms Sonia Gandhi, it limits itself
to "requesting" the Centre to "hold ...
wide-ranging consultations and dialogue, without conditions, with the
members of the legislature and other segments of public opinion ...".
The CMP drops the PDP's promise of investigating allegations against
SOG/security forces relating to disappearances/custodial killings. It
leaves a dialogue with Pakistan entirely to the Centre.
Some of this caution may restrain pro-Jamaat-i-Islami elements in the
PDP's support-base. However, for the people, any realistic solution
to the Kashmir problem must involve Pakistan. They include the vast
majority, not just supporters of the Hurriyat (which has lost much
credibility).
That's what the international community too wants. It is in India's
own interest to start a dialogue, however tortuous -- without
conceding anything to Pakistan in advance.
India's greatest asset lies in the credibility of the democratic
process and the moral case against terrorist violence. There is no
substitute for peaceful, patient diplomacy and engagement with the
international community.
Domestically, the litmus test will be how soon the new government can
end state and militant violence, and restore the people's faith in
the possibility of elementary justice. Here, it needs the full
backing of the Centre, whose leadership will have to break with
clichéd "pro-active" (read, hardline) strategies.
Equally crucial will be tackling unemployment among J&K's educated
youth. Here, ironically, the Jammu region is as important as the
Valley. It's in Doda, Rajouri and Poonch that the militants are
recruiting.
So, J&K will need an extraordinarily imaginative development plan --
not a souped-up version of the "packages" the Centre periodically
announces, nor a replica of earlier plans for Punjab and Assam, such
as setting up an Institute of Technology or big public project. Only
a plan which takes into account the state's endowments and people's
skills, and targets their needs, will work.
Without such an initiative, there is a danger that the window of
opportunity in J&K will slam shut -- as in the Northeast, in the
past. If, on the other hand, India's leaders show wisdom and
foresight, things could change dramatically. India's appeal to
Kashmir's people will grow if they feel assured of the representative
character of its democratic system. That's worth fighting for.
Praful Bidwai is an eminent Indian columnist.
Mubarak Ali
To control the past is to master the present, to legitimise dominion
and justify legal claims. It is the dominant powers states,
churches, political parties, private interests which own or finance
the media or means of production, whether it be school books or strip
cartoons, films, or television programmes.(1)
In the past, rulers and aristocrats used history to glorify their
achievements as saviours and benefactors. In the modern period,
political leaders use it to assert their authority and domination and
legitimise their status as rulers. In the newly independent
countries, particularly, leaders reconstruct history to suit their
agenda in the changing political situation.
After decolonisation, a new generation of political leaders, who had
struggled for freedom and assumed the status of freedom fighters,
claimed to rule the newly independent countries. As rulers they were
in need to legitimise their claims. This is why the concepts of the
'freedom struggle' and 'war of liberation' emerged with great lustre
and romance. Sacrifices of these leaders have become dominant themes
in recent history writing. In India and Pakistan, the role of these
freedom fighters is highly eulogised in order to give them the right
to rule the new nations. Interestingly, the British historians
describe the freedom struggle as a 'transfer of power', implying that
the change that took place was a voluntary surrender of power and not
as a result of struggle. These two interpretations reflect two
antithetical approaches to history.
Like most of the newly independent countries, Pakistan also had
problems about how to reconstruct its history in order to legitimise
its creation. It faced two problems: how to treat the colonial
period, and how to justify partition. Most of the colonised countries
have been sensitive about their colonial periods, which marked their
humiliation, surrender and defeat. Dealing with these periods
requires an acceptance of national and societal weaknesses in these
countries. Pakistan found an easy solution. It looked at the whole
period of colonisation as the Indian past because Pakistan had not
existed at that time. It left it to the Indian historians to deal
with the colonial period. However, the Pakistani historians had to
grapple with a number of complicated and complex issues on the
partition of India. While handling these, they kept in their minds
the interests of the ruling classes.
