Recent developments suggest India and Pakistan are rapidly moving
towards the deployment of nuclear weapons - with potentially
disastrous consequences.
AS India and Pakistan carry their eyeball-to-eyeball military
confrontation into its third month, can their citizens, and the
larger world, feel reassured that the stand-off will not get out of
control, by accident, overreaction or miscalculation? Is there real
clarity on India's aims behind mobilising 700,000 troops and putting
them on full alert, or on the conditions under which de-escalation
can begin? Does India hope to secure the release of all 20 terrorists
in its list, which curiously excludes Omar Sheikh? Or will it settle
for some or all of the 14 Indian citizens? Does Pakistan understand
those conditions? Are the two countries' political and military
leaders reading the signals right? The honest answer to these
questions must be 'no'. This is worrisome evidence that New Delhi and
Islamabad continue to misread each other's intentions and plans, to
think largely in worst-case-scenario terms, and to trade accusations
and counter-charges.
Take General Pervez Musharraf's astonishing February 13 statement at
the Woodrow Wilson Centre for Scholars in Washington, obliquely
suggesting that India may have carried out a nuclear test, in
addition to the January 25 test-flight of a new, improved short-range
version of the Agni missile. To quote Musharraf verbatim: "The
missile test carried out by India, and some information, some news
even, of maybe a possibility of a nuclear test, is most untimely and
may I also say, provocative." Indian officials promptly,
vociferously, denied this. And some unnamed U.S. officials were
quoted as saying "we don't have any information that would suggest
anything like that having occurred". It is far from clear if, as
claimed, Musharraf shared "this information" (which he admits is not
"conclusive evidence"), with the U.S. Many Indian newspapers poured
scorn upon Musharraf's charge that India might be preparing to
conduct some kind of nuclear tests. Some attributed his charge to
paranoia.
There is another way of looking at the issue - on the frank
assumption that we do not know the truth about India's testing plans,
including sub-critical tests, as well as test explosions; our
secretive government is extremely unlikely to reveal the truth. That
hypothesises that either New Delhi was dissembling, or Musharraf was
indulging in wild, paranoid, speculation about India's actions and
intentions: there was no Indian test, nor preparation for one.
Neither hypothesis is very reassuring. The second, in particular,
implies a serious misreading of India's capabilities and intentions.
This is part of a dangerous pattern replicated by both sides for at
least two decades. The pattern involves making boastful claims about
one's nuclear and missile prowess, and running down the adversary's
capabilities - on the dubious assumption that the technologies in
question are "advanced".
Thus, Indian leaders, misled by the nuclear scientocracy, repeatedly
ignored until 1998 signs of progress in Pakistan's nuclear programme
right since 1987 - when A.Q. Khan granted an interview to Kuldip
Nayar, declaring "we have" the Bomb. Indeed, until Pakistan's first
test of May 28, 1998, many influential figures in the Indian
establishment refused to believe that Islamabad had the Bomb. Home
Minister L.K. Advani's speech of May 18, threatening a "pro-active",
aggressive Kashmir policy in the changed "geo-strategic"
circumstances, was based on that hopelessly mistaken assumption.
This gives the South Asian nuclear standoff a particularly nasty,
perhaps uniquely ominous, aspect. Put simply, two important
pre-conditions for the feasibility of any kind of deterrent equation
- however unstable and degenerative it may be - do not obtain here.
These are, one, that adversaries have fairly reliable, accurate,
knowledge of their ability to inflict "unacceptable damage" upon each
other through nuclear weapons. And, two, they will adopt an extremely
cautious approach as regards military confrontation.
Thus, ever since the USSR acquired nuclear weapons in 1949, there
never was any doubt about its ability to inflict "unacceptable
damage" upon the U.S., and vice versa. By the 1960s, both sides had
the capacity to raze numerous mainland cities. By the 1970s, they had
enough firepower to destroy the entire globe many times over - by the
mid-1980s, some 50 times over. Both were clear they could not
countenance tens of thousands civilian deaths in a nuclear attack.
