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Avert Nuclear War Over Kashmir

The conflict between India and Pakistan over the disputed territory of Kashmir is edging ever closer to a nuclear war. A nuclear exchange between these rival nations could kill 12 million people and spread radioactive fallout around the globe. Please join us in calling on President Musharraf of Pakistan and Prime Minister Vajpayee of India to step back from the brink of holocaust.

Sign a message from concerned citizens of the world to these two leaders at:

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Not That Much Time

In the light of the shocking attacks in Jammu and Kashmir, which, of course, are to be totally condemned, two questions dominate our political horizon. Should India go to war against Pakistan? And will it? The answer to the first question is that it should not. It would be militarily dangerous, potentially disastrous (because of the nuclear factor) and politically foolish and unjustified. The answer to the second question may be bruising to Indian egos, but it is Washington not New Delhi that is almost certainly going to play the decisive role.
While many in India will assume that Pervez Musharraf must bear the principal blame for the Kaluchak attack (or even for the tragic assassination of Abdul Gani Lone), this is not the way the rest of the world sees it, although it can certainly collar Islamabad for not doing enough to stop cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. What the rest of the world sees is a Musharraf government halfheartedly and even somewhat hypocritically engaged in a war against internal Islamic fundamentalist forces, but nonetheless the engagement is real enough with the latter determined to defeat this Pakistan government and usher in a far more fundamentalist regime.
They see a Musharraf government which is not in control of the country and is itself the victim of bomb blasts; a government which has immediately condemned both the December 13 and May 14 attacks in India, and even called for an international impartial investigation into them. They see no evidence provided by the Indian government linking these attacks to Musharraf's orders, although obviously circles within the wider establishment, such as sections of the Inter-Services Intelligence, are very likely to be involved.
In fact, it would be utterly foolish of Musharraf to have wanted the December 13 or May 14 attack, which only put much more pressure on him, with the latest one diverting attention away from Gujarat and the world's opprobrium of the Indian government on that score. It is far more plausible to see these attacks as carried out by forces fighting on two fronts, not just in Kashmir but also to undermine the Musharraf government. They would like nothing better than to provoke India to attack Pakistan, that is, turn matters into a war between the two country's armed forces.
This would immediately benefit them politically by harnessing anti-Indian patriotism and jingoism (which they will do everything to fan) to their cause. Like our own religious extremists, they recognize that their anti-secular fundamentalist agenda can never have anywhere near the same public resonance as a stance of "defending at all costs the honour and sacred territory of the country", that is through a nationalist chauvinism gone berserk. In fact, their shameful and cowardly terrorist attack is itself indicative that politically they are losing in Jammu and Kashmir, being ever more alienated from the public there.
For this sangh parivar-led government, anxious to rationalize away its own culpability in the Gujarat carnage, threatening war with Pakistan is the best way to divert attention from the fact that the greatest danger to the future of India as a secular, democratic and humane society does not come from outside but internally from the sangh itself with its pernicious ideology and aim of establishing a Hindu rashtra. Indeed, since the constituency for anti-Pakistan sentiments is much wider than for anti-Muslim and anti-Islam sentiments, one of the crucial cards the sangh must consider playing before the next general elections is precisely the provoking of a war situation with Pakistan. Such a strategy is all the more likely to work electorally if it can be combined with acts (such as more communal riots or a communally charged campaign again centred on Ayodhya) which can further polarize emotions in accordance with the Hindutva ideology of hatred towards Indian Muslims.
If, politically, it is religious extremism on both sides that will benefit, there is also the fact that not only will war not solve anything, including the issue of permanently ending cross-border terrorism, it is certain to make things much worse. A short-duration war will almost certainly be a stalemate with immense suffering on both sides (the Pakistan army is as battle-hardened as India's) while a longer-duration war of attrition (in which India's military "advantages" have more chances of surfacing) is almost inconceivable because of the international uproar and because of the much greater likelihood of Pakistan resorting to nuclear weapons if its feels it is losing - a response that is also perfectly conceivable in a short-duration war.
In such a nuclearized context, it is the height of irresponsibility for India to talk in terms of "calling Pakistan's nuclear bluff". The fact of the matter is that India's tests in 1998 (followed by Pakistan's) established a new situation where a terrible nuclear shadow was thrown over south Asia. But instead of acknowledging what a mistake this was and how it has dramatically reduced the space, militarily speaking, that India previously had, the bomb lobby continues desperately to pretend that there is no nuclear shadow but in fact, so much more sunlight!
But will India go to war or launch the kind of attack across the border that would almost certainly escalate matters to such a pitch between the two countries? It is not impossible for India to take such action. Indeed, both its current rhetoric in response to the May 14 attack and its previous policy of brinkmanship through massive and sustained mobilization of armed forces along the border (for longer than has ever been the case in peacetime since 1947) puts it into a corner where its non-military options become even weaker, if not closed. Moreover, the sangh, as pointed out, needs anti-Pakistan war hysteria for domestic reasons.
But it is still the case that the key actor is the United States of America not India, and that it will be very difficult indeed for New Delhi to buck Washington, if the latter says no to even a "limited" military strike on Pakistan. India's plan is to get the US to agree to such a limited strike and restrain Musharraf from responding, though abstinence of this sort can seriously undermine his domestic position. The US needs Musharraf so much for its other purposes, not just for fighting al Qaida but for other geo-strategic reasons in central Asia, that it is very unlikely to go along with this Indian plea.
After giving due allowance for the unavoidable uncertainty factor which means that defying logic, reason, or the intentions of key actors, there could still be war, it would be fair to say that the balance of probabilities weighs against this. But the truly frightening thing is that this need not be the case the next time around or the time after that. Both conventional war and with it the possibility of escalation to nuclear exchanges are very real prospects over the next five to seven years, perhaps longer.
We now have to give our serious attention, first, to getting rid of nuclear arsenals in this region even before total global disarmament takes place simply because this is the region where such a nuclear conflagration is most likely; and second, to preventing a conventional war breaking out over Kashmir even if terrorist acts continue to take place. If we cannot resolve the Kashmir issue soon (which requires dialogue with Pakistan and representatives of Kashmiris on both sides of the border), then can we find practical ways of easing border tensions through exploring various creative measures, for example, by establishing an effectively patrolled and monitored demilitarized zone on both sides of the line of control?
In short, we haven't that much time. But have we even begun, seriously enough, the process of thinking anew instead of constantly screeching as of old?
The author has recently co-authored the book, South Asia on a Short Fuse:Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament

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Nuclear war: an insane option