In Pakistan, historiography has developed under the framework of
the 'Pakistan Ideology', which is based on the idea of a separate
Muslim nationhood and justifies the partition of India. The Pakistani
historians are told from the very beginning to construct their
history within this framework. It is well understood that whenever
history is written under the influence of an ideology, its
objectivity is sacrificed. Facts are manipulated in order to justify
the political acts of leadership. Eric Hobsbawm has said:
"Nationalist historians have often been servants of
ideologists".(2) He observed: "History as inspiration and ideology has
a built-in tendency to become a self-justifying myth. Nothing is a
more dangerous blindfold than this, as the history of modern nations
and nationalism demonstrates".(3)
In power politics, an ideologically based historiography provides
legitimacy to the political leadership. Michael W Apple poses the
question: What does ideology do for the people who have it? He writes
that it "distorts one¹s picture of social reality and serves the
interest of the dominant classes in the society".(4)
Pakistani historians also face the problem of how to deal with the
ancient past. Islam came to the Indian subcontinent in the 8th
century. On the basis of the two-nation theory, the ancient Indian
past does not belong to the new country. A teacher and a
Jamat-i-Islami member, Asadullah Bhutto, once gave a press statement
that Mohenjo Daro and other such archaeological remains should be
bulldozed as they do not belong to Islam. Turning their attention to
the early Islamic past, the historians seek an Islamic link with the
Arab conquest of Sindh, known in history textbooks as "the door of
Islam" ('bab al-Islam'). According to them, the conquest of Sindh
made the Indian Muslims a part of the Arab empire. This makes them
more enchanted with the glories of Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, and
Cordoba than with the Indian counterparts of Delhi, Agra or
Fathepursikri. They also trace central Asian links. A reputed
Pakistani archaeologist and historian, A H Dani, has said that
Pakistan has closer and stronger cultural links with central Asia
than with India.
How one treats medieval Indian history is also problematic. During
this period, Muslim dynasties ruled over India but the centre of
power was situated in India and not in the area that constituted the
new country of Pakistan. Though the period is reconstructed under the
title of History of Pak-Hind, there are some fundamentalists who
totally reject the rule of the Muslim dynasties as being un-Islamic
on the grounds that the Muslim rulers preferred to rule on the basis
of secularism and did not establish an Islamic state. They inducted
the Hindus in their administration and weakened the Islamic character
of the state. These historians also condemn all attempts that led to
the development of a composite culture. I H Qureshi, a leading
historian, criticised the policy of cooperation with Hindus that was
enunciated by Mughal rulers, especially Akbar, who included Hindus as
partners and treated them equally.
Qureshi has argued: "And in the final analysis, if the Muslims were
to forget their uniqueness and come to absorb as Akbar did,
contradictory tendencies and beliefs from other religions, could the
Muslim nation continue to exist as a separate nation? Akbar's
policies created danger not only for the Muslim empire but also for
the continued existence of the Muslim nation in the sub-continent".(5)
Akbar is much maligned in the Pakistani historiography and is
completely omitted from the school textbooks.(6)
Recently in an article entitled "At Last the Fall Became our
Destiny", a Jamat-i-Islami intellectual wrote: "After Muhammad bin
Qasim, all conquerors invaded India for plunder and not for (the)
propagation of Islam. They had no desire and passion for holy war.
Some of them conquered territories after shedding Muslim blood and
assumed the royalty that was similar to the Romans and the Persian
rulers."(7) He condemned them for emulating the practices of the
non-Muslim kings. "They built palaces and castles for their luxurious
living and personal protection, kept slave girls for their sexual
satisfaction, and recruited eunuchs to watch the conduct of their
women. Following the traditions of the Pharaohs, they even built
tombs for their queens."(8)
He said that the reason for the downfall of the Muslim rule in India
was the attempt to create a composite culture. When Akbar and other
Mughal rulers adopted the policy of marrying Hindu women, the process
of polluting the Muslim culture began, which ultimately led to the
disintegration of the Mughal empire. He wrote: "When the Mughal
rulers married Hindu women and allowed them to keep their religion
and worship according to their religion, it was disaster. As a result
of these marriages, Mughal rulers were born from Hindu mothers."(9)
Medieval Indian history is not regarded as a part of the Pakistani
historiography because the Hindus and the Muslims both shared it. The
culture that was produced by both is looked upon as a denial of
Muslim separateness.
