Crisis India-Pakistan:
Achtergrondinformatie, analyse en nieuws
uit de Indiase, Pakistaanse en internationale media.

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October 7, 2002

The growing American presence in the spooking business especially in Pakistan

M.B. Naqvi

Karachi October 7, 2002
A certain question is going abegging; few ask it. Its background is the growing American presence in the spooking business especially in Pakistan; the CIA and FBI not to mention other agencies, are, no doubt aiding and cooperating with their Pakistani counterparts. But the extent of aid and cooperation has become controversial. The government certainly asserts that things are being done by Pakistanis in Pakistan and Americans are just a few and they are providing technical knowhow and assorted help. There are others who think that the Americans presence in the intelligence gathering field and in anti-terror operations is going far beyond reasonable limits. Some critics believe that Pakistan is now badly enmeshed in the American spooking networks based on US mainland. How would the Pakistan authorities sort out the issue is making a lot of people worried?
The main question that occurred was whether there are any Indians who ask their government for an enunciation of a Pakistan policy that looks forward to, say the century ahead. The other part of the same question is whether there are Pakistanis who make that every enquiry from their government about its India policy, again say for the next century. What the current India and Pakistan policies of Pakistan and India are can be discerned from their current activities: most of it can be summed up in two linked processes of running a cold war against each other and carrying on, as best as they can, with the required arms races to sustain the cold war. For the present it seems that long-term policy vis-à-vis the other can be assessed in terms of weeks or perhaps months. What they think will happen after the immediate future would require an international commission of inquiry.
And yet there is a whole world, with myriad problems, outside India and Pakistan which impact on them. What is the role of these two South Asian states in the emerging world order now being rough-hewed by the indefatigable Warrior against Terror, George W. Bush, and his able assistants. There is also this wide-scale and open-ended War against error which after Afghanistan is likely to engulf Iraq.
How does the Indian government define its longer-term drive for making India great? To most observers it looks today as if the Indian leadership is content to be a sublettee of a part of American greatness, wishing to remain attached to the US juggernaut. It seems happy to play its allotted role in allotted places.
Insofar as Pakistan is concerned, it is too obsessed with Kashmir and India that its military leadership is hellbent on being sappers and miners of the same American juggernaut. Their love of American aid makes its leadership ignore everything that is happening around us in Asia or elsewhere. For its purposes, so long as George W. Bush understands the position of Gen. Musharraf and the Army behind him and continues to smile would be three-fourths of the desired dispensation (whatever it may seem to others).
As it happens, there is the dramatic spectacle of how crudely is Mr. George W. Bush twisting the arm of the UN Security Council, the Secretary General and the arms inspectors who had been assembled for Iraq. The prestige of the UN has already been undermined and severely hit. If it wishes to barely survive, the UN has to become more willing handmaiden of the US government. True, despite being snubbed on the Middle East peace plan, the British Prime Minister continues to perform the role allotted to him, no matter if his own party is in tumult.
But it seems a stage has been reached when Russia, China and France have put up a great show of resistance, lasting almost over a week at this writing. The Americans are trying to persuade them and it is a most iffy situation if this defiance can continue to the point where the patience of Dick Chenys and Donald Rumsfelds of America gives way and they decide to go it alone. What would that do for the UN?
Let’s not kid ourselves: if the US invades Iraq without a UN cover, it do to UN, what Benito Mussolini’s aggression against Ethiopia did to the League of Nations. Is anyone in New Delhi and Islamabad worried? Would they like to live with another League of Nations? In any case, the world has already seen how has Bush treated it and how it was helpless.
There are questions about what are the linkages between the American government’s enthusiasm for warring against Terror. With its oil and other economic interests, on the one hand, and surviving primordial prejudices, dating from Crusades, on the other. There is the new American National Security Strategy that needs to be studied by all in the world. Insofar as one can see, no one in New Delhi and Islamabad establishments has yet taken any purposeful note of what the Americans now affect to believe and act upon. Where does the third world comes in or goes out. Have the Indians and Pakistani governments a view on the questionable contours of America’s Asian policies, if not for the whole globe?
It is not only politics that raises troubling questions. The American policies can be seen as a tripod. One leg is of course the geopolitical strategy. The second is economic, i.e. globalisation, is an inseparable part of the American way of operating. The third leg of the tripod is a combination of efforts to manipulate popular perceptions and opinions around the globe in association with a worldwide network of spies operating with their new technique of utilising such everyday workers as postmen, meter readers and of course other such like in selected places. These activities are centrally controlled and gather information at their central data banks which are of course in America.
This is happening now in Pakistan where the privatisation of various governmental services enables the emergence of new private sector companies performing the old public sector jobs. These are expected to be the best source from which to collect and collate detailed information. The American methodology also uses its military-to-military cooperation in parallel with the growth of understandings between intelligence gathering networks. Given America’s expertise and resources, it means that the social details of the rest of the world is now open to the US in the most stark and detailed sense of the terms. Information about all the social innards of various states are said to be centralized in the various centres of American CIA, FBI, NSA, NRO, NIMA, NDI and who knows how many other spook outfits there are.
The globalisation of economies, of course, is a large can of worms, insofar as the third world is concerned. Even the bigwigs of the IFIs (international financial institutions) have now begun to admit that the globalisation produces problems in the third world countries such as the pools of unemployed, growing disparities of income between classes and regions. A few even have begun whispering old fashioned word exploitation. The IFI chiefs are now running from one urban centre to another in the vain attempt to escape from protestors mainly in the developed countries who shout abuses on them in behalf of the third world also.
Where do India and Pakistan stand, the question echoes and re-echoes?

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The Hindustan Times, October 6, 2002

Indian, Pakistani activists share Nuremberg rights prize

Press Trust of India

Nuremberg, October 06
An Indian journalist and a Pakistani rights activist have both won the Nuremberg international human rights prize for 2003, the jury announced on Sunday.
The jury awarded the prize to Indian woman journalist Teesta Setalvad and Pakistan's Ibn Abdur Rehman for their "exemplary fight" for peace and human rights despite personal risk.
The 15,000-euro prize will be presented to the pair in the southern German city next September.
Setalvad, 40, co-edits a magazine and has spoken out against the ill treatment of women and minority groups.
Ibn Abdur Rehman, 72, has been director of an independent Pakistani human rights commission since 1990 and has worked for peace in Jammu and Kashmir.

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The Hindu, October 6, 2002

'India planning to disrupt polls'

By B. Muralidhar Reddy

ISLAMABAD OCT. 5. The Pakistan Interior Minister, Moinuddin Haider, today alleged that India was planning to `disrupt' the October 10 general elections in the country and said that security was being stepped up to ensure a peaceful poll.
In an informal talk with correspondents here, he claimed that the Pakistan Government learned about the `plans' of India through interrogation of a number of militants arrested recently from Karachi and other parts of the country. He said foolproof arrangements had been made to maintain law and order. The Minister claimed that as a result of the steps taken by the Government, the law and order situation had improved considerably. However, he urged the people to be vigilant.
The Minister said arrangements had been made to deploy the army if and when necessary to maintain order during the elections. In response to a question, he said politicians should exercise tolerance and not create hurdles in the way of development of the country.
In another development, Pakistan Supreme Court has admitted the petitions by Shahbaz Sharif and Kulsoom, the brother and the wife of the former Prime Minister, Nawaz Shairf, challenging the rejection of their nomination papers. They wanted to contest for the National and provincial Assemblies from Lahore. The nomination papers were first accepted by the Returning Officers but were subsequently rejected by a special tribunal following objections over their signatures.
In their petitions before the apex court, they have prayed that they should be allowed to contest the polls and offered to bear all the expenses for the printing of ballot papers at this late stage.

