Crisis India-Pakistan:
Achtergrondinformatie, analyse en nieuws
uit de Indiase, Pakistaanse en internationale media.

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Rediff.com, June 11, 2002

US welcomes Indian move to lift overflights ban

United States Secretary of State Colin Powell has welcomed the lifting of the Indian ban on overflights by Pakistan International Airlines aircraft, but said that the standoff between the two countries is 'far from over'.
"We are pleased that as a result of intensive diplomatic efforts... we have begun to see some relaxation in the tension," Powell said in a speech to the US Asia Society on Monday night.
Citing Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's assurances to stop infiltration across the Line of Control, Powell said, "We have also received indications that the Indian fleet is moving away from possible confrontation with Pakistan."
Describing the lifting of ban on PIA overflights as 'a step down the ladder', Powell said that Washington has taken a major role in coordinating the international effort to pull India and Pakistan back from the brink of war.

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The Times of India, June 11, 2002

Indian warships sail away from Pak waters

REUTERS [ TUESDAY, JUNE 11, 2002 1:50:55 PM ]
NEW DELHI: In the first move towards de-escelation at the military level, Indian warships on Tuesday began moving away from forward patrolling near Pakistan shoreline in the northern Arabian sea to their bases near Mumbai, a Naval spokesman said here.
The move comes a day after the ministry of external affairs lifted the ban on use of Indian airspace by Pakistani aircraft.
"Warships of the western Naval fleet which were patrolling different areas of northern Arabian sea have been recalled to their base as per the government decision," the spokesman said.
The warships, which include Russian acquired Kashin class missile destroyers, indegenious Godavari and Delhi class multi purpose frigates as well as missile corvettes have started moving back and are expected to be back in Mumbai within two days, the spokesman said.
He said that warships which are on their way back include the additional Naval flotilla from the Eastern Naval command, which had moved from Bay of Bengal to Arabian sea to bolster the Western Naval fleet.
On the move back of Eastern Naval fleet warships to Eastern bases, the naval spokesman said a decision on this would be taken later." For the time being they would remain with the Western fleet", he added.
The warships were tactically deployed in northern Arabian sea to cover the vital sea lanes into India as well as to strike against Pakistani Makran and Karachi coastline in the case of a conflict.
The Naval Chief Madhvendra Singh had recently said that Navy warships were in full readiness and just needed four hours notice to swing into action.
Even though New Delhi has ordered warships back to their bases, as part of confidence building measures, highly placed Defence sources made it clear that India will not opt for immediate ground troop reduction on its borders with Pakistan.
Any troop pullback, the sources said, would be linked to Islamabad providing permanent ground markers on reduction in border shelling, end to infiltration attempts across the Line of Control, disbanding of terrorists and jehadi groups camps in Pakistan and tapering off of terrorist funding through hawala channels.
New Delhi would be closely monitoring the situation on the ground both inside the country as well as across for next four to six weeks for these markers and would commence the withdrawal of troops and Air Force assets only after it was satisfied that ground situation supported claims being made by Islamabad.
However, the sources said as far as Jammu and Kashmir was concerned the troops would remain vigilant on the LoC till the crucial Assembly elections were completed in the state by the end of October.

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The Hindustan Times, June 11, 2002