Problems Posed by Recent History
In dealing with the recent history of the freedom struggle, the
emphasis has shifted from the freedom struggle to the "struggle for
Pakistan". The Congress, dominated by Hindus, is considered to be the
main adversary because it did not recognise the Muslim community as a
separate one and opposed partition. This approach makes the Hindus
more hostile to the Muslims, than the British. Therefore, the
creation of Pakistan is regarded as a victory against the Hindus and
not against the British.
The reconstruction of the regional histories poses another problem.
How does one adjust them in the ideological framework? In the case of
Punjab, its Sikh period is rejected and downgraded as the 'Sikha
Shahi', which is synonymous with anarchy and disorder. The wars of
the Sikhs, which were fought against the British, have no place in
the history textbooks. On the other hand, the British conquest of
Punjab is hailed as a blessing for the people of Punjab because it
delivered them from Sikh rule.
The British ignominiously defeated the Talpur Mirs, the rulers of
Sindh, in 1843. To minimise the humiliation of the defeat, historians
attempt to glorify some individuals who fought bravely against the
British. Sindh is given credit because its legislative assembly was
the first to vote for joining Pakistan. The North West Frontier
Province is remembered for its resistance to colonial rule but the
allegiance of its political leadership to the Congress is condemned.
The political leadership and not the people are blamed. On
Baluchistan, the resistance of the Kalat state not to accede to
Pakistan is not mentioned in the schoolbooks.
Pakistani historiography tries to homogenise the culture, traditions,
and social and religious life of the people. This suits the political
attempts towards centralisation. Any attempt to assert the historical
identity of a region is discouraged and condemned. This also affects
the non-Muslim religious minorities, who are also excluded from the
mainstream of history.
Pakistan has passed through a number of political crises. It has
experienced military dictatorships, corruption of feudal democracy,
the separation of East Pakistan, the rise of fundamentalism and ups
and downs in relations with India. History textbooks became the
victim. History as a subject was discontinued in 1961 and was
incorporated into the textbooks on social science.
Textbook writers are allowed to select only those portions of
history, which suit the ruling party in power. Michael W Apple
observes: "Selectivity is the point; the way in which from a whole
possible area of past and present, certain meanings and practices are
chosen for emphasis, certain other meanings and practices are
neglected and excluded. Even more crucially, some of these meanings
are reinterpreted, diluted, or put into forms which support or at
least do not contradict other elements within the effective dominant
culture."(10)
When there is democracy, the army rule is blamed for all existing
problems. When the army comes to power, it accuses politicians and
democracy for causing disorder and corruption. Even when there is a
democratic change, the past government is condemned for political and
economic problems. As George Orwell said: "All history is a
palimpsest scraped clean and reinscribed, exactly as often as is
necessary. The past is written in the light of the present
requirements of the authoritarian government."(11)
The disjointed and selected version of history fails to create any
historical consciousness among students and the general public. When
full facts of historical processes are not recorded, it reduces the
power of analysis and society is condemned to repeat its history
again and again.
-----
Notes
1 Marc Ferro, The Use and Abuse of History, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, London, 1984, p vii.
2 Eric Hobsbawm , On History, Abacus, London, 1999, p 35.
3 Ibid, p 47.
4 Michael W Apple, Ideology and Curriculum, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, London, 1980, pp 20, 21.
5 I H Qureshi, The Muslim Community of the Indian Sub-Continent, 1962, p 167.
6 Mubarak Ali, History on Trial, Lahore, 1999, pp 76-82.
7 Zahid Ali Wasti, 'And the Fall became a Destiny', ( Urdu article)
in Awaz, No 9, October-December 1999, pp 247, 248.