Poll monitoring team arrives

A 38-member SAARC poll monitoring team has joined other international observer groups to observe the October 10 general elections in Pakistan.
Among the international bodies that have sent election observers include the European Union and the Commonwealth. A group of observers from the Organisation of Islamic Countries is also likely to be here soon. The Colombo-based International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES) has selected the SAARC group. The details of the team and whether any Indian delegate is part of it is not known. The ICES coordinated similar missions in Pakistan in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997.
The SAARC team will assemble in Karachi and will be divided and sent to the four provinces. A sub-group, consisting of six senior members, will arrive here on October 8 from Karachi. According to Pakistan Security and Development Association, the group is likely to meet the Chief Election Commissioner, Foreign Minister, Foreign Secretary, Interior secretary and representatives of political parties.

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The Hindu, October 6, 2002

Missile tests may fuel arms race: U.S.

By Sridhar Krishnaswami

Washington Oct. 5. The Bush administration has said that it is disappointed with the missile tests taking place in South Asia and fears that a missile race would further threaten regional and international security. ``I would repeat what we have said in the past, that we're disappointed that ballistic missile tests are occurring in the region. There is a charged atmosphere in the region and these tests can contribute to that atmosphere, make it harder to prevent a costly and destabilising nuclear and missile arms race. A race like that would be a further threat to regional and international security'', the State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher said.
``We've continued to urge both Pakistan and India to take steps to restrain their nuclear weapon and missile programmes, including no operational deployment of nuclear armed ballistic missiles and to begin a dialogue on confidence-building measures that could reduce the likelihood that such weapons would ever be used. This could be a part of a broader dialogue to reduce tensions in the region'', Mr. Boucher added.
In Ottawa, the Canadian Foreign Minister, Bill Graham, expressed regret at Pakistan's testing of the Shaheen-1 short range ballistic missile and urged Islamabad to abide by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172.
``Canada deeply regrets that Pakistan has once again chosen to test a ballistic missile, particularly at a time when tensions with India remain high...this exercise only serves to aggravate regional tensions and to complicate serious efforts being undertaken by the international community to find a peaceful solution to this very worrisome situation'', Mr. Graham said in a statement.
Meanwhile on the ongoing violence in Kashmir, the administration has said that the attempt of the extremists to disrupt the polls in Kashmir is ``absolutely unacceptable'' and reiterated support for free and fair elections without outside interference and violence. ``...we've always noted that elections in Kashmir alone cannot solve the problems between India and Pakistan, but they are an important step towards a broader political process. And successful elections could pave the way for early resumption of diplomatic dialogue between India and Pakistan, and we will continue to encourage that'', the State Department's deputy spokesman, Philip Reeker said at the Washington Foreign Press Centre.
On the infiltration, Mr. Reeker took the position that he did not have ``any particular new information to share'',in the process making the point that infiltrations were continuing at lower levels than earlier this year. ``...following President Musharraf's assurances in May that support for infiltration across the Line of Control would be ended permanently, infiltration did decrease and there have been indications that it is continuing. It is, we believe, at lower levels than earlier this year. We obviously continue to monitor that very closely'', the senior State Department official said.

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The Hindu, October 5, 2002

'Pak. failed all tests to end cross-border terrorism'

By Amit Baruah

NEW DELHI Oct. 4. India today said it continued to hope that Pakistan would "accept" the results of the successful elections in Jammu and Kashmir even as the Foreign Secretary, Kanwal Sibal, said that Islamabad had failed "all tests" to end cross-border terrorism.
Mr. Sibal said Pakistan continued to "ignite" terrorism and violence in India. Using harsh words against Pakistan and its President, Pervez Musharraf, he said Islamabad hoped to continue with its policy of "sustainable terrorism". Referring to Gen. Musharraf's comments on Gujarat, Mr. Sibal accused him of indirectly "inciting internal violence" in India.
Lauding the people of Jammu and Kashmir for braving the bullet to exercise their ballot, Mr. Sibal pointed out that the polling percentages in the three phases of the poll were "quite close to the kind of averages" Western nations had. In fact, these countries had an even lower turnout and did not have to face the kind of threats encountered by the people of Kashmir.
He said the people who had gone from "outside" (diplomats) did not see any particular irregularity or coercion and felt that the elections seemed to be free and fair. They were extremely complimentary about the manner in which the Election Commission had conducted the elections.
Stating that the elections had had a positive impact, Mr. Sibal said India had to wait and see how Pakistan reacted to the polls. About the higher degree of violence in the third phase, he felt that this was a sign of Pakistan's "frustration". All the indications from Pakistan, he said, demonstrated that Islamabad was as yet unwilling to draw the "right lessons" from the elections. If Pakistan still saw reason and ended cross-border terrorism, then the way could be opened to resume a dialogue.
Asked about the likely pressure from the international community after the polls in Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan to begin talks with Pakistan, Mr. Sibal posed a counter-question - on what basis could they ask for the resumption of talks? Had Pakistan fulfilled its commitments to the international community to end cross-border terrorism? Replying to his own question, Mr. Sibal said Gen. Musharraf had done nothing on that front. Pressure, he said, would mean that India was being unreasonable in some way and had to be pressed. First, the international community would have to tell us that Pakistan was being convincingly reasonable based on hard evidence.
Asked if India had broached the question of the two Pakistani nationals reportedly responsible for the Akshardham massacre with Islamabad, the Foreign Secretary said Pakistan had done nothing about the list of 20 terrorists presented to it. This was despite the fact that Interpol had issued "red corner" notices for all the 20 persons wanted by India, adding there had been no cooperation from Pakistan on the issue.
On the coming general elections under military rule in Pakistan, Mr. Sibal said that while the judgment of the international observers there was awaited, the purpose and end results of the process had already been compromised by the President acquiring all kinds of powers.
The Foreign Secretary said the formation of the National Security Council and the constitutional amendments introduced by Gen. Musharraf showed that the NSC would be the real power. Whatever (Government) emerged after the elections would not be the result of a free and fair process, he argued. The polls, he said, could be "free and fair within an overall unfree and unfair framework".

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The Hindu, October 5, 2002

Akash test-fired

Balasore Oct. 4. India today successfully test-fired its most sophisticated medium range surface-to-air missile Akash from the Interim Test Range (ITR) at Chandipur-on-Sea, about 15 km from here, official sources said.
The missile was fired from a mobile launcher in clear-weather conditions at around 4 p.m. Akash, one of the five missiles under various stages of development by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), has a range of 25 km and a capacity to carry a payload of 55 kg.
- PTI

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The Hindu, October 5, 2002

Pakistan tests Hatf-IV missile

By B. Muralidhar Reddy

Karachi Oct. 4. Pakistan today successfully test-fired a medium range surface-to-surface ballistic missile Hatf-IV (Shaheen). It could carry a nuclear warhead and hit targets within the range of 700 km.
An official announcement in Islamabad claimed that the missile has been developed indigenously and test fired after ``due notification'' to neighbours. Obviously, the reference is to India.

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The Indian Express, October 5, 2002

India fires Akash, not impressed with ‘Pakistan’s missile antics’

Agencies

New Delhi:
India on Friday night slammed Pakistan for “over-reacting” to its test-firing of medium range missile Akash, saying this was the manifestation of endless hostility emanating from that country.
“It is Pakistan that is over-reacting,” an External Affairs Ministry spokesperson said when asked about Islamabad accusing India of initiating an arms race with the test firing of Akash.
Akash has a range of 25 km and capability to carry a payload of 55 kg.
In Islamabad, Pakistan Information Minister Nisar Memon said: “We believe that India has done this to initiate an arms race which Pakistan has not at all indulged in.”
Earlier, India said it was not ‘‘particularly impressed’’ with Pakistan test firing Hatf-IV, a medium range surface-to-surface ballistic missile, saying the neighbouring country’s missiles were based on clandestinely imported material, equipment and technology.
‘‘This particular test is clearly targeted at the forthcoming general elections in Pakistan,’’ an External Affairs Ministry spokesperson said in New Delhi.
Meanwhile, Defence Minister George Fernandes ruled out any “impact on the country’s Defence strategy” in the wake of Pakistan test firing Hatf-IV.
External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha said the success of Assembly polls in J-K has “unnerved’’ Pakistan and therefore, it was resorting to missile tests.