Grace under fire

A.G. Noorani

In the six months of the India-Pakistan stand-off, various military scenarios have been sketched. But the diplomatic fall-out of any outbreak of armed conflict — however limited — has been overlooked. Within hours, the UN Security Council will assuredly meet at the bidding of the United States and proceed to adopt a binding resolution under chapter VII with specific of the UN Charter imposing a ceasefire. It deals with “breaches of the peace”. Resolutions made under it are binding.
Chapter VI deals with specific settlement of disputes. Resolutions under it are recommendatory. In all probability, a draft is already in place after full consultations with Russia and others of the P5 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council with veto powers). In its train will follow a revival of the Kashmir dispute, which is on the dormant agenda of the council. Precedents should inject sobriety.
On September 20, 1965, during the Indo-Pak war, the council said it “demands that ceasefire should take effect” on a fixed date. It decided also “to consider” thereafter “what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict”. The Tashkent Declaration overtook this process. The nuclear tests activated the council on Kashmir 35 years later. On June 6, 1998, it resolved unanimously to “demand” cessation of further tests and to “urge” a dialogue between India and Pakistan “to find mutually acceptable solutions that address the cause of those tensions, including Kashmir”. There is certain to be a stronger resolution this time for there is a deeper understanding on South Asia between the US and Russia now.
The Simla Pact, already frayed, will be a wreck. Bilateralism will be extinguished. Worse, the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) will be activated by the binding resolution. Deft diplomacy in 1972 immobilised it. Ineptness in 2002 will revive it. UNMOGIP has an office on Purana Qila Road in New Delhi and in Srinagar. On May 17, 1992, India declared that it would not be allowed to carry out inspections. It did not expel the UNMOGIP — that would have woken up the Security Council.
British international lawyer Rosalyn Higgins maintains that under the council’s resolution of April 21, 1948, establishing the UNMOGIP, its mandate “stemmed from Chapter VII rather than Chapter VI”. Its resolution of March 30, 1951, was clearly under Chapter VII — “decides” that the UNMOGIP “shall continue to supervise the ceasefire in the state”. It would be irresponsible to overlook diplomatic consequences of such magnitude.
World opinion is unanimous and firm on two propositions. Cross-border terrorism is unacceptable. It, however, does not accept it as a valid causus belli either. War is not an option at all in such a case. India did not go to war on Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar when, as the UNMOGIP testified, a massive force of irregulars crossed the ceasefire line on August 5, 1965.
India legitimately went to war on Operation Grand Slam when Pakistan sent an army into Kashmir on September 1.
In the present case, India could have moved the Security Council under Resolution 1373 strictly confined to the aspect of terrorism and no more. The US does not accept the Afghan parallel as justification for war. President George W Bush’s remarks on May 30 were significant. Pakistan was asked to “stop incursions” across the LoC. “We are making it very clear to both Pakistan and India that war will not serve their interests,” said Bush.
Coercive diplomacy implies coercive measures in aid of diplomacy. On July 11, 1951, Nehru moved the solitary armoured division up to the Punjab border to deter Pakistan from launching an attack in Kashmir in order to foil elections to its constituent assembly. He, however, swiftly followed it up by inviting Liaquat Ali Khan to Delhi to “discuss every matter of concern to us without any conditions attached”. The crisis petered out.
In contrast, the present government ostentatiously rejects talks, clogs the channels of communication, relies on the threat of use of force alone to persuade the Americans to bring Pakistan to heal.
The world is not impressed. Let alone the bomb, which has acquired unwelcome significance in consequence, conventional weapons of 2002 — the missiles and weapons which can be used with precision — are far deadlier than the ones used in the 1965 and 1971 wars. Millions will be killed even if nuclear weapons are spared. Reliance on the US to prepare an exit strategy for us is demeaning. New Delhi should have devised one for itself before deploying the troops in December.
Six months’ deployment exacts a heavy toll — militarily, diplomatically and politically. The national consensus is now fractured. The people of the Valley are even more alienated and nothing is being done to win them over to the Union. It is any one’s guess as to how they will react if war breaks out.
President Vladimir Putin’s recollection of the Cuban missile crisis at Almaty on June 4 is relevant. Kennedy and Khrushchev were in continuous touch with each other. Various channels of direct communication between them were at work. An accord was thus worked out.
New Delhi’s diplomacy rests on international — especially American — involvement; not on dialogue with Pakistan. A sensible demarché of December 14, after the attack on Parliament, was followed on December 31 with the list of 20 which went beyond it and included people unrelated to cross-border terrorism. Recent strident rhetoric gives the impression of upping the ante. No proposal is being made realistically with any prospect of acceptance.
Joint patrolling of the LoC was rejected by Pakistan more than once. At Simla, even in defeat, ZA Bhutto secured the deletion of Para 4 (iv) which said, “A joint body composed of an equal number of representatives, nominated by each government, shall be appointed to establish ground rules and to supervise the effective observance of the Line of Peace and the rest of the border between the two countries.” It is surely not beyond diplomatic talent in both countries to devise a modus vivendi now. Playing hardball creates the suspicion that the crisis has its uses for the government in domestic politics. Else, it makes no sense to use the last desperate option first. Meanwhile, like it or not, the world’s attention is focused on Kashmir more than ever before.
Diplomacy devoid of sanctions, economic and military, is ineffective. Force unrelated to diplomacy is sterile and destructive. It was said during the Vietnam war that there was no exclusively military solution. That remains true of the Kashmir issue in both its dimensions — domestic and international. Before long, the US will be pressing India for a settlement of the Kashmir question.