8 Ibid, p 248.
9 Ibid, pp 250-57.
10 Apple, p 6.
11 George Orwell, Selected Writings, Heinmann Educational Books,
London 1976, p 165.
After having announced de-escalation and demobilisation of 700,000
troops at the border and having agreed that Prime Minister Vajpayee
would attend the next SAARC summit, the Indian government is again
vacillating and hedging. Apart from differences over a trade
agreement, the real cause for New Delhi's hesitation pertains to
internal rivalries within the National Democratic Alliance and a
major power struggle that has broken out within the sangh parivar,
where Vajpayee is at the receiving end.
On October 17, exactly a day after the Cabinet Committee on Security
announced the de-escalation, a television channel quoted minister of
state for external affairs Digvijay Singh as saying Vajpayee would
definitely travel to Islamabad for the SAARC summit in January
although "not for any bilateral process".
Within hours, Ministry of External Affairs officials began to brief
journalists to stem "speculation" that a "final" decision had been
taken on Vajpayee's visit: there exists, they said, a "large gap
between possibility and reality". But defence minister George
Fernandes-leader of the Samata Party, to which Digvijay Singh
belongs-reiterated that Vajpayee would visit Pakistan.
Soon, a war of words began over the summit dates. On October 23, MEA
declared India is still "waiting" to finalise the dates. Pakistan's
Foreign Office accused India of "trying to create confusion".
Pakistan's acting High Commissioner said he was "a little bewildered
... we are getting conflicting signals". The dates, formally proposed
by the SAARC Secretariat and Pakistan High Commission in August, were
further discussed at a foreign ministers' meeting in September where
Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha was present. The dates agreed
were January 11-13. India was to have re-confirmed them by September
25. It hasn't.
It now emerges that New Delhi would like to make Vajpayee's visit
conditional upon "progress" on SAPTA (South Asian Preferential Trade
Agreement) and SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Area). Vajpayee has also
said that he would go to Pakistan provided there is "clarity" on what
is to be discussed there. Clearly, the official message is, Pakistan
must discard its no-trade-with-India policy and accord to India Most
Favoured Nation status.
However, the weightier reason for Vajpayee's hesitation has to do
with internal conflicts within the BJP. A substantial section of the
party, now controlled by the hawkish LK Advani, is unhappy with the
demobilisation decision and does not want any normalisation of
relations with Pakistan unless that is linked to ending "cross-border
terrorism".
Even more important is the power struggle that has broken out between
the parliamentary wing of the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Hard
Right component of the sangh parivar, including the Vishwa Hindu
Parishad, Bajrang Dal and Swadeshi Jagran Manch. This has now taken
the form of a campaign of abuse. Abuse pervades the mainstream
political discourse. The worst manifestation of this is in Gujarat,
in pre-election campaigning.
There, VHP's "international secretary" Praveen Togadia recently
descended to the gutter level by calling Sonia Gandhi "an Italian
dog". Narendra Modi too termed her "Italy ki beti". He threatened to
"wipe Pakistan off the map of the world" through "Hindu militancy" as
well.
This came on top of VHP president Singhal's threats to repeat
Gujarat's ethnic-cleansing "experiment" all over India. Meanwhile,
the Shiv Sena's Bal Thackeray has appealed to Hindus to form
"terrorist suicide-squads". Worst of all, VHP vice-president Giriraj
Kishore, citing the shastras, has put the cow higher than
humans-especially Dalits.
True to cowardly type, Togadia now says he didn't name any particular
individual in his Oct 19 speech. Thackeray claims his remarks were
only directed at "pro-Pakistan Muslims"-a ludicrous statement,
falsified by the speech's transcript! Thackeray's defence is
fundamentally obnoxious in the first place. It is downright criminal
to threaten anyone with "terrorist squads".
These vituperative speeches mark a new low in India's Right-wing
politics. The public discourse here did not plumb such depths even
before Partition, with its ghastly bloodbath. Such intensely
intolerant politics couldn't have developed 40, 30, even 20 years
ago. What gave birth to it is the parivar's still-unfolding
anti-Babri mosque campaign, launched in the mid-1980s.