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The Telegraph (India), Friday, October 04, 2002

Over the Borders of Sense

The attack on Akshardham will result in a plunge into deeper folly

ASHOK MITRA

In American soccer parlance, 'Monday-morning-quarterbacking' is a well-known expression. During week-end games, many chances are missed, many passes are misdirected, many tackles misfire. Honest citizens spend a considerable part of the Monday forenoon in their offices describing in minute detail how, if only they were playing, they would have made the correct moves. India's security and intelligence apparatus is obviously going through this Monday-morning-quarterbacking phase. Three brats, armed to the hilt, infiltrated the Akshardham temple of the Swaminarayan complex in Gandhinagar and, for close to sixteen hours, carried out a ghastly carnage, which cost thirty innocent lives and injured over a hundred. Our security network could not do a thing about it.
They are however wonderfully smart after the event. Within twelve hours of the surcease of the outrage, the killers were officially declared to be Pakistanis. Even their names were given out, along with their addresses in Pakistan. Questions nonetheless will persist. In case our security and intelligence people are so clever, why were they not able to prevent the attack? How come these young Pakistanis could penetrate our frontier vigil and travel all the way to Gandhinagar? Are our borders so porous, or are our intelligence apparatchik so comprehensively incompetent?
Now that disaster has already struck, vigilance at religious places is being tightened, and ordinary citizens are going through indescribable harassment in the name of security checks. Whatever the post-event deepening of watchfulness, it cannot really proceed beyond a point though. Even if, given the colour of the Central administration, the decision is taken to beef up the security of only Hindu shrines, temples and other holy places, since there are literally more than a million such spots strewn across the country, the cost will be enormous and call for a hefty increase in our defence and security outlays.
Such outlays, currently amounting to around one hundred thousand crore of rupees, including hidden items, will perhaps have to go up to double that figure. Since the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund do not approve of rising budget deficits, and it is unthinkable to impose heavier doses of taxation on the country¹s affluent set, the extra money for security will necessarily be at the expense of spending on development and social services. The overall consequence will be a further lowering of national income growth as well as growth of social welfare. Those below the poverty level will swell in number, unemployment will be aggravated, education and health facilities will shrink further. It will be, all told, a formidably difficult arithmetic.
Even as it is, divisiveness in society has reached alarming proportions. Much of it is on account of the setback in the domestic economy compounded by the liberalization reforms. The obsession over security and the greater importance assigned to defence and intelligence expenditure will lead to a deepening of economic distress, which in turn will be the harbinger of the further fracturing of society. The divisiveness, as is its wont, will take diverse forms: agrarian tension apart, communal passion, either induced or autonomous, will intensify, industrial relations will worsen, caste battles will proliferate, and linguistic chauvinism will rear its head in all parts of the country.
Alien forces will of course not be forgiven if they try to avail of such opportunities and begin to fish in troubled waters. But their endeavours will be a natural offshoot of the developing confusion. To forestall their malevolent manoeuvres, an additional draft on public expenditure will be called for. The consequence will be a further diminution of development and welfare outlays.
The authorities in New Delhi are extraordinarily keen to link up the Gandhinagar episode with the happenings in Kashmir: it is because the Pakistan-bred terrorists have not quite succeeded in disrupting the polls in the valley, they have been compelled, so the argument proceeds, to give vent to their frustration by organizing the Akshardham incident. The argument may be just inane, or it may have some basis. It is however not necessary to get embroiled in that dialectics. What is a more crucial issue is the inevitability of a progressive immiserization of both countries should the India-Pakistan confrontation, now in its sixth decade, be elongated further. The ruling hegemony in either country will not bat any eye; whatever the dire circumstances the general population of the two countries are reduced to, the powerful ones will always continue to have it good. They will be only too glad to embrace the conditionalities of compradordom, and will remain convinced that their specific interests - class interest - will be duly taken care of by the master power, ten thousand miles away but still ubiquitously present. The master power can also be relied upon to supply both parties with weaponry and other logistical support, to continue their phoney, and occasionally hot, war against each other. Such special ³defence² assistance will be arranged against long or medium term loans involving high rates of interest. The inability to meet the terms of the loans will gradually sink both countries into the mire of total compradordom.
It is an extraordinary situation. Sensible people in both India and Pakistan realize the futility of the current proceedings. But they are immobilized. Pakistan in any case is a military regime where civil liberties are heavily constricted. India, while a democracy, is a competitive democracy. The latter incorporates the concept of competitive patriotism. The jingo spirit, once unsheathed, cannot therefore be easily sheathed back. Few people possess the courage to stand up and take a position which could be interpreted by motivated ones as gross treason. There is, besides, that other danger: sooner or later patriotic jingoism may be reinforced by an overlay of religious jingoism. The Swaminarayan complex affair will offer an extra chance to those who would love to tread such a path.
To repeat, this an extraordinary, almost hopeless, situation. It has thus been left to a group of university dons from Bangladesh to address a fervent appeal to their counterparts in India and Pakistan. The six decades-old confrontation has not done either the Indian or the Pakistani people any good. It is in its nature that it is unable to render any good to any other entity in the region either. Militarization can be stretched to the infinite extent and yet neither the Indian nor the Pakistani establishment will be in a position to overpower their adversary.
This is a truth which is mathematically provable; the exception of the Bangladesh war was on account of the revolutionary ground realities within. Since militarization alienates the authorities in both countries from the people, any potential revolutionary situation will actually operate against those entrenched in power. The Bangladeshi friends have drawn attention to some of these humdrum facts of life. They have appealed to their peers to gather courage and join their hands across the border to uphold the cause of peace, tranquillity, development and welfare.
All this is folly - or worse, terrorism - to the decisionmakers in New Delhi, Islamabad and Washington.

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The Daily Times, October 03, 2002

Institutions, individuals and the national crisis: The Zia regime (1977-1989)

