Pakistan's President, General Pervez Musharraf, has done something
few heads of states ever do--especially when they are beleaguered and
in crisis. He has subverted a major component, no less, of the
ideological foundation which has sustained the edifice of Pakistani
politics for two decades. He has begun a major surgical operation on
the tumour of militant political Islam which has long afflicted that
country's body politic. And he has launched an ambitious programme of
reform of Pakistani society, the like of which South Asia has never
seen before.
Gen Musharraf's January 12 address will go down as a landmark--even
if it were to remain a catalogue of the many disorders that Pakistan
suffers, and a list of pious intentions. But it is likely to turn out
to be much more than that. It was preceded, and followed, by South
Asia's biggest-ever crackdown on communal bigots and terrorists.
Already, 1,600 suspects have been rounded up, five organisations
including Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed banned, and 300 of
their offices closed down, locked and sealed.
It will not do to minimise Gen Musharraf's address as a defensive
"public relations" exercise aimed at appeasing Western powers on the
terrorism issue. More than two-thirds of his speech was devoted to
diagnosing the pathology of Pakistani society and politics, and to
outlining an agenda for internal reform, rather on making concession
on "external" issues like India's demand to take "decisive" action
against its list of 20 terrorists. Of course, there was a degree of
flamboyance that went with the much-publicised speech, but PR
considerations, alone or mainly, cannot explain its thrust.
What Gen Musharraf has unveiled is a plan to put Pakistan on the road
to modernisation and secularisation by severing the links between
political Islam and the state, between the military and the mullahs,
and between Kashmir and terrorist violence. At the heart of the plan
is trenchant criticism of Pakistan's dangerous mix of religion and
politics, and the disastrous consequences this has had on the state
and civil society. Whether the General succeeds in achieving his
objectives or not, and how soon, it must be conceded that his agenda
represents the most ambitious reform programme undertaken in any
country barring Turkey under Kemal Ataturk to deal with the issue of
religion and politics.
This reform programme represents a complete reversal of the
Islamisation project launched by Zia-ul-Haq to acquire a figleaf of
legitimacy for his brutal military dictatorship and to transform the
very character of Pakistan. The logic of Zia's project eventually
unfolded in its most developed form through the Taliban, through
Pakistan's attempt to virtually annex Afghanistan and acquire
"strategic depth", and through the promotion of a variety of militant
groups in West and South Asia, especially in Kashmir.
Gen Musharraf has started cutting the umbilical cord between the
Pakistani state and jehadi terrorism. One can argue that this is only
the beginning of what is likely to be a prolonged process which will
inevitably involve purging the army of pernicious religious-political
influences, and even cleansing the ISI. It is by no means certain
that Gen Musharraf will succeed. The Pakistan situation is fraught
with uncertainty, strife and danger. His agenda will antagonise some
of his own military colleagues. He has hit out at the bigoted mullahs
who for years have been the mainstay of fanatical groups. Successive
governments, including Gen Musharraf's, have found it hard to rein in
such men. Numerous jehadi militants, inflamed by the Taliban's defeat
in Afghanistan, are only waiting to get their claws into Gen
Musharraf.
Gen Musharraf has thus embarked on an extraordinarily bold and risky
mission. He may have done so under pressure, even compulsion. But
that should not detract from the importance of his endeavour and
coherence of his purpose. Far-reaching changes are sometimes brought
about not because there is a "genuine" change of heart, but because
"soft" options vanish, and there is a compelling need to change.
Therefore, it would be sheer nitpicking and pettifogging to fault Gen
Musharraf for the many omissions in his speech. True, he didn't refer
to the "Lahore process" or the "Shimla agreement". Of course, he
didn't own up the damage that Islamabad militants have caused to
Kashmiri civilians, or apologise for it. But that was hardly the
function of his address. Did we ask if he apologised for what the
Taliban had done in Afghanistan when he joined the US-led
"anti-terrorist" coalition? What is relevant is that Gen Musharraf
unconditionally condemned all forms of terrorism and the "Kalashnikov
culture" of all religious extremism. Of equal significance is his
insistence that Pakistani groups must not mess around in other
countries--no matter what the cause.
Backing this up is Gen Musharraf's internal agenda, including the
redefinition of jehad as a fight against poverty, illiteracy and
backwardness, and strict regulation of madrassas and mosques through
a system of registration. His radical plan can potentially transform
Pakistan into a modern, forward-looking, open society which is no
longer obsessed with religion, or crude, intolerant, interpretations
of it. He has clearly posed the choice between this future, and a
grim fate for Pakistan if it chooses to be a paranoid, closed,
religion-obsessed, backward society.
Gen Musharraf of course asserts that Kashmir "runs through our
blood". But he has been careful to decouple Kashmir's "freedom
struggle" from terrorist militancy. And he has offered a dialogue on
Kashmir. India must accept this in a spirit of openness, good faith
and generosity. It just won't do to acknowledge--as New Delhi
does--that Kashmir is an issue, a dispute, a problem, albeit a
bilateral one, and then refuse a bilateral dialogue on one pretext or
other. There is a real danger today that failure to discuss Kashmir
bilaterally, which India agreed to do at Lahore and Agra, will invite
external intervention, with unpalatable consequences.
The US is in a uniquely powerful position today as a hegemonic power
which is courted by both New Delhi and Islamabad. India has used the
US as the central interlocutor in its post-December 13 strategy of
brinkmanship. Having allowed America such a pivotal role, it cannot
easily resist its friendly (or not-so-friendly) involvement in
Kashmir--if bilateralism fails. Bilateralism must be made to work in
its authentic spirit.
Equally important, India must immediately de-escalatise its military
build-up on the western border. It would be ill-advised to wait for
Pakistan to "surrender" any of the 20 terrorists it has named. Gen
Musharraf cannot be easily pressurised into handing over any of the
Pakistani nationals in that list to Interpol, leave alone to India.
Equally unlikely is the surrender of Dawood Ibrahim or Chota Shakeel,
who in any case are gangsters rather than terrorists. India could
perhaps get some former Khalistanis exiled in Pakistan handed over to
some external agency. But that would be a minor consolation in
relation to the substantial gain from Gen Musharraf's outlawing of
JeM and LeT.