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The Times of India, June 11, 2002

Nuclear blackmail must be countered

K. Subrahmaniam

TIMES NEWS NETWORK [ TUESDAY, JUNE 11, 2002 1:20:14 AM ]
US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s visit to Pakistan and India was initially advertised as an attempt to teach the leaderships of the two countries about the horrors of a nuclear war.
For this purpose, he was reported to have been equipped with a study by the US defence intelligence agency highlighting the obvious — that a nuclear exchange involving even a score of weapons will result in millions of casualties.
Now Mr Rumsfeld is coming after deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage has completed his mission which appears to have resulted in a tangible reduction of tensions between India and Pakistan. General Musharraf has pledged his commitment to Washington that he was giving up cross-border terrorism as an instrument of policy permanently. If the general keeps his promise, then de-escalation of forces will follow over a period of time.
General Musharraf has vehemently disassociated himself from the nuclear threat which was conveyed by his diplomats and colleagues in the administration. Though the threat of a nuclear exchange in the subcontinent has dissipated, the issues raised by the Pakistani nuclear threat and the US response to it still remain. Mr Rumsfeld may be expected to clarify the US policy on the issue of nuclear threats by small nuclear powers indulging in roguish behaviour.
While the US has been silent on the issue, British foreign secretary Jack Straw has made it clear that the Pakistani nuclear strategy was totally unacceptable. What has been puzzling is the silence of the US administration, US academia and media about Washington’s responsibility in case of a nuclear threat conveyed by a small nuclear weapon state and the imperatives of US national interests and national security. Had Pakistan succeeded in its strategy of holding out a nuclear threat, a message would have gone out loud and clear to all potential rogue states that Islamabad’s path was the right one to follow. It would have signalled that rogue states could blackmail their neighbours without bothering about any punishment from the sole superpower. This supine behaviour on the part of the sole superpower does not reinforce credibility in its much proclaimed counter-proliferation strategy. This could only strengthen the opinion among some sections in Japan or Iran which are neighbours of potential rogue states that they would have to go in for their own nuclear deterrence.
Since India is pledged to a no-first-use policy, any nuclear exchange can only start with Pakistan’s first-use of nuclear weapons. The logical way of preventing that is to warn Pakistan that any first-use of nuclear weapons by it would not be tolerated as Mr Jack Straw has done and indicate that such use would be punished by other nuclear weapon powers.
Silence on the issue on the specious ground advanced by Pakistan that the use of nuclear weapons was the only way of stopping India’s larger conventional force would be a sanction to all nations facing a larger adversary to go in for nuclear weapons. Second, the Indian military superiority vis-a-vis Pakistan is not of a kind and magnitude as to cause a decisive defeat of Pakistan or permit a sustained war over a period leading to such a result.
In 1990, then president George Bush acted to stop Pakistan’s attempt at nuclear blackmail by dispatching the Robert Gates mission. Does the present US silence and inaction indicate a major change in US policy and counter-proliferation strategy? If Pakistan had been able to fire its nuclear weapon, what would be its impact on the morale of its erstwhile associates, the Al-Qaida, the Taliban and various jehadi groups? In that event, what is the guarantee that some of those weapons would also not be fired at US bases and US ships in the Arabian Sea — especially if the Pakistanis conclude that the Indian retaliation would be punitive? The jehadi spirit that drives the terrorists to indulge in suicidal attacks might inspire them to hit at US targets as well. The US silence does not indicate a high degree of concern for the lives of US servicemen deployed in Pakistan and Afghani-stan and in ships in the Arabian Sea.
It is possible that the Pakistani nuclear threat was an elaborate charade to which the US was privy and which was intended to stop India from any adventurist action. In that case, it was an imprudent act tantamount to crying wolf when there was no wolf. In any case, the Pakistani nuclear threat did not have an impact on India and it was General Musharraf who had to distance himself from his own threats. The general has been able to ensure that Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar and their associates enjoy a safe haven in Pakistan in spite of the US president’s warning that any nation providing them asylum will be treated as an adversary.
General Musharraf has been indulging in nuclear threats making a mockery of US counter-proliferation policy. The US forces have not been able to carry out any successful operation on the Pakistan-Afghan border. The US continues to face new threats of terrorist attacks by the Al-Qaida safely ensconced in Pakistan.
The US defence secretary has a lot to think about and explain during his travels to Islamabad and New Delhi.

