index
Early this year in Qasbah Colony, Karachi, I saw a poster that
proclaimed, "Shahadat Conference". Its central image was of a masked
man holding a machine gun, the background red, as in the afterglow of
an explosion. Along the margins of the poster were photographs of
martyrs, all the faces were young, some ridiculously so. The poster
also had a date for the conference and promised a "telephonic"
address from Syed Ali Geelani. It was placed on the outside wall of a
house that served as a school.
I was standing in a narrow lane of houses when I saw this poster. The
lane was on a hill. As I looked further up the lane, over the
rooftops following the phone lines, towards the hillside, I saw a
sign that commanded the community - it said 'Jaish-e-Muhammad'.
Qasbah Colony is next to the site area where the heavy industries of
Karachi are located. It is one of the colonies that houses the
industrial workforce. I had gotten there along broken roads, open
sewers and open-air trash burnings. In the entire area I saw only one
building that said it was a government-run educational institution.
I wonder if any of the $1 billion that Washington promised Islamabad
for the defanging of the madarsas, will make it to Qasbah Colony. I
wonder if the most obvious signs of violence will be removed. For
once I would like Barkha Dutt and her Star TV crew to cover Kashmir
from Qasbah Colony, Karachi.
I find myself writing the same thing in response to the attack on New
Delhi as what I wrote when Kargil happened.
It is not useful for the indignant Indian to point a finger at who it
is in Pakistan that is responsible for the Kargil war or the attack
on the Parliament. One has to have a compassionate understanding of
each of the players for figuring out the unfolding drama. After all,
for the players, it is a rozi roti ka masla.
In the case of Kargil it was the army, the Sharifs, the Lashkars, and
the public opinion that were the Pakistani factors. Now it is the
army and the Lashkars. Public opinion is only important if it comes
out as mass anarchy.
This should take the edge off the indignation of the Indian: many
things Indian, the public statements of the Indian establishment, the
media, the Indian military budget and the Indian nuclear policy
directly influence the Pakistani players.
Nawaz Sharif campaigned for peace in the last election, the only
prime minister to have done so. He was vociferous about trade with
India. In two years, the number of his office items on the trade list
between Pakistan and India grew substantially, according to a report
by the Karachi Chamber of Commerce.
It is a provocative question whether Sharif was a reluctant tester of
the nuclear device. It is also a question whether he was behind
Kargil or Kargil happened behind his back. This is not a matter of
ancient history: the office of the prime minister may soon come back
to Pakistan.
The Pakistani army is, and has always been, committed to a war with
India. That is its raison d' etre. It was not raised to fight China,
Iran, or Afghanistan. The Indian establishment has a lot of say in
the development of the Pakistan army. The Pakistan military strains
for the achievement of parity with India.
The last couple of years the Pakistani military budget has not grown
in real terms. The country is unable to borrow more. The Pakistanis
would not have exploded the nuclear device if the Indians had not. So
will they match India, if it reduces its military activities.
However, now that Islamabad has followed in the footsteps of New
Delhi, it has the confidence of the first use of a nuclear device.
However, neither is there a dearth of officers, ex and serving, in
Lahore or Rawalpindi, who in their war gaming, play nuclear tactical
strikes as end game.
The Lashkars may be the only Pakistani element that is unaffected by
Indian attitudes and policies. Javed Nasir, ex-chief of Inter-Service
Intelligence (ISI), is on record for saying the Lashkars may be
coordinated by the ISI but they have a mind of their own. Good luck
trying to disarm them.
Remember Sharif accused one of these Lashkars for an attempted
assassination in early 1999. All of them, and the Jamaat, issued
statements of intolerance towards a roll back policy on Kashmir back
when the Pakistanis sued for peace over Kargil. They are saying the
same things now with the Taliban having been crushed. These Lashkars
are a product of the mobilisation that the Americans organised to
fight the first Afghan war. The Americans did not subsequently
demobilise this army.
Ayaz Amir of The Dawn and Tariq Ali in London are a few of the
writers who have called Pakistan a used American condom. The business
end of the condom is now speaking up.
I shudder at the thought of what the Lashkars may be up to, if they
remain the army that they are and have no Kashmir cause.