Dr Akmal Hussain

The mobilisation of these narrow identities involved a psychic disconnection from the well-springs of universal human brotherhood within the Islamic tradition. Its liberating elements of rationality and love were replaced by bigotry and hatred Each regime that came to power sought to legitimise itself through an explicit ideology: The Ayub regime propounded the philosophy of modernisation and economic development. The Bhutto regime donned the mantle of redeeming the poor through socialism. General Zia-ul-Haq having come to power through a coup d'état, sought to perpetuate military rule in the garb of a coercive and obscurantist version of Islamic ideology.
In the absence of popular legitimacy, the Zia regime used terror for the first time in Pakistan¹s history as a conscious policy of the government. President Zia ul Haq publicly stated: 'Martial law should be based on fear'. In the same vein, Brigadier Malik wrote: 'Terror struck into the hearts of enemies is not only a means, it is the end itself' (Quoted by Omar Noman in his book The Political Economy of Pakistan). In pursuit of this policy, the democratic constitution of 1973 was set aside and draconian measures of military courts, arbitrary arrests, amputation of hands and public lashing were introduced.
Pakistan¹s society, by and large, was historically characterised by cultural diversity, democratic aspirations and a religious perspective rooted in tolerance and humanism. This was one of the reasons why the founding father, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, conceived of Pakistan as a democratic and pluralistic polity with religious belief to be a matter concerning the individual rather than the state.
'You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the business of the state.... We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state.... Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual but in the political sense as citizens of the state.'
General Zia in attempting to restructure such a state and society into a theocracy, undertook two kinds of initiatives: First, measures designed to subordinate to executive authority, institutions of state and civil society such as the judiciary and the press, which if allowed to function independently could check governmental power. In the case of the judiciary its essential powers to scrutinise the legality of martial law or the orders of military courts were abolished. The judicial protection against arbitrary detention of a citizen embodied in the right to habeas corpus was eliminated for the first time in Pakistan.
In the case of the press, Zia gave a pithy statement of Martial Law Policy with respect to the press: 'Democracy means freedom of the press, Martial Law its very negation'. In the pursuit of this policy, press control measures were introduced. The government constituted committees at the district level to ensure that articles repugnant to the ideology of Pakistan were not published. Those members of the press who had refused to acquiesce faced state repression. A number of newspapers were banned and journalists were arrested and given flogging sentences by military courts.
The second set of measures towards a theocratic state sought to inculcate obscurantist views and induced a narrowing of the citizens' mind. It involved a suspension of the sensibility of love and reason underlying the religious tradition embodied in Pakistan's folk culture.
In the absence of a popular mandate, Zia claimed that his mission to bring an 'Islamic Order' in Pakistan had a divine sanction: 'I have a mission given by God to bring Islamic Order to Pakistan'. Advocacy for a theocratic social order was conducted through the state controlled television and press. Furthermore the State undertook to physically intervene in controlling individual behaviour with respect to the practice of religion. In August 1984, for example, the Nizam-e-Salat Campaign was launched through the appointment of 100,000 'Prayer Wardens' for rural and urban localities. The task of these state functionaries was to monitor religious activities of individuals and to seek their compliance in religious practices. The institutional roots of 'Islamic Fundamentalism' were laid when government funds were provided for establishing mosque schools (madrassas) in small towns and rural areas which led to the rapid growth of militant religious organisations. This social process which later came to be known as 'Islamic Fundamentalism' was catalysed by the Afghan war.
As Zia moved towards the construction of a theocratic state and brutalised civil society, his isolation from the people as a whole was matched by increased external support. He sought political, economic and military support from the US by offering to play the role of a front-line state in the Afghan guerrilla war against the occupying Soviet army. Accordingly, Pakistan obtained a package of US$3.2 billion in financial loans and relatively sophisticated military hardware. Moreover, with support from the US, Pakistan was able to get additional fiscal space by getting its foreign debt rescheduled, and getting increased private foreign capital inflows. These official and private capital inflows played an important role in stimulating macro economic growth in this period. For example, GDP growth rate increased from 5% per annum during the Bhutto regime to 6.6% per annum during the Zia regime. Foreign capital inflows also helped establish a political constituency both within the institutions of the state and in the conservative sections of the urban middle classes, for a theocratic form of military dictatorship. As the Zia regime engaged in a proxy war, some of the militant religious groups together with their associated madrassas were provided with official funds, training and weapons to conduct guerrilla operations in Afghanistan. While they helped fight the war in Afghanistan, the religious militant groups were able to enlarge the political space within Pakistan¹s society and some of the institutions of the State.
From 1987 onwards, sectarian violence mushroomed in the Punjab province (which till then had been relatively peaceful) and later spread across the country. The phenomenon of large-scale sectarian violence conducted by well armed and trained cadres was closely associated with the rapid growth of Deeni Madrassas ('religious' schools). Historically, such schools basically imparted religious knowledge. In the late 1980s, however, a new kind of Deeni Madrassa emerged, which engaged in systematic indoctrination in a narrow sectarian identity, and inculcated hatred and violence against other sects.
In 1998, there were 3,393 Deeni Madrassas in the Punjab alone and 67% had emerged during the Zia regime and after. Between 1979 and 1994, many of the madrassas were receiving financial grants from Zakat funds. According to an official report of the police department, most of the madrassas were in fact providing religious education. Yet as many as 42% of them were actively promoting sectarian violence through a well-conceived indoctrination process. The students, predominantly from poor families, were given free food and lodging during their term at the madrassas. As poverty increased in the 1990s, the burgeoning madrassas provided a growing number of unemployed and impoverished youths with the security of food, shelter and an emotionally charged identity: a personality that felt fulfilled through violence against the other.
As the new kind of sectarian madrassas emerged and grew during the Zia regime so did sectarian violence. The number of sectarian killings increased from 22 during 1987-89 to 166 during 1993-95. Thus violence against the other became both the expression and the emblem of the narrowed identity.
The mobilisation of these narrow identities involved a psychic disconnection from the well-springs of universal human brotherhood within the Islamic tradition. Its liberating elements of rationality and love were replaced in the narrowed psyche by bigotry and hatred. Violence against the 'other' became an emblem of membership within these identities. Thus, civil society divorced from its universal human values began to lose its cohesion and stability.
Dr Hussain is a leading economist and author and co-author of many books.

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The Indian Express, October 3, 2002

The Line of Return

The solution, in the long run, lies along the LoC

J N Dixit

With the electoral process in Jammu & Kashmir nearing completion, the Indian government will have to undertake two exercises: one, commence a dialogue with the elected representatives about the future political dispensation in J&K. Two, engage Pakistan in a dialogue on the Kashmir issue. It is in this context that one takes note of media reports in Pakistan and abroad about the possibility of Pakistan agreeing to the resolution of the issue on the basis of converting the Line of Control into an international border.
The Pakistan newspaper News reported in the last week of August that the idea was gathering momentum. There was speculation that the US is supportive of the proposal. The media, in India and abroad, indulged in much speculation that Musharraf would discuss this proposal with US President George Bush, followed by discussions between Bush and India’s prime minister while both Musharraf and Vajpayee were in New York for the UN session.
A number of political and strategic analysts contributed to this misplaced optimism. When questioned about these reports at a press conference in New York, Musharraf posed a curt and abrasive counter-question: ‘‘Do you think I am a fool to think about such a solution?’’ He added that his policy on Kashmir has not changed and that he will raise the issue in every forum and on all available occasions. Vajpayee was equally categorical in rejecting the idea of the LoC as solution later at a press conference in New York.
It is worthwhile to examine why the suggestion has cropped up again. But first, the history. The origin of the LoC lies in the Karachi Agreement of July 17 1949 in which the cease-fire line was drawn up at the end of the Indo-Pakistan war in 1948. This agreement was signed by Indian and Pakistani military commanders as well as representatives at the UN Commission. The line commenced from Manawar in the south (south-west Jammu) to Khot in the North upto a map grid reference point NJ 9842 from where it lies, in the language of the ceasefire-line agreement, ‘‘thence North to the Glaciers’’. During the 1965 war, the line was violated but at the end of the war, India and Pakistan agreed to exchange prisoners captured by either side across the line, reverting the cease-fire line to status quo.
At the end of the 1971 war, however, both sides decided to keep the minor territorial gains that they had made across the cease-fire line under the Simla Agreement. So Indira Gandhi and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto decided to re-delineate the cease-fire line and to re-designate it as ‘Line of Control’. This was agreed upon in accordance with paragraph 4(ii) of the Simla Agreement. The re-delineation and the change in the nomenclature of the line signified an important political transition from the cease-fire line being a military line separating the two armies, to a line demarcating a political divide which was to evolve into an international boundary between India and Pakistan. Bhutto had agreed to this argument. This new LoC defined in December 1972 was cartographically demarcated in detail.
The present LoC has a length of about 740 km from the international border in the south upto the grid reference NJ 9842 in the north. The legality of this line was accepted by Pakistan for nearly 28 years. It is only during Pakistan’s invasion across the LoC in Kargil in 1999 that the Pakistani Army headquarters and the Pakistan Foreign Office started indulging in the patently mendacious argument that it was not fully demarcated, its delineation was ambiguous etc. Pakistan wanted to regress from the political legitimacy of the LoC to make it a temporary cease-fire line, the validity of which could be challenged by Pakistan.
The trial balloons in the US and Pakistani media could have been generated by think tanks and back channels in the policy planning staff of important powers
With this background in mind, Indira Gandhi advocated a permanent settlement of the Kashmir issue on the basis of the LoC to Bhutto in 1972 in Shimla. Bhutto agreed but pleaded for time to make a formal announcement, requesting that the suggestion should not be incorporated in the Simla Agreement. That Bhutto was serious is indicated by the fact that he merged the northern areas and made them a centrally administered territory of Pakistan soon after the Simla Agreement. He only resiled from assurances given to Mrs Gandhi when he found her enmeshed in domestic crises in 1974-75. The Indian side has informally raised the question of resolving the Kashmir dispute along the LoC more than once between 1983 and 1991. Pakistan consistently rejected it stating that changed circumstances in J&K preclude its implementation. The Indian response has been to revert to the original legal and political position that the whole state, including areas now under the control of Pakistan, are an integral part of India. The Indian Parliament passed a resolution to this effect in 1995. Vajpayee reiterated this position in New York this September.
Musharraf is not likely to accept the proposal regarding the LoC as a permanent solution because Pakistan is convinced that the people of J&K are alienated from India to the extent where they will ultimately choose to become part of Pakistan. Secondly, he is convinced that the Indian armed forces would not be able to hold on to Kashmir in the face of the continuing battle of attrition that he has sponsored. He also has the compulsion of placating Islamic and theocratic elements in Pakistani politics, who are upset with him for falling in line with the Americans.
Given the situation, there is no need for India to suggest a solution on the basis of the LoC. But it is clear that ultimately the solution to the Indo-Pakistani dimensions of the Kashmir issue will have to be on the basis of the LoC getting converted into the international border with some adjustments. Important think tanks in the west, particularly in the US, as well as policy planners in these countries, are increasingly convinced about the validity and logic of a durable solution on the basis of the LoC.
The trial balloons in the US and Pakistani media could have been generated by these think tanks and back channels in the policy planning staff of important powers. In the long run, that is the objective towards which India and Pakistan should work, even if the process is gradual. Other solutions to the Kashmir issue would be too drastic.