It would be unwise as well as unrealistic for India to cast itself in
the mould of a superpower by demanding that Pakistan give up the 20
suspects, or else ... For one, India has not established convincing
links between them and the Parliament attack; it has just cited or
raked up old cases. For another, the US was itself wrong, as this
Column has earlier argued, to use military force in Afghanistan,
without exhausting legal and diplomatic possibilities. It has ended
up killing at least 3,700 innocent Afghans--500 more people than were
killed in New York's Twin Towers. And for a third, India cannot bend
its near-strategic equal Pakistan to its will, as the US could with
its adversaries in Afghanistan. India is not a superpower which can
arrogate to itself the "right" to crush terrorism outside its borders.
It is in New Delhi's own interest to de-escalate the current
eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. The present build-up is the largest
ever, with half a million armed men pitted against one another.
Anything can go wrong: a terrorist attack inspired by a rogue agency
out to sabotage Gen Musharraf's plans, an overzealous local commander
on either side getting hyperactive, or a plain South Asia-style
goof-up. The consequences would be disastrous.
The longer India waits, the greater the chances of a mishap. Today,
the Vajpayee government can draw some satisfaction from the fact that
Gen Musharraf has taken concrete action against JeM or LeT--although
not entirely under India's muscle-flexing. Gen Colin Powell during
his visit has delivered a message in favour of dialogue and
de-escalation. If the government acts on its own, rather than under
US goading, it might even claim a minor victory and hope that this
will help BJP a little in Uttar Pradesh. But Mr Vajpayee must draw
the line here. Instead of indulging in more brinkmanship, he should
try to find an imaginative solution to the Kashmir issue by widening
the opening that has emerged in the Valley both as a result of the
Taliban's ignominious defeat and Gen Musharraf's new turn against
jehadi terrorism. But first of all, he must de-escalate.
Much mischief has resulted from the presence of intrinsically
destabilising presence of nuclear weapons during the current Crisis on
the borders. They do possess an inherent deterring quality. So the two
adversaries dare not use them and have made their confrontation look
foolish: unable to take it to its logical conclusion, they find it hard
to stand down while it appeared all too easy to mass troops menacingly
at the borders. There will be time enough to talk meaningfully about the atomic arsenals later. Right now it is necessary to arrange mutual
withdrawal that the two cannot do alone; its pointlessness will be too
obvious. They needed a third party.
As it happens, both sides have been competitively wooing the Americans
and want them to help achieve their respective objectives. India's main
wish is to see cross-border terrorism stopped in Kashmir with US help.
Pakistan has sought American good offices to diffuse the border tensions and help preserve peace in the Subcontinent. At least Pakistanis have been asking the good offices of the US. The US was delighted in being tacitly accepted as the honest broker by both the embattled nuclear powers, enhancing its role in the region.
But in the US Secretary of State Colin Powell's strategy of keeping
peace in South Asia, the ordering of immediate objectives is peculiar:
he wants Pakistanis and Indians to begin talks on Kashmir and on 'all
other matters' for building mutual trust --- and only after that
confidence building mutual withdrawal of troops is to take place. This
is strange. Here are two countries that are not on speaking terms, ready to rush at each other's throat, and they are being asked to start
elaborate negotiations first with a view to earning each other's
confidence. After mutual trust has returned, they will start withdrawing their troops and equipment from forward attacking position. Lay people would ordinarily advise these more than mere semi-cold warriors to start pulling back from the borders first 'without prejudice to their political positions'. This withdrawal itself will be the primary confidence building block. Formal talks can only begin after each side is sure that the other side is unlikely to make a sudden mischievous move. Why Secretary Powell has chosen an order of business that flies in the face of commonsense needs to be inquired into. Anyway, the US can only bring the two sides together; every other agreement has to be arrived at by these two together.
At all events India and Pakistan have to live side by side in peace and
they cannot ask the US diplomacy to be eternally there to persuade
(force?) them not to go war or threateningly massing their troops on the borders. They must have enough civilisation in themselves to coexist peacefully without external aid despite their differences. As a matter of fact, if the US good offices, --- the effectiveness of which is obvious --- had not been available the two sides would still have to
de-escalate tensions first by mutual withdrawals for the good and
adequate reason that both are nuclear powers that simply cannot afford
to use them. The experience since Dec. 13 last should convince both New
Delhi and Islamabad that old-style coercive diplomacy, or gunboat
diplomacy, does not now work the way it used to. Similarly the way
Pakistan was conducting its Kashmir policy has proved to be
counterproductive though earlier suppositions indicated otherwise.
Hopefully they can now draw up the rules of coexistence in the special
conditions of South Asia, as shown by the recent experiences.
Doubtless, there is the frightfully difficult question of Kashmir with
its telltale history. Experience has shown that a radically dissatisfied power, Pakistan, simply cannot use violent ways to agitate or take the Kashmir Valley militarily, the only area of Jammu and Kashmir state it wants. India would rather fight than allow any secession of Kashmir Valley. The BJP and Sangh Parivar in India might also unleash forces that would kill far too many Muslims in India, as Kuldip Nayar has shown, should anything like that look like becoming a probability. War is not an option now or later. But a recognition of this reality does not mean that Pakistan must necessarily accept the finality of the status quo. Only, it has to realise (a) that there is no quick solution to the Kashmir problem; and (b) that Pakistan has to have a new and more workable longer-term India policy that includes rational efforts to secure a democratic solution to the Kashmir issue through democratic means.
Pakistan policies will grow from the Jan 12 televised speech of Gen.
Pervez Musharraf, although this should have come earlier, soon after the U-turn in the Afghan policy. Its logic demands that all our stances, approaches and policies must be based on peaceful, in fact democratic, methodology. Pakistan itself has to democratise speedily in order the better to employ democratic methodology. That is how it can be more effective. The current military confrontation has shown that adequacy of military forces, nuclear and conventional, has no bearing on problems between India and Pakistan or for the solution of the Kashmir dispute, issue or problem. One it is admitted that there is no military solution of Kashmir issue, the whole military approach becomes inappropriate, including Jihad with the gun. Political approach is the right response to the Kashmiris aspirations.
Pakistan's substantial military build down, especially in the nuclear
sphere, will boost its credentials to talk peace and to gain high moral
ground. Whether or not India quickly responds, or is ready for early
negotiations, our policies must be based on patient, peace-promoting
ideas. We should now aim at exactly the opposite of what the Vajpayee
government did in December last: work for restoration of maximum
contacts between the Indians and Pakistanis, full normalisation of ties
between the two countries to at least the level they were before 1965
--- free mutual trade on the MFN basis, acceptance of SFTA and SAPTA
bases for the SAARC, seeking investments from Indians and investing in
India and of course maximum cultural exchanges. A people-to-people
friendship with India should be worked for, as the policy of controlled
hostility has resulted in the Crisis that grew out of December 13 attack on Indian Parliament that left no way out for either side.