Parivar hate speech is backed by action. Maharashtra and Gujarat
witnessed India's two worst pogroms. In Rajasthan, the BJP-RSS and
VHP are polarising politics communally. Tamil Nadu has banned
religious conversion-against the Constitution. In Haryana, five
Dalits were beaten to death in police custody because the VHP spread
rumours that they had killed a cow.
Many BJP leaders have joined the VHP's hate campaign. There are
revolving doors between all the parivar's components. Half the VHP's
top leaders have been BJP MPs in recent years. The Shiv Sena and BJP
are inseparable. The Bajrang Dal's topmost man (Vinay Katiyar) is the
BJP's Uttar Pradesh president.
The intra-parivar power struggle is triggered partly by the BJP's
appalling governmental performance. Togadia, Thackeray and Kishore
are upset at the NDA's drift towards economic policies they don't
like, and towards "appeasement" of Pakistan through troop
demobilisation.
These aren't differences over principle, but over sharing the spoils,
and sustaining enmity with Pakistan. Recently, Thackeray plucked out
the Sena's electricity minister from the Cabinet because he didn't
deliver "enough" moolah. He raved against the sale of a public sector
hotel in Mumbai not because he opposes public sector disinvestment,
but because he wanted it sold to a friend! The hardliners are also
stepping up the Ayodhya temple campaign, although there is no popular
support for this.
This is their way of getting even with the BJP's parliamentary wing.
They don't want to play second fiddle to it. They believe-not without
reason-that they put Vajpayee & Co in power; without the
Ramjanmabhoomi campaign, the BJP couldn't have grown from 2 to 89
seats between 1984 and 1989, and then eventually to 180 (in a Lok
Sabha of 545 seats).
Hindutva hardliners see Vajpayee & Co as interlopers. The BJP
leadership thinks the hardliners are a nuisance. But it lacks the
stomach to deal with them upfront. So it relies on the paterfamilias,
the RSS, to settle internal differences. This strategy is becoming
unworkable. The RSS leadership's equation with the BJP has changed.
Their recent mutual compromises have come unstuck. The same thing
will probably happen to the latest uneasy truce, reached on October
24.
It is a sign of Vajpayee's desperation and weakness that he still
begs the RSS to help him. If he really wants to assert himself, he
must act in consonance with Constitutional principles and the law.
His government should strictly apply hate-speech laws like Section
153 and 153(A) of the Indian Penal Code to members of the sangh
parivar. It must not cave in to Thackeray's hollow threats to set
Mumbai "on fire".
It is unlikely that Vajpayee can summon the will to take on these
dangerous fanatics. He may temporarily overcome their resistance and
attend the SAARC summit. But so long as he remains their prisoner, he
is likely to make reconciliation with Pakistan hostage to Hindutva.
Islamabad would only play into the hardliners' hands, and work
against its own interests, if it persists with the no-trade policy.
It would be well-advised to show that it is serious about SAPTA and
about giving India the MFN status required under the WTO.
THE SUCCESS OF a new alliance of six conservative Islamic parties in
Pakistan's general election on October 10 may have come as no
surprise to military ruler President Pervaiz Musharraf. In fact, his
army and Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, engineered the
victory of the fundamentalists like much else in the polls.
In the past, the military has supported religious parties as a
bulwark against the mainstream political elite and to help the army
carry out its foreign policies of maintaining hostility towards
India, regaining the mutually disputed territory of Kashmir and
supporting Pashtun allies in southern Afghanistan.
That equation has not changed, despite Musharraf's need to maintain a
strong alliance with the United States. The religious parties'
platform of anti-Americanism did not deter Musharraf: In fact, it
appears that the army and the ISI sponsored the religious leaders, or
mullahs, to ensure that the West does not question the need for
continued military rule to contain the religious parties. And by
keeping Kashmir on the boil, the election ensures a predominant role
for the army in the new political set-up.
"Strategically the military want to hold a red rag up to the West and
say 'Look, West, you need a military dictatorship because if there is
not, then pro-Taliban parties are going to come to power," opposition
politician and exiled former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto told
reporters in London.