Pakistan's president has a new role as a key U.S. ally. But concerns
such as Kashmir, nuclear security and the pursuit of democracy
haven't gone away.
SECURITY IS TIGHT around the old prime minister's home, perched on a
hill behind the parliament building in Islamabad, where Gen. Pervaiz
Musharraf keeps one of his offices. Red-capped security guards use
dogs and electronic devices to check for explosives and armed guards
stand at every doorway. But the general himself, dressed in a khaki
uniform, seemed at ease and spoke confidently when he met REVIEW
Editor Michael Vatikiotis for an exclusive interview on domestic and
regional issues.
ARE YOU WORRIED ABOUT A DOMESTIC EXTREMIST BACKLASH AGAINST YOUR
POLICY CHANGE ON THE TALIBAN IN MID-SEPTEMBER?
No. What is worrisome is more in Afghanistan. Everything is moving
well up till now. But there are certain areas of tension--of concern,
I would say. We have to make sure that the political environment that
will emerge in Afghanistan is such which brings peace and stability
and ensures the unity of Afghanistan and is representative of all the
ethnic groups. And which is friendly with all its neighbours, which
includes Pakistan.
THE GOVERNMENT HAS EMBARKED ON A PROGRAMME OF TRANSFORMING THE
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS, OR MADRASSAS, WHICH HELPED PROMOTE ISLAMIC
MILITANCY. HOW WILL THIS WORK?
The madrassas were being manipulated by certain extremists. So
therefore we saw the strength of the madrassas--the strength is free
board and lodging for hundreds and thousands of poor children, which
Pakistan can't afford, certainly. That was the better part. The
negative aspect was that many of these madrassas were only teaching
religious education. We thought we need to utilize the positive and
correct the weakness. We have created a curriculum for the madrassas
to be adopted by them . . . We thought we should absorb the students
in these madrassas into the mainstream of life in Pakistan. I think
this will function. I am going to call the religious leaders and take
them along.
YOU ARE SET ON ELECTIONS FOR OCTOBER 2002?
Yes indeed.
WHAT KIND OF ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE? WILL YOU PREPARE AN
AUTONOMOUS ELECTION COMMISSION?
The election commission will be absolutely autonomous. Provincial
elections will be held at the same time as the national elections in
October next year.
THE HEADS OF BOTH MAINSTREAM PARTIES, BENAZIR BHUTTO AND NAWAZ
SHARIF, ARE NOT IN PAKISTAN FOR THE ELECTION. DO YOU ENVISAGE A ROLE
FOR EITHER OF THEM?
No, I don't see any role for these party leaders . . . in the next
election. Their parties will have a role. It will be a party-based
election. The People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League are two
of the important parties and we wish them well.
WHAT WILL BE THE COMPOSITION OF THE PLANNED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL?
We haven't decided on the composition. It has to be representative.
It has to be a balanced composition which can ensure checks and
balances on the function of the government without being intrusive. I
don't envisage the NSC having any role in the day-to-day functioning
of the government. But certainly overseeing and making sure that the
national interest is held supreme at all times by the government.
ON BROADER SECURITY ISSUES: ARE PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
TECHNOLOGY SECURE?
I can say they are absolutely secure. We have no doubt. We have
institutionalized arrangements. We have a national command authority,
which oversees everything. There are custodial safeguards. The
arrangements we have made are totally secure and I'm very sure that
there cannot be any proliferation; there cannot be any breach of
security; our nuclear and missile assets cannot fall into the wrong
hands at all. This I'm very positive and sure of. Now these
scientists that we are talking of: These are a few irresponsible
people. Whoever has done anything, if we are investigating, then we
will move against them--we'll take legal action against them.
WHAT ABOUT REPORTS OF TWO PAKISTAN NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS WHO MAY HAVE
FLED TO BURMA?
This is news to me. This is the first time I hear of it. I have no
such information. Nobody has told me. I didn't know about it and I
have not spoken to anyone on this issue.
[An aide informs Musharraf that the report was sourced to an Indian
newspaper.]
India just wants one thing. They want to damage us. Anything they
want to do in Afghanistan--the purpose is only one: How to do
something which will be against Pakistan, that will damage our cause.