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June 11, 2002

Thanks to the foreign mediation

M.B. Naqvi

Karachi June 11:
Thanks to the foreign mediation --- yes, it was mediation except in name --- clouds of war and fears of nuclear escalation have more or less cleared from South Asia's horizon. Most Pakistanis will heave a big sigh of relief, though not all. There are those in the religious lobbies --- the true extremists even among the more radical religiously-oriented groups --- who are beside themselves with anger at Gen. Musharraf's perceived chicken-heartedness in first buckling under American pressure to ditch the Taliban regime and has now betrayed Kashmiri Jihad under the combined pressure of India and the other foreign powers. The world looks fated to hear more from these groups in days to come.
Whatever the truth about the origins or inspiration behind the new Hizb-i-Alami, or whatever is the correct name of this shadowy outfit, it is supposed to be committed to overthrowing the Musharraf regime. It is said to have owned up several terrorist acts. Among these is the bombing of a Protestant Church in Islamabad, the May 14 act in the Jammu area and the earlier suicide bombing attack on a bus of Pakistan Navy that was carrying 12 French engineers engaged in building new submarines. Not only this particular Hizb but many other extremist (read terrorist) organisations want nothing so much as a war between Pakistan and India, including its graduation into the nuclear stage. They apparently find the prospect acceptable. Their minimum expectation from the war is the downfall and disgrace of Gen. Musharraf. But is there more to it? who knows.
Meantime, the lifting of the war clouds has suddenly brought the political agenda of the military regime into sharp focus. Time is running out on it. Gen. Musharraf had only three years. He was 'mandated' to enable the country to get back on to the democratic rails by Oct. 12, 2002. Then on the Constitution will have to be followed. But in the meantime the general has left no one in doubt that he has a long agenda of reforms --- all kinds of reforms: in the economy and in the political system. He has also put all the 140 million Pakistanis on notice that he has decided to remain the President of Pakistan so that no PM, Parliament or anyone else can tamper with his reforms. He has thus put a questionmark on both democracy and his reforms. Yes, he will restore a democracy but it will not be able to harm or hurt his reforms that will have to continue.
The question arises what are the reforms he is so worried about? Insofar as the economy is concerned, his reforms can accurately be summed up and described: they are the same as the conditionalities that the IMF has spelled out in its Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility loan for $ 1.5 billion for three years --- in which minor changes in the agreed targets are negotiated and approved from time to time. They are, in critics' view, simple dictation by IMF of what economic policies to follow, leaving little leeway for Pakistan's own authorities to depart from the straight and narrow as laid down by IMF. Most Pakistanis are sceptical about what the IMF prescription will do to Pakistan. They fear that already poverty's growth has been rapid under IMF conditionalities --- that are at least 22 years old --- as a result of growing unemployment. Social services have been grossly neglected, despite so much rhetoric of social sectors' priority. Military expenditures and debt servicing preempt all social sector spending; except to maintain the bureaucracies little net development has taken place.
As for political reforms, they are most controversial. The central proposition of the proposed political restructuring is that the Army must have a role, indeed share, in power. With disarming candour General Musharraf has made it plain that supposedly to ensure the continuity of his reforms he must remain in power --- who will not let elected politicians change his policies. That is to say he will serve as the check on the new Parliament and the Cabinet responsible to it. That means his fiat will override what the elected government(s) and the Assemblies decide. How can that be done? By amending the Constitution of course. That opens up a Pandora'x box.