While the army imposed a raft of obstacles preventing Bhutto and
other potential candidates from the two largest secular democratic
parties from standing in the elections, the path was cleared for
mullahs. For example, secular politicians were barred from running if
they did not have bachelors' degrees, while mullahs were only
required to have degrees from religious schools.
The result will be a continuing state of crisis for Pakistan,
beginning with the current hung parliament. The largest block of
seats went to the pro-army Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam, or
PML-Q, with 78 seats. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party took 62 seats
and the alliance of six religious parties, the United Council of
Action (UCA), won a remarkable 50 seats--the highest for any Islamic
grouping since Pakistan's inception. The opposition faction of the
Pakistan Muslim League led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif won
14 seats. Another 100 candidates will be chosen from religious
minorities and women, bringing the total to 392 MPs.
WHAT THE MULLAHS WANT
The European Union called the election "seriously flawed," and
strongly criticized the army's interference in the pre-poll electoral
process. The EU raised serious doubts about whether there would be a
real transfer of power from the army to civilians.
In a not-so-surprising contrast the Bush administration in Washington
had little to say about the election, describing it as "a milestone
towards democracy."
Bush and Musharraf appear to be the only leaders to be so optimistic.
Whether the UCA joins hands with the PML-Q or remains in opposition,
it will pose immense problems. The UCA will demand greater
Islamicization and changes to the constitution at home while
questioning the country's alliance with the U.S.
Furthermore, Musharraf has in the past described the religious
parties and their militias as the first line of defence in any war
against India. With the hardline mullahs in parliament, it will be
inconceivable that the next prime minister will be able to hold
meaningful talks with India. The mullahs' victory will also push to
the back burner the pledges made by Musharraf to reform Pakistan's
religious schools, which have spawned Islamic militancy.
The UCA will certainly control the provincial governments of
Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province bordering
Afghanistan. This could weaken Afghanistan's leader, Hamid Karzai, as
the UCA leaders have close links to the Taliban and to renegade
commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Western diplomats say Hekmatyar is
already getting support from Pakistan.
"All of Pakistan's neighbours will see the UCA as a threat, and that
will increase the army's leverage with the Americans," says Rashed
Rehman, editor of the Frontier Post newspaper in Peshawar.
The results of Pakistan's elections come as a comprehensive
disappointment to liberal and secular-minded Indians just as they
represent a massive setback to the democratisation prospect in
Pakistan itself.
To start with, the ground-rules of the whole exercise were severely
rewritten by President Pervez Musharraf even before it began. This
made a grotesque mockery of the very function of elections as an
instrument of expression of the popular will. The mockery was further
compounded by the exclusion of the leaders of the two biggest
political parties, and by the doubts cast over the powers of the
legislatures to be elected.
Worse, the government's shady agencies egregiously messed with
political parties, promoting favourites and discouraging adversaries,
and thus further damaging the election process's credibility. Since
then, nothing -- including campaigning restrictions, low turnout and
(independent observers' reports of) rigging and ballot-tampering --
has salvaged that credibility.
On top of this come the results which reveal a badly fractured
popular mandate, but which nevertheless show that the
Islamic-communal jihadi parties comprising the Mutthahida
Majlis-e-Amal doubled their vote over the seven percent "barrier"
which many had hoped (and some confidently forecast) they would never
cross.
In my view, the MMA's emergence as the National Assembly's third
largest group -- besides its likely leadership of governments in two
provinces -- is the elections' single most retrograde or negative
outcome. This is so not so much because Islamic extremism is as
socially malign, ideologically distasteful and politically dangerous
as, say, Hindutva -- which it is--, but primarily because of why the
MMA rose to such prominence and what it is likely to do. There are
five reasons for this view.
First, the MMA's ascendancy is rooted in "negative" factors like the
growing anti-US popular sentiment over the past year, especially in
the provinces bordering Afghanistan, and the space created by popular
disillusionment with "normal" political parties whose monumentally
corrupt and unresponsive leaders have twice proved a letdown.