May 28 is the fourth anniversary of Pakistan's nuclear tests at Chaghai. On Yom-i-takbir, which the government celebrated in a big way in 1999, it informed the people through boastful newspaper ads: "We are the seventh nuclear power of the world".
Today, as war clouds gather on the horizon, this nuclear status gives us no joy or confidence. Those in power might reassure us that nuclear weapons will not be used. But who will believe them? Can states, which possess nuclear arsenals, keep their confrontation limited to warfare with conventional weapons?
The fact is that the nuclear capability we created for ourselves four years ago hangs like an albatross tied round our neck. When Islamabad decided to test its nuclear device, we were told that the tests were essential for Pakistan to restore the strategic balance with India. That country, under a militant right-wing Hindu fundamentalist government, had foolishly tested its nuclear bomb a fortnight earlier in a show of jingoism. But now it is plain that this balance will not save the two countries from self-destruction.
Initially, the governments on both sides of the border proceeded on the assumption that MAD (the nuclear doctrine of mutually assured destruction) will pre-empt a nuclear conflict between them. The general belief - though questionable - is that the US and the USSR didn't start a shooting war with each other in the cold war years because their nuclear weapons acted as a deterrent.
What has happened in our case is that we have come to wrongly believe that nuclear weapons can be made to serve rational ends. But this is a misconception. They are basically weapons of mass destruction and their use would amount to mass suicide, for the contiguity of the two neighbours ensures that the attacker is equally vulnerable.
The nuclear fallout would show no respect for international boundaries. Experts tell us that those close enough to "ground zero" (a six square-mile area for a one megaton blast) will be killed instantly by the gamma rays emitted from the blast. Others - that is nine out of ten people - will die in a ten-mile radius from the radiation, the pressure wave, the high-velocity winds and the firestorms which will follow. Hundreds of thousands will die immediately and many more will be doomed to die within a few weeks a painful and slow death caused by radioactivity.
One wonders if our policymakers understand the horrible implications of a nuclear attack. It is plain that they will never be able to resist the temptation to press the nuclear button when a conventional war breaks out in which Pakistan finds itself at a disadvantage, being the weaker side in conventional warfare. Moreover, in the climate of hatred and tension which is building up in the region, neither of the two governments can truly give an undertaking that the nuclear option will not be used.
Moreover, Pakistan with its smaller size and lack of territorial depth will be the one to suffer greater devastation even if it resorts to a first strike - which it might be tempted to do as a pre-emptive move.
It is strange that there is no general concern among the people at the mounting tension and the hazards of a nuclear war. That is probably due to the low level of knowledge and awareness of the dangers of radiation. In fact, the political parties and the media, which should know better, are whipping up a war psychosis and militant nationalism which will only encourage the government to throw all restraint to the wind.
Chaghai instilled a sense of false confidence in defence planners in Islamabad. From the revelations made by Bruce Riedel, the special assistant to President Clinton for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs at the US National Security Council, it appears that Pakistan was actually preparing to use its nuclear missiles in the Kargil war in 1999 when India threatened, out of sheer desperation, to broaden the theatre of the conflict.
The most negative impact of Chaghai has been that it has robbed Islamabad of the incentive to try hard enough for a politically negotiated settlement of its disputes with India. We have attempted to bargain as though we hold the high ground - when we don't militarily, politically or economically. We have a strong moral case in Kashmir no doubt, but by now we should know that morality without tangible strength on the ground takes one nowhere.
Paradoxically, the nuclear explosions only weakened us in the areas where we needed to consolidate ourselves. They started off an arms race, which has forced us to divert more and more of our measly economic resources towards defence. The defence budget has shot up from Rs 131.3 billion in 1997-98 to Rs 152.7 billion in 1999-2000 to plateau at Rs 131.6 billion in 2001-02 (budgeted - actual figures are disclosed three years later).
And how has this impacted on the national economy? Pakistan was subject to sanctions for more than three years until 9/11 came to our rescue and the government's willingness to cooperate with the Americans in their war against terrorism rehabilitated Islamabad's status in Washington. But three years were enough to undermine the economy. As Shaukat Aziz, the federal finance minister, has now admitted, poverty has increased because of the declining growth rates - 4.2 per cent in 1998-99, 3.9 per cent in 1999-2000 and 2.4 per cent in 2000-2001.
Since we cannot boast of a strong tradition of research in the health sciences and sustainable environment, no effort has been made to evaluate the effects of the Chaghai tests on the ecology, climate, natural resources and the health of the people. Press reports and random surveys give the impression that the incidence of cancer is on the rise.
Widespread drought has affected food production. In the absence of scientific research and surveys there is no way of confirming if this could be related to the Chaghai blasts. One just knows that the 'silent winter', a byproduct of nuclear explosions, is known to produce similar effects, and at Chaghai the mountain died, to use Eqbal Ahmed's anguished words.
Being a smaller state and having weakened ourselves with our own follies, we want to deal with India on equal terms. We proceeded to create a nuclear capability, which we planned to use in times of crisis without as much as drawing up the rules of the nuclear game with our adversary.
True, it was India which set the ball rolling by detonating its nuclear devices, but was Pakistan obliged to follow suit against all sane considerations and sensible advice?
Chaghai only made us bolder and more reckless. A number of opportunities came for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in the region. There was Mr Vajpayee's famous bus journey to Lahore in February, 1999. There was the cease-fire in the Kashmir valley in 2000 and the summit at Agra. But at no stage did the government attempt to address the root cause of the immediate crisis, namely, the militants who reportedly infiltrate into the valley to cause violence there. Their action has all along had the potential of becoming a casus belli and yet we did not try to hold them back. India says that these militants will be the target of "surgical" strikes. President Bush has set the precedent when he attacked the Taliban in Afghanistan. If Islamabad is expecting Washington to intervene and act as a restraining force, it might be disappointed this time. We have forgotten the lesson of Kargil, when Pakistan was forced to withdraw its forces under American pressure.
On this occasion too Mr Vajpayee may be allowed to proceed with his unholy plans. After all, the Americans have no love for the Islamic militants either and it would be expedient to allow New Delhi to do the dirty work of cleaning them up without incurring the odium the US did when it attacked Afghanistan.
President Musharraf insists that the militants in Kashmir are not operating from our side of the border. If that is so and he is sincere about avoiding a war, the president should heed the sensible suggestion a newly-launched daily from Lahore gave last week. Pakistan should offer to unilaterally pull back its forces from the LoC, create a demilitarized zone on Pakistan's side of the Line and ask the UN for international monitors to be stationed there. This will rob India of the pretext to attack.

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Musharraf's speech was an anti-climax

Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's televised speech of May 27, 2002, came as an anti-climax. It belied the expectations of many analysts that he would address more sincerely -- than in his speech of January 12, 2002 -- the concerns of the government and the people of India relating to the use of terrorism by Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment as a weapon against India.
The speech was evasive without any reference to specifics and his tone was unyielding, even defiant. Even the self-criticism, which one noticed in his January 12 speech, was absent and there was no condemnation of the activities of the Pakistani Punjabi terrorist groups, which a well-known analyst of Pakistan had recently referred to as the Punjabi Taliban. What struck one was his over-anxiety to avoid any criticism of Pakistan's religious extremist parties, which have been used by the Inter-Services Intelligence since 1989 to keep blood flowing in our territory.
Even at the risk of repeating oneself, one has to underline that what we are facing since 1993 is no longer Kashmiri militancy due to feelings of deep alienation in the local population, but Pakistani Punjabi terrorism in the name of the Kashmiris. Terrorist organisations such as the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Tayiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Al-Badr, etc are pure and simple Pakistani Punjabi organisations. They are not interested in the welfare of the Kashmiris. Even according to the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami's own publications, only 200 of its 650 cadres killed by the Indian security forces since 1991 were Kashmiris. The remaining 450 were Pakistanis, with the Punjabis constituting the largest number.
Their interests have nothing to do with the interests of the Kashmiris. These are pan-Islamic organisations of the same mould as Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda and members of his International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the US and Israel. Their aim is not just "the liberation of Kashmir", but the "liberation" of the Muslims of India, their Talibanisation, and the creation of a new Islamic caliphate extending from Pakistan to Indonesia, consisting of Pakistan and the "liberated Muslim homelands" of India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore, which they look upon as rightfully belonging to the Malay Muslims, Brunei, southern Philippines and Indonesia.
Their ranks have swelled and their irrationality has hardened after October 7, 2001, by the influx of the dregs of the present war on terrorism in Afghanistan, who pose a serious threat not only to India and the US, but also to the countries of the ASEAN and to international peace and security. Before October 7, 2001, there were two terrorist infrastructures in the epicentre of international terrorism as the Pakistan-Afghanistan region came to be called -- one directed against India located in Pakistan and the other anti-US and anti-West located in Afghanistan. The one located in Afghanistan has now been shifted to Pakistan, with the knowledge and complicity of Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment, and the two have been acting in tandem, targeting Indian as well as Western nationals and interests. It will be totally unwise and suicidal to think that Musharraf has no control over them and that they are being activated by rogue elements in Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment beyond his control.
Al Qaeda and the other constituents of the International Islamic Front were the joint creations of General Musharraf, General Mohammed Aziz Khan, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff committee, and Major General (retd) Mahmud Ali Durrani, when they were the blue-eyed boys of the late Zia-ul-Haq. They raised this "Army of Islam" for use against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and diverted it against India post-1993. The pre-1998 "Army of Islam" has become the post-1998 International Islamic Front.
To expect Musharraf to become a repentant sinner, give up the use of terrorism and destroy his own creations would be to live in a dangerous world of illusions. Till September 11, 2001, Musharraf used to project in public the capture of Afghanistan by the Taliban as his and the Pakistan Army's greatest success story since the 1971 defeat at the hands of India.
He and his officers were hoping, and continue to hope, despite the defeat of the Taliban by the international coalition in Afghanistan, that this "success story" could be repeated in India with the help of these Pakistani Punjabi Taliban. He has been able to persist with his perfidious actions because he thinks the US, the UK and other Western countries will not pressurise him beyond a point to meet India's concerns. Unfortunately, he has been proved right till now in his assessment of Western ambivalence.
The international coalition led by the US has been fighting against terrorism in Afghanistan for over six months. Apart from having the Taliban replaced, their achievements have been inadequate. Over 80 per cent of Al Qaeda and the Taliban and the components of the International Islamic Front, including their leaders, are intact and alive in Pakistani territory.
They have stepped up terrorism not only against India, but also against the US and France. They are threatening to target the UK too shortly. What intelligence Musharraf has given to the coalition? How genuine has he been in his cooperation with the US? What action has he taken to smoke out the dregs from their Pakistani sanctuaries? Why has he made a farce of the investigation and trial of Daniel Pearl, the American journalist, who was kidnapped and brutally murdered? Why has there been no progress in the investigation of the grenade attack on an Islamabad church on March 17, 2002, and of the suicide bomb attack on French naval engineers in Karachi on May 8, 2002?
An objective examination of the answers to these questions would enable the US to remove the blinkers from its eyes, but it does not want these blinkers to be removed lest it start seeing Musharraf for what he really is -- the godfather of international terrorism emanating from this region.
Since he joined the army in 1964, Musharraf has grown up with the belief and conviction that he can fool all people for all time. We have to prove him wrong.
What are the options available to India? New Delhi would be totally -- legally, morally and ethically -- justified in taking military action. But, before doing so, we must carefully examine whether the direct military option would help us achieve the objective of putting an end to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism.
The immediate short-term option has to be decided by the government on the basis of the intelligence, information, insights at its disposal and all should support the government in implementing its decision.
Any overall plan has to have short-, medium- and long-term options. It is here that the importance of covert action as an essential component arises. Unfortunately, in India, there is no proper understanding of the role and importance of covert action. Seeing what Pakistan has been doing, we tend to equate covert action with terrorism and recoil in horror at its very mention. For Pakistan, covert action means terrorism, but it is not so for democratic and civilised countries such as the USA, UK and France, all of which have and admit to having an effective covert action capability.
The possession of an effective covert action capability and the willingness to use it, if and when necessary, is the only deterrent against an adversary such as Pakistan which thinks it can achieve its objective against India through covert action.
Since 1968, India had a covert action capability whose role was significant in then East Pakistan. But for the effective use of this capability, there might not have been peace in Mizoram and we might not have put an end to anti-national elements in Sikkim. The role of our covert action capability in putting an end to the ISI's interference in Punjab by making such interference prohibitively costly to Pakistan is little known and understood. The goodwill which India enjoys today in Kabul might not have been possible but for the benign use of our covert action capability.
Covert action is not terrorism. Covert action is identifying the sensitive points of the adversary and exercising sustained pressure on those points through deniable means till results are achieved.
Terrorism, particularly the state-sponsored kind, is an unconventional war. To be effective, the response to it in thinking and action has to be unconventional.

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Impact of a nuclear strike

Everyone can agree that the death toll would be huge if a nuclear conflict broke out between India and Pakistan.

The scale of devastation depends on a bomb's size and detonation

But it is impossible to predict the scale of devastation on human life, cities and the environment if either of the South Asian nuclear powers decided to use their weapons in anger.
Some analysts have come up with hypothetical death tolls of three million or 12 million - with millions more injured - should there be a nuclear exchange.
With just two examples of nuclear bomb explosions in cities - the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki more than 50 years ago - the basic mechanics of what happens are known but it is hard to transpose the models of 1945 onto other cities.
First, the blast of the bomb creates intense heat and pressure.
Everything is immediately vaporised amid temperatures of up to 300 million degrees Celsius.

Firestorms and fallout

People are also killed by burns and the massive changes in pressure which can burst a person's lungs.

Weapons held by India and Pakistan could create many new Hiroshimas

Heading outwards from the epicentre, people will suffer burns, injuries from flying debris and acute exposure to ionising radiation.
Even if those injuries would not normally be life-threatening, many people would die as local infrastructure and medical services would have been destroyed and unable to cope with the sheer numbers of casualties.
Firestorms would develop and a cloud of radioactive fallout is spread with the wind.
Radioactive fallout particles enter the water supply and are inhaled and ingested, affecting communities perhaps thousands of miles from the blast.

A single bomb could kill millions of city-dwellers

In Hiroshima in 1945, shockwaves had destroyed everything within a four-kilometre (2.5-mile) radius 10 seconds after the bomb exploded 567 metres above the ground.
Three days later a bomb nearly twice as large was detonated 500 metres above Nagasaki and total destruction spread about 1km.
The different effects of the two bombs blown up over Japan show how a myriad of factors determine the destructiveness of a nuclear weapon.

'Unthinkable'

India:
* Agni II intermediate-range missile
* Tested 1999
* 200 kiloton nuclear warhead

Pakistan:
* Shaheen II intermediate-range missile
* Tested 1999
* 35 kiloton nuclear warhead

South Asia's nuclear stakes

Dr Keith Baverstock, a regional adviser on ionising radiation and public health for the World Health Organisation, said death tolls would depend on the height at which the bomb exploded, the geography of the area, the strength of buildings, population density and many other factors.
"Even the use of one weapon if it's on a city would have a massive effect - it's unthinkable," he said.
"There would be months in which people lead the most terrible life."
The impact of a bomb would spread far outside India and Pakistan, Dr Baverstock warned - not simply in terms of the passage of the radioactive cloud but in people's response to the war.
"There should be no effort spared to stop this," Dr Baverstock said.

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Into the darkness

India says Pakistan backs terrorism, but now it is charged with supporting terrorism itself. By John Elliott