Who will change the Constitution? Why? Musharraf himself will do so, of course. Hasn't other Martial Law dictators amended the Constitution of the day as they willed? And hasn't the apex court, in its inscrutable wisdom, given him an unasked for authority to amend the Constitution. True, there are so many who feel outraged at the idea that a man emerges on a white charger from the shadows and grabs the whole political system and starts changing laws and mangles the Constitution to suit his expediencies. These people refuse to recognise that Mr. Musharraf has any authority to change the basic law of the land. And the changes that subordinate the Parliament and its representatives to the politics of one man (may be his whims) will not be acceptable.
At any rate, some presume that no matter what amendments he makes, their enactment will have to conform to the procedure laid down in the Constitution which Musharraf recognises (in theory that it exists). Moreover, if there is a Constitution, the legitimacy of the Musharraf Presidentship will have to come from that supreme law. In other words, he will have either to get himself elected by the constitutional college that is similar to India's or will have to be ratified by the Constitution(al amendments). The same thing will apply to all Constitutional amendments. They will have to be 'enacted' in the standard way any amendment to the organic law is enacted.
That puts all the significance and importance on the quality, character and composition of the new National and Provincial Assemblies that are to be elected on 7th and 11th of October next. If they comprise Musharraf supporters by any chance or contrivance, Musharraf has nothing to worry about; they will rubberstamp all his actions. But if they comprise a majority of PML (Nawaz) and PPP (Benazir), he will face a major Crisis of his life --- bigger than any he has faced so far. He will be on a dilemma: either he refuses to accept the results of the elections as Gen. Yahya did in 1971; or he may have to submit to what a rebellious Parliament and other Assemblies may say or do. That may include any action in pursuit of Article Six of the Constitution that lays down punishment of death for anyone who abrogates or otherwise subverts the Constitution. Which of these two situations comes to pass will depend on how free the October polls will be.
If the polls were gerrymandered the way April Referendum was, no one will give any respect to the new Parliament and its government; they will all be seen as stooges of the Army and nobody --- Parliament, elected governments or the President or his Amendments --- will have any legitimacy or command people's respect. But if the polls are free and the new Parliament refuses to be stagemanaged the country might then embark on a democratic destination, strengthened, though the Army will have to get ready for being no more than a subordinate department of the government.
A lot rides on the nature of the polls. The outside world is irrelevant. Pakistan's own future will be at stake. The Army, through Musharraf's amendments wants to perpetuate its control, stranglehold as some would say, over the whole political system: these amendments will comprise additional and extraordinary powers of the President to oversee all the governance processes and shall have the ability to dismiss the Parliament (and Assemblies) and the governments responsible to them either off his own pen or on the recommendation of a National Security Council, with a majority of generals, which Musharraf wants to be empowered to recommend the suspension of the Constitution and dismissal of the normal elected governments and a few other measures.
The biggest worry of all aware citizens is whether the polls will actually take place; they can be postponed with the willing and cooperative permission of the apex court. It has throughout history given judgements in sensitive cases that pleased the dictator of the day. That postponement will create a crisis that Musharraf will be able to handle for sometime. But if the polls are held and they are not free, a bigger crisis will ensue that may beget an unending division in the political life. It may inaugurate an era of popular struggle against the military's overlordship and the controlled democracy that is thus likely to be inaugurated later in October will fare no better than Ayub Khan's Basic Democracy even at its start. But if the elections are free and fair, the military might be presented with a terrible choice: accept their results and receive a setback perhaps permanent, to its pretensions and frustration of its desires; or it rejects the poll results, as Yahya Khan did, and get ready to face similar consequences. So would the polls be held in October next? is the question.

