Former foreign secretary Salman Haider feels in the changed international circumstances India should not hesitate to accept an offer of facilitation between India and Pakistan. In an interview with rediff.com Haider said Russian President Vladmir Putin's offer to bring India and Pakistan together should be seen in that light. "What Russia is doing is what America has been trying to do," the former diplomat told Onkar Singh.
What do you think of the measures that the government has taken to ease tension on the India-Pakistan border? What have we achieved by granting permission to Pakistani aircraft to overfly India and ask our naval ships to return to their bases?
India was close to war -- at least that is what we were told. The risk of hostilities seemed much more imminent and dangerous last week. I welcome any moving away from the brink of war, particularly because of the damage that it would have done both India and Pakistan and the danger of it turning into a nuclear war. The country must do whatever it can to avoid war. I do not believe the risk is worth taking. Frankly, the war talk has not in any manner been edifying.
I welcome the measures the government has taken -- the war clouds have thinned a bit even if they have not been removed.
Hawks in the govenment and elsewhere ask why India has granted such concessions to Pakistan.
I think this is not correct. A military buildup does not mean you have to go to war. Buildup is as much for diplomatic purposes as much as it is for military purposes. We wanted to give a message to the world that India has no more patience with terrorist attacks. Such a buildup of military postures can go wrong by giving wrong signals to the other side and provoking an attack that could go out of control. This has had some effect on the international community in activating Pakistan to do something to stop infiltration.
As a former foreign secretary would you see the latest developments as a diplomatic victory for India?
No, I would not call this a diplomatic victory for India. I would not put it in such forthright terms. Once a matter gets internationalised, the way it has, the resolution of it has to be seen. In the present context a resolution seems in the process of taking shape. It would have both plus and minus points from our perspective. The most important outcome so far as India is concerned is that the deliberate freezing of the stakes seems to have compelled the international community to bring Pakistan to kneel and force it to put an end to cross-border terrorism. On the other side one must admit that it has opened the doors for much more active involvement of foreign countries in Indo-Pakistan affairs.
Do you think that in the present circumstances both the United States and United Kingdom will insist on sending troops to monitor the border between India and Pakistan in Kashmir?
I would not rule that out. There are many ways in which this can be done. Both countries have spoken of monitoring the border by helicopters. This would help monitor infiltration. When both the US and UK say they would like to ensure that Pakistan does not break its promise to contain infiltration across the border then it would not be easy for India to say we don't want monitoring. We could say they could do this on the Pakistani side. There are many variations by which this could be achieved. We could monitor infiltration/movement across the border by installing remote sensing devices. There are ways in which both the US and UK can play a part in monitoring infiltration and trying to ensure that the obligations assumed by Pakistan are in fact discharged.
Do you think there may be tacit understanding between Pakistan and the US that if the former halts infiltration, then the US would ensure that India returns to the negotiating table?
I think this is very much possible. No kind of bearing down hard on one part in a manner that makes that party's internal situation untenable or difficult will succeed. Unless there is a perception in Pakistan that they have also gained something. It would be difficult to believe that this is one sided intervention favouring India and they (Pakistan) have promised to stop doing what they have been doing for decades that brought the two countries on the brink of war.
Could US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage have given such an assurance to Pakistan?
He could have. But what matters is in what form he has given the assurance. How directly or how open is the assurance, it is difficult to say. He could have said what he has been telling India that Pakistan must stop infiltration. The two sides must withdraw their armies, return them to the barracks and get back to the negotiating table. How it is to be organised, what the sequence is and what the assurances are -- that is impossible for us to say because it was a private discussion. But it would be no surprise if something along these lines has been told to Pakistan.
Do you think the solution to the Kashmir problem has to be found under the Simla Agreement? Or do we have to go beyond it?
Under the Simla Agreement one of the most important parts is bilateralism -- India and Pakistan should sort out their own affairs. Both countries are of certain dimension and weight. This we know perfectly well. India is growing in strength. We may have had setbacks but by and large our influence is growing. Ten years from now we would be a much more potent force. Pakistan is also a substantial country. And it is not going to disappear.
We should first try and settle our differences bilaterally. In the changed international circumstances, in the post Cold War era, what people like to see is that some progress is made towards solving our problems. As an encouragement some sort of facilitation is being spoken of. And there is a sense amongst many competent observers in India that there is a willingness on the part of certain countries -- which are acceptable all round -- to help out without mediating or telling us what to do, to create an environment that could help in this process. We should not shy away from this opportunity.
What is your personal view?