Thus, Eisenhower in the late 1940s turned down proposals for a
"preventive war" against the USSR. "How could you have one?" he
asked, "if one of its features would be several cities lying in
ruins, several cities where many, many thousands of people would be
dead and injured and mangled?" There has been little ambiguity for
decades about the world's first five nuclear states' (N-5) ability to
wreak devastation upon one another (although with its 20 or so
long-range missiles, China's second-strike capability vis-a-vis the
U.S. might be in doubt). That is one reason why the N-5 have not
traded nuclear threats against one another in a cavalier fashion,
especially since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.
As for the reluctance to start a conventional conflict, the U.S. and
the USSR never fired a single shot at each other although they fought
terrible proxy wars in the Third World. The sole exception to the
absence of conventional war among the N-5 was the limited and
sporadic Ussuri river conflict between the USSR and China. The
assumption always was that a nuclear war was far too catastrophic to
risk. There must be no conventional war either, with its potential
for nuclear escalation.
By contrast, India and Pakistan fought an intense, prolonged medium-
or large-scale conventional war, at Kargil, within a year of going
nuclear. Now, they again confront each other with almost a million
men at the border - their biggest-ever mobilisation, and one of the
greatest anywhere since the Second World War. Their political and
military leaders have widely varying definitions of "unacceptable
damage". Some may think sacrificing 200,000 Indians or a million
Pakistanis is not unacceptable. Farooq Abdullah even said it would be
worthwhile to risk a nuclear confrontation with Pakistan: "We all
have to die one day." To complete the picture, Defence Minister
George Fernandes two years ago propounded an outlandish strategic
doctrine: nuclear weapons only deter nuclear weapons, not
conventional arms; nuclear powers can safely fight - and win -
limited conventional wars against each other!
And now, some strategic hawks are advocating that India should "send
clear signals to Pakistan by publicly debating how to administer some
jabs before de-escalating. Limited retributive measures would aim to
inflict calibrated pain and symbolically puncture Pakistan's
Kargil-rooted belief that its nuclear weapons are an effective shield
against Indian retaliation."
It is in this climate, one that favours military and nuclear
misadventurism, that India and Pakistan are proceeding rapidly
towards filling the gap between the manufacture of nuclear weapons
and missiles, and their induction into military forces. India is
taking the lead. Pakistan is likely to follow, as in the past. There
are several indications of this.
* The test-flight of Agni-I on January 25. This missile is both road-
and rail-mobile. It is claimed to be much lighter and more accurate
than the older versions - Agni, range 1,500 km, and Agni-II under
development, 2,000 to 2,500 km. The new missile uses an all-solid
fuel. This offers a major advantage over the liquid fuel used in the
second stage of the earlier models, which is corrosive and requires
prolonged filling. This takes India one step closer to full readiness.
* The Vajpayee government has authorised the armed forces to use the
shorter-range Prithvi missile in the battlefield, according to The
Pioneer (January 31). This is conditional: it must be the "last
resort", under the "utmost restraint". But it does devolve this
critical decision-making power to the Services chiefs, as distinct
from the apex political leadership.
The Prithvi has a range of 150-250 km, depending on the payload. It
is nuclear-capable. The authorisation comes in response to a request
from India's Chiefs of Staff Committee for directions for action in
the eventuality of Pakistan using its short-range Hatf missiles.
Although the authorisation is (presumably) limited to the missile's
use with conventional warheads, this status can easily change. In
practice, adversaries have no sure way of telling if an incoming
missile carries a nuclear or conventional warhead. Missile
flight-time between Indian and Pakistani cities is as little as three
to eight minutes - too short to determine whether an approaching
warhead is nuclear or conventional.
* The Hindustan Times reported (February 15) that Indian Air Force
and Navy personnel are being sent to the Bhabha Atomic Research
Centre of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) to learn how to
handle nuclear devices. The training courses are aimed at building
"synergy" between the DAE and the operators of nuclear weapons.