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The News International (Pakistan), Thursday October 2, 2002

A subcontinent's blight

M B Naqvi

The incident in Indian Gujarat state's Gandhi Nagar Hindu temple on September 24/25 night that killed 31 worshippers and another on September 25 in Karachi that murdered seven persons in the office of an NGO, Idara-i-Amn-o-Insaf. Both point to an ominous aggravation of negative trends in India and Pakistan and the rest of South Asia.
The Gandhi Nagar carnage is sure to give a handle to the hate merchants peddling a fundamentally anti-Muslim Hindutva, thereby increasing Hindu-Muslim polarisation in Gujarat some more and possibly succeed in spreading this virus to surrounding states. That BJP and the rest of Sangh Parivar hope to win elections thereby is an open secret; these groups, looming behind BJP, rode to power on the crest of anti-Muslim feelings following the destruction of Babri Masjid, widespread anti-Muslim rioting and the growing communal polarity. Such incidents can help the hate merchants no end.
That incident has other consequences too. It impacts on India's Pakistan policy. Indian government has already held Pakistan responsible. Although, India's reaction to December 13, 2001 attack on Parliament with mobilising the Indian Army and threatening Pakistan with an imminent invasion was losing credibility, these suicidal killings in Gandhi Nagar may -- on the tit-for-tat logic of communalism -- force Vajpayee government to make a demonstrative response to assuage the hurt Hindu sentiment.
Consequently, India-Pakistan military tensions would again aggravate. Communal passion, already widespread, will be reinforced by official spin of blaming Pakistan. That should superficially make war certain but both sides remain hesitant because of Nuclear Deterrents. It is however a moment of supreme test for deterrence doctrine: would it continue to hold back the Hindutva-preachers from taking a perhaps limited -- but nevertheless demonstrative -- action?
It is pointless getting involved in the validity or otherwise of deterrence concept. We can assume the two states will continue to prevent an all-out war either themselves or with American help. The net result will not be peace but prolongation of the present no-peace-no-war situation, with both taking limited hostile action but stopping this side of war. American influence over both Islamabad and New Delhi is bound to grow. That will reflect on the rest of Asia. Islamabad however seems scheduled to see the other face of US diplomacy. The US may put harder and unbearable pressure "to do more" in Kashmir -- and that might include accepting a final solution of Kashmir against the wishes of Pakistani hardliners.
The Subcontinent is likely to remain dominated by communal passions that stoke the fires of militarism. In India this militarism issues from a supposed 'manifest destiny' and has deeper roots, while in Pakistan it emerged ad hoc, first through international intrigue with Pakistan's powerful bureaucratic coterie that had already usurped power. Futile justifications predicated it on a shallow Muslim Nationalism and later on an Islamic Ideology that glorifies a reconstructed past. Democracy thus may increasingly become shallow throughout South Asia for similar reasons.
The Karachi incident is certainly alarming. Terrorism in Pakistan is hydra-headed. Authorities are fond of blaming India's RAW for all atrocities in Pakistan or even in India. That is no defence against Pakistani failure to protect minorities. Indian propaganda of blaming ISI for all terrorist incidents is a photocopy: failure of its own security agencies. What good are they, if they cannot stop the other country's spooks from causing mayhem inside their own countries? We had better look for true causes of terrorism in injustices and communal hatred.
Pakistanis should concentrate on terrorist killers that after all did not arrive from India. We must think about the process that created these terrorists. Mother of all terrorism was the emergence of Kashmir policy as a national cause by the bureaucratic coterie that had cornered power by April 1953. This latter involved many things: the collapse of Muslim Nationalism in which a powerful group of politicians enabled bureaucracy to thwart democracy. Simultaneously the US diplomacy bought over the bureaucratic coterie, supported by C-in-C Ayub Khan, rather cheaply. This international intrigue also helped shape domestic and foreign, especially the Afghan, policies. The culmination of these factors were the Taliban regime, nuclear detonations, Kargil and the current military confrontation with India.
While a militant Kashmir policy resulted in Army's political pre-eminence, able to spend most of the revenues and determining the development policy. This enriched both wings of bureaucracy while strengthening Army's hold on power. It needed justification. A bogus Pakistan Ideology was invented based on a new interpretation of orthodoxy. It served the US well in 1980s -- to the immense enrichment of generals -- and later in Kashmir Jihad. Becoming power drunk after the Bomb, the generals could 'safely' convert Kashmiris' spontaneous and non-violent movement in 1988-89 first into an armed rebellion and later an Islamic Jihad. A red hot Islamic Ideology provides inspiration for the Jihadis. That it had to no link with the Subcontinent's Islamic ethos bothered no one.
Bewildered Indians squirmed, tried to counter the Jihad with armed repression. Eventually South Block remembered it too had the Bomb, only bigger. So, when the Jihadis boldly attacked the Indian Parliament, India confronted Pakistan with all its might. India went on an offensive and threatened war. India is daring Pakistan to fight a limited war and if it uses the Bomb, it would invite India's nuking it in return. Which is where both India and Pakistan stand deadlocked. No one can go further. The Americans are able to play the honest broker to their own political advantage.
Net results of Kashmir and Afghanistan policies is an oversupply of Islamic extremists straining at the leash to strike at -- minorities, sectarian and religious minorities, Indians and Americans or whoever. Pakistan has just told the Americans that 33 dangerous activists of Harkatul Mujahedeen al-Alami are still freely operating in Karachi, after it had earlier arrested 24 of them in joint operations with FBI. For all a layman knows, this group is perhaps as small as that. But what about the many thousands of their soul mates who are Taliban, the many Kashmir's Jihadi outfits, not to mention the factions that content themselves with killing local Shias, Ahmedis, Christians, Hindus etc. Their number would be much greater. They are all the same: religious zealots of more or less the same theoretical origins. Minorities and the country do need that they are reclaimed with required patience.
It is a problem that has to be sorted out by Pakistanis. The US interest is limited to preventing them from attacking American or western targets. Indians only want Jihadis and zealots to stay at home and leave them alone. But this country is now a snakepit of all manner of Islamic extremists, wanting to kill all kafirs, Indians (Hindus first), foreigners -- a travesty of Islam in historical India. These fanatics are a bigger danger to Pakistan and its plural society. For this American money, technology and advice is irrelevant, though these might help if they are used to fight crime. It is vital to seek the learned humanists from India, Europe, US andindeed everywhere to help change Pakistan's social, political and economic conditions that beget and sustain bigotry. Promotion of tolerance is the task, requiring more employment and cultural development as a prerequisite.
The particular Karachi incident does not seem to be a simple killing of Christians by undifferentiated Islamic fanatics. It is not the first of its kind in methodology -- first overpowering the victim(s) through heavy sedation, tying their hands behind them and then taping the mouths and noses for killing them through asphyxiation. Reason for selecting them remains obscure. There was a similar case recently in Karachi: two persons were murdered in a similar fashion (without the use of a gun) in the office of Irtaqa Institute in Gulshan-e-Iqbal locality. Even the putative murder of Omar Asghar Khan is said to have been a similar case. One understands that many more incidents of the kind have taken place in Karachi. The police are reluctant to publicise them for some reason. But we shouldn't be.
Other victims of the same kind of killing were not members of minority sect or religion. There seems to have been nothing common among the victims, except one: some link with, or a reputation of "progressive" ideas or left-of-centre politics. If this is true, we have a new specie of terrorism -- some version of ultra-right death squads, so characteristic of so many Latin American republics. That opens up a whole new vista for inquiry. Another commonality is: all religious fanatics are also ultra rightists in political preferences and so are their friends and supporters.