But what about Kashmir? It may be asked. Well, let us actually accept
what we verbally say: there is no military solution to the problem. If
so, all militaristic approaches or methods must be eschewed in favour of recognising the true particulars of Kashmir imbroglio. If Kashmir issue is to be peacefully and amicably solved, what it requires is that
Pakistanis have to mount a giant operation to convince the Indians that
India will actually benefit --- economically and even politically ---
more by being flexible and forthcoming to the Kashmiris. Indeed we must
ascertain and understand desires and psychology of Indians to determine
our policies: what precise quid pro quo can we offer, if any, to make
them accommodating on Kashmir and become cooperative friends with
Pakistanis.
Pakistan actually needs a growing pro-Pakistan lobby in India and it
should freely allow a pro-India lobby in this country. The basic
orientation of both countries being what it is, each has a stake in the
overall orientation of the other. A thoroughly democratic and secular
Pakistan is in India's interests. Similarly, Pakistan has a vital stake
in the Indian polity remaining secular, democratic and non-militaristic. Let each state pursue this aim. The two countries and their peoples have thousand and one commonalties of cultures, languages and literatures, races and of course common history. Their social conditions are broadly similar and both have to live and prosper in not only the Global Village the world has become but in the globalised economy. There are plenty of issues where they need to work together. Ecology of South Asia imposes common tasks and makes cooperation an imperative.
To revert to the Kashmir issue that has caused so much trouble already,
it has to be seen that if it has to have an amicable solution, it will
be a long haul. It requires a two-pronged approach. Let approaches to
its proper democratic solution be sought by non-officials --- eminent
personalities of this big Village. It can be implemented in the fullness of time, say 30 to 35 years. Meantime, there can be an interim and neutral sort of arrangements for the Valley to be negotiated between New Delhi and Islamabad. The issue of sovereignty needs to be fudged or blurred, if it cannot be shared. Indeed, it need not affect
sovereignties but should mean an effective demilitarisation of that part of Kashmir, full freedom to Kashmiris to travel to all parts of the old Jammu and Kashmir State, to manage their own affairs democratically and trade freely with both Pakistan and India, with the two countries jointly picking up the tab insofar as the Valley is concerned. Let Kashmiris progressively become a bridge between Pakistan and India --- to pave the way of a rational and democratic solution of this problem.
India had handed over a list of 20 wanted persons to Pakistan some time
ago.
Of these, 14 are said to be Indian nationals, and the rest Pakistanis.
President Pervez Musharraf, when asked about this list and what he
intended to do in response to the Indian demand to hand them over,
said that there was no question of handing over any Pakistani
national.
However, he added if evidence were provided against them, they would
be prosecuted here.
As to the Indian nationals in the list, the president categorically
denied that the government knew anything about them or their
whereabouts.
They were certainly not in our custody, he said.
Now Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar has revealed during his joint press
conference with the visiting Canadian Deputy Prime Minister that he
has seen the Indian list and the government will examine it carefully.
He too echoed the president in saying that Pakistan would not hand
over any of its nationals to India.
As for extraditing wanted Indian nationals, he stated that it
involved a complex legal and political procedure.
He also said that some of these Indian nationals were allegedly
involved in old offences dating back for example to a hijacking
incident of 1981.
India has simply picked up some old files and made this demand, the
foreign minister asserted.
But he too was adamant that without any evidence, no action could be
taken, whether the person concerned was Pakistani or Indian.Mr Sattar
then went on to make the startling observation that Pakistan too has
a list of wanted persons who had taken refuge in India.
Although he did not reveal who these people were or what were their
alleged crimes, observers see this as a hint at the members of an
ethnic political group that was active in urban Sindh, and some of
whose members were thought to have fled to India some time ago to
escape the police action against them during the 1990s.
The thrust of Mr Sattar's remarks was centred on reciprocity in not
giving refuge to each other's criminals and wanted persons, and only
then could the 'complexities' of mutual extradition be resolved in a
satisfactory manner.
One report in the press now says that the Indians have moved the
goalposts again by demanding a list of all the Kashmiri groups and
their members fighting in Indian-held Kashmir.
Not only that, a list should be compiled to show who were the persons
who infiltrated from Pakistan into Indian-held Kashmir to conduct
militant actions.
Pakistan of course, has dismissed this as just a propaganda ploy,
aimed at trapping Pakistan into admitting that it has been militarily
supporting the armed struggle in Indian held Kashmir.
In the case of Pakistan-India relations, one is tempted to look for
hopeful signs.
But it is always better to prepare mentally for the worst This list
'war' promises to become the latest episode in a sorry history of
tit-for-tat rivalry between the two South Asian neighbours.
It would be too simplistic to assert that one-upmanship has motivated
the Musharraf government, irked by New Delhi's constant harping on
its 'wanted' list since December 13.
But the timing of Mr Sattar's remarks cannot be just a coincidence.
If India has played footsie with the issue of the 'wanted' list to
embarrass Pakistan and try to paint in the colours of a harbourer of
criminals and terrorists, Islamabad now seems to be gearing up to pay
India back in the same coin.
This is neither an issue which should delay de-escalation of tensions
or normalization of relations, nor something that should assume the
importance of a ping-pong war of words that it seems rapidly to be
acquiring.
If relations could be restored to an even keel between the two
countries, this is an issue quite capable of being resolved in a
rational, mutually acceptable manner.
But in the present climate, neither this nor weightier matters are
likely to see reasonable closure.
ISLAMABAD: In a move that could further deteriorate relations with India, Pakistan has said Indian wheat for Afghanistan was infested 1 with fungus and diseases and, therefore, it would not allow the grains' transit through its territory. "We have reports the Indian wheat is infested, it contains diseases,"food minister Khair Mohammad Junejo told newspersons here on Saturday. "We have decided not to allow the transit of Indian wheat through Pakistan due to reports that it was infested with germs and diseases which can harm Pakistani wheat," he said. He said the government had also communicated its reservation to the WFP and informed it that Pakistan would not take any risk.
NEW YORK: DEFENCE Minister George Fernandes has ruled out any de-escalation on the border unless Pakistan conceded India's demands sincerely and soon. Speaking to The Indian Express and later to Fox-News TV, Fernandes rejected such calls from the international community without any visible action by General Musharraf on the ground.
"We will stay alert. Our troops will remain on the border till Pakistan has to do what
they know they have to do," he said. "Our demands are clear and it is now in their hands to reduce the tension that has built up." Speaking at a reception at the Indian consulate, here on the penultimate day of his six-day visit, he blamed General Musharraf for the crisis, saying the Pakistan president's past propaganda had culminated in the situation, after the December 13 attack on Parliament.