Under the existing division of labour, the DAE holds the nuclear
cores, while weapons and delivery systems are with the armed forces.
The training is meant to "establish vital linkages" between the two.
An officer is quoted as saying: "These courses are meant to ensure
complete clarity in the deliverer's mind about the process and the
safety measures. So far, the drill has largely been at a conceptual
level."
* India is also negotiating the acquisition of two nuclear-powered
submarines from Russia. The two "Bars" class multi-role submarines
are likely to be leased in 2004 and deployed in the Indian Ocean to
"balance" China's growing presence.
This is significant because India's own nuclear submarine development
project has repeatedly failed to deliver. In 1988 too, India had
leased a Soviet nuclear submarine for three years. Nuclear-powered
submarines can stay under water for up to a year and hence carry a
big element of surprise.
* India is trying to buy long-range Tupolev nuclear bombers from
Russia. Pakistan is also scouting the market for similar equipment.
The closer India and Pakistan move towards actual deployment of
nuclear weapons, the harder it will be to roll back the nuclear arms
race and advance processes of nuclear restraint and disarmament.
The arms acquisition programmes are buttressed by elevated nuclear
rhetoric and India's acquiescence in the new ultra-hawkish approach
to proliferation in George Bush's 'State of the Union' address.
Examples of the first are Army chief Gen. S. Padmanabhan's January 11
statement, and the Navy chief's January 16 pronouncement hinting that
India has a second-strike capability. Gen. Padmanabhan warned that
although "nuclear weapons are not meant for war fighting", India
would severely punish any state that is "mad enough to use nuclear
weapons against any of our assets". He said, "The perpetrator shall
be so severely punished that his very existence will be in doubt. We
are ready for a second strike."
However, even more far-reaching is India's passive acceptance of
Bush's new counter-proliferation doctrine, which violates the
half-century-long consensus, which holds that the spread of weapons
of mass destruction can only be stopped by political or peaceful, not
military means.
When Bush said, "I will not stand by as peril draws closer and
closer, the U.S. will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes
to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons", he was no
longer talking about merely extending the "war on terrorism", but of
launching a series of larger wars to stop the spread of weapons of
mass destruction. He was speaking of replacing diplomacy with
military force. As The New York Times commented, "the application of
power and intimidation has returned to the forefront of American
foreign policy."
This is an ominous development. It will legitimise the routine use of
military force as the preferred instrument of state policy. It will
potentially replicate the example set by Israel's act of brigandage
in bombing Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 to eliminate the
"proliferation danger". We now know that Bush's father too was under
pressure from Republican hawks in 1994 to bomb and destroy a North
Korean facility where some spent-fuel rods from a nuclear reactor
were supposed to have been stored. He resisted the pressure. His son
is likely to capitulate to it.
It is a matter of shame that there have been no words of caution and
restraint from New Delhi on any of this. It has maintained an
unconscionable silence on the U.S.' reportedly advanced plans to
attack Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein. Nor has there been any noise
from South Block on the "Axis of Evil", comprising North Korea, Iraq
and Iran. The very least that the term implies is close coordination
between the three. But North Korea has little contact with the other
two. And these two have fought bitter wars, and continue to be
rivals, although India has good relations with both.
New Delhi's genuflection before the arrogant, imperious U.S. is
complete even as that Hyperpower divides the rest of the world into
"vassals" and "tributaries". Where does Vajpayee's India belong?
The crushing defeat of the BJP in the recent elections
in U.P. Uttaranchal and the Punjab is, in fact, defeat of
communalism. The BJP for long had been playing double game. It
pretended to be secular before the Indian people in general but
maintained its communal face before its hard core cadre. It is not
possible to deceive the people for ever. Its leaders, including the
Prime Minister Shri A.B. Vajpayee told the nation that the
construction of the Ramjanambhoomi Mandir was not on its (NDA) agenda
but whenever elections were declared its other face appeared in the
form of VHP and Bajrang Dal. And these outfits of the Sangh Parivar
would threaten to construct the temple from a declared date to
satisfy the Hindutvawadis. This bluff now has been called off.