Your friendly local corner shop may seem an unlikely place to find links to religiously motivated violence and ethnic cleansing. But the Patels, a community (some say caste) who originally came from the Indian state of Gujarat, played an important role in the troubles that engulfed the state in March and April.
Together with other overseas Gujaratis in the UK and the US, Patels are among those who help to finance the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the arch-Hindu fundamentalist organisation whose political arm, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), runs the state government in Gujarat and leads India's coalition government. Some of the Patels also help to finance the sect's small temples and schools in Gujarat's villages, where, according to local social workers, militant Hindus led attacks on Muslims in the past two months.
Without the dominant power of the VHP in Gujarat, riots that started after 58 Hindu train passengers were burned alive, by a Muslim mob in Godhra on 27 February, might have ended within a few days instead of leading to more than 2,000 deaths, with bloody scenes of rape and the burning of Muslims and their homes.
Instead, the violence accelerated, aided and encouraged by the BJP Gujarat government and police - led by one of the Hindu movement's most ambitious fundamentalists, Narendra Modi, the state's chief minister. Modi used the Godhra incident as a trigger to unleash attacks on Muslims, hoping that this would reverse recent BJP electoral losses in the state - and allow Hindus to settle long-running communal scores and drive Muslims out of their areas. "This has not been a communal riot, nor a one-off event. It has been genocide with the state being used as a laboratory for the VHP's aims," says Cedric Prakash, a Jesuit priest and leading social worker who has been in Gujarat for nearly 30 years.
The large-scale violence has now stopped and, apart from isolated incidents, is unlikely to begin again in the foreseeable future. However, tensions and even further killings will continue later, possibly instigated by Muslims marooned in refugee camps who do not expect to get any significant redress in the courts for their loss of relatives and property.
For the time being, though, the main protagonists are tired. Leading businessmen, who have mostly stood by in silence for two months (either because they supported the attacks on Muslims or were scared of being attacked themselves), are demanding peace. There is a general wish to revive the economy after two months of inactivity, with workers staying away and truck drivers refusing to enter the state.
Modi risks being dismissed for allowing the situation to deteriorate - and it is far from clear whether the BJP has gained politically. Government ministers and VHP leaders are loath to admit any involvement with the riots. Some Hindus are still prepared to voice anti-Muslim feeling, sentiments boosted by America's attack on Islamic terrorists , and by India's growing tensions with Pakistan over terrorist incidents in the disputed northern state of Jammu and Kashmir.
Nationally, the BJP has realised that, instead of enhancing its appeal as a strong Hindu party, the events have destroyed the secular image it had been cultivating since it came to power in 1998. India's reputation has been irretrievably damaged abroad, which will almost certainly lead to a loss of urgently needed foreign investment. Since 11 September, Pakistan has been condemned by the US and other countries for abetting terrorist activity in Indian Kashmir, but India itself is now being accused of permitting and even encouraging domestic terrorism. "What we have been seeing is state terrorism, nothing less," says A P Raman, a leading local lawyer and former senior judge.
This was probably the worst and most prolonged violence since the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, and it raises the question of whether similar events will break out elsewhere in India, with militant Hindus in other states looking for excuses to copy Gujarat and ethnically cleanse their areas.
"What you have seen evolving here is the original RSS agenda when it was set up some 70 years ago to develop a Hindu rashtra (nation) and bring back the glories of Hindu kingdoms 2,000 years ago," says Mukul Sinha, a lawyer and opponent of the riots. He is referring to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the Nazi-style organisation at the centre of the Sangh Parivar, as the BJP's and VHP's overall Hindu revivalist movement is known.
Although the state is famous as the home of the pacifist Mahatma Gandhi, there are tensions under the surface that have made it an ideal breeding ground for the Sangh Parivar. The Patels, in particular, turned to the VHP because elite Gujaratis failed to give them sufficient status as they gradually developed from farm workers to landlords and prosperous businessmen. Involvement in Sangh Parivar politics has changed that, and Patels now occupy leading positions in the state. "They have become one of the most influential supporters of the BJP and VHP in Gujarat, both politically and economically," says a local newspaper editor.
Special factors, therefore, led to the events of the past two months - a well-established but worried BJP ruling party, a Sangh Parivar that wanted to flex its fundamentalist muscles, supported by a large and prosperous social group which wanted to assert itself. There does not appear to be a similar political and social mix elsewhere in India. But that could change in sensitive states such as Maharashtra or Uttar Pradesh, so another "Gujarat 2002" cannot be ruled out sometime in the future.

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The evil they are

Nuclear weapons in South Asia are at least four years old. Both India and Pakistan provided the world with audio-visual aid by detonating 11 nuclear devices in Rajasthan and Balochistan deserts in May 1998 - without consulting their people, of course. It is time to review what the two countries have achieved thereby.
Insofar as India is concerned, its motives remain a mystery. Some think atomic weapons are the currency of power and a status symbol. Others saw it as the pursuit of national greatness, conceived as amassing overwhelming military strength. Since atomic weapons seemed to fulfil this quest for power, it chose to go nuclear. Others had laid emphasis on its desire for a big league membership, with an application for the permanent membership of the UN Security Council pending. These theories are valid, though it leaves some dissatisfaction. Although Indian publicists claim Pakistan was not in the rickety BJP government's mind in April 1998, a suspicion survives that the immediate context was Pakistan's Kashmir policy. New Delhi perhaps wanted to demonstrate overwhelming strength to overawe Islamabad. Anyway, has India achieved the aims it had thereby?
Before examining India's achievements, Pakistan's motivation has a relevance. Pakistan's sole objective was to deter India. Pakistan Army had assessed that India was a radical threat to its national security. Given half a chance, India will somehow swallow Pakistan. It felt nuclear weapons would help in defying India's power vis-à-vis Kashmir. Some in Pakistan's military might be credited with an unavowed desire for eventually getting even with India; the defeat in 1971 war rankled. Anyway, the raison d'etre of Pakistan's nuclearisation is deterring India from possible aggression. Nukes are seen as a shield behind which Pakistan can safely keep India on the hop in Kashmir and were an insurance policy for Pakistan's national security. Four years on, a similar question arises: have the atomic weapons, with their Shaheen and Ghauri vehicles, done the job of safeguarding national security?
For India, the first result of Pakistan's counter explosions was that India degraded itself to Pakistan's level; both have stayed equated ever since. Despite much international massaging of Indian ego verbally, it is still not in the big league. The permanent seat in the UN SC is still up in the air and depends almost solely on a problematical consensus among the Big Five. Pakistanis were not overawed by India demonstrating its nuclear muscle; Pakistan could counter it. Pakistan's policy did not change one whit vis-à-vis Kashmir and India. Indeed Jihad in Kashmir was promoted with gusto, despite India's superiority in conventional armaments and in its larger nuclear capability. There was no noticeable increase in India's stature abroad because of its nuclear status, while the rest of the world habitually brackets India with Pakistan despite all inequalities.
Giving a hard look at Pakistan shows its stature too have actually deteriorated; nobody was impressed with Pakistan's new-found greatness. It invited horror at the combination of nuclear muscle with mass poverty, political instability and economic backwardness. Pakistan defaulted in its external debt liabilities in the year it gate-crashed into the nuclear club. Its economy remains precarious with IMF and World Bank administering help. Later 9/11bestowed on it considerable largesse. The economy however remains in doldrums and the debt burden is still too high. Relief through rescheduling of debt payments has been a shot in the arm --- but only for the next few years. Pakistan was a pariah nation before that event. It is only marginally better; even the Chinese, their staunchest ally, are now wary of Pakistan's resumed special relationship with the US. The value of US friendship remains to be realistically assessed.
One aspect of Subcontinent's nuclear weapons is clear. Except for the brief interval of bus diplomacy and Lahore Process, India and Pakistan have gone from one Crisis to another ever since. Military tensions have continuously been rising. Kargil operations and their sequel have said it all. While initially the Kargil operations underlined Pakistan's insouciance, its sequel demonstrated a dramatic and humbling climbdown, literally and figuratively. While Pakistan remains perky behind the atomic shield, the going has gotten too rough as India massed its entire armed forces in an attacking mode on Pakistan's borders, though happily, it has not had the courage to clinch the issue. Pakistan, despite membership of anti-Terror Coalition and resumed friendship with the US, remains in a qul de sac, with no options.
Atomic capability has failed to sustain four key Pakistan policies: (i) the Taliban regime had to be left in the lurch; (ii) Islamabad has 'to do more' to stop infiltration into Indian-held Kashmir; (iii) it is strongly discouraging Islamic zealots domestically; and (iv) regime is going further in letting Americans pursue Al-Qaeda and Taliban inside Pakistan's FATA. Nuclear weapons have not saved these policies that were largely predicated on them. If India seems to have done relatively better, the reasons for that is not the panapoly of its nuclear deterrent but India's own size, importance and others' needs. When, what or whom will the Bomb help?
The conclusion is irresistible that the nuclear weapons are inherently destabilising. Exposing the myths that surround these mass destruction weapons is now a necessity. There were many Bomb lovers in India and Pakistan --- otherwise hardliners and quite anti-Pakistan or anti-India in domestic contexts --- who promoted the fib that nuclear weapons, by their sheer destructiveness, would guarantee peace; neither side will dare go to war and both will stay deterred. All the two needed was to negotiate a nuclear détente. Peace will reign. Well, nothing of the kind has happened.
Amidst near-total sundering of relations, the two countries remain engaged in a ruinous arms race --- in both nuclear and conventional fields. Look at the latest Pakistani missile tests; they cost a pretty penny. Whatever may happen to India's economy Pakistan economy cannot sustain such a growing burden, because nuclear weapons too need to be up-dated and increased in number along with their delivery mechanisms, whenever the adversary does so. Who can ignore that this armament race is relentless and unavoidable so long as the two believe in deterrence. Moreover, a new conventional arms build up is unavoidable after some nuclear deterrence has been achieved. This is the experience of all nuclear powers.
This huge delusion of deterrence has boxed both India and Pakistan in a no go situation. Neither can go forward and nor can any go back. For six months the armies forces of the two are confronting each other, eyeball-to-eyeball. No one knows what to do next, while the sane common advice by all foreigners is somehow not accepted. The point emerges: so long as Indians and Pakistanis do not break out of the present vicious cycle of chauvinistic politics and stop relying on nuclear weapons, there may be no future for the Subcontinent.
New Delhi and Islamabad are unlikely to be rid of their fascination for the bogus doctrine of deterrence --- that has never worked for anyone at anytime. As Praful Bidwai maintains, both have to break out of the thrall of catchy slogans like Minimum Nuclear Deterrent. The fact is that it is neither minimum nor has it deterred anyone in both cases, such illusions make nuclear arms race unstoppable. Even the talk of a nuclear detente is nonsense. With four minutes flying time of missiles between the two countries, what CBMs and what understandings can work? In short, no one can be trusted with a mass destruction weapons. Period.
To escape from this stultification it is vital to reorient politics. It would seem politics is too serious a business to be left to governments alone or to the political classes that plays musical chairs. The common people have to stand up for their rights and assert the need for their desires' fulfilment --- that require peace and a radically reoriented economic effort. Only then will Subcontinent have a future. The master formula is a people-to-people reconciliation between India and Pakistan by way of a start. It has to be a region-wide people-to-people reconciliation, friendship and cooperation. Peace comprises these things and it is not simply the absence of war.