Islamabad: AS THE Indo-Pak standoff over New Delhi's demand for handing over 20 terrorists continued, India has asked Pakistan to furnish a comprehensive list of militant groups who had infiltrated into Jammu and Kashmir in recent times, a move resented by Islamabad which said it was being "pushed against the wall" by New Delhi. The report in 'The News' was published a day after Pakistan Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar said that Islamabad would provide India its own list of wanted men for extradition. The Pakistani daily said the Indian demand for a comprehensive list of militants infiltrated into J&K was conveyed to Pakistan officials during the recent visit of US Secretary of State Colin Powell.
IN the wake of the Afghan conflict and in the face of growing tension and animosity between India and Pakistan, the Governments of the West have been talking a lot about engineering a state of sustainable peace and development in Asia.
The latest actor to come on the scene is Britain's Prime Minister Tony
Blair (dubbed "the Gandhi from Islington" by his opponents), who took the initiative to fly to India in order to lend his weight in the diplomatic tussle between Pakistan and India.
Thus far, all that has emerged from Blair's visit to New Delhi has been
the usual froth and soundbites.
No one would doubt that the sentiments expressed by Blair are
intrinsically good in themselves (such as the call for an end to hostilities, the opening up of trade and communication channels, open discussion of pressing issues like Kashmir).
But the worry lies not in what is being said, but rather in what has been left unsaid and what is going on behind the scenes.
For it was recently revealed in the British Press that soon after Blair's visit to India there will be two other officially supported missions to the South Asian region. While Blair had flown to New Delhi to speak of peace and reconciliation, the two other trips that will follow will address the question of how that fragile peace will be maintained.
The answer is brutally simple by force of arms.
In late February, the British High Commission in New Delhi will be playing host to a group of British arms manufacturers who will be there to take part in the Defexpo weapons and armaments fair in the city.
At around the same time, the British Trade Office in Bangalore will also be hosting the visit of a military-oriented trade mission organised by a few British aviation and aerospace companies.
The aim of these visits is plain for all to see: To sell to the
Governments of the region more British weapons of mass destruction that are meant to "protect" them and guarantee peace in their part of the world.
But what makes matters even more depressing is the obvious level of
skepticism and cynicism evident in the participant of these arm fairs
themselves.
Many of the companies concerned have blatantly tried to peddle their wares by appealing to the feeling of insecurity and collective fear in the wake of the Afghan conflict and the fears of "Islamic terrorism" that have been aroused as a result of the Western media's manipulation of the issues at stake.
The companies concerned are also pleased with the fact that another valued customer Pakistan has been taken off the arms boycott list thanks to the co-operation that it showed during the Afghan conflict, thereby making it another potential big-time consumer of weapons.
At no point in this entire sordid process have the values that Blair spoke of come into the picture.
Rather than contributing positi-vely to the actual human develop-ment of the countries of South Asia, Western arms companies have actually sought to profit from the political crises in the region.
The logic of the accountants and salesmen have prevailed, while ethics and the prerogatives of comprehensive sustainable development have gone out of the window.
Worst of all, none of the actors involved the Governments of the West and South Asia, the arms companies and their cohorts have realised the
futility of this entire exercise.
While the human potential of South Asia remains neglected (illiteracy in both India and Pakistan remains as the one major problem that holds back their respective economies and prevents both countries from leap-frogging into the future), the corporations of the developed West seem more than happy to continue to sell their arms to these societies.
The net result of this vicious circle of unethical sales and consumption is that the most neglected and needy sections of Indian and Pakistani society will remain marginalised, impoverished and unrepresented.
While their Governments continue to arm themselves, preparing for the
final showdown which both sides think that they can delay provided that their weapons are stronger and better than the other side's.
As the economies of South Asia continue to develop unevenly and their
societies suffer the results, the arms and weapons companies of the
developed world will continue to reap the profits from their vile
harvest.
"If we have to go to war, jolly good." Those were the words India's
army chief, Gen. Padmanabhan, used at a news conference on Jan. 11 to
describe the prospect of war with Pakistan.
I'm sorry, general. Maybe you were trying to show resolve, or prove
that you're tough. But I can tell you from experience, war between
India and Pakistan would not be jolly good. It would be very bad.
I've fought in more than 20 "wars" between India and Pakistan. I've
seen skirmishes turn into conflagrations. I've seenferocious attacks
across the border, and defending divisions worn down. I've seen
Pakistani commanders turn tonuclear weapons to fend off
advancingIndian divisions. I've seen New Delhi -- a city of more than
11 million -- destroyed and hundreds of thousands of its residents
killed in a flash. I'm sorry, Gen. Sunderajan Padmanabhan, I've seen
nothing that came close to jolly good.
How have I seen these things? In "wars" that took the form of games
played out by American war colleges and military services over the
past decade -- ever since the United States began to seriously worry
about the consequences of a clash between India and Pakistan. These
are not fanciful intellectual exercises, but serious, two-week-long
simulations used to educate American officers, choose weapons systems
they will need for the future and better prepare the United States to
respond to complex international conflicts. In the past, these
"games" have proven to be extraordinarily good prognosticators of
events.In the case of India and Pakistan, the outcome was nearly
always catastrophic. And even after the carnage, the fundamental
problems dividing the two nations remained unresolved.
In each of the simulated conflicts in South Asia, some incident
provoked the two countries into putting their forces into a high
state of readiness along their border. Sound familiar?A recall by
Pakistan of its troops participating in peacekeeping operations
throughout the world was on our list of actions that would indicate a
conflict was near. My own sense of the gravity of the current
situation was sharpened when Pakistan recently took this action.
On the balance sheet, India has a stronger military force. India can
field more than a million soldiers; Pakistan around 650,000. For both
countries, most of these troops are infantry. But in a major attack,
the decisive forces are the armor and mechanized divisions, which
have large concentrations of tanks. Although the balance still favors
India, in this area the gap is not as great and Pakistan could
overcome some of the disadvantage by the wise use of its units.
That means striking quickly, and striking first. To wait is to be at
a disadvantage. When it became apparent in the simulations that
conflict was inevitable, one of the sides -- usually Pakistan --
always initiated combat. That's why face-offs such as the current one
make me extremely nervous.