That is their sole purpose. They have invited the future interior
minister of Afghanistan, Mr. [Younis] Qanuni, there [to Delhi]. They
must have planted something in his mouth to say. We are not bothered.
I am very sure we want to play a positive role in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan has suffered tremendously. We understand their problems.
We are their neighbours. Geography, our common history, our common
culture and religion cannot be undermined by any actions of India,
I'm very sure of that.
ON KASHMIR: WHAT DO YOU MAKE OF BENAZIR BHUTTO'S COMMENT IN NEW DELHI
ABOUT ENGAGING INDIA IN NEGOTIATIONS MODELLED AFTER THE INDIA-CHINA
DISPUTE?
We certainly want to have a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir
dispute. That is what we stand for. Kashmir is the main dispute
between India and Pakistan, because of which we fought so many wars.
It needs to be resolved in a peaceful manner, through a dialogue in
accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir. This is our
stand.
WHAT KIND OF ASSURANCE CAN YOU GIVE THAT THERE WILL BE NO INVOLVEMENT
BY THE GOVERNMENT IN PROMOTING VIOLENCE IN KASHMIR?
There is no government sponsorship of any such thing. Whatever is
happening in India is indigenous--it's by the people of Kashmir. How
could it have gone on if it was not indigenous and did not have the
backing of the people of Kashmir? Why doesn't India open the border
and let international groups like Amnesty International to come and
see?
COULD A PIPELINE FROM IRAN PASSING THROUGH PAKISTAN TO INDIA ACT AS A
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE WITH INDIA?
Absolutely. We're for it. It's India that doesn't want it because of
their own suspicion. Unfortunately there's a lot of suspicion on both
sides.
Jammu: Dec. 19. - About 35 Pakistani soldiers were today killed
and at least 25 Pakistani posts destroyed in Jammu sector on the
Line of Control in Nowshera and other areas of Poonch and Rajouri.
This is a retaliatory action taken by the Army against yesterday's
unprovoked shelling from across the border, defence sources said.
The heavy shelling, started by Pakistani troops to provide cover to
infiltrators last evening, was resumed today, the sources said.
"They started heavy mortar shelling and fire at 10.40 a.m. and it
continued till 1.30 p.m. However, we hit back with a heavy amount
of fire which resulted in the smashing of at least ' 25 Pakistani
posts. The casualties on the other side were expected to be more
than 35. We could see many posts burning from our forward
posts," the defence sources said.
Following the official statements on the culprits and suspects in the
grisly Parliament House attack, the public must ask two basic
questions: Whodunit? And cui bono (who benefits?). The honest answer
to the first is: We still don't know; clinching evidence is yet to
emerge.
The indirect, circumstantial, evidence available generally points to
some Pakistan-backed Kashmiri tanzeem (militant group/movement). But
that's a long distance away from rigorously logical, legally tenable,
proof.
The official case has more holes than a piece of gruyere cheese. Its
first statement (Jaswant Singh's) held the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT)
responsible for December 13. But the Delhi police investigation, the
only one to unearth specific clues, named the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).
Home Minister Advani lifted the police account, but for good measure,
also blamed the LeT. Now, anyone who knows anything about Kashmir
knows the two are disparate, competing, organisations, with
distinctly different genealogies and ideological affiliations.
The Jaish-e-Mohammed was founded last year by Masood Azhar, freed in
the IC-814 hostage exchange. Its birth followed Azhar's split from
Harkat-ul Mujahideen (which changed its name from Harkat-ul Ansar in
1995, after it was proscribed by the US for kidnapping westerners).
The JeM's roots are solidly Deobandi. Ideologically, it is affiliated
to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan, which was also the main
inspiration for the Taliban.
The LeT was established in 1987 by Hafeez Mohammed Saeed, a Gujjar
and former theology professor strongly influenced by the
ultra-orthodox Saudi Arabian Wahhabi school. The LeT is the only
Kashmiri group in the Al-Qaeda network.
It shot to fame with its suicide-bomber (fidayeen) attacks, like the
audacious 1999 action on Badamibagh cantonment. The LeT is run by
Markaz-Dawatul-Irshad which defines its compass in trans-Kashmir
terms - unlike the JeM.