But above all, that ascendancy is a tribute to years of malgovernance
and the deep crisis in which "normal" democratic politics finds
itself in Pakistan on account of its inability to acknowledge and
address the elementary concerns of the mass of the population, and
vent them in policies -- however obliquely or imperfectly.
Second, the fundos' support has grown on account of a "positive"
factor: ethnic-religious "identity politics". This, regrettably,
brings to fruition some of the darkest prophesies of the critics
(including myself) of the post-9/11 Bush Doctrine and the US's
disastrously militarist approach to "terrorism". The worst forecast
was that America's open-ended "anti-terrorist" crusade would end up
strengthening the forces of religious extremism, especially in the
Muslim world. Predictable as this might have been, it is a retrograde
development.
Third, the MMA is set to push Pakistan's society and politics
backwards. If it shares power in a Federal coalition, it will
certainly impose some elements of its agenda upon its allies. It is
already talking about banning co-education, releasing pro-Taliban
extremists like the Jaish-e-Mohammed's Masood Azhar and former
Lashkar-e-Toiba chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, and making Friday the
weekly holiday. Even if it is excluded from the next government, the
MMA will wield considerable influence given the PML(Q)'s severe
credibility crisis, the PPPP's weakness, and its own clout in the
NWFP and Balochistan.
Fourth, the MMA's ascendancy will be seen by India's religious bigots
as their own vindication, and a signal for hardening their political
stance. Nothing feeds extremism in one country of the subcontinent as
strongly as Right-wing extremism in the other. The MMA will also
encourage India's "secular" hawks to paint Pakistan in dark hues, as
a society obsessed with Islam and incapable of throwing up a
democratic culture.
Such perceptions could subvert or slow down moves towards badly
needed reconciliation and dÈtente -- to our collective detriment.
Finally, the MMA will confront Musharraf with new challenges -- and
(ironically!) opportunities. On the one hand, allowing the MMA to
join a coalition government risks incurring US displeasure. On the
other, he cannot keep it out without inviting grave charges of
subverting democracy. This "Algerian" dilemma doesn't auger well for
Pakistan's health.
If Musharraf chooses to be super-devious, he could use the MMA's
existence as a bargaining counter vis-a-vis the US. He could cite it
as a potential threat to US plans for this region -- to highlight the
military's indispensability for Pakistan. Alternatively, he could use
the MMA as an excuse for his failure to deliver on his own
promises to rein in extremists and prevent cross-border infiltration.
After all, nothing sells in Washington like the "compulsions" of an
ally, especially one in "democratising" mode.
This is, admittedly, a grim picture. The only silver lining to the
proverbial dark cloud has now appeared -- India's de-escalation and
demobilisation from the border, euphemistically called
"redeployment". This has been long overdue. Keeping 700,000 troops on
high alert for 10 months has proved -- as many critics, and in
particular the peace movement had argued -- counter-productive, and
drained away anything between Rs 5,000 crores and Rs 8,000 crores
from the exchequer, which means from the social sector.
Atal Behari Vajpayee took the decision to demobilise partly under
external (largely US pressure), partly because the armed forces were
fed up, because the build-up was unlinked to a clear political
objective, and because nothing tangible would be achieved by
prolonging the "coercive diplomacy" with some nuclear brinkmanship
thrown in (duly reciprocated by Pakistan).
The demobilisation opens a window of opportunity for quick resumption
of diplomatic relations and an India-Pakistan dialogue. There is
fairly widespread support for this, including from the Congress and
the Left. The Congress demands that air and surface links be restored.
There is pressure from the West for a dialogue on Kashmir too. As an
unabashedly pro-US analyst puts it: "Washington does not want to get
embroiled every other year in defusing a nuclear crisis between the
subcontinent's nuclear rivals. It would rather make a sustained
effort now to see if India and Pakistan can find ways to resolve the
Kashmir dispute and normalise bilateral relations."