My personal view is that any overt or visible intervention by third parties would not work. I don't think both India and Pakistan would like to go through a process which is controlled by someone else. A mediatory process could mean that a third party tells us do this or do that. This is not acceptable to India. But if some countries do something to bring the two countries together and encourage them to sit at the table and have constructive discussions. I think we should certainly consider that proposal.
Minister of State for External Affairs Omar Abdullah has said the Indian army will remain at the border till the assembly election is concluded in Jammu and Kashmir. How do you read this statement?
Frankly, I don't know what to make of it. On one hand we are allowing Pakistan's civilian aircraft to fly over India, asking our naval ships to return to their original positions, thinking of sending high ranking officials to Pakistan. On the other hand we have a contradictory statement of this nature and say we are ready for war and that the army is going to remain on the border. This sends contradictory signals. This is not useful for us. If we are satisfied that steps are being taken towards ending cross-border terrorism, I think it is in the country's interest to reduce the war-like atmosphere in the sub-continent and genuinely work for measures that can bring a sense of normality. We have no idea of the burden that the present standoff is putting on our economy.
One point of view has it that when America caught a top Al Qaeda terrorist recently President George W Bush realised Pakistan has not done enough to put down terrorist outfits with an iron hand. This forced America to put pressure on Pakistan and ask it to end cross-border terrorism.
This could be part of the reason for growing American pressure on Pakistan. After its battle in Afghanistan America is determined to end terrorism in any form. The Americans and the world community know and acknowledge what Pakistan has been doing to encourage terrorism. Infiltration along the border is another form of terrorism. That is why the pressure on Pakistan has increased. America has been aware of Pakistan's activities and this has been going on for years. The presence of Al Qaeda could be an important part for the changed American strategy in the Indian sub-continent.
Do you think countries like the US, UK and Russia are trying to get a foothold in Kashmir and stay put once they are allowed to come in on some pretext?
I don't think they want to come to Kashmir and stay there as you put it. This could have been true in the Cold War days, but not any longer. Today conditions are more conducive for negotiations on Kashmir. President Putin's proposal to help India and Pakistan is an indication of revival of Russian activity in this region. This puts him solidly in line with what America has been trying to do. The picture that emerges is that a majority of powerful nations in the world are speaking with the same voice and trying to impress upon India and Pakistan to avoid war and come to the negotiating table.
The next Lok Sabha elections could well be the key turning point in
the struggle pertaining to the future of Indian democracy - whether
it has one or not.
SOME OF the wider strategic implications of the Gujarat pogrom and
the latest bout of war-mongering (including nuclear brinkmanship by
both India and Pakistan) over cross-border terrorism are now becoming
clear. The moderate mask has been dropped and the Sangh has decided
that an unequivocal Hindutva posture is its preferred route to
achieving greater power and influence in the future. But this still
leaves key issues open. First, we have to be clear not only about the
immense danger that the Sangh represents to Indian democracy's future
but also about the path it is most likely to take in order to fulfil
its ambition of establishing a Hindu Rashtra. Then, we can try and
assess the obstacles and difficulties facing it, explore what tactics
the Sangh might adopt, so that forethought and challenge can stymie
its effort at advancement.
Though Hindutva ideologues often try and confuse matters by claiming
that India is already a Hindu Rashtra, which in English translation
means a "Hindu nation", they know that their model of Indian society,
if it is to come about, requires the prior establishment of a Hindu
state comfortably under Sangh control, which in coordination with the
RSS, can then carry out the dramatic re-shaping of Indian
society/polity demanded by a proper Hindu Rashtra. But there are only
two routes to achieving or attempting to achieve such sufficiently
strong state power - the electoral one of securing an absolute or
near-absolute majority for the BJP in Parliament; or bypassing
altogether the constitutional-electoral route and carrying out an
authoritarian coup either of a military-police kind, or a civilian
unconstitutional coup of the Emergency-type.
Fascism in Germany and Italy combined the electoral and
unconstitutional processes. A dominant but minority party comes to
power in a coalition through elections but then overthrows all
democratic-electoral restraints and establishes its authoritarian
state. For a number of reasons, the BJP cannot do this (as evidenced
by its period in power at the Centre since 1998), not least because
of the profound regionalisation of Indian politics. Nor does it seem
likely or possible for the BJP and the Sangh Parivar to repeat the
Emergency-type coup as a minority party though dominant in a ruling
coalition. The Congress, it should be remembered, was in 1975 already
the majority party in the Lok Sabha when it took that measure.
Moreover, once bitten twice shy. There is no way that the other
parties or the Indian public would quietly accept a repeat of the
imposition of Emergency-type rule.