The JeM's headquarters is in Sindh, at Binori, a Karachi suburb. The
LeT is run from Muridke, near Lahore in Punjab. Both were patronised
by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. But the two have never
done a joint operation in the Valley, according to knowledgeable
Kashmiris. Would they do one in New Delhi? Or was the LeT's name
tagged on because it is already on a US watchlist and easy to brand a
pariah?
The government has a lot of explaining to do. So far, it hasn't even
disclosed the specific identities of the five (or was it six?)
attackers, nor their organisational affiliations. They are all
purportedly Pakistani. But the arrested suspects like Syed Geelani
are all Indian.
Their mutual links must be carefully investigated and continually
established. It won't do to present a 10-month old meeting with Ghazi
Baba as adequate evidence. Different accounts of the sequence of
events, personal locations, and explosives used (RDX, according to
early reports, and crude ammonium nitrate, according to police) have
to be reconciled.
Cui bono? It is far too easily assumed that an official Pakistani
agency is behind the attack (eg ISI). Yet, however official
dishonourable Islamabad's intentions - as indeed they are, on past
evidence - it makes little political sense for Pervez Musharraf to up
the ante via the Parliament attack, just when he is under American
surveillance and orders to clean up terrorist bases.
Barring an arcane US-Pakistan conspiracy, the most plausible
explanation is either that some militant group acting solo, or an
agency not fully under Musharraf's control, masterminded the
operation. It was conducted remarkably amateurishly by tanzeem
standards. In either case, the appropriate riposte can't be based on
assumption of Islamabad's direct culpability. If December 13 has
weakened Musharraf, an open-ended, untargeted response would damage
India.
In plain truth, December 13 was neither an act of war nor a casus
belli, or rationale for war. India can only demean itself by
militarily aping Israel or Washington - which three months down the
line is still presenting 'clinching' evidence against the Al-Qaeda.
This doesn't argue that India should minimise or condone the gravity
of December 13, let alone do nothing. There are many options between
inaction and armed attacks on terrorist training camps (most of
which, the armed services chiefs are quoted as saying, are "no more
than drill squares and firing ranges", located "deep inside Pakistan
territory").
It is easy enough to invent punitive diplomatic steps such as
recalling ambassadors, or pruning mission sizes. But they all assume
Islamabad's guilt - before it's proved. They are also liable to be
seen as expressions of India's frustration, and will damage
longer-term India-Pakistan reconciliation. After all, the two have to
live with each other. India would be equally ill-advised to rely on
Washington's 'friendly' intervention - as Vajpayee insists on doing.
This won't be impartial, but guided by narrow US self-interest.
The first logical, dignified, mature step would be to take the issue
to the UN Security Council, and demand that Pakistan take verifiable
action against terrorist groups within its borders, in keeping with
Resolution 1373 - on pain of sanctions.
Secondly, New Delhi must overcome its allergy towards an
International Criminal Court, which is about to come into being. Its
argument against this worldwide criminal jurisprudence forum, sorely
needed to keep pace with crime itself, is based on an unconscionably
narrow idea of national sovereignty. And thirdly, we must begin
sorting out the mess in Kashmir, by resuming the ceasefire and
dialogue process, besides fully respecting human rights.
It would be utterly suicidal for India to launch military action -
'hot pursuit', 'surgical' attacks on training camps, or brief forays
across the LoC. Besides being legally dubious, such adventurism
gravely risks heightened conflict, leading to war, with possible
escalation to the nuclear level. Nuclear wars can't be won and
mustn't be fought.
India committed a grave blunder by crossing the Nuclear Rubicon in
1998. It further compounded the mistake by indulging in reckless
nuclear threat-mongering during and after Kargil. It must now reverse
the damage it inflicted on its own security in going down the
slippery nuclear slope.
Doing this means fighting our ultra-nationalists' pathological
nuclear addiction and discarding New Delhi's pitiably pusillanimous
stand on Washington's flagrant assault on the Anti-Ballistic Missile
treaty in order to launch the 'Star Wars'-style National Missile
Defence. NMD spells a Second Nuclear Age, no less.