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Courtesy: INSAF Bulletin [6] October 1, 2002
International South Asia Forum (www.insaf.net)

Fatal Friendships - Pakistan and America four decades and four dictators later

by Pervez Hoodbhoy

Appearing at a press conference in military uniform in late August, General Pervez Musharraf declared he would remain president and army chief for the next five years, would have the right to name the heads of the three military services, and emphasized no parliament could overturn his 29 amendments to Pakistan's constitution. "This is part of the Constitution," he declared, waving his hand in the air. "I am hereby making it part of the Constitution." Convinced of his sagacity and goodwill, Musharraf says he does not want to rule, but must because no one else can reform Pakistan. "Democratic dictatorship", he says, is what the country needs.
The reaction in Washington was mild ­ no talk of regime change here. "He's still tight with us in the war against terror, and that's what I appreciate," Bush told reporters while visiting Squires Mountain in Oregon. "He understands that we've got to keep al-Qaida on the run. ... And I appreciate his strong support."
Indeed, squeamishness has never afflicted America's Pakistan policy. As Deng Xiaoping once famously declared "it doesn't matter whether the cat is black or white so long as it catches mice". Today America¹s mouse-catcher is flying high.
General Musharraf is the fourth Pakistani general in forty years to seize power. In 1965, General Ayub Khan ­ a staunch anti-communist ­ brought to his nation the dubious distinction of being, in John Foster Dulles's words, America's "most allied ally". Then, in 1971 Richard Nixon rallied to the defence of General Yahya Khan, who had ran amok and led the country into a catastrophic civil war. But it was the coup of 1977 by General Zia ul Haq which was to have the most profound influence, not only upon Pakistan but all over the world. Zia brought a messianic zeal to redefine Pakistan as an Islamic state run by Sharia (Islamic Law) and Islamicize its institutions. The US was not enthusiastic, but then the Soviets walked into Afghanistan in 1979.
From the early 80's onwards, Pakistan was to be the hub of a thriving global jihad industry. Financed for a decade by the US and Saudi Arabia, American strategy to drive the Evil Empire out of Afghanistan required marshalling the forces of Islam from Algeria and Morocco to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Pakistan Army participated enthusiastically ­ "Islam, Pakistan, Jihad" were soon emblazoned on banners at recruitment centers, beards proliferated, promotions went with piety, and few could be seen to miss Friday prayers. A new ethos was in creation; this was to be an army not just for Pakistan, but to fight the enemies of Islam everywhere.
After the Soviet Union withdrew, and then self-destructed, jihad went into temporary limbo. But, like any military-industrial complex, it too found excellent reasons for not doing away with itself. Fortunately for those initially recruited by the CIA and Pakistan's secret agencies, the Pakistan Army still had plenty of use for jihad. It wanted "strategic depth" (a friendly backyard) for itself in Afghanistan, and sought to wrest Kashmir from Indian occupation without all-out war. Both required setting up a complex infrastructure of Islamic militant groups which freely roamed the country, but whose existence could be officially denied. Some were closely connected with Al-Qaida and the Taliban.
Then came 9/11. Faced by a United States bent upon bloody vengeance, Pakistan's military establishment scurried to join the US-led coalition and take up arms against its former creation, the Taliban and their Amir-ul-Momineen (leader of the pious, Mullah Omar). Osama T-shirts disappeared from bazaars in Peshawar. This straightforward betrayal was resisted only by a few senior officers with an Islamic bent. They were quickly rendered irrelevant. General Musharraf knew the alternative. In all likelihood the Americans would "have done an Iraq on Pakistan", as one highly placed member of the foreign ministry conceded to me in the week after September 11. He was probably right.
Today, the Pakistan Army's jihad philosophy lies buried under the rubble of the World Trade Centre. The Pakistan Army has taken upon itself a brand new role. The transition has not been painless. Bloody encounters with Al-Qaida, beginning after Tora Bora, have exposed internal contradictions. As casualties mount, and hostile tribal reaction to joint US/Pakistani search-and-destroy operations on the western border increases, officers and men are asking: why?
Inevitably the anger - visible or otherwise - at having to fight America's war against Al-Qaida and the Taliban focuses on Musharraf, a man who received high praise from the United Jihad Council after secret incursions and battles fought against India around Kargil in Kashmir two years ago. Musharraf's successful coup was warmly welcomed by right-wing religious groups in Pakistan. But today he lives in mortal danger, aware that he is silently stalked by the forces that once sided with him.
To be sure, Musharraf claims a reform agenda and the Americans are happy to believe him. But he is no Gorbachev, nor is he a Kamal Ataturk. All of his attempts at reform arose under international pressure. Feeble at best, Musharraf's reforms invariably avoid the type of structural changes Pakistan needs to break out of its recurring, worsening crisis.
In fifteen years, Pakistan's population will exceed that of the United States. The economy, which as grown at around 3% only in recent years, is hopelessly incapable of providing jobs to the exploding population. The education system ­ which cannot offer any school for 4 out of 10 children and only poor quality schools to the rest ­ contributes directly to the growth of madrassas promoting jihad and militarism. The problems are vastly compounded by a huge military establishment.
All countries have armies, but in Pakistan things are reversed. Here it is the army that has a country. Defence expenditures consume between one-third and one-half of the national budget. Over the decades, senior military officers have been transformed into powerful landlords through grants of choice agricultural lands and real estate. Many, if not most, public corporations are headed by retired officers.
Given General Musharraf's diminishing domestic popularity some here worry about his survival But a real threat "from the street" seems impossible. Pakistan's public, disillusioned by Benazir Bhutto's and Nawaz Sharif's kleptocratic regimes, is far too wretched and ambivalent to rise up. Even heavily armed militant groups are no match for the state's firepower. While intrigues and coups are always possible, Musharraf's survival is likely because he won't touch the enormous powers and privileges of the institution he heads: the Pakistani military.
Pakistan's stability ­ and Musharraf¹s political and physical survival ­ have now become contingent upon US support. Ironically, fate has yoked his survival to George W. Bush, who could not recall the name of this Pakistani leader at the time of the US presidential elections. Indeed, after Pakistan was declared a US ally, all earlier sanctions were lifted, and international financial institutions rescheduled debts and gave new loans. Currently foreign exchange reserves are a 700% higher than before 9/11. However, this by itself does not indicate that the economy has improved ­ manufacturing has steadily decreased in the past year and fear of instability has resulted in essentially zero foreign direct investment.
True, General Musharraf is not a religious fanatic and, unlike his predecessor General Zia, has not exercised brute repression. It is also true that his sudden removal ­ or possible assassination ­ would be disastrous in a situation where Islamic militant groups wait in the shadows. But Pakistan's army is part of the country's problem; it cannot be a solution. It must relinquish control over civilian institutions, cut back its budget, and move Pakistan away from militarism and war. The US must realize that its support to Pakistan's former dictators ­ all for reasons of expediency ­ ultimately boomeranged. But shall it learn from history?
(Pervez Hoodbhoy is professor of physics at Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.)