The historical root and most visible cause of tension between India
and Pakistan has been Kashmir, the region controlled by India but
claimed by Pakistan as part of its territory. But in previous
real-life wars and in the "wars" I've seen, the important fighting
doesn't take place in that contested area. The mountains there just
don't offer a good place to fight a decisive battle. Both sides look
to other parts of the 2,000-mile border that divides them.
The critical terrain for both sides is the Punjab valley, where key
north-south roads lie. On the Indian side of the border, these roads
are the link to Kashmir. On the Pakistani side, they link the
southern part of that country with Lahore and Islamabad. These are
strategic lifelines for both nations.
In the earliest games I took part in, before we thought Pakistan
possessed nuclear weapons, the conflict tended to move in a
relatively benign pattern, based in part on the Arab-Israeli War of
October 1973. I recall a discussion with a colonel on the faculty of
the Pakistani defense college who told me that he had his students
study that war. I assumed he was interested in how the Israeli army
surrounded the Egyptian forces toward the end of the fighting. To my
surprise, he said they were interested in Egypt's strategy. They
thought it the best example of a weaker country that was defeated in
war but achieved its policy objectives.
The lessons of Egypt in 1973 were not lost on Americans playing the
role of Pakistani leaders in past years' games. They would engage in
some direct fighting, but would also carry out cross-border attacks
in areas where Indian forces were not present in strength. It was a
take-territory-and-go-to-the-U.N. strategy. It was a pattern repeated
from the earlier wars between the two countries.
But war games try to imagine the future, and the U.S. military's view
of South Asia's future changed around 1993, when we began to assume
that Pakistan would eventually acquire nuclear weapons. (Pakistan did
not test a nuclear weapon until spring 1998.) That changed the
strategy of the Pakistani leadership. Conventional forces were used
differently, and the wars certainly ended differently.
Since then, these war games have unfolded in much more lethal ways.
An initial attack by Pakistan generally cuts the Indian link to
Kashmir. India responds against the Pakistani units in India, but
rushes its main forces toward Lahore -- Pakistan's second-largest
city, and the country's cultural and intellectual center. The Indian
teams assume, probably correctly, that, as they advance, Pakistan
would be forced to withdraw from its forward positions.
As Indian units advance toward Lahore, which lies just 18 miles from
the border post, Pakistan realizes the war is reaching a critical
point. If the Indians take the city, they will split Pakistan in two
and the Pakistani nuclear weapons will be of little or nouse. The
Indians must be stopped and must be stopped quickly.
In our scenarios, the only way for Pakistan to do that is by using
nuclear weapons on India's forces inside Pakistan. Strange as that
sounds, using nuclear weapons on your own territory has some
political advantages, and bears some similarities to NATO strategic
options in place during the Cold War. The world would see it as a
defensive measure. India would be seen as the aggressor.
It takes three or four nuclear weapons to stop the massive Indian
attack. Pakistani forces also suffer heavy casualties from the blasts
and radiation, but the Indian advance is halted.
India is left with a dilemma. Does it retaliate against Pakistan with
nuclear weapons? Should it hit Pakistan's cities in its initial
strike? That would only further cede the moral high ground to
Pakistan. India picks four or five Pakistani military targets for its
first use of nuclear weapons, but the attacks also cause significant
civilian casualties.
In the simulation, Pakistan responds by dropping a nuclear bomb on New
Delhi.
The casualties from this exchange vary depending on the exact targets
and the winds, but they would be measured in the millions. If
Pakistan drops a relatively primitive nuclear weapon of 20 kilotons,
50 percent of the people living within a one-mile radius of the blast
would die immediately. Fires would ignite as far away as two miles,
and blast damage would extend to buildings three miles from the point
of impact. People 3 1/2 miles away would suffer skin burns and
radiation could extend hundreds of miles, depending on the weather.
The participants in these games took no pleasure in unleashing their
weapons of mass destruction. To them, it represented failure. In
1998, when India and Pakistan first tested nuclear weapons openly,
many strategists said Cold War-style deterrence might prevent war.
Yet the danger is that Indian and Pakistani leaders still believe it
possible to have a small conventional conflict. Soviet and American
leaders didn't think that way during the Cold War. As a result,
Soviet and American forces never traded shots across the Iron Curtain
the way India and Pakistan have exchanged fire across the Line of
Control in Kashmir. NATO and the Warsaw Pact never went to the level
of mobilization in Europe that has emerged between India and Pakistan
over the past month.
What can the United States do? One of the objectives of the war games
is to understand how the United States might make a difference, even
if it means using our own combat capabilities. After my 20 wars, I
still don't know how to do that once hostilities begin. Any use of
U.S. forces would mean taking sides; three-sided wars are not
possible. The United States would have to side with the weaker party,
meaning Pakistan. But that still might not prevent a cataclysmic
outcome.
A far better strategy would be for the United States to insert itself
strongly before armed conflict begins, and get India and Pakistan to
realize what they must do. We're not going to quickly solve the
underlying problem of Kashmir, but we can press the two sides to
stand down, start talking and recognize how easily they can stumble
forward to disaster. In the war games, we did not call a timeout and
allow the two countries to negotiate. India and Pakistan exchanged
messages through their actions. The current cycle might be broken if
the United States can bring about a pause for talks.
A few years ago, I ran a war game with my sophomore class at George
Mason University. With a little instruction on doctrine and weapons,
the two teams managed to fight their way to the all-too-typical
results. After the Pakistani team used nuclear weapons on Indian
combat formations,I stopped the game and asked them to reflect on the
experience.
I heard standard answers. "If we would have moved more divisions to
the point of attack, we would have been able to hold out," said one
student. "A heavy airstrike as the first move would have changed
things," said another. Toward the end of our discussion, one young
woman in the class asked a question I've never been able to answer:
"Why don't they do this kind of game with the leaders of the
countries so they won't let it happen?"
Now that, my dear general, would be a jolly good idea.
Sam Gardiner, a retired U.S. Air Force colonel, is a visiting
professor at the Air War College and the National Defense University.
His opinions do not necessarily reflect U.S. government policy.
(c) 2002 The Washington Post Company
WASHINGTON -- Once again, Pakistan is at the center of a South Asian
storm. Following a terrorist attack on India's Parliament building
that New Delhi blames on Islamabad, President Pervez Musharraf is
working his way toward a new diplomacy. He is trying to stave off
Indian retaliation, rearrange the remnants of his country's old
Afghanistan engagements, contemplate new Kashmiri strategies, find a
way to combat intolerance at home and weave a path toward renewed
relations with the United States.
Embedded in his frantic activity is a brutal irony: Pakistan's army
is squeezing the country into the world's tightest corner, and
although everyone, including the West, is banking on Musharraf's
rule, Pakistan's survival depends on his capacity to relinquish power
and move toward democracy.