KARACHI - Last week's attack on the Indian parliament building in New
Delhi - widely blamed on terrorists trained in Pakistan - is the
latest turn of events to add to Islamabad's troubles.
Pakistan now has an essentially unfriendly neighbor across the 1,300
kilometers of the border its shares with Afghanistan, and most of the
military and strategic objectives that caused the United States to
woo Islamabad in the war against terrorism have been achieved.
Immediately after the attack in New Delhi, in which five terrorists
and eight Indian security force members died, the Indian government
blamed Kashmiri militants. Subsequently, it has pointed the finger at
the Pakistani-based Lashkar-i-Taiba (Army of the Pure) as responsible
for the attack, with Indian Home Minister L K Advani on Tuesday
repeating the accusation in parliament.
India has now given Pakistan a deadline of a few days to close down
the offices of the Lashkar-i-Taiba as well as the Jaish-i-Mohammed,
another militant group, and warned of "dire consequences" if it does
not. Delhi says that these two groups are based in Pakistan and
receive training and support from the country's intelligence service,
the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Islamabad denies this, saying
that India has provided no evidence to support its allegations, and
says that it "will not be intimidated".
India has seized the opportunity launch a diplomatic initiative to
push its contention that the separatist struggle being waged in
Kashmir is actually terrorism. The Jaish-e-Mohammad and
Lashkar-e-Taiba are Islamic groups fighting to separate the mostly
Muslim region of Kashmir from India.
Following India's warning, the Pakistani military leadership under
President General Pervez Musharraf called urgent meetings at which it
was concluded that Pakistan would not bow down to the Indian demands
as such a move would demoralize the military struggle in Kashmir,
which has engaged several thousand Indian forces in the Kashmiri
Valley. Musharraf has also warned that any "adventurism" on the part
of india in response to the attacks would be firmly resisted.
However, sources say that Pakistan's strategic planners are concerned
over how the United States will react to this hard line as Washington
has already branded the Jaish-i-Mohammed and the group from which it
separated, the Harkatul Mujahideen, as terrorist organizations, and
many US publications, thanks to Indian lobbyists in America, are
promoting the idea that these organizations have strong links with
Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda terror network.
So, once again, just as it was urged by the United States to turn its
back on the Taliban in Afghanistan, which it had nurtured over the
years, Pakistan is caught between the devil and the deep blue sea
over how it handles the militant groups in the country.
While the war in Afghanistan was still raging, the United States was
prepared to let Pakistan, its frontline ally, handle the militant
organizations as it saw fit. The situation might be different now
with Pakistan's usefulness exhausted.
The US has succeeded in having an acceptable interim leadership
installed in Kabul, it has fostered strong relations in the Pashtun
belt in the east of Afghanistan and its forces have established a
strong presence in the Central Asian republics. Within Afghanistan,
they have secured key airports, so they no longer need Pakistani
airbases, a key reason for courting Musharraf in the first place.
Indeed, the US is likely now to turn on Pakistan, forcing it to take
action against senior Taliban leaders - possibly including bin Laden
- who are thought to be sheltering in the semi-autonomous Pakistani
tribal areas. And there will be pressure to take action against
pro-Taliban leaders in the tribal belt to nip any possible revival of
the Taliban movement in the bud.
All of this could force Islamabad to rethink its Kashmir policy. The
Kashmiri struggle was connected to the Afghan war against the Soviets
of 1979-89 in that the struggle for an independent state was
converted into a jihad so that foreign mujahideen fighters would join
locals in trying to force India to give Kashmiris the right to
self-determination.
This policy could now backfire on Pakistan. The Kashmiri uprising in
Indian Kashmir began in 1989. The ISI, then under the command of
General Akhtar Abdur Rehman, started making a case for a Kashmiri
jihad in the mid-1980s. Rehman was subsequently elevated to the
position of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. He died
in an air crash that also killed military dictator General Zia
ul-Haq, on August 17, 1988.
Kashmiris have been fighting for self-determination ever since the
partition of British India in 1947, when, despite the fact of a
majority Muslim population, the region was incorporated into India
with the permission of the maharajah of the state. The rulers of
princely states had been given the choice to freely accede to either
India or Pakistan, or to remain independent.