One might not agree with the assessment that India has made "an
important political leap" and now recognises "it needs the
cooperation of the international community in pressing the Pakistani
Army to discard the instruments of extremism and terrorism". But the
mood among India's policy-makers is already a far cry from the
cowboy-style belligerence of a year, or even a few months, ago.
Today, Vajpayee for his own domestic reasons might want to promote a
dialogue. He is beleaguered by his increasingly strident Right-wing
sangh parivar colleagues, who have escalated their hate campaign
against the religious minorities and Dalits.
Any agenda to counter them, assuming Vajpayee has the stomach to do
so, must logically involve restoration of diplomatic relations and
reconciliation.
Whatever Musharraf and Vajpayee do, it is the interests of Indian and
Pakistani citizens to enlarge the silver lining. Militarism,
chauvinistic nationalism, religious extremism and nuclearism feed
upon one another in unique ways in South Asia. People-to-people
contacts and state-level detente are the best way of taking the sting
out of that toxic nexus. They are also the only way of saving the
democratisation process from fundamentalists of all kinds.
BHUBANESWAR OCT. 19. Even as India and Pakistan move towards
de-escalating tension along the international border, women from
South Asia broke all boundaries to come together on a common platform
today. On the penultimate day of the 10th conference of the Indian
Association for Women's Studies (IAWS), women from Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and India spoke out strongly for peace
and an end to conflict in the region.
The conference, which has brought together women scholars and
activists from around India and from several South Asian and other
countries, has focussed on the theme "Sustaining democracy:
challenges in a new millennium". But perhaps the discussion that had
the greatest resonance in the face of the continuous state of
"simultaneous war and peace" in the region, as described by Ritu
Menon of Kali for Women, was the one on South Asia.
Khawar Mumtaz, a leading women's rights activist, from Pakistan spoke
of the increasing challenges and difficult choices that the still
embryonic peace movement faces in her country.
She said that it represented a coalition of a variety of emerging
social movements ranging from the women's movement to organisations
of peasants, of fisher folk and of trade unions.
"The State in Pakistan always colluded with the religious right and
this has pitched us in conflict with the State and the religious
right," she said. After the recent elections, and the victory of the
fundamentalists in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan,
social movements faced an even bigger challenge.
Ms. Mumtaz said the first targets of the fundamentalist groups were
civil society organisations. For example, when the U.S. began bombing
Afghanistan last year, eight offices of groups working with women and
on education in the NWFP were attacked and razed to the ground. There
have also been attacks on schools run by women's organisations.
Despite these threats, the peace movement in Pakistan, which stands
for separation of religion from politics and is opposed to all forms
of violence, continues to grow.
From Sri Lanka, anthropologist and feminist scholar, Dr. Malathi de
Alwis spoke about the dilemmas facing groups that had argued for a
political settlement to the violent conflict in their country but now
had doubts about the process. "Peace is about compromise, it's a
contract, it's about negotiation. Feminists have always asked for a
political solution to the ethnic conflict but we must have peace with
justice," she argued.
She suggested that even as peace negotiations were proceeding, there
were violations of the rights of individuals and minorities that were
being ignored.
Meghana Guha Thakurta from Bangladesh emphasised that no country in
the region was an island and that what happened in one inevitably
affected the other. She said that the minorities in Bangladesh had
become increasingly insecure in the last year and had been targeted
each time Muslims were attacked in India or Ahmadis were attacked in
Pakistan.
For the Hindu minority, problems began after December 6, 1992 and the
demolition of the Babri Masjid in India. Since then, each communal
conflagration in India had its fallout on these communities in
Bangladesh.
Kamla Bhasin, well-known women's activist, ended the deliberations by
stating that we did not need "Bush-ful thinking - where you don't
need dialogue, don't need to talk, but just decide who to kill."
The day ended with a special session on Gujarat, where activists
narrated their firsthand experiences of the last months in the State
following the communal carnage, and a silent, candle-lit peace march
through Bhubaneswar.
index | HOME Landelijke India Werkgroep | pagina KRUITVAT INDIA-PAKISTAN |