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Mid Day, October 1, 2002

From Godhra to Gandhinagar

by Rajdeep Sardesai

September 11 2001 changed the world in more ways than one. It also seemed to change the rules of journalism. Until that day, a journalist believed that his basic function was to report the truth and question the establishment’s lie. The attack on the World Trade Center, however, redefined the entire notion of a “manufactured consensus”. No longer were journalists supposed to ask the uncomfortable questions: no one was to question the possible intelligence failure, no one was to rewind to the double standards in US foreign policy that had spawned Osama-like characters, no one was to zero in on the unfolding human tragedy. Instead, journalists would simply wear the star and stripes on their sleeve, and forget all else. Anyone who chose to defy the official line would be deemed “anti-national”.
And so it has been with the attack on the Akshardham mandir complex in Gandhinagar. As far as the establishment is concerned, this is a simple, open-and-shut case of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism designed to spread communal disharmony in the country, and to destabilize India. While few would doubt the Pakistan hand in the attack, there are other more searching, uncomfortable questions that must be asked, questions that the media is being told cannot be asked at a moment of national crisis. But now, since the immediate crisis is over, and at the risk of being dubbed anti-national, I think it perhaps is time to ask those questions.
Question one: Why did the terrorists choose a temple in Gujarat as their target? The official answer is, of course, that Pakistan is trying to spark off another communal conflict. But why Gujarat? Why not Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Rajasthan, or Tamil Nadu, all states dotted with hundreds of temples? The reason is simple: Gujarat today is seen nationally and globally as the soft, vulnerable spot in the country’s proud secular tradition. Like you and me, the terrorists too are not unaware of the hate campaigns that have been unleashed in Gujarat, of the attempts made to isolate, humiliate and in some instances, eliminate members of a community in the post-Godhra carnage. While it is true that as a border state with Pakistan, Gujarat was always vulnerable to ISI mischief, the fact is that the capacity of the ISI to fuel trouble in the region increased manifold after the post-Godhra carnage.
Which brings me to my second question. Was this entirely a Pakistani operation handled by the Laskhar-e-Tayabba or the Jaish-e-Mohammad, or was there a strong local connection to what happened at Akshardham? The Gujarat chief minister within 48 hours of the attack said that the terrorists were “probably” from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. The deputy prime minister was even more emphatic that this was a Lashkar operation. But while the modus operandi smacks of a Lashkar-like fidayeen squad, could the terrorists have made their move without some local back-up facility?
In the last six months, there have been persistent intelligence reports of new terrorist groups being formed in Gujarat, groups that have strong links with other jehadi outfits and formed in the aftermath of the post-Godhra violence. While even before Godhra, there were reports of a few Islamic radicalized groups being set up in Gujarat, the fact is that these groups were marginal and had little real support among the community. The communal violence gave these groups a new relevance, one that simply did not exist in a peaceful Gujarat. In the ghettos and neighbourhoods into which a community has been virtually caged after Godhra, there has been a desire for revenge among a few hot-heads who believe that they have nothing to lose after having been stripped of their self-respect and livelihood. It’ss in these ghettos that organizations like the Tehreek-e-Kasas are being created, organizations that have a single point agenda of striking at symbols of Gujarati Hindu culture to avenge what happened after Godhra.
Which brings me to my third question. If Gujarat is so susceptible to a chain reaction of violence why did it not blow up when the Vishwa Hindu Parishad called a bandh this time in the manner it did after Godhra? The answer lies in the changed political reality. On February 28 after Godhra, the VHP and its patrons in the state machinery decided to take to the streets and target a community because it suited its political agenda at the time. After seven years of being in power in Gujarat, the sangh parivar was slowly losing its appeal, with the BJP-led government suffering a series of electoral reverses. Godhra breathed new life into the saffron brigade’s hearts and minds. Looking to organize and consolidate its Hindu constituency, attacking the minorities over an emotive issue like Godhra was the easiest way to create a wave of public support for the organization.
Now, seven months later, the BJP-VHP combine have achieved the communal polarisation that it was looking for. The organization didn’t take to the streets this time because it didn’t need to. If they had once again unleashed mayhem on the streets of Gujarat, they would have run the risk of alienating the business-conscious Gujarati, quite apart from Narendra Modi losing his last chance to have an election before the end of the year. This is also why this time the state administration was ready to act tough at the slightest hint of trouble, proof again that there is no substitute for a strong political will when handling street violence.
Which brings me to my final question. Will Gujarat blow up into another Punjab-like situation where terrorism was strongly linked to the religious divide? If it doesn’t then it will be only because of the resilience and common sense of the average Gujarati, Hindu and Muslim, who somewhere down the line must realize that this process of action and reaction can only be catastrophic for civil society. The people of Gujarat must realise that the grief of a Hindu mother who has lost her child in the temple attack is no different from that of a Muslim mother who lost her infant in the riots.
From that realisation must spring the strength to fight the forces who are seeking to divide people on religious lines.
The writer is managing editor, New Delhi Television.

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The Indian Express, October 1, 2002

Vajpayee comes down heavily on terrorism

Express News Service

New Delhi, September 30:
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee today said India is willing to fight the battle of cross-border terrorism with firepower and would also intensify diplomatic efforts to pin down Pakistan.
Coming down heavily on Pakistan, he said: ‘‘It must be held accountable for its continued sponsorship of terrorism in India’’. The main threat to country’s internal security is from cross-border terrorism fueled by religious extremism, drawing its ‘‘ideological sustenance, organisational patronage and operational support’’ from outside the borders.
‘‘To overcome this challenge, we have to fight our battle at various levels and with multiple means - diplomatically, politically, ideologically and of course, on ground with intelligence and firepower,’’ the Prime Minister said during a conference of the Director Generals and Inspector Generals of Police.
‘‘The Centre will intensify its diplomatic efforts to remind the global anti-terror coalition partners to redeem their pledge to combat and defeat terrorism everywhere,’’ he said. Also, security forces would have to continue their ‘‘goodwork’’ on the ground, which had allowed two phases of free and fair polling in J-K, he added.
‘‘There were killings of candidates and political activists, intimidation of voters, call for poll boycott. However, the people of J-K braved all this to once again demonstrate that bullet cannot defeat ballot in a democracy,’’ the Prime Minister said.
Asserting that Indian security forces had made steady advances on all fronts to fight terrorism, Vajpayee said, ‘‘this has made the adversary grow desperate’’. ‘‘A good part of this desperation owes to the growing success gained by our security forces in turning the heat on terrorist outfits and infiltration from across the border,’’ he said.
On the insurgency situation in the Northeast, he said while peace efforts with NSCN (I-M) has made headway, similar efforts is also on with Bodos and negotiations with a militant outfit from Karbi Anglong district of Assam. ‘‘We are trying to speed up all-round economic and infrastructural development in the Northeast,’’ he added.
Referring to Left-wing extremism which is ‘‘spreading tentacles in many parts of central and eastern states,’’ the PM urged the police and security agencies of the affected states to pool their intelligence and experience and undertake coordinated operations on a sustained basis.