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Lighting The Nuclear Fire

A nuclear war is said to have no winners, but Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee seems to think otherwise. His exhortations to Indian troops in Kashmir to prepare for sacrifices and "decisive victory" have set off widespread alarm. It seems plausible that India is preparing for a "limited war" to flush out Islamic militant camps in Pakistan administered Kashmir. But with swift reaction and counter-reaction, it is far from clear whether the combat can remain confined. Meanwhile, as cross-border artillery shelling intensifies, five Indian naval vessels are rapidly moving towards the Arabian Sea. On Thursday, Pakistan's stock market suspended trading for the day and, as fighter aircraft circle the skies over Islamabad, foreign diplomats start their exodus from the capital.
Events shall take their course in the days and weeks ahead, but there is much to reflect upon as we cross the fourth anniversary of the Pokhran and Chaghai nuclear tests. With free debate on sensitive issues largely proscribed in both countries - particularly on national television - the only voices to be heard are those of militarists and establishment strategic analysts. Not surprisingly, nuclear affairs are now being guided by wishful, delusional, thinking.
The most frightening delusion is India's trivialization of Pakistan's nuclear capability. This relatively new phenomenon has gained astonishingly wide currency in Indian ruling circles. Although Pakistan's nuclear tests had dispelled earlier scepticism, senior Indian military and political leaders continue to express doubts on the operational capability and usability of the Pakistani arsenal. Still more seriously, many Indians believe that, as a client state of the US, Pakistan's nuclear weapons are under the control of the US. The assumption is that, in case of extreme crisis, the US would either restrain their use by Pakistan or, if need be, destroy them. At a recent meeting, I heard senior Indian analysts say that they are "bored" by Pakistan's nuclear threats and no longer believe them. Should one laugh or cry?
Wishes are being confused here with facts, and expediency with truth. Four years ago, to their chagrin, Indian militarists realized that they had shot themselves in the foot by forcing Pakistan's nuclear weapons out of the closet. This had been subsequently rationalized by claiming that a stable peace based upon a "balance of mutual terror" was now imminent. But after the upsurge of Kashmir militancy, denying the potency of Pakistan's nuclear weapons has become more convenient because it clears the road to a limited war.
One notes another massive change in the attitude of Indian militarists. For years they had insisted that all matters, including nuclear issues, be settled only bilaterally. Suggestions that nuclear weapons in the possession of India and Pakistan were more dangerous than those possessed by the West, Russia, and China had been angrily rejected. How dare anyone suggest that India and Pakistan are in any way less responsible, reasonable, and rational?
Bilateralism has now bit the dust. Having cut off direct communications with each other, both adversaries have thrust disaster prevention into the hands of diplomats and third-tier leaders of western countries. A continuous stream of officials from America and Britain has passed, or is due to pass, through Islamabad and Delhi. These include Christina Rocca, Chris Patten, Jack Straw, and Richard Armitage The subcontinent's fate now hangs in their hands.
Pakistani nuclear misperceptions and miscalculations have been no less severe than India's.
Pushed into the nuclear arena first by India's tests in 1974, and then again in 1998, Pakistan soon became addicted to nuclear weapons. Countering India's nukes became secondary. Instead, Pakistani nukes became tools for achieving foreign policy objectives. They created euphoric hyper-confidence and a spirit of machoism that led to breath-taking adventurism in Kashmir. The subsequent Kargil war of 1999 will be recorded by historians as the first actually caused by nuclear weapons. Believing that a nuclear shield made Indian retaliation impossible, Pakistan coyly disclaimed any connection with the attackers who were extracting heavy Indian casualties from their high mountain posts in Kargil.
These illusions were soon to be dispelled. As India counter-attacked, a deeply worried Nawaz Sharif flew to Washington on 4 July 1999, where he was bluntly told to withdraw Pakistani forces or be prepared for full-scale war with India. In an article published last month, Bruce Reidel, Special Assistant to President Clinton, writes that he was present in person when Clinton informed Nawaz Sharif that the Pakistan Army had mobilized its nuclear-tipped missile fleet. Unnerved by this revelation and the closeness to disaster, Nawaz Sharif agreed to immediate withdrawal, shedding all earlier pretensions that Pakistan had no control over the attackers.
Other pretensions continued. Today, in spite of General Musharraf's soothing statements, there is little doubt that militant camps shelter under Pakistan's nuclear umbrella. Having operated openly for over a decade in full public view, and with obvious state backing, only magic - or massive military action - can eliminate them. Whatever Pakistanis might choose to think, the rest of the world remains incredulous of the continuing official Pakistani position that it provides "only diplomatic and moral support" to the people of Kashmir. Earlier denials of military involvement in Kargil, or of providing military support to the Taliban regime, have hugely diminished Pakistan's international credibility.
It is now a matter of survival for Pakistan to visibly demonstrate that it has severed all links with the militant groups it had formerly supported, to be firm about providing "only diplomatic and moral support", and to implement what General Musharraf promised in his Jan 12 speech. To run with the hares and hunt with the hounds - and imagine that the world will not know - has become impossible. War is around the corner.
Difficult though this course of action is, it is also essential if the people of Kashmir are to be spared from the brutal rapaciousness of Indian occupying forces. Although our generals have yet to swallow this bitter pill, the fact is that Kashmir cannot be liberated by force. The "bleed India" policy, an apparently cheap option for Pakistan, was vociferously advocated for over a decade. This has totally collapsed - Pakistan has bled no less than India.
Even more important than the fate of a few million Kashmiris is that of India's huge Muslim minority, which equals or exceeds the population of Pakistan. Without Pakistan's decisive action on cross-border insurgency, the Muslims of India will become the target of state-sponsored pogroms and ethnic cleansing. The massacres of Gujarat provide a chilling preview of what may lie ahead at the hands of a fundamentalist Hindu government.
Terrible dangers lie ahead. Lacking any desire for political settlement or accommodation, or even a strategy for achieving victory, jihadists in Kashmir now operate as a third force independent of the Pakistani state. Their goal is to provoke full-scale war between India and Pakistan, destabilize Musharraf, and settle scores with America. Hence the possibility that they will soon commit some huge atrocity - such as a mass murder of Indian civilians - which would turn India into a mad bull dashing blindly into a nuclear-armed Pakistan.
Many observers have noted that the Srinagar, Delhi, and Jammu attacks on Indian civilians coincided with the visits of high officials from Western countries. Could the forthcoming visit by Richard Armitage provide a trigger for the next atrocity and a nuclear war? -----------------
Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy is professor of physics at Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.