Of course the VHP and some hard core elements still
maintain that the BJP faced crushing defeat, as it did not fulfil its
promise to construct the Ram temple in Ayodhya. They maintain that
the BJP would have won had it taken up the cause of the Ram temple.
However, this claim is not born out by the ground reality. All
surveys show that people are tired of temple issue. They are more
interested in developmental issues than temples and mosques. The BJP
was defeated simply because it did not deliver.
The BJP failed on all fronts. Its slogan was "bhay, bhook
aur bhrashtachar se mukti i.e. freedom from fear, hunger and
corruption. It was nothing more than a deceptive slogan. The BJP
governments in all states - in Gujrat, in U.P. and in Uttaranchal
indulged in record corruption. In Punjab too, along with the Akalis
it was partner in corruption. It had several criminals among the
elected representatives and even in the Cabinets. In Gujrat the VHP
and the Bajrang Dal repeatedly attacked the minorities and minorities
including Muslims and Christians have been living in perpetual fear
in Gujrat. In U.P. they had to moderate their attacks on minorities
as they ruled in alliance with other secular parties. The Gujrat was
referred to as the 'laboratory of Hindutva' by the supporters of the
BJP.
The minorities in Gujrat are living in the constant fear
of attacks. The attacks on Christians also began from Dang in Gujrat.
Their churches were demolished and bibles burnt down in various parts
of Gujrat. So much for their slogan of freedom from fear. While BJP
launched a tirade against the corruption in the Congress it described
itself as the 'party with the difference'. Its governments turned out
to be more corrupt than the Congress governments.
As often asserted by this writer a democracy cannot be run by
communalising the polity. A democracy has to be based on secular
principles. In democracy it is citizenship which is fundamental
category and not religion. Parties like the BJP in India and Islamic
parties in other countries try to make religion as fundamental
category rather than citizenship. Only a secular democracy can
guarantee rights of all citizens irrespective of their religion,
caste or creed. Communal parties cannot.
It is unfortunate that even Prime Minister Shri Vajpayee
was not above this kind of politics though he is projected as
moderate in the BJP politics and Shri L.K.Advani as the hawk. Shri
Vajpayee went to the extent of saying during his election campaign
that he does not care for the Muslim votes and that the BJP will win
even if the Muslims do not vote for his party. This resulted in
furore and Mulayam Singh went to the extent of demanding his
resignation. The party managers had to do the damage control and
Vajpayee issued a clarification maintaining, as politicians always
do, that he was misquoted by the press.
But the fact is he did say the BJP could do without
Muslim vote. No doubt he said this in sheer frustration. He was of
course receiving the results of pre-poll surveys which clearly
indicated that the BJP is losing and the Muslims will vote either for
Samajwadi party of Mulayam Singh Yadav or the BSP of Mayawati. Muslim
votes are crucial in more than 60 assembly seats of U.P. No party can
win without the Muslim support in these constituencies and sixty
seats matter a lot.
And it is interesting to note that it was not the first
time that the BJP leaders had made such statement. In previous
elections too, in U.P. in 1991 elections as well as in the Centre in
the 1999 elections the BJP leaders had said that they have shown that
one can win without Muslim votes. Shri A.B.Vajpayee spoke in the same
vein. Somewhere it is the desire of the BJP to win the elections
without the Muslim support and then dispense with their democratic
and constitutional obligations towards minorities. This is what the
communal politics is based on. After all the RSS talk about the Hindu
Rashtra is not just a slogan. It is their deep desire and their
political logic is based on this. Zial-ul-Haq also marginalised the
Hindu and Christian minorities in Pakistan politics by introducing
separate electorate for them.