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The News International (Pakistan), Thursday September 26, 2002

Education by hatred

Praful Bidwai

When India's foreign minister Jaswant Singh went to Kandahar in December 1999 to exchange civilian hostages from a hijacked Indian Airlines plane for three men (including Ahmed Omar Sheikh and Maulana Masood Azhar) detained in India under serious terrorist charges, the sarasanghachalak (supreme leader) of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh described the trade-off as an act of "Hindu cowardice", no less!
This might sound scathingly, weirdly self-deprecatory coming from the head of a virulently militant organisation dedicated to promoting "Hindu pride", indeed, Hindu supremacism, for three-quarters of a century. But it reveals, as nothing else, the power of stereotypes that Hindu/Muslim communalists in South Asia have constructed about one another. Such images have been disseminated over decades through stories, myths, jokes, films, skits and, increasingly, books.
They have been so fully internalised within the ethnic-chauvinist discourse that it is hard to begin a serious dialogue between Indians and Pakistanis without discarding, attacking or dismantling these cliched views.
Some of the stereotypes go back to 19th century colonial historiography, which divided India's past between different "religious" periods and dynasties. Among the most important stereotypes are the image of the Hindu as the quintessential "wily" Bania - "weak, unable to fight and timid" - and of the Muslim as "brave and valiant" (or if you like, "violent and hot-tempered").
As Rubina Saigol, a Lahore-based independent researcher and freelance writer on feminism and educational issues, argues, "the Two-Nation Theory was a binary construction used by history and social studies textbook writers to create the India/Hindu as the opposite Other of the Muslim/Pakistani."
Textbooks, prescribed or approved by the state, have become one of the most contested spaces in this tussle over identities. This is true, with a vengeance, of India, where the Hindu Right has been trying since the 1970s to censor, rewrite or suppress textbooks. Its special targets are works by liberal or left historians who question both "colonial" and "nationalist" schools of history-writing, and who put people and socio-economic processes at the centre of their concerns.
"Saffronising" education has been at the very core of the BJP's agenda since it came to power in 1998. This has met with stiff, principled resistance at several levels from educationists, scholars, teachers, social activists and political leaders of all persuasion except Hindutva.
The resistance has now received a temporary setback with a judgment of the Supreme Court in a public-interest petition moved by three eminent citizens, including an award-winning right-to-information activist, a social scientist, and a journalist-commentator. Two of the petitioners are Hindus (one married to a Muslim), and one a Christian.
They questioned the role of the government-sponsored NCERT (National Council for Education Research and Training) in formulating the National Curriculum Framework (NCF) on which future textbooks will be based. Regrettably, the verdict upholds the validity of the devious methods NCERT used to write the NCF.
The textbook process in India progresses from the National Education Policy (last revised 1986) to the NCF. From this are derived both the syllabi and textbooks for different classes. Once adopted by the Central Board for Secondary Education, the textbooks get disseminated through most schools, even private ones.
Pivotal to the process is consultation between teachers, experts and officials, and between the Centre and states. The principal agency here is the Central Advisory Board on Education (CABE) - a 104-member body consisting largely of state representatives. CABE (established 1920) is uniquely empowered to approve the NCF. Without CABE, the states' views would be excluded - spelling dangerous overcentralisation.
However, CABE never approved the NCF produced two years ago. It was deliberately bypassed. This was wilful sabotage of democratic process. NCERT, headed by a crony of education minister Murli Manohar Joshi, systematically excluded independent scholars and educationists from the NCF discussion process. Rather than organise a free exchange of views through structured seminars, it merely put the NCF draft on its website and mailed it out to individuals.
The NCF-2000, "finalised" by NCERT, is based on the concept of "value education" which is itself centred on religion. This violates the principles of secularism and equality and the right to education. Under India's Constitution, the state cannot favour religion, nor under Article 28 support "religious instruction".
But the NCF roots its entire philosophy in religion as "a major source" of "universal" values central to education. Thus it says: "What is required today is ... education about religions, ... the values inherent therein and also a comparative study of the philosophy of all religions..." It claims that "the essence of every religion is common, only the practices differ."
This violates the National Policy on Education-1986, from which alone the NCF can be legitimately derived. NPE does not even mention religion. The Supreme Court has held in any number of cases that "religion cannot be mixed with any secular activity of the state. In fact, the encroachment of religion into secular activities is strictly prohibited".
However, NCERT ruthlessly insinuated religion into the NCF. It also censored several existing textbooks - to promote Hindutva. NCERT's syllabi and censored textbooks depict Hinduism as the "essence" of India and other religions as "alien". Parts of them exclude Islam and Sikhism from the list of "Major Religions".
In the NCERT-doctored textbooks, Vedic culture is made contemporary with Harappan civilisation, although centuries separate them. History is presented as a succession of dynasties. Twentieth-century communalism is reduced to the Muslim League (as if Savarkar did not father the Two-Nation Theory and the RSS did not exist). There is no mention of the Hindu Mahasabha's collaboration with the British.
From what I have read, there are analogous biases in Pakistani textbooks too. Their "official" history jumps straight from Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro to the next "real" civilisation, which "naturally" begins with the "Islamic conquest" of Sindh. The intervening "Buddhist" and "Hindu" periods are treated as pitiable voids or aberrations. Scholars like K K Aziz and Mubarak Ali have exposed the biases in such "history".
Pakistani civics textbooks too blatantly project "nation-building" principles purportedly derived from patriarchical Islam. Counterpoised to this is the contemptuous treatment of India as "feminine", "weak" and "mean".
To return to India, a close, critical reading of the NCF should have persuaded the Supreme Court to order its reformulation. But it did not recognise the NCF's communal slant. It relied on a technicality - that CABE is not a statutory body. But then, nor is NCERT. The judgment is another blow to Indian secularism - barely six months after the Gujarat pogrom.
There is a lesson in this for all South Asians. We cannot rely on established institutions alone to guard the citizen's rights, nor to combat stereotypes. We have to fight for our rights primarily on our own. And that's going to be a long haul.

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The Indian Express, September 25, 2002

Govt keeps pledge not to let Pak derail SAARC

Arati R. Jerath

New Delhi, September 24:
While their diplomatic battle may show no signs of easing, India and Pakistan have once again silently ensured that the SAARC process is not disrupted by their bilateral tension.
On Wednesday, a two-member team consisting of Additional Secretary in the PMO Pradipto Ghosh and SEWA founder Ela Bhatt will leave for Islamabad to attend a three-day SAARC meeting on poverty alleviation.
This is the third SAARC meeting in Pakistan to which India has sent a delegation since tensions flared up because of the December 13 terrorist attack on Parliament House.
In February, Deputy Chairman Planning Commission K.C. Pant had gone for a meeting of the SAARC Poverty Commission. In March, Information and Broadcasting Minister Sushma Swaraj went to Islamabad for the SAARC I&B Ministers’ Meet.
Ghosh has been chosen to represent the Government of India at the official-level meet because he is the point man in the PMO who oversees poverty-alleviation projects.
All eyes are now on the annual SAARC Summit in January, this time scheduled to be held in Islamabad. External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha had hinted in Kathmandu a few weeks ago that India would not derail the summit simply because it’s being held in Pakistan. His statement was widely interpreted as a signal that Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee would go to Islamabad for the summit.
Official sources cautioned against linking the return of normalcy in Indo-Pak ties with the efforts to keep SAARC going.
They said that the resumption of the bilateral dialogue was entirely dependent on the cessation of cross-border terrorism.
This does not preclude India and Pakistan participating in multilateral meets, even if they are held in Islamabad, official sources pointed out.
The Government is believed to have taken a policy decision earlier this year that India would not allow its diplomatic war against Pakistan to affect the South Asian multilateral forum.
The decision came in the wake of pleas from the other SAARC nations at the Kathmandu Summit in January this year.
They had asked both India and Pakistan to keep their bilateral tensions out of SAARC.



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Landelijke India Werkgroep - 9 oktober 2002