Since its founding, Pakistan has been ruled too often by generals
whose insecurity and poor judgment have left the country living on
edge. The army's interests--alliances to support nuclear experiments,
close relations with China, meddling in Afghanistan and Kashmir and
cheer for U.S. interests that did not always coincide with its
own--have emboldened the military while exposing Pakistan to every
danger that domestic instability and an unstable region could conjure
up. The first casualty of military rule is accountability. When the
army patronized extremists to do its bidding in Kashmir and
Afghanistan, who could say "no" to misadventures that were
endangering the state? When the same extremists broke the law by
fomenting hatred and violence at home, the army couldn't say "no,"
either--at least, not without risking its foreign policies. When
civil libertarians criticized the links between domestic insurgency
and cross-border terror, no one was able to defend them from
harassment.
Have things changed since the war against terrorism, the demise of
the Taliban, the Indian-Pakistani skirmishes and recurring fears of
war?
Judging by Musharraf's recent speech, the answer is "maybe." His plea
for social progressivism, vague though it was, drew praise from
foreigners and sighs of relief from the millions of anxious
Pakistanis who have been held hostage to creeping intolerance,
violence and, in Musharraf's words, internal strife that is "eating
us up like termites."
But a speech needs broadly-based policies, or it's only public
relations. Pakistan needs policies that rejuvenate its institutions,
and these, in turn, require an engaged public. These are not goods
that military governments usually value. Without them, however, the
fundamental contradictions within Pakistan's domestic and foreign
policies will easily betray Musharraf's determination to change
course.
When foreign policy is predicated on fraud and terror, when the army
advocates policies that require illegal actions to implement, when
militant groups have enough resources to challenge the state's
monopoly on force, only a complete house-cleaning will do. Last week,
Pakistan's military government banned more extremist groups, although
not enough of them to make a significant difference, and arrested
more than 1,000 of their members. But Musharraf has yet to confront
his hardest, most important jobs: overhauling foreign policy to
protect Pakistan's people, borders and economy, and ensuring that the
fight against internal instability protects the rights of all
Pakistanis.
This is why serious politics has to return to Pakistan, so that
government can help build a compassionate state where liberty is the
foundation for security. Not Musharraf's politics of constrained
public discourse, docile elected bodies and a paternalism mired in
old-fashioned feudalism. Rather, Pakistan needs political contests
that encourage open debate, enshrine the value of fundamental rights
and challenge--finally--the verities that army rule has persuaded
civil society to accept for too long.
It would be better, of course, if a political makeover did not emerge
from fear of war. Pakistan's crackdown on religious extremism looks
like a response to Indian pushing and U.S. pulling, even though it is
Pakistanis who have been trying--and until now, failing--to excise
extremism from within. Had Musharraf seriously gone after terrorism
when he took office in a military coup in 1999, Pakistan and its
neighbors would probably be much safer, peaceful places. Instead,
even some of Pakistan's embattled liberals now fear that Musharraf is
as good as they will get from an army laced with militancy.
This is why army rule has to go--because Pakistanis should be able to
choose, not cower and compromise. If Musharraf truly believes his
words, then he will ultimately have to stand habit on its head and,
like enlightened authoritarians elsewhere, do himself out of his job.
This is why Musharraf's patrons in London and Washington need to
measure their actions with care. For the moment, Musharraf may seem
like a pliable autocrat who sounds like a politician and thinks like
a general.
But those who believe that terrorism can only be countered by
military strongmen should take another look at Pakistan, where
authoritarianism and army rule have consistently fostered instability
and insecurity. And then they should ask how long Pakistanis should
pay for short-term thinking and politically empty, military-dominated
partnerships.
In the past, political change has come to Pakistan in the wake of
war, assassination and tectonic shifts in international politics. If
the silver lining in today's South Asian conflicts is a belated
recognition that civilians should run armies and armies should not
run states, then we may all be a bit wiser and much, much safer.
Paula R. Newberg is an international consultant who works in
conflict-affected regions and writes regularly about politics in
South Asia.
The colours on the canvas has changed - troubled reds have displaced
the luminous greens and blues. The sketches of the Dal lake and
chinar trees no longer celebrate the beauty of the valley. Today they
are morbid metaphors, filled with a sense of foreboding - lotus
leaves have become green helmets and the only association painted
orchids evoke are of the cemeteries on which they are placed. But
what else would one expect after 12 years of pain, violence and
tragedy?
Kashmir is not what it used to be. And the artists are only too aware
of this reality. Sculptor Shabir Mirza has a way of dealing with the
transition - by dividing his works into the pre and post '90s era.
The latter phase transformed him into a ''witness and a victim''.
''Earlier I made landscapes, mountains and lakes but later my work
began to mirror the deteriorating situation,'' says Mirza, who has
been an art teacher at Srinagar's Institute of Music and Fine Arts
(IMFA) from 1977 onwards. His Portrait of a Family series depicts
heads of people and soldiers who died in the last 12 years. ''How can
I not talk about the terrible times that engulf the people living
here,'' he asks.
But for someone like Veer Munshi, who migrated to Delhi in '90, it is
the long 'exile' that conditions his art. ''These works would have
never happened if I had stayed on in Kashmir. But to leave my home
with the intention of returning in a month and then realise that I
could never go back had a profound effect on my psyche. Overnight I
became a minority, a refugee,'' he says, seated in his Chittranjan
Park residence.
''I remember trying desperately to make pretty paintings to sell as I
needed the money. But they just wouldn't come. Then I made a painting
Terrorist on a Floating Land, and began a two-year long series on
Kashmir,'' he adds.
Eleven years later, the memory is fading away. ''Today I view Kashmir
alternatively - as a nostalgic memory and as a problem. But the
immediacy has gone away,'' he admits. What has emerged instead is a
deeper understanding of the situation, visible in the installation he
made in 2001 - a boat, once a symbol of livelihood for the Kashmiris,
had been turned over to become a coffin. On the sides hang 10
garlanded photographs of the artist, each labelled secessionist,
refugee, displaced, fundamentalist etc. ''In the last decade, the
average Kashmiri has been called so many things. But
no one wants to tackle the problem, they only want to kill people,'' he
sighs.
While artists like Munshi and Jammu-based Bhushan Kaul address
political issues in their works, a number of other artists continue
to subscribe to the long Kashmiri tradition of landscapes and
spiritual abstraction promoted by the likes of G R Santosh, Dina Nath
Wali and Bansi Parimoo. Sculptors like Gayoor Hassan and Rajinder
Tikoo, who have made a name in the contemporary Indian art scene,
subscribe to this trajectory.