Shri. Vajpayee also sings different tunes in different
places. First he said in Staten Island in USA among the crowd of the
VHP sadhus that "RSS is his soul" and changed his statement when he
returned to India. To please his Hindutva constituency he made a
statement that construction of Ram temple reflected national
sentiment but when he came under attack from opposition he mused from
his holiday resort in Kerala that " do not disturb the status quo"
at Ayodhya, Kashi, Mathura and other places. "The Government will not
remain a silent spectator" he said "and adopt delaying tactics, as
unfortunately happened eight years ago."
The BJP, and any communal party for that matter, tries to
arouse communal sentiments and bases its politics only on these
sentiments. Under compulsions of the NDA politics the BJP-led
Government at the Centre tries to maintain a moderate and secular
face but reverts to its communal face when it comes to winning
election taking people's religious sentiments for granted. The BJP
had totally failed to provide good governance in U.P. and other
states and as soon as the U.P. elections were announced it resorted
to various emotional measures like banning the SIMI (Students Islamic
Movement of India), enactment of POTO in the teeth of opposition to
fight terrorism and raise the Mandir issue through VHP and Bajrang
Dal.
However, as the results show nothing helped it. The BJP
by itself could not get even 100 seats in U.P. The SP of Mulayam
Singh Yadav has emerged as the largest single party with 148 seats
and Mayawati's BSP got 94 seats, which is an impressive gain. This is
the worst performance of the BJP since its ascendance to power on the
Ramjanambhoomi issue. Not only this Shri Vajpayee, sensing the
defeat, was not referring to local issues in his campaign speeches at
all both in U.P. as well as in the Punjab. He was referring only to
emotional issues of cross border terrorism and attack on parliament
on 13th December.
Again it was keeping in view the U.P. elections that the
Vajpayee Government severed all connections with Pakistan. Rail, bus
and air links with Pakistan were snapped to arouse emotional
hysteria. The people to people contacts in both the countries are
very important to promote amity and friendship between the two
countries and peace in South Asia depends on peace between India and
Pakistan. Now it will take, one does not know how long, to restore
these links again. Pakistani rulers of course are no less to blame.
It is, however, another story.
The BJP should now learn a lesson that its communalism
and politics of religion will not take it far. The basic issues of
the people will have to be addressed which are issues of development,
poverty, unemployment and housing. People cannot vote for it
indefinitely on issues of temple and mosque. The defeat in the U.P.
elections is a clear writing on the wall for the BJP. The
Hindutvawadis, it must be understood, will not rest in peace. They
may put more pressure on the BJP leadership to intensify the Mandir
issue arguing that it lost because it did not fulfil its promise to
build the temple.
Thus one has to wait and watch. One does not know who
will form the Government in U.P. If Mulayam Singh forms the
Government the BJP may intensify the Mandir issue to embarrass the
Mulayam Singh Government. Or under pressure from its hard core
elements the BJP leadership may try to intensify it and put the
country again on fire. The Gujrat elections are due in next 11 months
and conditions in Gujrat are also not very congenial for the BJP. The
BJP lost heavily in Panchayat elections in Gujrat last year despite
weak and faction ridden Congress. In bye-elections in Gujrat along
with the elections in U.P. though its Chief Minister Narendra Modi
scrapped through the BJP lost two other seats to the Congress.
Thus it is not the end of woes of the BJP. It has lost the
biggest state of U.P. and is likely to face tough time in its
'laboratory of the Hindutva'. It may play its Hindutva card much more
intensely as Gujrat is also quite crucial to the survival of the BJP.
The secular forces, unfortunately, are endlessly divided. The future
of the country lies only in strengthening secular democracy.
There may not be immediate fall out of the U.P. results
on the NDA Government at the Centre but cracks may appear soon. There
are already rumblings within the BJP against the Vajpayee leadership.
They now doubt his capacity to deliver. His charisma is wearing thin
and the hawks may gain upper hand. And if the secular forces fight
among themselves as in Maharashtra, only the communal hawks will gain.
Centre for Study of Society and Secularism
9B, Himalaya Apts., 1st floor, 6th Road,
Santacruz (E),
Mumbai:- 400 055.
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