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Kashmir dispute and Åland model

The Åland model could succeed because the two main contenders, Sweden and Finland, showed signs of maturity Leaving all else aside, the basic dispute between India and Pakistan remains the issue of Kashmir. While Pakistan has traditionally asked for third party mediation to settle it, and in doing so also invoked the UN Resolutions on Kashmir, India has equally vehemently rejected such mediation. There is need, therefore, to take a fresh approach to the issue, one that moves away from the stated positions of India and Pakistan and offers new possibilities.
Given the intractable nature of the dispute and the inability of both sides to force any solutions along the lines of 'winner-takes-all', a new approach must follow the 'no-losers' formula. What could that be? This article proposes to look at the Åland (pronounced Oland) Islands model, which refers to the settlement between Sweden, Finland and the people of the group of islands known as the Åland Islands. These islands, with a current population of 25,000, lie between Sweden and Finland in the Gulf of Bothnia.
Historically, these islands were always inhabited by Swedish-speakers. The Åland Islands and Finland were part of the Swedish empire until 1808-1809 when Sweden lost them to Russia in war. Under the Russian dispensation, the Åland Islands became part of the Grand Duchy of Finland. When the Russian Empire started disintegrating, a meeting was held at the Åland Folk High School in August 1917, with secret discussions between representatives of all the Åland districts. The meeting resolved to work towards a reunion with Sweden, the old mother country. This wish was conveyed to the King and the government of Sweden. A mass petition signed by an overwhelming majority of the resident adult population wanted their islands to be joined with Sweden.
Meanwhile, the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 made it possible for Finland to proclaim itself an independent republic. This was so because in his early years Lenin was strongly committed to the right of national self-determination. However, the Finns were not prepared to comply with the Ålanders' demand for reunion with Sweden. They were instead willing to give the Ålanders internal self-government. In 1920, the Parliament of Finland passed an autonomy act, but the Ålanders were unwilling to accept it at that stage.
Because the dispute had an international character and could easily erupt into a war between Sweden and Finland, the Åland Islands question was referred to the newly formed League of Nations. In June 1921, the Council of the League confirmed Finland's sovereignty over the Åland Islands. In return, Finland undertook to guarantee the inhabitants of the Åland Islands their Swedish language, culture and customs. The decision was supplemented by a treaty between Finland and Sweden on how the guarantees were to be effected. In order to avoid any recurrence of conflict the League of Nations decided that a treaty should be drawn up on Åland's demilitarization and neutralization. This meant that none of the three parties in the conflict, Finland, Sweden and the Åland Islands, was left without any benefits. Finland received sovereignty over the Åland Islands, the Åland Islands received their autonomy combined with guarantees for the Swedish language and culture, and Sweden received guarantees that Åland would not constitute a military threat to Sweden. Since then the Autonomy Act has been completely revised twice, in 1951 and 1993, but the basic structure remains unchanged. Only those possessing regional Åland citizenship can vote in elections and contest public office. Anybody who goes away from the islands for more than five years loses his/her citizenship. Citizenship can be applied for by aliens who may have lived there for five or more years. The Ålanders can freely go and work in Sweden and in Finland but the treaty does not ordinarily allow non-Ålanders to buy property on the islands.
The Åland model could succeed because the two main contenders, Sweden and Finland, showed signs of maturity and agreed on a formula that could preserve the peace and deliver advantages on all sides. There is nothing which says that Pakistan and India cannot agree to something similar. Of course the situation in Kashmir is quite different - most notably that this former princely State is now divided between Pakistan and India. That only means that a solution will have to be found with this situation in mind.
As a start, both Pakistan and India could be persuaded that a rationalised Line of Control be converted into an international border. Later, both states could withdraw or at least drastically reduce their armed personnel from their respective parts and make travelling between them relatively free for bona fide Kashmiris, though without the automatic right to settle on the other side. Such a course could then begin a process which will finally enable both sides to exorcise the ghost of Partition from their midst. This is also essential because South Asia needs a cooperative framework both for progressive and survival.
The author is an associate professor of Political Science at Stockholm University. He has authored two books and written extensively for various newspapers and journals

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The warped logic of nuclear gambles

The main issue is to protect the country from the sinister adventurists who are pushing the region into the nuclear abyss under the cover of patriotism.

IT IS difficult to attribute a shred of rationality to the war preparations that are taking place in India. Aside from being ethically objectionable, they serve no useful purpose. The impulsive side of the situation is easy to understand. As the Indian leadership sees it, cross-border terrorism cannot be allowed to continue. Sooner or later, "we have to hit back". Let us for the moment accept this discourse of counter-terrorism, even though it may hide more sinister designs, as discussed below. Where will this "reaction" lead? Pakistani leaders have made it clear that if they are pushed to the wall, they may use nuclear weapons. Indian strategists dismiss the threat on the ground that Pakistan would never "dare" to do this, since it would invite a devastating second strike. This confidence is misplaced, for several reasons.
First, it is far from clear if India would really respond to a Pakistani first strike with a devastating "second strike". That would certainly be a foolish thing to do, since India has nothing to gain (and plenty to lose) from a nuclear showdown with Pakistan. Also, international intervention may prevent it. Of course, a second strike cannot be ruled out. The point is that India's response is anyone's guess. The uncertain nature of India's response makes it, in turn, difficult to rule out a first strike: if the stakes are high enough, Pakistani leaders may take the risk.
Second, even if a second strike is certain, it does not follow that Pakistan would necessarily refrain from a first strike. It would be naive to expect nuclear decisions in a war situation to be based on a rational assessment of the consequences. Further, suicide is not incompatible with rationality. A military commander who believes that martyrdom leads to heaven is quite capable of launching a nuclear missile even if he knows that a devastating response is certain.
Third, nuclear war does not proceed in neat and predictable steps such as "first strike" and "second strike". It is more likely to be the outcome of a process of escalating violence. The risky, unpredictable and even irrational nature of escalatory processes is well understood in the strategic literature. History, too, tells us that massive armed conflicts often begin with trivial skirmishes, initiated on the cheerful assumption that hostilities are going to be "limited". Even World War I essentially happened through escalation.
Indian strategists have produced all sorts of warped arguments to convince us that the military option is "safe". The smartest of them all, K. Subrahmanyam, has recently argued that we can sleep in peace because if Pakistani fingers come anywhere near the nuclear button the U.S. army will "disarm" Pakistan's nuclear facilities through surgical strikes. Give us a break, my friend. What if this highly speculative reasoning turns out to be mistaken, for whatever reason? What if the U.S. strikes on Pakistan arrive a little late - say an hour late, enough for a dozen Pakistani missiles to leave the launch pad? What if some of the U.S. missiles miss their target, leaving enough firepower for Pakistan to nuke a few Indian cities?
The bottom line is inescapable: if India attacks Pakistan, nuclear war simply cannot be excluded. In answer to this, many argue that "Pakistan has much more to lose from a nuclear war than we do". Big deal. When Delhi is in flames and Jaipur has been reduced to ashes, what consolation will it be that the sufferings of our brethren across the border are even worse?
The problem with nuclear war is that grasping its horrors is often beyond our imaginative powers. That makes it possible to talk about nuclear war as if it were a "game". We can discuss the pros and cons of "taking out" enemy cities or "settling scores" with Pakistan with the same detachment as chess players or cricket fans. The cool language of strategic thinking insulates us from the excruciating agony of the victims.
Assuming that we could somehow trust the impending war to be "limited", what would India gain from it? No one has explained this clearly. It would certainly be childish to expect that a limited war between India and Pakistan would end cross-border terrorism, let alone help bring peace to Kashmir. On the contrary, there is every chance that the violence would increase. After months of merciless bombing in Afghanistan, the U.S. is more vulnerable than ever to terrorist attacks. Israel's recent experience is much the same. Like it or not, the sledgehammer approach does not work.
Even if a war is averted, troubling questions arise about the strategic value of this kind of nuclear bullying (or "coercive diplomacy", as it is called in strategic circles), not to speak of its ethical acceptability. The gains (if any) are small, and the risks are enormous. The military build-up on the border has effectively put India at the mercy of enterprising terrorists: any loose cannon with a few grenades and Pakistani chocolates in his pockets can potentially trigger a nuclear conflict in the region. The situation has already been skilfully exploited by the perpetrators of the Kaluchak massacre; the military build-up is almost an invitation for further incidents of this kind.
Given the transparently counterproductive nature of war preparations from the point of view of halting cross-border terrorism, we are forced to consider an alternative reading of the whole situation, which actually makes more sense to anyone with a minimally critical mind. For many people who are frighteningly close to the levers of power, cross-border terrorism is just an excuse for a war they have been seeking all along. The BJP hardliners have never made any secret of their military ambitions. Go to any RSS headquarters and you will see a map of Akhand Bharat, the promised land, which includes not only "Pakistan-occupied Kashmir" but also the rest of Pakistan.
Further, the Gujarat massacres have made it painfully clear that the Sangh Parivar "means business". Surely, those who have supported the mass killing of innocent Muslims in Gujarat can also condone a "nuclear showdown" with Pakistan? Indeed they are making no secret of this apocalyptic dream: they are proclaiming it in open meetings, in television interviews, and other public forums. The writing is on the wall, in capital letters and fluorescent paint. I fear that future generations of Indians may have good reason to blame us for ignoring it.
Seen in this light, the main issue is not whether and how India should respond to cross-border terrorism (important as it might be). The main issue is to protect the country from the sinister adventurists who are pushing the region into the nuclear abyss under the cover of patriotism.
What is most distressing in all this is the lack of concern, on all sides, for the people on whose behalf the violence is supposed to be taking place, namely the Kashmiri people. In this respect, the official policy on Kashmir is a bundle of contradictions. On the one hand, Kashmir is held to be an inalienable part of India. On the other, Kashmiris are not deemed worthy of the basic human and civil rights owed to all Indian citizens. Until their aspirations are addressed, the iron fist approach to cross-border terrorism will be futile and the violence will continue.
(The writer is Visiting Professor, Delhi School of Economics.)