Delhi-based Faiyaz Dilbar feels this might be because of an inability
to take a stand on the issues ''Everything on Kashmir is so
polarised. It becomes easier to simply evade the question and turn to
landscape which has always been a part of our psyche.''And others
like Zargar Zahoor, who teaches art at the Jamia Milia Islamia, say
matter-of-factly, ''I have to go back to Srinagar every year and I
don't want to get into any trouble.'' His landscapes, however, betray
a deep sense of isolation and sadness: ''When I go home, I see the
beautiful scenery. But all it conveys to me is a feeling of
insecurity and chaos, as if everything is moving away from me.'' He
uses paint as it is done traditionally by the paper-maiche artisans -
moving from a black background to white and other lighter colours. On
the canvas, at least, people seem to have found a way to transform
the darkness into brilliant, luminous colours.
FOR many the choice to hold on to the language of abstraction and
landscape is deliberate. Like the late Manohar Kaul, who when asked
why he never wanted to refer to the tension and the violence in his
paintings replied, ''I would rather show everyone how beautiful
Kashmir was. Then they will get the strength to change it.'' Agrees
artist Shabir Santosh, son of the legendary G R Santosh, ''People are
obsessed with the political situation, they spend the entire day
talking about it. There is no work either. What is the point of
talking about the same things in our paintings?''
''The role of art is to make people see - to show them the fantastic
light that hides in our mountains.'' He talks of his father, a Shia
Muslim, who embraced Kashmir Shaivism after visiting Amarnath and
embarked on a series of Shiva-Shakti paintings and works that
explored the therapeutic value of colours. ''Kashmir, in those days,
was so liberal,with our culture of Sufism. We have regressed by 500
years today.''
The conditions in Kashmir are not exactly conducive to creative
growth. Militancy apart, job opportunities and spaces to show works
are almost nil. Mehraj-ud-din Dar, a young sculptor, has taken up
television production to sustain himself. And like him, most of the
IMFA graduates have given up art. Akthar Hussian, who studied applied
arts from IMFA in 1999, runs an internet cafe to survive. ''No one
wants to take the risk of starting their careers here,'' says Arshad
Salai, another young artist.
But not all have the time to moan over the lack of state patronage.
In fact, P N Kachru, who came to the Capital in 1989, doesn't even
think it is worth his while to mope over the loss of his home and
studio in Srinagar. ''The only thing that bothers me still is the
destruction of my library. It had 7,000 books and years of
research,'' hea dds sadly. ''But let it go, I don't want all these
mundane details of my life to creep into my canvases,'' says this
founder member of the Kashmir progressive artists group that was set
up in the late '40s.
In the deeply spiritual landscape of Kashmir, artists have opted out
of finding solutions for people. Those living in the valley are only
trying to cope with their circumstances. ''My art cannot escape the
times even if I run away from my surroundings,'' says Mirza. And the
ones away from it are trying to exorcise themselves of the nostalgia
and the longing to return.
While in strife-torn Sri Lanka, artists are constantly expressing
their dissent by making political art in public spaces, Kashmiri
artists continue to hold on to the old-fashioned power of beauty - in
its power to heal. That and the hope that they will regain the land
they once knew. Beyond that, as Kachru says, ''I don't know what is
the need of my paintings. All I can say is that it is me.''
WASHINGTON, JAN. 18. India cannot withdraw forces from the border until Pakistan ceased cross-border terrorism and handed over the 20 terrorists sought by it, the Defence Minister, George Fernandes, stated here. "It is only when we realise that Pakistan has taken specific, very concrete steps to end cross-border terrorism we can discuss the withdrawal of the troops that are now on the frontiers," Mr. Fernandes said at a press conference at the In dian Embassy on Thursday evening. While acknowledging that the diplomatic efforts had yielded "substantial results,"he said India was not looking at a timeframe for "non-infiltration. "The Indians in the list of 20 would have to be handed over and New Delhi and Islamabad could discuss over the Pakistani nationals.
NEW DELHI, JAN. 18. Without committing itself to a dialogue, India today indicated that it could look afresh at the diplomatic and political measures it had adopted against Pakistan after the terrorism attack on Parliament, provided Islamabad took action again those named in the list of 20 sent to it earlier. "If there is action with regard the list of 20 wanted terrorists and criminals, then I am very hope that there would be a distinct move to a situation that would similar to what existed before 13th of December", the External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh said at a joint press conference with the visiting U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell.
Washington, Jan. 18: Against "The back concerns in Washington and other global that the prevailing tensions between Inc Pakistan could spiral into a nuclear a defence minister George Fernandas on Thursday said it was "a lack of maturity" that resulted people predicting such a situation. "I don't believe any mature person would talk about a nuclear conflict," Mr Fernandas, who commenced his six-day visit to the US here on Wednesday, said at a press conference at the Indian embassy on Thursday evening.
A TRIP to Pakistan, while troops of India and Pakistan were massed on
the frontiers of the two countries, yielded insights one could
scarcely have gained in rich nuances in normal times. There were,
most remarkably, no cries for war or belligerent action against
India. Nor were the political parties vying with one another in
striking patriotic postures. There was no sign of panic. But there
was concern lest the situation got out of hand; most thought that it
would not. Regret was universal at what was perceived as India's
recourse to threat of war. A good few were even bitter that
Pakistan's nuclear armoury, though small as compared to India's,
provided considerable assurance of security.
It was on the issue of terrorism that one heard comments that find
scant space in the Indian press. There is not one journalist of any
significance, not one public figure of any standing - bar the 'usual
suspects' in the jamaatis and jehadis - who had anything but scorn
for the terror tactics used by these outfits within Pakistan itself.
The 'fundos' - as the fundamentalists are derisively called - have
overshot their mark. It would be premature, perhaps, to say that they
are a spent force. It would be correct to say that their decline has
set in sharply and public resentment at their misdeeds is now
expressed more openly than ever before.
Sadly, the present crisis in India-Pakistan relations erupted just as
Pakistanis had begun to ask themselves searching questions about
their country's future, its recent travails, especially since the Zia
era, and indeed, about its identity. As this writer has documented in
detail in these columns earlier (''Secularists in Pakistan'',
Frontline, April 23, 1999), Pakistan preserved, against all odds, a
significant secular segment in its society which few in India cared
to understand and appreciate. On the contrary, India's hardline
policies and the Sangh Parivar's rhetoric harmed the cause of
secularism in Pakistan. The truth is that in every neighbouring
country in South Asia there is a body of opinion which admires
India's democracy, its political and judicial set-up and its secular
commitments, despite its failures and failings on each count. India
has never quite appreciated the worth of such genuine admirers or
forged hands with them. (The less said about the publicity-hunters
who profess Indo-Pakistan friendship while espousing the hardline for
domestic opinion, the better.)