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Reporters Without Borders [ Reporters San Frontiers], June 11, 2002
5, rue Geoffroy-Marie
75009 Paris - France
Paris

Official reason for Kashmiri journalist's arrest is challenged

Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontières) called today for the release of Kashmiri journalist Iftikhar Ali Geelani and suggested his arrest was an attempt to restrict coverage of events in Kashmir.
"Charging a Kashmiri journalist under the Official Secrets Act in present circumstances would seem an effort to intimidate any media which tries to report independently on the conflict in the province," said Reporters Without Borders secretary-general Robert Ménard in a letter to Indian interior minister Lal Krishna Advani.
Calling on him to explain the arrest and charging of Geelani, who is New Delhi bureau chief of the Indian daily Kashmir Times and also correspondent for the Pakistani daily The Nation, he said the case against the journalist was "weak."
He also asked the minister to make a speedy inquiry into the beating-up of another Kashmiri journalist by Indian police who, he said, "seem incapable of putting a stop to a wave of physical attacks and attempts to kill journalists in Kashmir. It would be regrettable if the government allowed the climate of impunity enjoyed by these attackers to increase," he added.
Geelani was charged today under the secrets act and police were granted a further five days to hold him for questioning. He was arrested on 9 June at his New Delhi home by tax department officers and police but was then accused of storing information in his laptop computer about India's military presence in Kashmir. He pointed out that this material was from a 1997 US State Department report and had already been published in the Indian daily The Hindu.
The daily Hindustan Times said the journalist had admitted to his interrogators that he worked for Pakistani intelligence but this has not been confirmed by other sources. Many Kashmiri journalists, as well as the New Delhi journalists' union, have condemned his arrest, which came soon after the detention of his father-in-law, Kashmiri leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani, who has been charged under an anti-terrorist law and accused of being in the pay of Pakistani intelligence.
Another Kashmiri journalist, Mohammad Yusuf Dar, a reporter for the Daily Excelsior in Jammu (Kashmir), was beaten and insulted by police and detained for two hours on 10 June. The independent English-language daily Kashmir Images said he was arrested on his way home.
Police have still not made any serious investigation into the attempt to kill Zafar Iqbal, of Kashmir Images, who was shot and seriously wounded by masked men at his office in Srinagar on 29 May. His colleagues told Reporters Without Borders that police had made no effort to guard the paper's offices and made no inquiry into the shooting.

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The Hindu, June 11, 2002

India allows Pak. Overflights

NEW DELHI, JUNE 10. Responding positively to the visible decline in terrorist infiltration from across the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir over the last two weeks, India today took the first steps towards easing the six-month-long standoff with Pakistan. The calibrated reaction by the Government today involved decisions to reopen its skies to the overflight of Pakistani aircraft, identify a new envoy to Islamabad and order some naval ships in the Arabian Sea to their home bases. The key decision on the naval front is designed to reflect India's readiness to reduce the military tensions with Pakistan "in tandem with Islamabad's progress on ending cross-border terrorism", well-placed sources here say. The Government does not expect to announce more actions towards de-escalation in the immediate future. "India will consider additional steps only when Pakistan moves further down the road towards dismantling the infrastructure of cross-border terrorism," the sources add.

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The Times of India, June 11, 2002

Heavy shelling on despite de-escalation moves

New Delhi/Jammu: The situation may be heading towards a de-escalation in the ongoing Indo-Pak tensions but the Army is clearly taking no chances. Apart from strengthening its counter- insurgency grid in J&K, the Army is continuing to exert "military pressure" along the Line of Control and the International Border with "retaliatory fire assaults". While the exchange of artillery and mortar fire is taking place in several places along the border, it has been especially fierce in the Siachen, Kargil, Batalik and Dras sectors in the past 24 hours. Incidentally, these sectors have been witnessing heavy firing for the first time since the 1999 Kargil conflict.



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