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Pull Back From The Brink - War is no solution

The roll of war drums is getting louder as India and Pakistan move perilously close to a deadly confrontation. After India's tough diplomatic measures following the May 14 terrorist carnage at Kaluchak near Jammu, there is clamour for "action" in particular, " limited strikes" across the Line of Control. This demand has got louder after Mr Abdul Gani Lone's assassination. However, as we see below, New Delhi would be totally ill-advised to initiate armed hostilities against Pakistan. But can one argue that war is an irrational, extremely risky, dysfunctional option, and still avert appeasing the forces of terrorism?
The short, emphatic, answer is, yes. An armed attack on Pakistan is unwarranted because Kaluchak does not constitute a casus belli (reason for war). Although the Vajpayee government claims to have established the identity of the militants involved in Kaluchak as Pakistanis, it has produced no credible evidence that they were sponsored, or indirectly aided or abetted, by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. Frankly, it is hard to believe that Pakistan at this stage would engineer such an act (or for that matter, the December 13 Parliament attack). This is not because military-ruled Islamabad has suddenly become a noble, benign or well-intentioned power. It is because of the international setting and the military-diplomatic pressure under which Gen Pervez Musharraf operates today.
When the General, rightly or wrongly, decided to throw his lot with Washington, he greatly narrowed his own freedom of action. He has been compelled to act against militant "freedom-fighters" at the risk of facing the Right-wing mullahs' wrath at home. With American troops present in four locations in Pakistan, and participating in active military operations to mop up Al-Qaeda-Taliban members on Pakistani soil, Gen Musharraf would have to be mad or keen to shoot himself in the foot to ask the ISI to embark on a high-risk adventure in Jammu on May 14, just when a senior US diplomat was visiting South Asia.
A more plausible explanation is that the Kaluchak terrorists were anti-Musharraf jehadis. Recent violent incidents in Pakistan targeted at the government and its Western collaborators suggest the same--especially the Islamabad church bombing in March, and the May 8 attack in Karachi, killing 11 French technicians. These were calculated to show that jehadi militants are capable of wreaking vengeance upon the Pakistani state.
On rational, informed, judgment, these incidents--including the Kaluchak massacre--couldn't have been sponsored by Islamabad. They were probably the work of a "rogue" agency or of terrorist groups bent on provoking a war in order to weaken the Pakistani state, get the Americans out, and spread communal terror in battle-scarred India. This goal may sound grossly unrealistic, even bordering on the insane. But neither the dementia nor the demonic determination of Taliban-style jehadis should be underestimated. These forces of apocalyptic terrorism even wanted to destroy the US!
It would be ludicrously irrational and irresponsible for India to start a war with Pakistan unless there is convincing proof of Islamabad's hand in specific acts of terrorism, and unless all non-coercive diplomatic options are exhausted. It won't do to hold Islamabad generally, vaguely guilty of sponsoring terror. New Delhi has been sloppy in this regard. For instance, its homework on the list of 20 "suspects" has been extraordinarily poor. A majority of the 20 don't live in Pakistan. Only a fourth are charged with involvement in recent incidents. Others, like the Khalistanis or Dawood Ibrahim, have cases going back to the 1980s or 1990s. Even here, the necessary filing of charges in Indian courts has not been done, as required under the law.
New Delhi will not be able to convince the international community of its case for military intervention without such clinching evidence, especially in regard to Kashmir, where it itself has a questionable human rights record. Today, unlike during the 1999 Kargil war, Pakistan is not globally isolated. Then, its troops, poorly disguised as "Kashmiri freedom-fighters", crossed the LoC, alarming the world. Today, it's India that's upping the ante under a government which in the world's eyes has lost direction, popularity and legitimacy, and which, after the Gujarat carnage, is looking desperately for rescue.
The Vajpayee government is far too dependent on the US to want easily and openly to defy Washington's call for restraint. Its own role-model here is Israel, which has successfully imitated the US' "anti-terrorist" excesses by unleashing unspeakable horrors upon the Palestinian people. But Pakistan is not the Palestinian Authority, a weak regime with barely municipal powers. Rather, it is an unbalanced, fairly strong, Middle Power, one with nuclear weapons.
India does have conventional superiority over Pakistan. But this is not of an overwhelming nature, as between Israel and the PA, or the US and Iraq. Besides, Gen Musharraf has a powerful argument for American ears. He can claim his troops cannot fight on two fronts; if the US wants them near the Afghan border, then it should be prevent India from escalating tension on the eastern front.
New Delhi thus faces a predicament. It wants to "settle scores" with Pakistan. Passivity in the face of Kaluchak, after India has ratcheted up the border build-up to high levels, can only lower India's "tough-guy" image and perhaps embarrass the army leadership. But India cannot unleash an attack without risking US displeasure. It seems to be seeking an angry, immature, way out of the dilemma by preparing for "limited war" and "surgical strikes".
The most talked-about plan is either to launch covert operations inside Pakistan or destroy terrorist camps and communication routes in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and hold on to the territory and let Islamabad decide whether to escalate the conflict. This would send the salutary message to anti-India terrorists that they must pay a heavy price for their operations. The hope is that the action would weaken the Musharraf regime, which has already lost some credibility with the referendum, and promote restrained behaviour on its part.
This plan is totally adventurist and fraught with grave danger. Delusional ideas like "limited" war assume that the adversary has no freedom of action. In reality, Pakistan, as much as India, will determine the level of escalation and intensity of the conflict. Given today's balance of power, there exists no mechanism to limit the military force used. India is vulnerable on parts of the LoC--just as Pakistan is. Each can hurt the other considerably by extending, widening and prolonging the conflict.
Any full-scale war in today's circumstances necessarily means Nuclear Armageddon. This is totally, wholly, absolutely unacceptable--no matter what the cause, threat, or provocation. Even if the Vajpayee government gets a nod from Washington to inflict "limited" punishment on Pakistan, it will be hard put to cap the conflict, without losing face. The US will remain the fulcrum or cornerstone of its policy. This government cannot afford to annoy Washington without inviting serious reprimand and paying a high price for crossing the LoC--just as Pakistan did in 1999.
However, we should not underrate the Vajpayee government's capacity for adventurism, brinkmanship and mischief. It is led by men and women who justified the Gujarat carnage and made outrageously communal statements about it (which Mr Vajpayee has altered without an apology--to avoid breach-of-privilege charges). They have created crisis after crisis every few months: the nuclear tests, ICHR textbook censorship, UTI scam, sugar scandal, the Kargil intelligence disaster, underselling of public sector units, the Tehelka scam, Mr George Fernandes' disgraceful return to the Cabinet (despite charges against him), the Balco sell-off, blatant rewriting of history textbooks, the Ram temple campaign revival ...
Till May 14, the bulk of public opinion, all of the Opposition, and much of the establishment was united against the government, whose character it saw as untrustworthy, and prone to undemocratic, sectarian and irresponsible behaviour. Are we now suddenly to trust the same bunch of people on life-and-death issues? On using military force before other options have been exhausted? On understanding the profound but painful truth that war's only legitimate aim is not victory, but peace?
Are we to let BJP leaders pretend that India is the US, and therefore should emulate it by unilaterally launching armed action against Pakistan just as America avenged September 11? Are we to suspend all our critical faculties and allow jingoistic nationalism to overwhelm us?
It is bad enough that the government has expelled Pakistan's high commissioner. This is no more than an expression of anger. But terminating diplomatic contacts with Pakistan, while begging the US to side with us, is no way of resolving any issues that matter. One sincerely hopes that this is not followed by other thoughtless measures such as abrogating the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. This would be illegal. Besides, the World Bank, on whom this government is dependent for soft loans, guarantees that Treaty. The alternative logical course would be to take the "cross-border terrorism" issue to the United Nations, and to make imaginative proposals like joint patrolling of the LoC under neutral UN supervision. In any case, "limited war" is no option. It represents insanity.