Debate on Pakistan's identity and the danger posed by the jehadis had
begun, ironically, after the military coup in Pakistan on October 12,
1999. Benazir Bhutto, whom the Indian establishment is busy promoting
with utter lack of scruple, was a hardliner vis-a-vis India (goli
chalao) and made an alliance with Maulana Fazalur Rehman's
Jamiat-i-Ulema-Islam when she was in power from 1993 to 1997. The
Maulana was made chairman of the National Assembly's Committee on
Foreign Affairs. Nawaz Sharif was sympathetic to the Islamists.
General Pervez Musha-rraf began with modest efforts such as reform of
the blasphemy law but was forced to beat a retreat. But he had,
meanwhile, nailed his colours to the mast by revealing his admiration
for Kemalist Turkey. He had to eat half an apple pie for this as
well. By June 5, 2001, he had, as it were, come into his own. He
bearded the lions (no pun intended) in their own den when he
addressed a conference of the clergy (Ulema) that day at the National
Seerat Conference convened by none other than his Minister for
Religious Affairs, Dr. Mahmood Ghazi, in order no doubt to provide an
opportunity to the General to speak out his mind. Which he did: "I
would like to talk on that (Prophet Mohammad's message) frankly,
simply and in my own idiom. I do not have a written text before me...
How does the world look at us? The world sees us as backward and
constantly going under. Is there any doubt that we have been left
behind all, although we claim Islam will carry us forward..."
Little was left unsaid. But what was said is of direct relevance to
us when we appraise the kind of person our interlocutor is. Is
President Pervez Musharraf one with whom we can "do business"?
Pakistanis will have to decide whether he can deliver on his promise
to restore democracy.
"We claim it (Islam) is the most tolerant of faiths. How does the
world judge our claim? It looks upon us as terrorists. We have been
killing each other. And now we want to spread that violence and
terror abroad. Naturally, the world regards us as terrorists. Our
claim of tolerance is phoney in its eyes...
"Where do we see justice and equity? Do you see it? In Pakistan?
Where? Look at the judiciary's performance. Corruption is rampant and
misdemeanour the order of (the) day. Only sifarish works. Merit has
no takers. The poor are oppressed. To be poor in Pakistan is a curse.
Everybody oppresses him...
"This is the justice about which we brag so much that Islam provides.
But where is it in Pakistan? And for whom? For the rich, maybe. For
the powerful, maybe. What about mutual tolerance? It exists nowhere.
Instead, we are killing each other wearing masks...
"We know and the world knows that whenever we took up arms for Islam,
we did it openly, not hiding behind the masks, not through terror,
not firing a burst and then slipping away. This is not the way to
promote an ideology... This is sheer cowardice. Do it openly if you
want...
"One example comes to my mind. One hears the boast that we will hoist
our flag on the Red Fort (in Delhi). We will do this, we will do
that. Have your ever thought of the consequence of such talk on
Muslims in India...
"On the contrary, this provides India with the excuse to talk about
you as terrorists and to tell others to declare you as terrorists so
that prospective investors shy away from your country. When you kill
each other, who will consider Pakistan a safe place for investment?"
He concluded by saying "above all, religion should never be exploited
for political gains. Do not sully our great faith.''
The speech came as a shot in the arm for publicists who braved the
ire of the fundos and kept the flag of secularism flying even in
depressing times; most notably I.A. Rehman, a veteran of many battles
in the noble cause, and Khaled Ahmed, Consulting Editor, The Friday
Times.
December 13, 2001, had a mixed impact on this debate. Most argued
that India's military moves deprived Musharraf of the political space
he needed to continue his fight against the 'fundos'. But they
stressed that considerations of prestige should not deter him from
what he should be doing in Pakistan's own interests, anyway.
Significantly, in the clime generated by the intra-Muslim debate, the
minorities came forward and boldly ranged themselves on the side of
the liberals who, in turn, strove to offer amends for the past. Two
meetings held during the writer's tour merit particular mention. In
Islamabad on January 3, the Sustainable Development Policy Institute
organised a seminar on the Blasphemy Law, which has been abused to
target not only members of minority communities - Hindus and
Christians - but also Ahmadis. Aslam Khaki, an eminent jurist and
consultant of the Federal Shariat Court, pleaded for reform of the
law so that investigation precedes the lodging of a first information
report. "Even the execution of this law is illegal because Islam does
not allow such harsh punishments." The court's position on that law,
he said, was legal but un-Islamic. Islam did not allow such
punishments. He mentioned that fear of reprisals from extremists
deterred even judges of higher courts from deciding the cases. "We,
the silent majority, have let them carry out their activities which
need to be dealt with an iron hand."
The Concerned Citizens Forum in Lahore has been holding interactive
dialogues since 1999. On January 5, it held one on the question which
Pakistanis are asking themselves today - "What kind of Pakistan do we
want?". The keynote speaker was one of Pakistan's ablest diplomats,
Iqbal Akhund. Others who spoke were Khaled Ahmed and Group Captain
(Retd.) Cecil Chaudhry, a national hero of the 1965 war fame, who is
an educationist and peace activist. He is a Christian. M.L. Shahani,
another speaker, is an advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan,
while S.U. Kaul is a social activist. The invitation card quoted
Jinnah's famous speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on
August 11, 1947, in which he said "...in course of time, Hindus would
cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the
religious sense... but in the political sense as citizens of the
state." The speakers pulled no punches. Shahani reminded the audience
tartly that the Koran described god as the lord of the Universe
(Rabbul Alameen) and not as one of the Muslims alone (Rabbul
Muslimeen).
Two features of the debate must be noted. Not even the most ardent of
liberals or secularists favour abandonment of Pakistan's stand on
Kashmir. They advocate a compromise acceptable to all the sides - the
two states and Kashmiris - and denounce the use of violence. More to
the point, they remind us that in Pakistan, the fundos faced one
debacle at the polls after another. They used muscle power to make up
for want of electoral support. In India, they said, the 'fundos' are
in power at the Centre.
index | HOME Landelijke India Werkgroep | pagina KRUITVAT INDIA-PAKISTAN |