After skirmishes in previous years, heavy fighting broke out again in
1965 between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. A ceasefire was
established in September 1965. Indian prime minister Lal Bhadur
Shastri and Pakistani president M Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent
agreement on January 1, 1966. They resolved to try to end the dispute
by peaceful means. However, it was at this time that the Kashmiri
leadership decided that they would fight for their own fate, with one
possible option being an independent state ruled by Kashmiris,
whether they be Sikhs, Hindus or Muslims.
Rehman subsequently prepared the grounds to convert this struggle
into a jihad. The leadership of the Jamu Kashmir Libration Front were
declared traitors in Pakistan, and the ISI promoted the
Jamaat-i-Islami, which had a strong network in Indian Kashmir, to be
the main force for the Kashmir jihad.
Thus, the plan was that as soon as the Afghan jihad had successfully
seen off the Soviets, mujahideen would pour into Kashmir, and as with
Afghanistan, Islamic countries would lend their support. Rehman did
not survive to see his plans come to fruition though. He was
succeeded as head of the ISI by Hamid Gul, who adopted the same
policy approach.
During the Afghan resistance struggle, three Pakistani-based militant
organizations fought alongside Afghan groups - the Al-Badr, the
Harkatul Mujahideen and the Markaz-i-Dawat-u-Irshad. Al Badr was an
off-shoot of the Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan, the premier fundamentalist
party in the country and the real force behind the Afghan resistance
movement. The Harkatul Mujahideen was affiliated with Islamic
seminaries of the Deobandi school of thought, and the
Markaz-i-Dawat-u-Irshad was connected with the wahabi school of
thought.
All three of these organizations were given a role to promote a
militant struggle in Kashmir, with the Al-Badr playing a pivotal
role. Initially, the Jamaat-i-Islami helped fire the spirit of the
Kashmir jihad among youths, who were then sent to Afghanistan for
training and fighting experience.
The Al-Badr organized their training at Khost. Later, the youths were
organized under the banner of the Hizbul Mujahideen, which was a
purely Kashmiri-based militant organization ideologically affiliated
with the Jamaat-i-Islami, and which wanted Kashmir's accession into
Pakistan. This proved to be a successful formula and laid the
foundations for the struggle that continues today.
However, the Harkatul Mujahideen failed to attract mass support in
Kashmir Islamic seminaries and thus was unable to organize an
effective indigenous movement. The Harkat, therefore, continued to
train Pakistani youths to send to Kashmir, and its chief is a
Pakistani. Because of its Pakistani flavor and its vocal opposition
to the US presence in Pakistan, the US listed it as a terrorist
organization.
Before this declaration, it had renamed itself the Harkatul Ansar. As
a result, the US banned the "Harktul Ansar". So, soon after the US
announcement, it reverted to the Harkatul Mujahideen and continued
its operations. A breakaway faction of the Harkat is the
Jaish-i-Mohammed, which is also included on the US terror list.
Splits also occurred in the Markaz-i-Dawat-u-Irshad, leading to the
establishment of the Lashkar-i-Taiba. The purpose was to get
financial aid from Saudi Arabia because the Lashkar came from the
wahabi school of thought. But since there are almost no wahabi
influences in Kashmir, they have failed to organize an indigenous
movement and are seen as foreign infiltrators.
Now, the Jaish-i-Mohammed and the Lashkar-i-Taiba have been thrust
into the limelight. Clearly, they are not indiginous movements, and
their senior leaders are all Pakistani. In the past, when these
objections were raised, the Pakistani government took a strong stand
that a jihad is a part of Islam, and any Muslim wanting to join in
one could not be stopped by Pakistan.
Given recent events, though, Pakistan will find it difficult to stick
with this policy.
ISLAMABAD: Two top Pakistani officials claimed Wednesday that
Afghanistan's northern alliance handed over 110 detained Pakistani
Muslim militants to India and that Pakistan's archrival then
airlifted them to New Delhi for interrogation. Indian officials said
they had no information on the allegation.
The Pakistani officials, who spoke only on condition of anonymity,
accused India of planning to use the Pakistanis who fought with Osama
bin Laden's al-Qaida network to defame its neighbour. [...].
Full Text at: http://jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2001-daily/20-12-2001/main/main3.htm.
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