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Pakistan has secretly built up nuclear arsenal

PAKISTANI scientists have secretly been working round the clock for the past three years to accelerate production of weapons-grade uranium for atomic warheads. According to a leading Pakistani nuclear physicist, the country could have more warheads than previously thought.
Pakistan successfully tested a ballistic surface-to-surface missile yesterday for the second day running, increasing tension with its nuclear rival, India, and once again proving that it also has the means to deliver its weapons.
On the other side of the border, Atal Behari Vajpayee, the Indian Prime Minister, said his country's patience with Islamic militant attacks was running out: "There is a limit to our patience," he said in a national television address.
Pervez Hoodbhoy, professor of nuclear physics at Quaid-e-Azam university in Islamabad, told The Times: "The scientists have been working in three shifts over the past three years since the Kargil conflict." Dr Hoodbhoy said there were clear indications that the nuclear warheads were already in place on missiles.
"We are much closer to a nuclear confrontation with India than at any other time," he said.
The disclosure raised the possibility that Pakistan could assemble more nuclear warheads than the estimated 30 to 50. Each warhead is thought to have the same explosive power as the US atomic weapon dropped over Hiroshima in 1945. Reports say that India has already taken its warheads out of storage to be fitted to delivery systems.
Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, leaves for the region today to try to ease tensions and to open dialogue. He will propose establishing greater contact between Islamabad and New Delhi to avoid either side accidentally triggering a nuclear holocaust.
President Bush appealed to President Musharraf to "show results" by clamping down on attacks in India by militants from Pakistan. Mr Musharraf, who is due to deliver a televised address to the Pakistani people today, said that he had acted to stop all military actions and insisted he was not looking for confrontation with India. But he also vowed to defend himself if attacked.
In an interview with the Washington Post, he accused India of trying to "destabilise me, my Government and Pakistan" in the past weeks and gave warning that if war broke out "we'll take the offensive into Indian territory".
India, which outnumbers Pakistan in conventional and nuclear weapons, paid particularly close attention to the missile tests over the weekend.
Pakistan successfully tested a short-range Ghaznavi missile capable of hitting targets 180 miles away yesterday. On Saturday it tested a Ghauri missile with a range of 950 miles. It is widely expected to test fire its long range Shaheen 2 missile, which can reach targets 1,800 miles away.
"The flight data indicated that all design parameters have been successfully validated," a military spokesman said. The development is said to have enhanced Pakistan's tactical nuclear strike capability.
The Ghauri missile is capable of hitting Delhi, Bombay and other major Indian cities, while the Ghaznavi, according to defence experts, could be used against the Indian forces on the front line. "Ghaznavi underscores Pakistan's capability for tactical nuclear strike," a defence analyst said.
The tests were conducted in defiance of an appeal by President Bush and President Putin who, on Saturday, expressed concern over the missile launches and urged Mr Musharraf to halt raids into Indian-controlled territory.
Pakistan welcomed Mr Putin's suggestion for a meeting between Indian and Pakistani leaders in Kazakhstan next month. Pakistani officials said that President Musharraf was prepared for talks with Indian leaders "anytime, anywhere".
Pakistan insisted that the missile tests were routine. "The tests were merely a technical requirement and it should not be seen as an offensive measure," Nisar Memon, the Minister for Information, said. Nevertheless, the timing was a defiant gesture that added to world alarm.

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General brushes aside India's complaints on terrorism

In his much-awaited address to the Pakistani nation on Monday night, President Pervez Musharraf repeated his earlier promise not to allow any terrorist attacks from the country's soil, but brushed aside India's complaints on cross-border terrorism saying no infiltration was taking place from their side.
During his 25-minute televised address, the general, who looked tense, had nothing new to offer India, belying international expectations that he would announce steps to curb infiltration by terrorists, which would have helped ease the tension between India and Pakistan.
Instead, Musharraf chose to attack India for the current escalation of tension and pledged to continue Pakistan's support to the "freedom struggle" in Jammu & Kashmir. He also referred to the atrocities on Muslims and other minorities in Gujarat and elsewhere in India in this connection.
Musharraf told Pakistanis that tension with India "was at its height" and the danger of war "is not over yet". Wearing his uniform, General Musharraf said Pakistan would not be the first to initiate war. "We want peace in the region," he said.
Claiming that Pakistan was not doing anything across the Line of Control in Jammu & Kashmir, he said Islamabad would never allow the export of terrorism anywhere in the world from its soil. He maintained that Pakistan had taken 'bold' steps after his January 12 speech.
"Unfortunately," he said, "we have not seen any positive steps from India."
Musharraf appealed to world leaders to impress upon India to move towards normalisation of relations and de-escalation of tensions, initiate a dialogue, cease all "atrocities" on Kashmiris and allow the international media and human rights organisations to go to Kashmir to see the situation there.
He also blamed 'Hindu extremists' for killing Muslims in Jammu & Kashmir and Gujarat and committing atrocities on other religious minorities as well as the scheduled castes and tribes in other parts.
Vowing to back what he called the "struggle for liberation" of Kashmiris, the general said Islamabad would continue to provide "moral, political and diplomatic" support to them.
PTI

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SAHR asks India, Pak to ensure peace

New Delhi, May 27: In a statement released on Monday, South Asians for Human Rights has called upon peace loving citizens of India and Pakistan to "come forward and resist this mentality" of hate between the two countries.
In the statement SAHR said, "the spectre of another conflict between India and Pakistan is again haunting one-fifth of humankind. At the same time the people desire only peace."
"They recognise the historical truth that war has never solved any issue and that a war between India and Pakistan at this point in time will further fuel the focus of militancy, terrorism and quasi-religious bigotry that have already soured relations between these closest neighbours and also plagued domestic peace on both sides," it further stated.

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