The only realistic route for the Sangh, therefore, is in trying to
secure an absolute majority in the Lok Sabha elections or as close to
it as possible. Here it is faced with an obvious dilemma. Given its
static performances in the last two elections and the enduring
strength of regional parties, there seems to be no escape from
coalition rule whether it is led by the Congress or by the BJP at the
Centre. The earlier strategic perspective of the Sangh (before
Gujarat) seemed to be a more patient and longer term one. It was a
kind of two-stage approach. For sometime to come, coalition rule at
the Centre would be the norm and the Sangh should make sure the BJP
remained at the hub of successive coalition Governments. This would
help make it the "normal" party of national-level governance
enhancing its credibility in ever widening circles of the electorate
as well as giving it time to pursue a differentiated geographical
strategy aimed at weakening all its rivals. So, a somewhat more
aggressive Hindutva could be pursued in places where it was strong
but a more cautious approach would be adopted, e.g., in the South,
where it had yet to achieve a strong enough implantation. But Gujarat
has shown that the dominant sections within the Sangh no longer have
patience for such a strategy, one that is also uncertain and provides
no guarantees for delivering the final desired outcome. The next Lok
Sabha elections could well be the key turning point in the struggle
pertaining to the future of Indian democracy - whether it has one or
not. Obviously, the Sangh would like to get a sense of where it
stands, and of its wider prospects, after the Gujarat Assembly
elections which some believe can be called this October. If it
retains power or does not fare badly then this will be read as a
strong endorsement of the value of pursuing an aggressive Hindutva
stance. But even were the BJP to fare badly, aggressive Hindutva is
almost certainly still going to be seen as the only viable or
preferable option for it to pursue elsewhere in the country.
After all, so far nothing else has worked, with the BJP's inept
record of State-level governance leading to today's situation where
it is ruling only in Goa, Jharkhand and Gujarat. Thus, the key
tactical tasks of the Sangh are what steps or measures it must take
to create the circumstances that can polarise the next general
elections into a referendum on the ideology of the Sangh and help it
obtain enough support!
Two approaches are likely to be combined. One could be to instigate
communal violence and riots in other States. Furthermore, in the
ideology of the Sangh, being anti-Muslim, anti-Islam and
anti-Pakistan are all linked together. In fact, the constituency that
can be tapped through anti-Pakistan sentiments is much wider than the
constituencies available for the first two. Relations today between
India and Pakistan are at a nadir. And the BJP has noted how its
principal political opponent, the Congress, was effectively
outflanked by the Government's resort to `coercive diplomacy' over
the issue of cross-border terrorism, and how it successfully brought
around an otherwise secular constituency which in a time-honoured
manner convinces itself that in regard to external `security matters'
the Government's policies somehow stand above the narrower
party-ideological considerations of the BJP. Hence, the enduring
political attraction of pushing anti-Pakistan jingoism through the
creation of wartime or near-wartime tensions.
True, the U.S. presence in the region does act as a dampener against
waging a war or enacting the kind of `limited' incursion as a
response to a future act of cross-border terrorism that could then
escalate into a military exchange between the two official armed
forces. But it is not a guarantee that such an outbreak cannot happen
in the future despite the current receding of war clouds.
While winding down tensions between India and Pakistan is clearly a
current priority, one must not allow the deeper meaning of what has
happened in Gujarat to recede from public discourse and attention. It
is not Pakistan or cross-border terrorism inspired by Islamist
fundamentalist groups or the dilemmas in Kashmir (despite their
seriousness) that poses the greatest danger. It is our home-grown
version of religious-political fanaticism striving for ever greater
power that poses the greatest threat to our very existence as a
secular and democratic polity and society.
NEW DELHI, June 12. — The US defence secretary, Mr Donald
Rumsfeld, today said there were enough indications that Al-Qaida
militants were operating near the Line of Control in Jammu and
Kashmir. "I've seen indications that Al-Qaida is operating near the
LoC," he told reporters after a 75-minute meeting with the Prime
Minister before leaving for Islamabad. Asked if American forces
would enter Pakistan to get the militants, Mr Rumsfeld said the
USA was working with other countries to ensure that they did not
become haven for ultras. Pakistan was being very cooperative and
the Pervez Musharraf government had handed over the Al-Qaida
men it had captured to the USA, he said. The USA would insist on
dismantling terrorist camps inside Pakistan and PoK and had
offered India , ground sensors to check infiltration along the LoC.
India is yet to accept this. Mr Rumsfeld said the issue came up for
discussions, but "we did not come to any conclusions''. It was for
the "technical people to discuss", he added.
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